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THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH-EAST WALES, 1906-1924. 
Between 1906 and 1924 the Conservative party only won three 
parliamentary elections in North-east Wales – the Denbigh Boroughs division 
twice in 1910 and the county seat in Flintshire in 1924. Conversely the Liberal 
party won all the other elections throughout the period, with the exception of 
Wrexham which fell to Labour in 1922 and 1923. This, however, says more about 
the vagaries of the British ‘first past the post’ electoral system than it does about 
the true strength of the political parties in the region. Indeed, between 1906 and 
1924 the Conservative party never averaged below 39 per cent of the electorate in 
the constituencies it contested. Given this impressive but unrecognised electoral 
position, what this study set out to do was to analyse the strength of Conservatism 
in a region where failure was the norm. The period was chosen because it saw the 
last Liberal administration in this country, and marked the start of the 
Conservative dominance of government for much of the twentieth century. It also 
saw one of the biggest cultural and social upheavals in British history with the 
advent of the First World War, and witnessed the enfranchisement of women for 
the first time. 
 The general election of 1906 returned no Conservatives for Wales. In North 
Wales a conference was called to examine the situation and evaluate future 
prospects. This led to a review of party organisation in the region, the intention 
being not only to attract more working class people and women, but also to lessen 
the autocratic domination by the landed classes. In 1910 the Conservatives won 
the Denbigh Boroughs constituency with a large swing against the Liberals, and 
came very close to winning the Flint Boroughs by-election of 1913. The period of 
War, 1914-1918, saw all political parties moth-balled until the end of hostilities, 
but during the period of Coalition Government from 1918 to 1922 in which 
Liberal representation went almost unchallenged in North-east Wales, the 
Conservatives reorganised their Constituency Associations. By 1924 the landed 
domination of the party had diminished significantly, and in Flintshire the 
Conservatives won their first seat in an industrial working class area. 
 Underpinning this success was a long-standing popular support, which after 
1906 was better organised and mobilised for the Conservative cause through a 
variety of loosely attached organisations, societies and clubs. The Primrose 
League, an organisation that had been founded in 1883 to rally Conservative 
support, had a very high membership in the region compared to the rest of Wales. 
For example, the Denbigh Primrose League had over 800 members in 1912. A 
network of Conservative clubs existed in the region and as early as 1905 a 
thriving Workingmen’s Association had been founded in Wrexham. The 
Conservative party was also well represented in local government; in Flintshire 
between 1907 and 1913 it had more county councillors than the Liberal party. In 
addition, the upheaval of War and the attraction of socialism to the newly 
enfranchised masses meant that the Conservative party had to widen its appeal to 
those people who had acquired the vote in 1918. By recruiting women and 
working class members the Conservative party was able to lay the foundations for 
a number of parliamentary successes in North-east Wales that lasted until the 
1990s. It is therefore the contention of this thesis that the Conservative party not 
only survived a very difficult period, but that it emerged a strengthened and 
invigorated force. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 This is a study of the Conservative party in North-east Wales between 
1906 and 1924. In particular it represents an attempt to analyse and evaluate 
how the party organised itself, and how it operated and survived during a 
period of turmoil and transition in national politics. It will examine how the 
party performed in three distinct demographic regions: the largely rural county 
of Denbighshire, the more diverse county of Flintshire and the industrial town 
of and the areas surrounding Wrexham. It will explore how the party reacted to 
electoral failure in the region - between 1906 and 1924 it gained only three 
victories, Denbigh Boroughs twice in 1910 and Flintshire in 1924, from a 
possible thirty contests at seven general elections - and will analyse the 
negative impact of radical Liberal legislation on the party in the years leading 
up to the First World War. For example, it will discuss the effects of Lloyd 
George’s 1909 People’s Budget, its proposed land taxes and the Peers versus 
People’s Debate on the party. It will show how after the First World War its 
position was further undermined by the boundary changes contained within the 
Representation of the People Act and how even during the 1920’s when the 
Liberal party went into decline nationally it remained the dominant political 
force in North-east Wales while the Conservative position was further 
weakened by the emergence of Labour.  
However, the election results belie a basic Tory strength in North-east 
Wales. The party performed well at county council elections, winning 
Flintshire in 1910, and its share of the vote never fell below thirty per cent at 
any parliamentary election it contested during the period. Furthermore, the 
party leadership was at the forefront of moves designed to make the party 
more popular, often embracing and nurturing change to widen the party’s 
appeal. These were largely successful, as by 1924 organisation had been 
overhauled as constituency associations, the key component in the local 
Conservative party machine, became more democratic and professionally run 
institutions. In addition the party substantially expanded its membership, 
mainly owing to the increased numbers of women and working class members. 
Even though it ultimately failed in its chief ambition to get Conservative 
candidates elected on a consistent basis the thesis will attempt to demonstrate 
that the party emerged from the period a modern and vibrant organisation.  
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   CONSERVATIVE PARTY HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Studies of the Conservative party and its ideas, policies and associations, 
down until the late 1980s trailed significantly behind those of the Labour and 
Liberal parties and tended to focus upon high politics–biographies, memoirs 
and diaries, general histories of the party, crisis and upheaval in the political 
party, even policies were analysed in a high political context. Biographies such 
as H. Nicholson’s, Curzon: The Last Phase (London: Macmillan, 1937) and 
K.Middlemas and J.Barnes’ Baldwin (London: Macmillan, 1969) were two 
among many works that related to the high political emphasis on renowned 
politicians who were key to change and developments in the Conservative 
party. The general histories included such seminal works as R.Blake’s The 
Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London: Fontana, 1985) and the six 
volume Longman series on the history of the party, including J.Ramsden’s, 
The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London: Longman, 1978), which 
proved invaluable to this thesis when considering organisational change. In 
addition such works as A. Sykes’ Tariff Reform in British Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979) and D. Dutton’s ‘The Unionist Party and 
Social Policy’ considered Conservative policy in the period leading up to the 
Great War.1  Both these studies were again invaluable to this thesis because 
they demonstrated that the Conservative party was not merely a passive 
bystander as the Liberal government passed a raft of radical legislation, but 
was considering and modifying policies of its own–policies discussed at a 
local level in North-east Wales.   
 From the late 1980s research into the party began to take new directions 
as it moved away from a high political focus and began to broaden its analysis 
and it is in this re-direction that this thesis locates itself. Within this move 
away from high politics we can observe four overlapping themes which 
together provide the context and basis for this study. Firstly, a number of 
studies started to look below high politics at popular Tory leagues and 
societies, movements, opinion forming, mobilising agencies and Conservative 
                                                 
1 D, Dutton, ‘The Unionist Party and Social Policy’, Historical Journal, volume 24, No 4, 
(1981) 
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Associations. In particular, these studies looked at the constituency groups that 
provided the foot soldiers of the party, the unsung heroes of Conservatism. For 
example, M. Pugh’s influential work The Tories and the People 1883-1906 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), a study of the Primrose League, ‘reveals how 
social relations and political ideas were mobilised among millions of citizens 
by the first popular political organisation in Britain’.2 Conservative Century: 
The Conservative Party Since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
edited by A. Seldon and S. Ball is a thematic collection which includes studies 
of the Conservative party’s electoral support and social class as well as its 
appeal to women.3 Furthermore, Neil McCrillis’ The British Conservative 
Party in The Age of Universal Suffrage Popular Conservatism, 1918-1929 
(Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1998) considers the Conservative response 
to the ever-widening franchise in post-World War Britain. To do this he also 
takes a thematic approach analysing the roles of the Women’s Unionist 
Organisation, the Junior Imperial League, Conservative labour committees as 
well as the effect of party propaganda and education on Conservative party 
fortunes. This thesis considers such support in North-east Wales and 
demonstrates that despite the hostile conditions such agencies, especially the 
Primrose League, flourished and as, with elsewhere, formed the essential 
bedrock upon which Toryism stabilised and survived in the region.  
Secondly, a number of works took the Conservative story into 
constituency parties and organisations.  Eminent amongst these are D.Tanner’s 
Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); J.Lawrence’s article  ‘Class and Gender in the 
Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914’and S.Ball’s ‘Local Conservatism and 
the Evolution of the Party Organisation’ in Conservative Century.4 Such 
histories looked at local organisation, local themes and parties and 
demonstrated that party organisations were not monolithic structures but were 
                                                 
2 N. McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage, Popular    
Conservatism, 1918-1929 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998) p.5.  
3 R. Waller, ‘Conservative Electoral Support and Social Class’ in Conservative Century, The 
Conservative Party Since 1900, eds, A. Seldon and S. Ball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990) and J. Lovenduski, P. Norris and C. Burness ‘The Party and Women’ in Conservative 
Century, The Conservative Party Since 1900, eds, A. Seldon and S. Ball (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990).  
4 J. Lawrence, ‘Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914,’ English 
Historical Review  (July 1993)   
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composites of different aims, ideas, groups, pressures, demands and concerns. 
Similarly, this study of North-east Wales Conservative Associations also 
reflects such organisational diversity. Affiliated to the North Wales Provincial 
Division of the National Union of Conservatives (NWDNU), the individual 
Conservative Constituency Associations in North-east Wales were only 
loosely connected–and often contested or simply ignored NWDNU 
resolutions. This thesis considers why such independence was maintained and 
what affect it had on Conservative politics in the region. 
 Thirdly, a number of histories looked at the Conservative party in specific 
regions. In particular, J. Bates ‘The Conservative Party in the Constituencies, 
1918-1939’ (Merton College Oxford, DPHIL thesis, 1994); T.A. Jenkins’ 
‘Political Life in Late Victorian Britain: The Conservatives in Thornbury’ and 
N. Mansfield’s ‘Farmers and Local Conservatism in South West Shropshire’ 
are typical of these.5 As such they look at the concerns and the different 
priorities and aims within the regions, and build on the research undertaken by 
J. Lawrence in Speaking for the People, Party Language and Popular Politics, 
1867-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) who assess the 
nature of politics in an urban setting prior to the First World War. Lawrence’s 
methodology is important to this study which recounts the nature of 
Conservative politics in Wrexham, not too dissimilar to Wolverhampton, upon 
which Lawrence bases his research. As he explains: 
  
The intention is to examine the shifting fortunes of party within a framework 
which is sensitive both to local social, economic and cultural context, and to the 
impact of development at the national level. Local politics are seen not as the 
antithesis of Westminster politics, but as a specific, and electorally very 
important facet of the ‘party game’. 6   
 
 This study is located within this framework, its study of low politics in 
North-east Wales far removed from the battlefield of Westminster, studying 
                                                 
5 T.A Jenkins, ‘Political Life in Late Victorian Britain: The Conservatives in Thornbury’, 
Parliamentary History, 2004; N.Mansfield, ‘Farmworkers and Local Workers in South-west 
Shropshire’ in Mass Conservatism, the Conservatives and the Public Since the 1880’s,eds, 
S.Ball and I.Holliday (London: Frank Cass, 2002).   
6 J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People, Language and Popular Politics, 1867-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p.6.  
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the Conservative party in the social, economic and cultural context of the 
region, while analysing the effects of national developments. For example, the 
thesis looks at how the party interpreted Tariff Reform, a major Conservative 
fiscal policy initiative after 1903, in a diverse regional setting and how it 
attempted to persuade rural Welsh communities as well as industrial areas near 
the English border of its benefits. This helps feed our knowledge of how the 
party employed Tariff Reform policies in the constituencies far away from the 
national inter and intra-party debate on the policy at Westminster.7 Given 
Lawrence’s conclusion that local politics is very much an integral part of 
understanding how support is gained nationally, it is surprising that historians 
have not tested his methodology further and that regional and local studies of 
the Conservative party remain few in number. 
 Even rarer are studies of the Conservative party in Wales, but F. Aubel’s 
‘Welsh Conservatism, 1885-1935, Five Studies in Adaption’ (University of 
Wales, Lampeter, PhD thesis, 1995); S. Jones’ ‘The Political Dynamics of 
North-east Wales with special reference to the Liberal party’ (University of 
Wales, Bangor, PhD thesis, 2002) and M. Cragoe’s An Anglican Aristocracy, 
The Moral Economy of the Landed Estate in Carmarthenshire, 1832-1895 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) all consider aspects of the party’s history in the 
Principality. Consequently, all reflect on certain facets of the party in a 
different ethnic, linguistic, historical and cultural context to that faced 
elsewhere. Jones’ study is not one that concentrates on the Conservative party, 
but it is important to this thesis as it analyses the Liberal response to the threat 
the Conservative party posted to its hegemony in North-east Wales after the 
First World War concluding that:  
 
In terms of management and organisation, they were the most successful party 
in North-east Wales between 1918 and 1939. Although this was not reflected in 
                                                 
7 Tariff Reform was a policy initiative championed by Joseph Chamberlain that offered 
protection to British industry by imposing duties on foreign imports while giving preferential 
trading agreements to the Empire. It was anticipated that ‘Protection’ would reduce 
unemployment and that revenue from import duties would provide money for social reform. It 
was thus seen as a radical positive policy initiative to many Conservatives but also alienated 
many Free Trade Tories.    
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electoral terms, when the obstacles the Tories had to overcome are considered, 
their achievements were substantial. 8 
 
As Jones’ main point of reference is the Liberal party she does not give any 
substantive explanations as to why this situation was so and thus her 
observations need validating; this thesis addresses the reasons for this and why 
the Conservative party was relatively strong in a region where the Liberal 
party was dominant.  
Cragoe’s work is also significant because it analyses the role of Tory 
landowners in a rural Welsh setting and challenges the commonly held view of 
them ‘as a class wholly alienated from the lives of their fellow countrymen’.9 
Cragoe observes that far from routinely coercing and evicting tenants for not 
voting for the landowners choice at election times, as has often been 
suggested, there was frequently a shared inter-dependence between landlord 
and tenant, including the acceptance of voting for the landlord’s choice at 
elections – a fact borne out by the evidence included in this thesis. But it is 
Aubel’s study that remains the only in-depth study of the Conservative party in 
Wales. His thesis is a study of electoral failure, but it concludes that Welsh 
Conservatism remained resilient and that the party continued to be a vigorous 
force throughout the period. This is demonstrated by his close analysis of five 
Welsh constituencies.10 The constituencies he considers are diverse and are 
broadly typical of other divisions in the Principality, but as Aubel accepts his 
study is largely restricted to the party’s fortunes in Mid and South Wales, 
because of his extensive knowledge of these regions, the access to source 
material as well as a desire to ensure that the thesis was kept within a 
manageable reading length.11 He thus suggests that there is room for further 
historical analysis of the Conservative party in Wales.  This is finally where 
this study is positioned. It sits alongside the only other examination of the 
party in Wales and fills a gap in the historiography of the party. It considers 
                                                 
8 S.Jones, ‘The Political Dynamics of North East Wales with Special Reference to the Liberal 
Party, 1918-1935, University of Wales, Bangor, PhD Thesis, 2002. p.91.  
9 M. Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy, The Moral Economy of the Landed Estate in 
Carmarthenshire, 1823-1895 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) p. 103.  
10 F. Aubel, ‘Welsh Conservatism, 1885-1935, Five Studies in Adaptation’, (University of 
Wales, Lampeter, PhD thesis, 1995), p.436.  
11 F. Aubel, ‘Welsh Conservatism, 1885-1935, Five Studies in Adaptation’, p.436. 
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the party’s fortunes in a narrower time scale than Aubels’ study and during a 
period when it faced a number of challenges both in North-east Wales and 
nationally. The reasons for such a study are varied and thus need explaining in 
more detail. 
    
A RATIONALE OF THE STUDY. 
For this regional study of the Conservative party the two counties of 
Denbighshire and Flintshire, adjacent to the English border, were chosen 
because of the availability of primary sources, the diverse nature of the two 
counties, and the Conservative party’s ability to adapt to and survive in the 
ever changing adverse political conditions it faced in the region.  By 
comparison the more western North Wales counties of Anglesey, 
Caernarfonshire and Merionethshire (now Gwynedd) retained very little 
Conservative presence during the period of 1906 to 1924, because of the 
overwhelming strength of Liberalism, and visits to local record offices here 
revealed very few Conservative party papers or sources. These counties were 
and remain largely rural areas where even today in certain parts English has 
failed to penetrate as a first language. It is not coincidental for a party largely 
consisting of English speaking Tory landowners subsequently regarded as an 
English institution in Wales, that the Conservative party faired better in the 
more anglicised areas of North Wales, in particular the counties of 
Denbighshire and Flintshire. This was especially true of those areas close to 
the English border where industrialisation and inward migration from 
neighbouring English counties brought with it an ever-expanding anglicisation 
process. At the same time the more westerly parts of these counties retained 
large areas of farming land where Welsh speaking people remained in the 
ascendancy, but yet contained a high concentration of landowners. It is not 
surprising therefore that many Conservative party papers and private archives 
of Tory landowners existed and survived from the period, providing a rich 
seam of sources for this thesis. This said, North-east Wales remained a 
difficult region for the Conservatives between 1906 and 1924– 
industrialisation and anglicisation bringing with it its own set of unique 
problems and challenges to set alongside the existing problems faced in the 
more westerly Welsh speaking rural areas.   
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From the heavily industrialised areas in Flintshire and Denbighshire north 
and south of North Wales’ largest town, Wrexham, to the rural farming lands 
in west Denbighshire where tenant farmers eked out a living, every area 
presented a challenge to the Conservatives. In the industrial areas the Liberals 
dominated prior to the Great War and Labour started to gain a foothold during 
the post War period. In the rural Welsh speaking areas in the west of the region 
where English speaking Tory landlords earned themselves fierce reputations as 
overpowering tyrants, Liberalism remained unchallenged even after the First 
World War. It is these challenges that made the research a fascinating study, 
and as such this work represents an attempt to explain how the Conservatives 
reacted to the almost impossible circumstances they faced. It is ultimately a 
study of electoral failure, similar to that of Aubel's, but helps us complete our 
picture of the party in the Principality, and considers the measures the party 
took to adapt and survive in a hostile environment dominated by long-term 
Liberal success. That it survived and remained vibrant is not necessarily the 
most significant factor that emerges from this thesis. Indeed, its consistent 
failures at general elections and how it reacted to them helps furnish our 
understanding of the party and how it operated.  
 Unlike Aubel’s study this thesis considers Conservative party fortunes in 
a fairly narrow time frame. Aubel’s study of Welsh constituencies considers 
the party against a national backdrop of fifty momentous years including the 
effects of the Reform and Redistribution Acts of 1884 and 1885, the end of the 
Conservative dominance of the late Victorian period, the First World War, the 
Coalition Government between 1918 and 1922 and Conservative, Labour and 
National governments up to 1935 – in terms of politics a broad canvass. The 
short period of 1906-1924 was chosen deliberately here because it represented 
a unique period in the history of the Conservative party - it marked an isolated 
period of uncertainty for the party that has been the most successful political 
organisation in British history. Between 1886 and 1997 it won 16 out of the 28 
general elections with its share of the vote seldom falling below 40 per cent. 
According to E.H.H. Green ‘no other European party of the right operating 
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within a mass electorate has equalled this achievement’.12 Yet continued 
success looked unlikely after the 1906 general election defeat which saw the 
party reduced to a mere rump of 157 MP’s. Such was the despair that the party 
felt after its defeat that many feared they faced a very long time in opposition 
with little hope of re-election – few could see they would be in government by 
1915, or that by 1924 the party would win a landslide general election victory 
with over 400 victorious MPs. The party’s fears appeared to be borne out as 
two further general elections losses occurred in 1910 and even after a number 
of by-election victories which saw the Conservative party overtake the Liberal 
party, in numbers of seats, its position seemed uncertain on the eve of the First 
World War.13  
The First World War was a pivotal period for the party – not just because 
many from the patrician classes, inevitably the leaders and future leaders of the 
Conservative party, lost their lives, but also because the conflict saw their 
return to government. At first this was as a minor partner to Asquith’s 
administration from May 1915, but from December 1916 it was as a fully-
fledged partner of Lloyd George’s Coalition Government. Conservatives 
dominated the Cabinet and took leading positions, including Bonar Law, the 
party leader, as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of 
Commons. The War thus marked an important turning point in Tory fortunes. 
Yet, franchise reform and the rise of the Labour party after the War rendered 
this a potentially dangerous period for the party. Few believed that the 
Conservatives would be able to compete in the era of the mass franchise. In 
particular, it was perceived that women’s suffrage, the huge potential of a 
working class electorate, and the growing power of the trade unions, in theory 
helping the Labour party, would seriously hamper the Conservative party’s 
electoral prospects. These fears were exacerbated by the period spent in 
Coalition Government between 1918 and 1922. Against a background of 
                                                 
12 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the 
British Conservative Party, 1880-1914 (London: Routledge, 1995) p.1 
13 See for example, Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, pp.268-269; D.Dutton, His Majesty’s 
Loyal Opposition, The Unionist Party in Opposition, 1905-1915(Liverpool: Liverpool 
University, 1992) pp297-300; M.Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics 1867-1939 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) pp.152-153. J.Ramsden does take an opposite view and 
believes the party was poised for success see J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 
1902-1940(London: Longman, 1978) pp.85-86.  
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mounting industrial conflict, the emergence of Labour as a political force and 
the cost of social welfare programmes reflected in high taxation levels, 
Conservative discontent started to fester and grow. This was solved in the 
short term when in October 1922 Conservative MP’s rebelled against its 
leadership and brought the Lloyd George Coalition down, and in the ensuing 
election won a landslide victory. But even with an overall majority of 87 over 
all other parties Conservative uncertainty resurfaced. Economic and 
unemployment problems undermined the government and at a subsequent 
general election in November 1923 the Conservative party lost its overall 
majority. As a result with Liberal help the Labour party took power for the 
first time. Nevertheless, less than a year later the party was returned to 
government winning over 400 seats and gaining a majority over all other 
parties of more than 200 - a victory that witnessed the start of the Conservative 
dominance of politics in the twentieth century. 
 So the period 1906 –1924, marks one of the most turbulent and critical 
periods in the party’s history, which makes it an important one for study. 
Given the amount of high political literature that exists on the party, especially 
on its period of ‘crisis’ before the First World War, this thesis takes this story 
into North-east Wales to explore how the party adapted to and managed during 
this very difficult period in a small region. It examines how the party 
acclimatised itself to the new political environment after 1906, the 
compromises it was forced to make, how it survived a very difficult period 
both during and immediately after the First World War and the dangers and 
obstacles it had to surmount in this region. As a result the thesis presents a 
totally different picture to other studies of the Conservative party during the 
same period and it is this perhaps more than anything else that made it worthy 
of study.    
 
A NOTE ON THE SOURCES. 
For this study it was imperative to look at both national and local documents 
concerning the Conservative party during the period under review. One of the 
first places that was visited was the Bodleian Library at Oxford which houses 
the Conservative party archive and the Primrose League manuscripts. A search 
of Conservative Agents Journals and Campaign Guides between 1906 and 
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1924 revealed little of note for this specific narrow study of the party in North-
east Wales. Of more use were the Executive Committee Minutes of the 
National Union of Conservative Associations, 1897–1956 and the Central 
Council Minutes of this body for 1899–1956. The papers of the National 
Union, the body that co-ordinated Conservative support in the constituencies, 
proved a rich source for matters concerning party organisation prior to the 
Great War and the response from constituencies to, for example, Irish Home 
Rule and franchise reform, but again they revealed little of specific reference 
to North-east Wales. However, a search of the Primrose League manuscripts 
proved far more productive. The Primrose League ‘Roll of Habitations’ for 
1886, 1904 and 1912 demonstrated that there were thriving League 
Habitations in North-east Wales in the period leading up to the First World 
War. For example, Denbighshire and Flintshhire had 36 Habitations with over 
4,000 members in 1886. Nonetheless, the records were patchy, no membership 
numbers are recorded for 1904 and only partial accounts exist for 1912, with 
hand-written entries for this date making legibility difficult; much of the detail 
had to be filled-in from local sources.  
  A search of private papers belonging to leading politicians of the period 
under review proved more fruitful. At the British Library in London the papers 
belonging to A.J Balfour, Conservative Prime Minister between 1902 and 
1905, are housed. His papers provide detailed evidence of the political 
problems that the Conservative party encountered during his leadership, which 
lasted until 1911. Of value here was the correspondence of Ernest Iwan 
Muller, editor of the Daily Telegraph, who informed Balfour of Conservative 
party discontent and the reasons for electoral failure in 1906. Kept at the 
House of Lords Record Office are the Lloyd George and Bonar Law papers. 
As Prime Minister between December 1916 and October 1922 and senior 
Welsh politician for nearly the first half of the twentieth century, Lloyd 
George, who was also MP for Caernarfon Boroughs in North-west Wales, is 
integral to this study. His papers contain a number of documents that are 
contextually important to this thesis including many on Welsh Church 
Disestablishment, the Liberal land campaigns, his time as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, which saw the passage of the 1909 Budget and provoked the Peers 
versus People debate, and his period as Prime Minister during and after the 
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First World War. Also contained within Lloyd George’s papers are the draft 
agreements, which mapped out the electoral pact between the Conservative 
and Liberal parties at the 1918 general election. This impacted greatly on 
North-east Wales where it was agreed that all three constituencies would be 
represented by Coalition Liberals with all prospective Conservatives standing 
down.  
As leader of the Conservative party between 1911 and 1921 and Prime 
Minister between October 1922 and May 1923 Bonar Law is of obvious 
importance to this thesis. His papers include many relevant documents 
including Conservative party reaction to Irish Home Rule.  Also of importance 
are the 1918 general election reports from party agents indicating the subjects 
in which the electors were most interested and the forecast of results in each 
region. Unfortunately in both cases no returns were forthcoming from North 
Wales, but the documents remain useful tools providing contextual 
information and acting as a comparison to the evidence available in local 
sources.   
With regard to local sources the Denbighshire Record Office at Ruthin 
and the Flintshire Record Office at Hawarden hold Conservative Constituency 
Association records. At Hawarden, the Flintshire Constitutional Association 
and the Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Minute Books 
between 1910 and 1964 are deposited. These records are supplemented by the 
Bryn-y-Pys Estate papers of Major Hugh Peel, a leading local Conservative, 
which contain a limited number of documents, mostly accounts concerning the 
Denbigh Boroughs Conservative and Unionist Association between 1911 and 
1918 and the records of the Flintshire Maelor Conservative Associations 
between 1922 and 1934. In Ruthin, the official papers of the Denbigh Division 
of Conservative Associations between 1923 and 1939 are archived while the 
Plas Nantglyn manuscripts of the Wynne family, Conservative landowners, 
contain the records of the West Denbighshire Constitutional Association 
between 1895 and 1924.  Finally at Aberystwyth the National Library of 
Wales house the Minute Book of the Wrexham and East Denbighshire 
Unionist Association 1918-1926 and the Minute Book of the Wrexham 
Division Women’s Constitutional Association 1923-1924.  
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All these sources contained vital information for this research but also 
presented a number of problems. Firstly, a number of gaps exist in the years 
between 1906 and 1924. Apart from those of the West Denbighshire 
Conservative Association none of the other Constituency Associations papers 
have survived the period before 1910. All associations have detailed records 
after 1910, but there is a paucity of information concerning the Conservative 
party during the First World War. Secondly, the documents often only offer 
tantalising glimpses of contentious issues and divisions that occurred within 
the party. For example, in January 1924 the Wrexham Conservative 
Association underwent an organisational change that saw Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn, the largest landowner in the region and President of the party 
since 1886, lose his place on the Executive Committee and thus his overall 
control of the local party. Was this a rebellion of the rank and file which saw 
Sir Watkin ousted perhaps because of his attempts to forge an unpopular 
alliance with the local Liberal party? Or was it an amicable agreement which 
saw Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn withdraw from the strains of local politics? 
The documents tell us little except who won selection to the new Executive 
Committee and that new Association rules and regulations were passed. On the 
other hand, some of the papers are very frank in their detail. The Flintshire 
Constitutional Association report into the 1910 general election defeat in Flint 
Boroughs condemns the lack of canvassing, the poor organisation and the 
failure to campaign properly on behalf of party activists. 
 Many of the party’s financial accounts also remain intact and are 
produced in detail–evidence showing that in West Denbighshire, where many 
wealthy Tory landowners resided, subscriptions remained buoyant and even 
helped fund a working class candidate in 1910. At the same time in Flintshire, 
a more demographically diverse county with few large landed estates, 
subscriptions remained low, the party was unable to fund much party activity 
and consequently it nearly went bankrupt in 1914. The financial accounts 
therefore produce a snapshot of the state of the party in North-east Wales – 
where it remained vibrant and where it struggled to survive. In addition the 
papers provide an in-depth account of how the party gradually responded and 
adapted to the Liberal hegemony in the region. In particular they show how the 
party transformed itself in each constituency after the First World War from 
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narrowly based male dominated organisations into modern democratic mass 
movements. In many cases they also demonstrate how this occurred at the 
behest of and not in spite of the landed leadership.  
Other local political parties papers were also scrutinised, the most useful 
of these being the Flintshire Liberal Association Minutes for the period 1918 –
1939, archived at the Flintshire Record Office. These papers confirmed 
Conservative party attempts to forge an electoral pact with the Liberals to 
cover county council as well as parliamentary elections in Flintshire during the 
period of Coalition Government between 1918 and 1922. While an electoral 
pact remained in force for parliamentary elections Conservative advances for a 
similar agreement for council elections were firmly rejected. The documents 
reveal that the Liberal Association was more sympathetic to the aims of the 
Labour party, thus creating tensions between themselves and the local 
Conservative Association. These tensions led to the local Conservative party 
forging their own organisation and survival plans and so the Liberal Minutes 
are important to this thesis. 
Unfortunately apart from these papers little official evidence remains for 
the Liberal party in North-east Wales. In amongst the Ruthin Borough Council 
manuscripts held at the Denbighshire Record Office, a few papers exist 
concerning the Ruthin Liberals in 1913 but nothing of any relevance to this 
study. Nevertheless, the Glyndwr Manuscripts recently deposited at the 
Denbighshire Record Office contain the papers of Edward Hughes, Chairman 
of the Wrexham Liberal Association during the post First World War period. 
In contrast to the Flintshire Liberal Association minutes these papers show the 
close relationship that existed between Hughes and Sir Watkin Williams-
Wynn, leader of the Wrexham Constitutional Association, after 1918. This 
enabled them to enter into negotiations and to consider fielding a mutually 
acceptable candidate in opposition to Labour, even after the Coalition 
Government had fallen in October 1922. 
The Wrexham Trade and Divisional Labour party papers, 1915-1922 also 
deposited at the Denbighshire Record Office outline the problems Labour were 
having gaining a foothold in the region. Even in the coal mining and steel 
working areas surrounding Wrexham, Labour had problems gaining support 
prior to 1922. With the Labour forces split between the Independent Labour 
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party (ILP) and the Divisional Labour party there was a total lack of cohesion 
between Labour forces in the area. The papers describe how after 1921 a joint 
executive was formed and how finally the Labour party became a credible 
alternative to the Liberal and Conservative parties in the Wrexham 
constituency.      
 Two further manuscript sources proved invaluable to the completion of 
this thesis. The privately owned papers and diaries of the Fourth Baron Tyrell 
Kenyon show how this leading Conservative was central to all that happened 
in Conservative politics in North-east Wales between 1906 and 1924 as his 
role as Chairman of the Denbigh Boroughs Constitutional Association, Vice–
president of the East Denbighshire Unionist Association and Chairman of the 
NWDNU suggest.14 His papers reveal his diverse responsibilities between 
1908 and 1914 – meetings and involvement with the Conservatives in the 
small enclave of Flintshire Maelor, in Anglesey, in the Denbigh Boroughs 
constituency (one of the very few Conservative seats in Wales after 1910), 
with the North Wales Unionists and with prominent party leaders, including 
F.E. Smith, Arthur Steel Maitland and Bonar Law. Not only this but his 
personal scrapbooks also demonstrate his interest in the defence of the Church 
in Wales, which was constantly threatened with Disestablishment before 1914, 
the ‘Peers versus People’ debate and the protection of landed interests.  
The Brogyntyn manuscripts held at the National Library of Wales contain 
the papers and letters of the Fourth Baron Harlech, William Ormsby-Gore, 
Conservative MP for Denbigh Boroughs in 1910. These give an insight into 
election campaigning in a small marginal constituency in North-east Wales 
and also provided an invaluable insight into the Conservative parliamentary 
candidate selection process. The manuscripts also offer a fascinating glimpse 
of the expectations and fears of a leading peer’s son as he takes the accepted 
family path of a career in politics. It soon becomes clear that politically little 
animated Ormsby-Gore apart from the Welsh Church and, as a ‘diehard’ Tory, 
rejection and resistance to Liberal plans to end the House of Lords veto. He 
argues that he ‘could never feel ‘partizan’ and general elections were near 
torture to me…I rarely attended party meetings or conferences. For me 
                                                 
14 The Fourth Baron Tyrell Kenyon’s papers are owned by the Sixth Baron Tyrell Kenyon. 
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political life was a family tradition and an opportunity to work–a medium 
rather than an end or career in itself’.15 As revealing as they are both of these 
sources, are limited in their application – Ormsby-Gore’s papers often consider 
the much wider political stage with little on Denbigh Boroughs and both give a 
highly individual and biased account of events and consequently left gaps that 
needed filling to complete the story of the party in North-east Wales. To this 
end local newspapers provided an invaluable source of information. The two 
most important papers were the Denbighshire Free Press, still in existence 
today, and the Flintshire Observer. Both were heavily biased towards the 
Conservative party, the Flintshire Observer was actually owned by the party 
until it was sold in 1914. A number of papers also favoured the Conservative 
party and were important to this study – The North Wales Guardian, a 
Wrexham publication, and the North Wales Pioneer, a Colwyn Bay 
newspaper. All stories had to be sifted carefully because of political bias–those 
that could be cross-referenced with official party papers proved the most 
informative. The newspapers were also the only sources that covered the many 
Primrose League functions that took place before the Great War-fleshing-out 
the limited information on membership numbers that the manuscripts held at 
the Bodelian gave. A number of North Wales newspapers provided a counter 
balance to the Conservative point of view: the County Herald, a Flintshire 
newspaper; the North Wales Times, a Denbighshire publication, and the 
Wrexham Leader all represented the Liberal perspective. In particular these 
newspapers provided useful information on the period of Coalition 
Government between 1918 and 1922. In addition, the Wrexham Leader proved 
invaluable as a source for the period leading up to the 1924 election. It was the 
only newspaper that gave a detailed account of the negotiations which went on 
between the Wrexham Conservative and Liberal Associations in selecting a 
joint anti-socialist candidate, the Conservative party and newspapers that 
favoured it proving very secretive on the subject.  
 In conclusion, this thesis uses a wide range of sources of differing types 
and value to give an insight into a short period of Conservative party history in 
two fairly small Welsh counties. All the source materials demonstrate that the 
                                                 
15 National Library of Wales (NLW), Aberystwyth, Brogyntyn MSS, William Ormsby- Gore, 
Fourth Baron Harlech, Autobiographical Notes.n.d.   
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Conservative party remained a vibrant and dynamic organisation which 
adapted well to a hostile environment, during an uncertain period in 
Conservative party politics. The leadership, in general, attempted to widen the 
party’s appeal and were not the group of self-interested political amateurs that 
one, perhaps, might expect from a group of wealthy landowners who had been 
at the forefront of North Wales society for so long. As the sources show by 
1924 the party had overhauled its outmoded organisation, addressed its 
financial shortcomings, played an important part in undermining Labour’s 
progress in the region, and was challenging the Liberal party for political 
ascendancy in North-east Wales.  
 My thesis will thus demonstrate how the Conservative party operated in a 
regional setting where electoral failure was the norm. It will show how the 
party addressed questions of organisation and finance, in particular how and 
where it gained its sources of revenue. It will also examine how the party 
survived in a region where the Liberal party reigned supreme, and will explore 
how national issues and developments were interpreted and acted upon, and 
how sometimes national aims did not correspond with the parties interests in 
North-east Wales. For example, when the Conservative party’s resistance to 
the Irish Home Rule Bill was the focus nationally, the major issue in North-
east Wales became defence of the Established Church. This thesis also looks at 
the Conservative party’s support in the region and how it attempted to broaden 
its appeal. In particular it explores how the party embraced working class 
support and how it attempted to undermine the spread of trade unionism by 
adopting its own labour committees. It will further examine the party’s 
endeavours to increase its female membership–women were seen as invaluable 
party workers as fundraisers and canvassers, and of course, after 1918 as vital 
to the party’s electoral prospects. Finally, the thesis investigates the ideas and 
policies that mobilised the party during the period - in particular those that 
provoked intra-party conflict such as Tariff Reform and those that were a 
unifying force, for example the resistance to Labour after the First World War.  
 To do this it was decided to break the thesis down into an initial chapter 
that considered the region in a socio-economic as well as a political context 
followed by five chapters which examined the Conservative party during five 
distinct periods within the timeframe of 1906 to 1924. Each of these, with the 
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exception of the period encompassing the Great War, start with an overview of 
the Conservative party’s national fortunes, analyses its performance in North-
east Wales during a general election campaign and then finally considers its 
response in the region afterwards - including how the party organised itself, 
the political initiatives it undertook in a bid to improve its electoral 
performance and how these compared to those undertaken by the party 
nationally. Thus the Conservative party’s performance and fortunes in 
Denbighshire and Flintshire are examined in the following timeframes: 1906-
1910; 1910-1914; 1914-1918; 1918-1922 and 1922–1924. This is unlike many 
other regional political studies, which consider a different approach. For 
example, in the introduction to his thesis ‘Politics in Devon and Cornwall, 
1900-1931’ (London School of Economics, PhD Thesis, 1991) A.M. Dawson 
explains that: 
 
All of the chapters apart from those on the Liberal Land campaign cover the 
whole of the period 1900-1931. Rather than deal with Edwardian and inter-War 
politics this approach reflects the fact that continuity not change marked the 
region’s politics before and after the First World War. There were no changes 
substantial enough to write a section on the impact of the War.16     
 
Similarly, in his study of Welsh Conservatism Aubel considers the 
Conservative party across the whole timeframe 1885-1935, dedicating a 
chapter to each of his chosen constituencies. 
 Such approaches were considered here. However, it quickly became 
apparent that the changes contained in the Representation of the People Act 
1918, which reduced the number of constituencies from five to three in the 
region, altering all the electoral boundaries, prevented such a seamless 
comparison of constituencies in North-east Wales before and after the Great 
War. Furthermore, it also became apparent that a separate chapter was needed 
to explain the Conservative party’s response to the War. In particular 
participation in the War effort and its relations with the local Liberal party 
during the conflict needed explaining while its reaction to the Representation of 
                                                 
16A.M.Dawson, Politics in Devon and Cornwall, 1900-1931(London School of Economics, 
PhD Thesis, 1991) p20.  
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the People Act as well as the measures it undertook to ensure its survival as a 
separate political identity in the region during the War warranted examination. 
 A chronological approach also allowed comparisons to be made between 
the constituency Conservative parties and their responses to national political 
events within the region. For example, the period of Coalition Government 
between 1918 and 1922 saw relations sour between the Conservative and 
Liberal parties in Flintshire, while they remained cordial between the two 
parties in Wrexham. These local differences, which needed analysing against 
the national political backdrop and the flexibility that a chronological approach 
gave the thesis, proved the deciding factor in deciding the layout of the text. It 
is believed that by adopting this approach the party has been covered more 
comprehensively in this regional setting.   
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CHAPTER 1: NORTH-EAST WALES GEOGRAPHIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
A number of geographic, demographic and social factors affected the 
Conservative party’s electoral performance in North-east Wales between 1906 
and 1924. For example the geographic position of the two counties in the region, 
Denbighshire and Flintshire, bordering as they both were in 1906 on to England 
at their eastern ends suggests a more anglicised population – especially in those 
areas closest to the English border.1 This in theory meant better prospects for the 
Conservative party which by the end of the nineteenth century was increasingly 
coming under pressure from the Welsh electorate which viewed it as an alien 
party in Wales, mainly because its membership consisted of English speaking 
landowners, who were far removed from the everyday concerns of the 
population, and worshipped in the Anglican Church. By contrast the vast 
majority of people in Wales still spoke Welsh and worshipped in Nonconformist 
chapels. 
At the same time as the franchise widened during the second half of the 
nineteenth century the Liberal party came to dominate parliamentary 
representation in Wales as it became closely associated with, and promised to 
address the grievances of the Nonconformist population, especially inequality in 
education and religious worship, while they pledged to correct the plight of the 
underprivileged, including Welsh speaking tenants on landed estates. As a   result 
those MPs who came from the landed classes, had dominated parliamentary 
representation and the Tory cause in Wales since Tudor times were removed 
from office and were replaced by radical Liberals. In particular after the 1884 
and 1885 Reform and Redistribution Acts a solid phalanx of Liberals who 
represented radical politics came to represent Welsh constituencies at the 
expense of Conservative candidates whose party never again won the majority of 
                                                          
1 North-east Wales throughout this thesis refers to the areas covered by the traditional counties of 
Denbighshire and Flintshire.  See W.T.R. Pryce, ‘Language Areas in North-East Wales’ in 
Language and Community in the Nineteenth Century, ed, G.H. Jenkins (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1998) p.21 for a definition 
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seats in the Principality.2 This chapter will therefore discuss the demographic and 
social factors that affected the Conservative party in North-east Wales by looking 
at such matters as population figures (including inward migration), Welsh 
language statistics, employment levels and religious worship. It will also 
examine the influence of landed authority in the region and will review the 
party’s electoral performance during the latter half of the nineteenth century to 
provide the essential contextual information for this study.     
 
POPULATION.  
By the turn of the twentieth century there were over 2,000,000 people 
living in Wales.3  In North-east Wales the population more than doubled between 
1801 and 1911 to reach 247,500, a reflection of the region’s industrialisation and 
inward migration, but unlike the south eastern counties the rates slowed after 
1821.This was largely due to a steady decline in the lead mining and 
metallurgical industries at this time.  A large downturn in population levels was 
offset, however, by the steady expansion in the collieries and ironworks, 
especially in the area surrounding Wrexham. Thereafter, the coal mining areas 
increased their share of the regional population from 48 percent in 1801 to 
approximately 54 per cent by 1851 but the agricultural population dropped from 
24 to 17 percent in the same period.4  
An analysis of migration figures for Denbighshire and Flintshire indicate 
that by 1901 nearly 30 per cent of the population were immigrants. Until 1871 
nearly half of all people who migrated to Denbighshire and Flintshire came from 
neighbouring English and Welsh counties. After 1871, more people migrated to 
the region from further away, and by 1911 over 53 per cent of the migrants into 
North-east Wales came from more distant areas in England.  In addition by 1891 
those migrating from the adjacent English border counties of Cheshire and 
Shropshire overtook those migrating from the neighbouring Welsh counties of 
Caernarfonshire, Merionethshire and Montgomeryshire. The development of the 
slate industry in Carnarfonshire and Merionethshire as well as the lure of the 
                                                          
2For a summary of political issues and the importance of the Liberal party to Wales in the second 
half of the nineteenth century see D. Gareth Evans, A History of Wales, 1815-1906 (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1989) pp 271-296 and pp301-306. 
3 P.Morgan and D. Thomas, Wales, the Shaping of a Nation, (Newton Abbot: David and Charles) 
p.48.  See also, J.Davies, A History of Wales (London: Penguin, 1994) p.319. 
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larger South Wales coalfields meant that from the 1850’s onwards North-east 
Wales was no longer such an attractive destination for the rural Welsh. Thus a 
trend that added significantly to the continued and quickening pace of the 
Anglicisation of North-east Wales was established.5      
 
 
Table 1.1:  
Population Changes in Industrialised Counties of Wales 1851-1921 
 1851- 1861- 1871- 1881- 1891- 1901- 1911-
 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 
N.E.Wales   6.1   6.4   6.0   1.5   9.2 11.5 10.1 
Denbs.   8.9   4.3   6.3   5.5 11.6 10.0   7.0 
Flints   2.3   9.4   5.6  -4.1   5.5 13.8 15.0 
Glamorgan 37.1 25.2 28.6 34.4 25.0 30.4 11.7 
Monmouth 10.9 11.9   8.1 22.2 15.5 32.8 13.9 
Wales 10.1 10.3 11.3 12.8 13.6 20.3  9.7 
The table shows percentage changes in population between census reports, 1801-1921. 
Original source for above table: W.T.R Pryce, ‘Language Areas in North- East Wales c.1800-11911 in Language and 
Community in the Nineteenth Century, ed, Geraint H.Jenkins (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998).  
 
 
Table 1.2: Inward Migration Into North-east Wales 1861-1911. 
  1861  1871  1881  1891  1901  1911
Population (thousands) 159.3 169.0 181.3 183.0 199.0 224.8
Migrants (thousands)   22.2   33.5   41.1   42.6   51.5   65.8
Migrants % of Population   17.7   19.8   22.7   23.3   25.9   29.3
       
Regional Origins %       
Neighbouring Counties:       
Cheshire and Shropshire   25.1   25.4   20.8   25.5   25.5   18.0
Caernarfonshire, 
Merioneth&Montgomeryshire.
  29.7   24.1   24.4   21.2   19.3   16.3
Wales (excluding above 
counties) 
    5.3     5.2     7.0     6.9     6.7     6.2
England (excluding above)   29.6   34.2   40.9   38.2   41.5   53.5
Ireland     7.3     6.9     5.8     4.1     3.3     2.4
Scotland     2.0     2.5     2.3     2.0     1.8     1.7
Foreign     0.9     1.4     1.8     1.9     1.7     1.9
    Original source: W.T.R. Pryce  ‘Language Areas in North-east Wales’, p.30.                                       
 
THE WELSH LANGUAGE 
 From the 1536 Acts of Union onwards Welsh was encouraged as a 
medium only in the new Protestant Church. By the eighteenth century, its 
usage further declined as the upper classes, landed gentry and merchants 
started to use English as the language of trade and economics. As a result there 
                                                                                                                                                             
4  Pryce, ‘Language Areas in North-East Wales c1800-1911’, p. 27. 
5 Ibid., p.31. 
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emerged an anglicised group of people detached from those workers and 
peasants of Wales who continued to use the Welsh language. Moreover, as the 
Welsh economy grew so did the use of the English language and its integration 
into Welsh speaking communities. Bilingualism has been seen as one of the 
major steps in the Anglicisation of the Principality, and by the mid nineteenth 
century it encroached everywhere.6 The 1870 Education Act also accelerated 
this process as it enforced English as the language of instruction in schools, 
hastening the decline of the Welsh language. As English became the language 
of economic and social prestige, Welsh was accorded the label as the language 
of inferior social status.   
  Towards the end of the nineteenth century bilingualism was spreading 
westwards across North-east Wales engulfing the Vale of Clwyd and many 
western areas of Denbighshire. By 1870 most people in West Denbighshire 
understood English, and at the same time it was reported that very few people 
did not understand the language in Flintshire. Everywhere people accepted that 
children should acquire English as it was considered ‘indispensable for their 
advancement’.7 Once a community absorbed the English language it was only 
a matter of time before it became fully English speaking with an anglicised 
outlook. All the anglicised areas sustained strong population growths, and the 
most rapid expansions were recorded in communities, which went from a 
bilingual to that of a full English status. These communities were largely 
situated in the coalfields of East Denbighshire, where the highest inward 
migration of people took place, and where English gradually replaced Welsh, 
not only in the workplace but also as the medium of family life. 
 Welsh, however, remained the principle language in rural parts of 
Denbighshire: Llanrwst, Ruthin and Corwen still had over 50 percent of their 
populations as monoglot Welsh speakers. In the industrialised areas of 
Flintshire many people still spoke Welsh, and even in Wrexham, the centre of 
the North-east Wales coal industry, with its many English migrants, 47 per 
cent of the people still spoke the language. Nevertheless, the influx of English 
speakers into the region coupled with the spread of bilingualism westward, 
                                                          
6 Morgan and Thomas, Wales the Shaping of a Nation, pp. 46-47.  
7 Ibid., p.50. 
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was to leave North-east Wales as part of the territory, described by E.G. 
Bowen, as ‘Outer Wales’.8  
By 1921 English was the dominant language in North-east Wales. In 
Denbighshire only 8.5 per cent of the population were monoglot Welsh 
speakers and fewer than 50 per cent still spoke the language. In 1931 the 
numbers of people in the county who could speak Welsh saw a slight rise, but 
now only just over five per cent of the population were Welsh only speaking. 
In Flintshire, the most industrialised county in North Wales the figures were 
even worse. In 1921 just over two percent of the population were monoglot 
Welsh speakers and just under 33 per cent still spoke the language. By 1931 
less than one per cent of the Flintshire population were Welsh only speakers. 
The two North-east counties of Wales had become completely anglicised.9 
 
Table 1.3: Language statistics in North Wales.  
Welsh speakers as a percentage of total population over 3 years of age.  
     
    1891    1901   1911    1921    1931 
North-west Counties      
Anglesey 93.5 91.7 88.7 84.9 87.4 
Caernarfonshire 89.3 89.6 85.6 75.0 79.2 
Merionethshire 92.3 93.7 90.3 82.1 86.1 
      
North-east Counties      
Denbighshire 64.7 62.2 56.7 48.4 48.5 
Flintshire 67.8 49.1 42.2 32.7 31.7 
Original source: J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Studies (Pontypool: The Welsh 
Office, 1985) p.86. 
 
EMPLOYMENT.  
 South Wales’ industrial history will be forever associated with coal 
mining but there was also a thriving coal industry in North-east Wales. The 
North Wales coalfield, compacted into a small area of North-east Wales, 
extended from the English border near Oswestry to Point of Ayr, a few miles 
east of Prestatyn, on the coast. Coal mining played a major part in the 
development of such towns in North Wales as Holywell and Wrexham, and by 
1848 the Flintshire collieries employed approximately 8,000 people, and the 
                                                          
8 E.G. Bowen’s description of North-East Wales as ‘Outer Wales’ is also taken from this article. 
See p.21. 
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Mostyn pits were producing 70,000 tons of coal a year. Further developments 
saw 10,176 miners working in the Denbighshire and Flintshire coalfields in 
1881. By 1901 this number increased to 13,337 and by 1914 to 16,257. At the 
start of the twentieth century coalmining was the largest non- agricultural 
employer in North Wales and it became such an extensive and successful 
enterprise that over 3.3 million tons of coal were being produced by 1914.   
Iron manufacturing in North-east Wales stagnated after 1830, but by the 
end of the century a new steel industry was born and developed. A modern 
steelworks was built in East Denbighshire at Brymbo in 1885, and John 
Summers, Liberal M.P for Flint Boroughs in 1910, founded his steelworks at 
Shotton in East Flintshire in 1896.10 By 1911 the steel industry employed over 
3, 300 people in North-east Wales. This figure contributed to the 6,800 people 
who worked in the metal working trades in Denbighshire and Flintshire, which 
by 1921 reached over 8,000. Further industrial development took place at 
Holywell as the Holywell Textile Mills, incorporated in 1874, produced Royal 
Welsh Flannel, a highly desirable product throughout Great Britain. After 1931 
these textile mills became the largest in Wales, employing over 3,700 
workers.11 Chemical making was also established at Flint in 1917, a 
development, which led to the manufacture of synthetics and the founding of 
the Courtaulds Rayon Works. 
 In spite of these industrial advances the early part of the twentieth 
century still saw vast tracts of land in Denbighshire and Flintshire under 
agricultural cultivation. In 1901 agriculture employed over 10,000 people in 
Denbighshire, a figure that hardly changed by 1921 when still over 10,500 
people worked on the land.  In Flintshire, agriculture was still the largest 
employer of labour between 1851 and 1921, and at no time did the numbers 
employed in the new industries exceed those working in agriculture. In 1901 
there were over 5,000 employed on the land and between 1911 and 1921 this 
figure increased to 6,000. 12      
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Studies (Pontypool: Mid-Wales Litho Ltd, 1985) pp.78-
86. 
10 Davies, A History of Wales, p.487. 
11 Flintshire for Industry and Pleasure, Official Handbook, (Cheltenham: J. Burrow, 1938). 
12 J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Studies, pp.101-116. 
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Table 1.4: Largest Employers in Denbighshire and Flintshire, 1851-1921. 
  
Numbers Employed 
Denbighshire     1851    1901   1911   1921 
Agriculture  17,114  10490  11719  10781 
Mines and Quarries     4752  10656  11983  13451 
Metal Working     1756    2116    2366    2948 
     
Flintshire     
Agriculture     3891    5165    5980    5726 
Mines and Quarries     3549    4780    5062    4546 
Metal Working     1149    2436    4441    5195 
    Original Source:  J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Studies, pp.111-112. 
 
RELIGION AND SOCIETY: 1851-1905. 
The spread of Nonconformity in Wales during the nineteenth century 
can be attributed to the number of immigrants who flooded into the industrial 
areas and established new centres of worship. It was also helped by the 
weakness and intransigence of the Established Church. The Church, which had 
served rural areas for centuries, could not adapt to the needs of the new 
industrial society and provide the desired places of worship, as it was unable to 
subdivide its existing parishes that were designated by an Act of parliament. 
By contrast Nonconformity unhindered by legal precedent could build chapels 
wherever communities gathered. 
 In 1851 the first religious census took place in Great Britain. The results 
indicated that Wales was a far more religious country than England and that on 
the day of the census 34 per cent of Welsh people attended a religious 
establishment compared to 24 per cent for both England and Wales.13 The 
most revealing figures were those for the denominational breakdown of 
religious attendance. In the Principality Anglican Church attendance figures 
were extremely low: only nine per cent of total worshippers went to Church 
yet 87 per cent went to Nonconformist chapels. By 1905 the people who 
attended Nonconformist religious establishments in Wales increased to over 
half a million, and the total number of people who attended places of worship 
                                                          
13 D. Gareth Evans, A History of Wales, 1815-1906, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989) 
pp.215-220.  
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reached 744,760 or 37 per cent of the population, three per cent more than in 
1851.14   
Yet, the figures in Table 1.5 demonstrate that Anglican Church 
attendance in North Wales was at its highest in those more anglicised regions 
nearest the English border. Church attendance was much higher in the North-
eastern counties of Denbighshire and Flintshire and was way above the total 
figure for Wales in percentage terms. Conversely, Nonconformist chapel 
attendance was very high in the North-western counties, away from the 
English border, and was higher here than the percentage total for Wales. 
Flintshire had the highest percentage of Anglican Church communicants in 
Wales, and in all other Welsh counties only Radnorshire with 44.4 per cent 
had a higher percentage of Church Communicants than Denbighshire. 
Nonetheless, Nonconformity was still in the ascendant in Denbighshire and 
even in the more anglicised Flintshire nearly 55 per cent of worshippers were 
Nonconformists.    
 
Table1.5: 1905- Religious Communicants – Comparative Study, Northwest 
Wales, Northeast Wales. 
 
Northwest 
Wales 
 
          Church  
     Communicants 
 
% 
 
 N/conformist              
communicants 
 
% 
Counties     
Anglesey 4807 18.4 21251 81.6 
Caernarfonshire 13361 19.9 53938 80.1 
Merionethshire 4213 14.5 24733 85.5 
Northeast Wales     
Counties     
Denbighshire 16922 32.4 35339 67.6 
Flintshire 11621 45.3 14016 54.7 
Wales 193081 26.0 551670 74.0 
Figures taken from: K.O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1970). 
 
It is not hard, therefore, to see why tensions grew in the late nineteenth 
century as Welsh speaking chapel-goers agitated for the Disestablishment of 
what was seen as an alien English speaking Church sponsored by a state that 
did not represent them. Tensions were also heightened as the Anglican Church 
was seen as the body that represented the English speaking landed gentry, 
largely Tory by nature, who dominated land ownership and made vast profits 
                                                          
14 K.O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1970) 
p.315. 
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from the tenants who worked their land. The Anglican Church and the landed 
gentry came to symbolise all that was wrong in modern Welsh society to the 
rural and increasingly radicalised worker.  
 
LAND. 
In the nineteenth century the amount of owner-occupied land was very 
small in Wales, and those who owned land often let it out to other farmers and 
then became tenants on neighbouring estates. It was the combined strength of 
the aristocratic nobility and the landed gentry who owned vast tracts of lands 
in Wales, and derived most of their wealth and income from their tenanted 
estates, that ensured the ownership of land remained in the hands of the very 
few. Estates of over 1,000 acres accounted for over 60 per cent of the total area 
of Wales, which in 1871 stood at approximately five million acres.15 
 
Table 1.6: Wales- Landowners 1873.  
 
Catergory of Landowner No. Acreage held % of Wales 
Peers       31   557000 13.5 
Great Landlords     148 1263100 30.6 
Squires     392   672000 16.3 
Greater Yeoman   1224   612000 14.8 
Lesser Yeoman   2952   498000 12.1 
Small Proprietors 17289   431000 10.5 
Cottagers 35592       7300   0.2 
Public Bodies     723     79700   1.9 
Information taken from: J.Bateman, The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland. 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1971).              
 
The most powerful section of landowners were the 179 peers and great 
landowners who each had at least 3,000 acres of land with a gross annual 
income exceeding £3,000 a year. Between them they received approximately a 
third of the total farming rental of Wales.16 Table 1.7 indicates what percentage 
of the total land in each county those estates over 3,000 acres in size 
represented. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Evans, A History of Wales, 1815-1906, p.199. 
16 P. Jenkins, A History of Modern Wales (London: Longman, 1996) p.279. 
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Table 1.7: Wales- Percentage of land held in estates over 3,000 acres  
 
Caernarfon 67% Denbighshire 43% Pembrokeshire 38% 
Anglesey 61% Monmouthshire 43% Radnorshire 37% 
Glamorgan 55% Brecknock 42% Cardiganshire 36% 
Merioenth 48% Mongomery 40% Carmarthenshire 34% 
Flintshire 45%     
 
J.Bateman, The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland. (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1971).  
 
At the end of the nineteenth century the highest concentration of estates 
in excess of 3,000 acres was, with the exception of Glamorgan, in the counties 
of North Wales. While the three North-west Wales counties had higher 
concentrations the two North-east Wales counties still had a high proportion of 
their land given over to estates in excess of 3,000 acres. In Flintshire, which 
was the smallest county in Wales, there was not a single estate of over 10,000 
acres, and yet it had the fifth largest amount of land given over to estates in 
excess of 3,000 acres (see table1.7).  One of the largest landowners was 
Captain Rowley-Conway of Bodrhyddan Hall, near Rhyl, whose 5526 acres of 
land brought in nearly £7,000 in annual rents. Other influential landowners 
included Lord Hanmer at Bettisfield whose estate of 7,318 acres netted nearly 
£11,000 in rents, Lord Kenyon whose Gredington estate received £5,575 in 
rents from 4,000 acres of land and the Peel family whose estate at Overton 
raised £5,574 from just under 3,000 acres of land.17      
Denbighshire, with fourteen, had the highest number of major 
landowners in North Wales although at the end of the nineteenth century when 
the Returns of the Owners of Land survey was taken there were no peers in the 
county. The Watkin Williams-Wynn family not only owned a 34,000-acre 
estate near Wrexham yielding over £25,000 in rents, but also owned large 
tracts of land in Merionethshire and Montgomeryshire that earned a further 
£17,000. Other important landowners in Denbighshire included the Biddulphs 
of Chirk Castle whose 5513 acres netted them £8,580 in rents, the Cornwallis 
West family of Ruthin Castle whose 5,457 acres brought in £9,562, and John 
                                                          
17FRO, The Returns of the Owners Land -1873 volume II -Wales.  See returns for Flintshire. 
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L. Wynne’s estate near Abergele that yielded over £9,000 from just over 
10,000 acres.18                         
 
LANDED INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY: THE ARISTOCRATIC 
LEADERS OF CONSERVATISM IN NORTH-EAST WALES.  
Land ownership also brought with it political influence. 19 This 
political power was based on an authority that the landed classes built up and 
exercised over their tenants who lived and worked on their estates in a pre 
industrial society. In Wales large estates were founded in the last decades of 
the seventeenth century as families unified their land and vast fortunes through 
marriage.20 This unification process saw the end of the squire’s dominance of 
politics, and witnessed the takeover of parliamentary representation by the 
landed classes who largely favoured the Tory Party.21 At the end of the 
seventeenth century approximately two thirds of the members for Wales had 
Tory sympathies although there were a small number of families, in particular 
the Myddletons in North-east Wales, who had Whig affiliations.22 This trend 
continued until the latter half of the nineteenth century when with the passing 
of Reform Acts the franchise was widened and the landed stranglehold on 
politics slowly diminished.   
The huge amount of land, over 145,000 acres at the end of the 
nineteenth century, owned by the Watkin-Williams Wynn family from 
Wynnstay, Ruabon, earned the family immense deferential and political 
power, not just in North-east Wales but in the Principality as a whole. Such 
was the influence that the Watkin Williams–Wynn family wielded during the 
period that the Sixth Baronet was dubbed the ‘Prince in Wales’ (see 
Appendices, p324)23. The Sixth Baronet also represented Denbighshire for the 
Conservative cause in parliament until his death in1885. 
 The Seventh Baronet, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, who inherited the 
Wynnstay estates and the Denbighshire parliamentary seat on the death of his 
                                                          
18 FRO, The Returns of the Owners Land-1873 volume II -Wales See returns for Denbighshire. 
19 K.O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p 14. 
20 Davies, A History of Wales, pp.285-286. 
21 A squire was a landowner who had an estate of between 1,000 and 3,000 acres and was distinct 
from a great landowner who owned over 3,000 acres. See J. Bateman, The Great Landowners of 
Great Britain and Ireland, p. 501.  
22 Davies, A History of Wales, p.286.   
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uncle in 1885, was defeated in the general election of the same year and thus 
served in parliament for just six months. After unsuccessful attempts to win 
the East Denbighshire constituency back in 1886 and 1892 he concentrated on 
local politics and became President and Treasurer of the East Denbighshire 
Constitutional Association, which was formed in 1886, and then the Wrexham 
Constitutional Association which was founded in 1918. He also served as a 
Vice-President of the West Denbighshire Constitutional Association that was 
formed at the same time, and was elected as a Conservative county councillor 
for Ruabon in 1888, a position he held until his death in 1944. As a wealthy 
local Conservative leader his contributions to the party could be seen in the 
provision of land, money and premises for Conservative constituency 
associations, clubs and workingmen’s organisations, especially in Ruabon 
close to the family estate at Wynnstay. After his election defeat Sir Watkin 
restricted himself to local affairs and did not seek any higher office in the 
Conservative Party, but his patriarchal benevolence and patronage ensured that 
he remained at the centre of local Conservative party affairs until his death. He 
was instrumental in holding the alliance between Conservatives and Liberals 
together in East Denbighshire between 1918 and 1922, and was central to the 
discussion that led to an anti-socialist candidate being elected in the Wrexham 
constituency in 1924.    
 The Fourth Baron Tyrell Kenyon of Greddington Hall, Flintshire Maelor, 
was born in 1864 and went on to become one of the most important 
Conservatives in the region. Unlike Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and his uncle 
George T. Kenyon, who became MP for the Denbigh Boroughs in 1885, Lord 
Kenyon never sought elected office and chose instead to wield political power 
and influence through the Conservative Party organisation. In 1911 Lord 
Kenyon scaled the heights of the Conservative Party by becoming Chairman of 
the National Union, a major achievement for one of the lesser-known members 
of the landed elite.24 In comparison to some of the other landed families in 
North-east Wales, in particular the Mostyn family, the Kenyon family were 
relative newcomers to the region only arriving in 1696. By 1873 the Kenyon’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 D.Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London: Papermac, 1996) p143. 
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owned over 7,000 acres, which by Flintshire standards made them very large 
landowners. Despite his reluctance to seek elected political office, the Fourth 
Baron was a pivotal hub in the Conservative landed network that grew up in 
North-east Wales in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Married to 
the daughter of Colonel Howard, of Wigfair Hall St. Asaph, the parliamentary 
candidate for both the Flint Boroughs and the Flint County constituencies at 
the two 1910 general elections, Lord Kenyon was also tied to the Ormsby- 
Gore (Barons Harlech) family through his mother, the only daughter of the 
First Baron Harlech. More importantly for the Conservative Party Lord 
Kenyon was also chairman of the Denbigh Boroughs Constitutional 
Association, Vice-President to the East Denbighshire Constitutional 
Association, a Vice-President of the West Denbighshire Constitutional 
Association from 1913 and served on the Financial Committee, the most 
powerful group in the Flintshire Constitutional Association.  
He was, therefore, centrally involved in every Conservative Association 
in North-east Wales. In addition he represented the East Denbighshire 
Constitutional Association on the Central Council of the National Union and 
was a Vice-President of the NWDNU in 1906 and became its chairman in 
1922. Kenyon was thus a highly influential figure within Conservative Party 
circles - it was to him that the Flintshire Conservatives deferred in the matter 
of the de-selection of their parliamentary candidate for Flint County in 1909, 
and it was Kenyon who ran two associations in 1918, the Denbigh Boroughs 
and the East Denbighshire Unionist Associations, when Sir Watkin Williams 
Wynn refused to be involved in politics for the duration of the First World 
War. If this was not enough Lord Kenyon was also Ruling Councillor of the 
Hundred of Maelor Primrose League Habitation.  
The Third Baron Mostyn, Llewelyn Neville Vaughan Lloyd Mostyn, 
was born in 1865 and came from one of the oldest landed families in North 
Wales - the Mostyn family settled at Mostyn Flintshire in the early fifteenth 
century and Richard Mostyn took 1600 miners to support Henry Tudor at 
Bosworth Field in 1485. The family acquired lands in Cheshire, 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 In the 2004 edition of the Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) the Fourth Baron Kenyon does not receive a mention, although the First and Fifth Barons 
do have entries. 
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Merionethshire and Caernarfonshire and developed Llandudno as a resort town 
in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1873 the family held 5,460 acres in 
Flintshire making it the third largest landowner in the county. When the 
family’s other lands were added the Mostyn’s owned 8, 390 acres earning £15, 
312 in rent, one of the largest returns on land in North Wales.25 The Mostyn 
family also dominated parliamentary representation in Flintshire, a Mostyn 
first winning a parliamentary seat in 1544.26 When the Flintshire seat fell to the 
Liberal landowner Lord Grosvenor in 1861, the Mostyn’s never represented 
the constituency again. 
 The Third Baron Mostyn slipped into local politics, as Sir Watkin 
Williams Wynn had in Denbighshire, and held the Mostyn seat on the 
Flintshire County Council until 1922. He was President of the Flintshire 
Constitutional Association, the organisation that looked after Conservative 
affairs in the Flint Boroughs and Flint County constituencies, for over forty 
years until his death in 1929.27 Lord Mostyn held an almost omnipotent control 
over the Association, often refusing to adopt directives from the NWDNU 
whilst ironically being the Association’s delegate to the same body. Yet it 
would be wrong to describe Mostyn as an intransigent diehard peer of the type 
that afflicted the Conservative party during the Parliament Act and House of 
Lords veto crises. Lord Mostyn was a pragmatist who believed in House of 
Lords Reform, but abstained from the vote on the Parliament Bill in 1911. He 
was ambivalent towards Tariff Reform - he was initially committed to 
Balfourite retaliatory policies, but then became a Protectionist. He was 
conciliatory over education, one of the biggest causes of dispute between 
Liberals and Conservatives in Wales, and even held his political opponents in 
Flintshire in high esteem.28 It was also during Lord Mostyn’s tenure as 
President that the Flintshire Constitutional Association adopted an 
organisational strategy, which received complimentary notices from Central 
Office for its thoroughness.29  Lord Mostyn was therefore, a landed aristocratic 
                                                          
25‘Archive Network Wales: Mostyn MSS’ [Online]. Available:  www. archivesnetworkwales.info  
26 W.R.Williams, Parliamentary History of Wales (Brecknock: Davies and Bell, 1895) See entry 
for Flintshire. 
27 North WalesWeekly News, 18 April 1929.   
28 Flintshire Observer, 28 December 1905. 
29 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association, Minute Book 2, D/DM307/2. Meeting 
of the executive held on 7 July 1923.    
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politician who was determined to hold on to his power base, but was also 
aware of the need to adapt and move the Conservative party forward at a time 
it was under intense pressure from the radical forces in the region. His 
dedication to the Conservative cause finally paid off when Goodman Roberts 
was elected for the Flintshire constituency at the 1924 general election. With a 
Conservative taking the seat for the first time in over eighty years he is 
supposed to have said ‘Now I can die in peace’.30  
  Finally, the landed domination of the Conservative party organisation in 
North-east Wales was completed by Colonel Mesham of Bodfari near Denbigh 
who became a leading figure in the West Denbighshire Constitutional 
Association. William Mesham inherited the Pontrufydd estate in Bodfari from 
his aunty Margaret Mesham in 1873. A career soldier who was related to the 
Mostyn family, Mesham played a central role in late nineteenth century North-
east Wales society, becoming a magistrate and deputy Lord Lieutenant of 
Denbighshire as well as High Sheriff of Flintshire. On the death of John 
Wynne Edwards in March 1886 he became Chairman of the Denbigh 
Conservative Association and thereafter became Chairman of the West 
Denbighshire Constitutional Association as the county Conservatives divided 
their resources to match the redrawing of the constituency boundaries under 
the 1885 Redistribution Act.31 Mesham was a personal friend of George T. 
Kenyon, Conservative MP for the Denbigh Boroughs, an ardent Churchman 
and played a prominent role within the Primrose League in North-east Wales. 
Not only was he Chairman of the West Denbighshire Constitutional 
Association, he was also Ruling Councillor of the Denbigh Primrose League 
for 32 years until his death in 1918.When he died it became clear that the 
Conservative Party had lost one of their best administrators in North Wales. 
Mesham was responsible for organising Primrose League conferences in the 
region, for developing the West Denbighshire Constitutional Association as an 
effective democratic organisation, and in an enlightened move appointing Sam 
Thompson as a working-class Conservative parliamentary candidate for the 
West Denbighshire constituency in 1908. After his death the West 
                                                          
30 North Wales Weekly News, 18 April 1929. 
31 Denbighshire Free Press, 16 March 1886. 
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Denbighshire Constitutional Association went into decline, not reviving again 
until 1923.  
 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the landed elite dominated the 
leading positions in the Conservative Party in North-east Wales. This network 
consisted largely of wealthy landowners many of whom were ex-MPs finding 
an outlet in party organisation and local party politics and were Anglican 
Churchmen determined to defend their religion from the encroachment of 
Welsh Nonconformity. Most were appalled by the prospect of Irish Home Rule 
and the perceived threat to Empire, and were not deterred by their rejection at 
the polls, but saw the loss of their privileged status at the hands of radical 
Liberals as an indignity to be avoided at all costs. United and consolidated by 
marriage, these landed families had played a dominant role in Welsh society 
for centuries. The ranks of the landed rich in North–east Wales were packed 
with magistrates, Lords Lieutenants, High Sheriffs, county councillors and 
high-ranking soldiers.32 Liberal reforms, which attacked the status of such 
people were seen by North-east Wales landowners as a series of unjust acts by 
an over-zealous crusading Nonconformist government.     
 
 
THE EROSION OF CONSERVATIVE POWER AND THE RISE OF THE 
LIBERALS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY WALES. 
Much was made of landlord influence over tenants in mid–nineteenth 
century Wales. Landlords, mostly Conservative by inclination, often expected 
the support of their tenants in the election bid that they or their nominees made 
and such expectations occasionally led to the coercion of tenants for not voting 
for their choice – as happened in 1859 and 1868 when tenants were evicted in 
many parts of Wales for not voting the way of the landlord.33 Consequently the 
Welsh language radical press created a storm by highlighting the plight of 
impoverished tenants, such as those who had been evicted from their homes by 
unscrupulous Tory landlords.34 Furthermore, accusations were made that 
                                                          
32 The Seventh baronet Sir Watkin Williams Wynn was Lord lieutenant of Montgomeryshire in 
1891, High Sheriff of Denbighshire in 1890 and a J.P in the same county; the Fourth Baron Tyrell 
Kenyon was a Lord Lieutenant of Denbighshire; the Third Baron Mostyn was a Vice – Admiral 
of North Wales and was royal standard Bearer of Wales at the coronation of George V.  
33 See, for example, Morgan, Wales in British Politics, pp20-21 and pp24-25. 
34 D.Howell, Land and People in Nineteenth Century Wales (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1977) pp. 86-88.  
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landlords cruelly enforced agreements on their tenants, charged excessive rents 
without abatements in times of depression and allowed the tenants to feel 
insecure for not adopting a decent tenurial system. Allegations were also made 
that landowners preferred Churchmen and Conservatives as tenants to radicals 
and Nonconformists. Thomas Gee, editor of the Baner newspaper, described 
landowners as ‘in general, cruel, unreasonable, unfeeling and unpitying 
men’.35  
Relations between landlord and tenant were irrevocably soured by this 
radical press onslaught, especially the ‘ceaseless tirade against Welsh 
landlordism’ contained in Gee’s Baner newspaper from 1886.36 Yet it has been 
argued that the claims of the radical press on the land question were greatly 
exaggerated. According to D.G Evans there is evidence to show that during 
agricultural difficulties large landowners suffered as much as their tenants and 
that ‘during the 1880’s and the early 1890’s the landowner was often made a 
scapegoat for the tenants’ problems.37 Furthermore Mathew Cragoe concludes 
that tenants generally accepted the leadership of their landlord in political 
matters and that ‘a vote for the estate was a vote for the things with which an 
individual had been brought up, and for a system that, religious considerations 
not withstanding, guaranteed the tenant satisfaction of his fundamental social 
imperative, the transmission of his family’s farm to the next generation’.38  
These arguments appear reasonable, and there is evidence in North-east Wales, 
for example, amongst the Wynnstay Estate papers to prove their point.39 
Nevertheless, the Welsh language press gave radical Nonconformity a political 
voice, which was enhanced by the Reform and Redistribution Acts of 1884 
and 1885. These Acts allowed many newly enfranchised working-class men, 
stirred by the emotive language of the radical press to eject Conservative 
landowning MP’s from parliament at election times.   
 At the same time the transfer of land from the gentry to their tenants 
eroded the landowners position in the Principality. At the start of the twentieth 
                                                          
35 Howell, Land and People in Nineteenth Century Wales,  pp.86-87. 
36 Ibid., p. 86. 
37 D.G. Evans, A History of Wales, 1815-1906, p.209.  
38 Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy, p171. 
39 Denbighshire Record Office, (DRO), Wynnstay MSS, DD/WY/9060, letter from William 
Owen to Sir Watkin Williams- Wynn, 18 February 1886. 
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century landowners with interests in England started to sell off their Welsh 
estates, seen as mere supplements to other holdings and as a means of raising 
money. The sell-off intensified when with political power transferring to the 
Liberals in 1906 a new collectivist environment was created in which 
individualism and landlordism were seen as enemies of social improvement; 
Lloyd George’s land taxes and land campaigns threatening the existence of the 
landed elite. As John Davies has noted: 
 
The vehemence with which Lloyd George and his colleagues attacked the land-
owning class,… certainly created apprehension, and some of the sales of 1911 
and 1912 were motivated by a desire to take advantage of a buoyant market 
before Lloyd George dreamt up new offensives.40    
 
Between 1910 and 1914 nearly every major landowner in the 
Principality sold land. A more democratic climate precipitated an explosion of 
sales as tenants bought the land they farmed. Sales continued throughout the 
First World War and after the War the torrent of sales became a flood as 
tenants eagerly bought up land from their former landlords. At the height of 
the boom estates exchanged hands for vast sums of money. In North Wales 
£100,0000 was received for Tremadog estate land, in excess of £120,000 was 
taken for land sold by the Glynllifon estate, both were in Caernarfonshire, and 
£200,000 was made on the sale of the Barons Hill land in Anglesey.41 The 
sales boom ended in 1922 and even though a mini- boom occurred in 1924 and 
1925, which saw sales of Penrhyn land in Caernarfonshire and Nash and Bute 
land in Glamorgan, a depression set in, and during the 1930’s the number of 
successful auctions dropped significantly.  Nonetheless, by the start of the 
Second World War Wales had seen a transformation in land ownership, as 
owner-occupiers who enthusiastically bought up land now owned over thirty 
over cent of the Principality’s acreage. 
In North-east Wales the situation mirrored that of the rest of Wales as 
land transferred from estate to tenant ownership. Between 1910 and 1914 Sir 
Watkin Williams-Wynn sold off Wynnstay estate land in Denbighshire and 
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Montgomeryshire, and in Flintshire the Duke of Westminster made £20,000 on 
his land sales. During the First World War the Bodelwyddan estate was sold 
off and large areas of the Gladstone estate was put on the market as a result, 
somewhat ironically, of the Liberal tax measures.42  After the War, Major 
George Cornwallis West sold Ruthin Castle and 11,000 acres of land in 
Denbighshire for £76,000, and the outlying areas of the Gladstone’s family 
estate at Hawarden in Flintshire were sold for £112,000 
This transfer of land in Wales was accompanied by a transfer of political 
and social power as the Principality witnessed something ‘little short of an 
agrarian revolution’.43 Kenneth O. Morgan has commented: 
 
The gentry subsided as if they had never been. Great houses eventually turned 
into public or private institutions….The political influence of the gentry was 
now in total eclipse…. Notable landlords still appeared as lords lieutenant, high 
sheriffs or justices of the peace…. But their regime in real terms was dead. 
Landlordism, no less than the thousands of young servicemen who sacrificed 
their lives between 1914 and 1918 was a casualty of total war.  The passing of 
the old social order, notably in the rural areas, led to the passing of an old 
political order. After the declaration of the polls in December 1918, the general 
ascendancy of Liberalism….appeared to be confirmed. 44        
 
In addition a number of Nonconformist issues and grievances also helped 
undermine the Conservative position in Wales. The issue of Church 
Disestablishment had long given radical Liberals a cause with which to assail 
the Tory landowning interest. Landlords were seen by the Welsh radical press 
as the political arm of the state Church, and as Nonconformity spread 
throughout Wales during the nineteenth century the clamour for Church 
Disestablishment grew; in 1895 every single Welsh Liberal candidate featured 
it in their election addresses. Such was the movement against the Anglican 
Church that in 1886 disturbances took place in many areas of Wales as farmers 
refused to pay their compulsory annual tithes to the local Church. Supported in 
their agitation by the scourge of the Anglican Conservative landowners, 
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Thomas Gee, conflict continued in parts of Wales for many years.45 With the 
passing of the Tithe Bill in 1891 that made the landowner responsible for the 
collection of the tithe many disturbances ceased, but by the last decade of the 
nineteenth century the Liberal party was committed to the Disestablishment of 
the Church.46 Attempts to place Welsh Church Disestablishment Bill on the 
Statute book failed, but with the arrival of a Liberal government in 1906 its 
passage through parliament appeared inevitable. 47 
The issue of education also proved detrimental for Conservative 
support in Wales. The Forster Education Act of 1870 placed schools, including 
the Nonconformist British Society Schools, under the control of local School 
Boards and maintained them on subsidies from the rates.48 At the same time it 
left the Church of England National Schools outside the Act. With over 1,000 
Church of England National Schools teaching the Anglican catechism serving 
over 300 locations in Wales, and with no Board schools being set up in areas 
which were adequately supplied by National Schools, the potential for a 
Nonconformist backlash was created. 49 The Education question finally came 
to a head at the start of the new century, with the introduction of Balfour’s 
1902 Education Act. The Act was designed to rationalise education by 
bringing both voluntary and school boards under the supervision of county 
councils, but a massive groundswell of Nonconformist antipathy to the Bill 
and the provision it now made for Church schools to be maintained on the 
rates culminated in Welsh county councils refusing to operate the Act. By 
December 1903 with Lloyd George advising resistance to the Act, only 
Radnorshire and Brecknockshire had not refused grant aid to voluntary 
schools.50 In the 1904 County Council elections every single Welsh council 
fell to the Liberals whose leaders actively campaigned on the issue of 
Nonconformist education. Not a single council applied the contingencies of the 
Act, an impasse only broken by the fall from power of the Conservatives in 
1905.  
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  Not even the more anglicised region of North-east Wales was saved from 
the onslaught of the Welsh education issue. In Denbighshire an already 
overwhelming Liberal county council had its Liberal ranks swelled to a total of 
35 in 1904, the highest number, prior to the First World War. In Flintshire, 
Herbert Lewis, the Liberal MP for Flint Boroughs, claimed that Balfour’s 
controversial Education Act enabled the Liberals to take control of the council 
in a county where Anglican schoolmasters predominated.51  
 Radical Nonconformity and Welsh Liberalism were also invigorated by 
the temperance movement. Over indulgence in alcohol became a concern 
during the nineteenth century as drunkenness undermined the success of 
industry by affecting both the health and output of the working-class.52 A sub-
culture grew up in which Nonconformists took the teetotal pledge and pushed 
for legislation that would curb the liquor trade as temperance moved from 
being a moral crusade to one that formed part of the radical Liberal 
programme.53 In 1872 the Liberal government was persuaded to restrict the 
licensing trade and in 1881 the Welsh Sunday Closing Act was passed, which 
to the supporters of abstinence was a step towards a total ban.54 Temperance 
increasingly became part of the Nonconformist Liberal campaign fostered by a  
new band of Welsh Liberal MPs who emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century.55 
However, the Conservative Party in North-east Wales was less affected 
by the main thrusts of radical Liberalism.  For example, issues such as 
temperance were less important here than they were elsewhere in North Wales. 
Wrexham was the centre of the brewing trade in the region, employing many 
people, and the ranks of the Conservative Party contained some well-known 
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brewers.56 Charles Murless, a Wrexham brewer was on the Finance Committee 
of the Wrexham and East Denbighshire Unionist Association and J.A 
Chadwick a local brewer, held the South ward in Wrexham for the 
Conservatives at the 1904 and 1907 county council elections. This suggests 
there was local support for the brewing interest or at least little concern about 
temperance and certainly at this time brewing and the consumption of alcohol 
played a strategic part in the defence of Conservative principles and the attack 
on Nonconformist Liberalism. According to Jon Lawrence ‘Liberalism was 
portrayed as a stern coercive creed that had no understanding of or sympathy 
for the social customs of the free born Englishman’.57  
The Conservatives thus defended the right of the working class man to 
enjoy a beer as a basic freedom. In North-east Wales the Conservatives began 
to cultivate the support of the workingman as early as 1871 when a 
Conservative Working-men’s Association was founded for the industrial 
villages of Ruabon, Rhos, Penycae and Cefn.  Subsequently, a thriving 
network of Conservative clubs grew up in the region. Every major town had a 
licensed Conservative club, although concerns were expressed about the over-
use of billiards tables and the lack of commitment to the Conservative cause at 
election time. In Wrexham, the largest and most industrial town in North 
Wales, both the Conservative Club and the Workingmen’s Association were 
very well supported, indicating that there was solid support for the 
Conservative stance on the freedom of the individual to consume and enjoy 
alcohol.58 Membership of workingmen’s clubs and associations did not 
obviously automatically translate into votes, but a large working-class 
Conservative vote certainly existed in Wrexham enabling the party to hold the 
Denbigh Boroughs seat between 1885 and 1906.  
The Conservative Party also managed to fight a sustained rearguard 
action on the issue of Church Disestablishment in the region. Faced with 
demands for Disestablishment by Nonconformists the Conservative party 
responded by claiming that Disestablishment represented religious intolerance 
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and that the removal of long held endowments was merely asset stripping by 
vengeful dissenters.59 This vigorous defence culminated in mass 
demonstrations organised by Church leaders and Conservative party members 
as a new Disestablishment Bill was introduced in 1912. Welsh Church 
Disestablishment was a radical issue that had Conservatives on the defensive, 
but it also conversely gave them a principle to fight for and helped galvanise 
them at a time when they were swamped by Nonconformist Liberalism. 
Conservatives, particularly in North- east Wales, were able to whip up support 
for the defence of the church, which even had local Liberals questioning the 
wisdom of removing church endowments (in this case a large proportion of its 
land and rents). For a small number of Liberal churchmen the issue marked the 
end of their attachment to the Liberal party as they swapped allegiances to join 
the Conservative party, which they believed would better protect their spiritual 
inheritance.60  
There was also only minimal agitation against landlords in North-east 
Wales. This was especially so in those areas closest to the English border 
where ‘Welsh was rapidly giving place to English and where the vernacular 
press was thus limited in its influence’.61 Agitation against the payment of 
tithes started in Denbighshire, but in some areas tenants managed to persuade 
the parish priest to award discounts and disputes over rents were often 
countered by landlords offering concessions, as happened in the Vale of Clwyd 
in 1885.62 There were also many tenants who were unconcerned by the politics 
of their landlord or the agitation that ensued over Church tithe payments and 
were willing to negotiate directly with the landlord. A letter from one of the 
Wynnstay tenant’s in February 1886 betrays a disdain for any form of tithe 
agitation or conflict that would disrupt landlord- tenant relations: 
 
The agitation which they are trying to raise in some parts of the Principality will 
not I am sure have any attention from Sir Watkin tenants. We have always been 
proud of the good feeling, which has so long existed between landlord and 
tenant, and I sincerely hope it may always continue. Should I hear anything 
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unpleasant talked about I will for my own sake and that of my family do all in 
my power to stop it…63  
  
This demonstrates that there was still strong support for the Williams-
Wynn family and landowners in North-east Wales, perhaps suggesting there 
was, if not substantial local sympathy for the Conservative party and its 
leadership, at least a tolerance of their aims. This in part helps explain why the 
party retained the Denbigh Boroughs seat until 1906 and why its vote held up 
better in this region between 1885 and 1900 than it did in the corresponding 
period for the rest of the Principality (see table 2.3) The evidence also shows 
that in spite of all the impediments and the prevailing conditions in the rest of 
the Principality, especially in the rural more westerly areas where the Welsh 
language and Nonconformity dominated, the Conservatives recovered well in 
North-east Wales after 1906. They were aided by the advances made in party 
organisation and by the successful development of Conservative support 
groups.  
 
THE PRIMROSE LEAGUE. 
Conservative support in North-east Wales was bolstered by the 
existence of a successful Primrose League network. The Tory Primrose 
League, as it was initially known, was founded in 1883 by Lord Randolph 
Churchill, John Gorst, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Sir Alfred Slade, all 
members of the National Union’s Council – the body concerned with 
organising Conservative support. Their aim was to harness the affection and 
respect the memory of Disraeli, who had died in 1881, still evoked during a 
period of internal party bickering and low morale caused by election defeat in 
1883.64 The intention was to rectify ‘the failure of Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations to suit the popular taste or to succeed in joining all 
classes together for political objects.65 Membership was open to all except 
atheists and enemies of the British Empire, the pledge being: 
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I declare on my honour and faith that I will devote my best ability to the 
maintenance of Religion, of the Estates of the Realm, and of the unity of the 
British Empire under our Sovereign.66  
 
While membership of the Primrose League was open to all classes, 
allowing working class members to rub shoulders with those from the landed 
elite, a hierarchical structure existed ‘that mirrored the gradations of society’ 
as the most senior Habitation officers in the Primrose League, the Ruling 
Councillors and Dame Presidents, came exclusively from the ranks of the 
landed elite.67 However, since its founding in 1883 the Primrose League had 
introduced women to the world of politics as part of its all-embracing ethos.68 
Even though those females involved also tended to come from the upper strata 
of society they were successful in the roles they eagerly adopted for the 
Conservative party. According to Martin Pugh  ‘middle and upper-class ladies 
threw themselves enthusiastically into arranging League functions, canvassing, 
contacting the outvoters, conveying electors to the polls in private carriages, 
raising funds and generally keeping the grass roots of Conservatism 
vigorous’.69 
The League also proved to be an enormous benefit to the Conservative 
Party in organising and educating supporters while providing an outlet for 
social gatherings, which were especially well attended in rural areas. The 
League made ‘good use’ of sympathetic landed families in North and Mid-
Wales - Lord Mostyn in Flintshire, the Earl of Powis in Montgomeryshire, the 
Marquess of Anglesey, and Sir Watkin and Lady Williams-Wynn in 
Denbighshire – their names often being given to the local Habitations with 
social events frequently being held on their land.  Measurement is somewhat 
difficult but Pugh’s survey of the Primrose League indicates that there were 68 
associations, or Habitations, as they were known, in North Wales at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Memberships varied, but somewhat surprising were the 
membership figures in the rural west of the region, where the Liberal party 
dominated.  In 1886 the membership at Bangor was over 1,000, in Caernarfon 
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over 600, and in Beaumaris nearly 600.70  There were also large memberships 
in North-east Wales. For example, the Denbigh Primrose League Habitation 
had a membership in excess of 800 in 1886 and by the end of the nineteenth 
century there were 16 Habitations in Flintshire and 20 in Denbighshire, all 
holding regular social gatherings, political functions and fetes up until 1918 
(see Appendices, p319).71 
The Primrose League did not survive the First World War in North-east 
Wales with any significant numbers. As local Conservative Associations 
adapted and revised their organisations to incorporate women and restructured 
their leadership, the League became obsolete as all social, financial and 
political functions were brought under the auspices of the local constituency 
associations. Nevertheless, in the period prior to the Great War the Primrose 
League was a powerful tool, which the Conservative Party deployed to its full 
extent as both a purveyor of its political message and as a successful lobbying 
agent. Utilising its members to canvass and sponsor political meetings on its 
behalf during election campaigns the Conservative Party had at its disposal a 
ready-made support machine even at times when its own organisation was 
weak. The Primrose League’s popularity is hardly proof that people were 
willing to vote Conservative in North-east Wales, but it does demonstrate that 
this body was acting as an important outlet for the Conservative message as 
well as providing a valuable social function.  
 
VOTERS AND THE CONSTITUENCIES. 
With the passage of Disraeli’s Reform Act in 1867 large numbers of 
urban householders were enfranchised for the first time throughout Wales, and 
the Secret Ballot Act of 1872 enabled people to vote unhindered without the 
threat of coercion from their landlords. The Reform and Redistribution Acts of 
1884 and 1885 extended the franchise further and altered the composition of 
constituencies. As a result of these Acts in Wales thousands of industrial 
working class men were enfranchised, and in rural areas, the county electorate 
rose from 74,936 to 200,373.72 The Acts worked to the benefit of the 
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workingman as a number of working class industrial constituencies were 
founded, and many traditional boroughs were disenfranchised. In addition 
large urban constituencies, such as Cardiff with 85,000 inhabitants, were given 
the same parliamentary representation with one member as constituencies like 
Montgomery Boroughs, which had a population of fewer than 20,000. The 
impact of these measures on party politics in Wales was enormous, as 
increasing numbers of rural workers were able to vote uninhibited and elect 
Liberal Nonconformist candidates in areas where previously only the landed 
interest, with a small electorate and little opposition, had stood for parliament. 
As a result the Tory interest that dominated Wales for so long was pushed into 
the anglicised border areas, where they received a more sympathetic hearing.73 
Under the terms of the Reform and Redistribution Acts of 1884-85 
Wales was divided into 34 parliamentary constituencies, the North of the 
country being split into twelve parliamentary seats.74 North-east Wales was 
given one more constituency by breaking up Denbighshire into three 
parliamentary divisions, retaining the Denbigh Boroughs division, but splitting 
the county into two seats - West Denbighshire and East Denbighshire. The 
new East Denbighshire division contained all the coalmining districts and 
industrial centres in and around Wrexham and the English border. The West 
Denbighshire constituency included all the farming and rural areas west of the 
narrow band that made up East Denbighshire. The only major town in this 
division was the resort town of Colwyn Bay, which by the turn of the century 
had nearly 9,000 inhabitants. The West Denbighshire constituency stretched 
from the Conwy valley near Llandudno, southerly as far as Llanrwst and 
easterly as far as Chirk adjacent to the English border.75 Two totally different 
constituencies were thus created - the rural West division and the industrial 
urban sprawl of the East division. The Denbigh Boroughs constituency 
remained unaltered. The division consisted of the two market towns of 
Denbigh and Ruthin, in the centre of Denbighshire, together with Wrexham, 
the largest town in North Wales, and the tiny borough of Holt both situated at 
the eastern end of the county.  Under the terms of the Reform Act the 
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electorate in the Boroughs division was increased from 3,071 to 3,414.The 
electorate in the old Denbighshire division was 7,323, in the new West 
constituency the electorate was 8,899 and in the East constituency it was 
8,297. 76 
Flintshire remained unaltered by the terms of the Redistribution Act. 
The Flint County seat contained all the major industrial centres situated at the 
eastern end of the county including the Shotton steel works and the collieries 
dotted along the North Wales coast at Point of Ayr, Mostyn and Bagillt. Large 
areas of the constituency were still agricultural, especially in Flintshire Maelor 
where farming dominated and much of the land was under the control of the 
estate owner. The largest town in the Flint County constituency was Rhyl, the 
resort town, which by 1901 had a population of 8,500 people.77 The Flint 
Boroughs constituency consisted of the small boroughs of Caergwrle near 
Wrexham, Caerwys near Denbigh, Overton in Flintshire Maelor, Rhuddlan just 
south of Rhyl and the cathedral town of St. Asaph. The only sizeable boroughs 
in the constituency were the colliery and industrial towns of Holywell, Flint 
and Mold. In 1901 both Flint and Mold had populations of approximately 
4,500. The Reform Act increased the electorate in the County constituency 
from 4,794 to 10, 081, but the electorate in the Boroughs division remained 
approximately the same.78  
 
 
ELECTIONS AND PARTY POLITICS 1880-1906.  
At the 1880 general election the Liberals secured a majority of 137 
over the Conservatives and other parties while Nonconformist anger over the 
restrictive Burial Acts of 1874 and criticisms of coercive Welsh landlords 
ensured a disastrous set of general election results for the Conservative Party 
in Wales. Noticeable landed defeats included Douglas Pennant of the Penrhyn 
family at Caernarfon, and a scion of the mighty Wynn family of Wynnstay was 
defeated in Montgomeryshire by Stuart Rendel, an English industrialist and 
Anglican who avowed Welsh Church Disestablishment.79 The trend that 
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started at the 1880 general election, was completed at the 1885 general 
election, when over 200 years of Conservative ascendancy was brought to an 
end in Wales, the party subsiding to a mere 38 per cent share of the 
electorate.80 Of the 34 M.P’s returned for Wales only nine now represented the 
landed interest, of which five were Conservatives. The general election also 
marked a slump for the party nationally as it crashed to defeat gaining only 
249 seats compared to the Liberals 335. 
The forces of Conservatism recovered nationally and swept to power a 
year later gaining 316 of the Westminster seats at an election defined by the 
secession of a number of Liberals who were concerned about the party’s 
apparent commitment to Irish Home Rule. Liberal Unionists, as they became 
known, gained some support in Wales as Gladstone’s dalliance with Irish 
Home Rule upset such leading Welsh Nonconformists as Thomas Gee. More 
famously Lloyd George came close to joining the Liberal Unionists, but at the 
1886 general election Wales remained solidly Liberal even though six 
Conservatives were returned and Cornwallis-West was successful as a Liberal 
Unionist in West Denbighshire.  
  In 1892 a mere three Conservatives in Wales were elected at an election 
dominated by Nonconformist issues. Every Liberal candidate mentioned 
Welsh Church Disestablishment in their election addresses; six placed this 
issue at the top of their agenda, and eleven mentioned Welsh issues only.81 The 
1892 general election also saw the start of an isolated period of Liberal 
government, during an era dominated by the Conservative party. The Liberals 
obtained a 40-seat majority based on their success in the new county seats, 
which became increasingly vulnerable for the Conservatives as a result of the 
enfranchisement of many more rural voters.82 
 At the 1895 general election the Conservatives again swept to power 
gaining 411 seats against the Liberals 177. Even in Wales the Conservatives 
did relatively well winning eight of the 34 seats. Where Liberals featured 
Church Disestablishment in their programmes the Conservatives mounted a 
fierce opposition aided by the formation of the Church Defence Committee, 
                                                          
80 Davies, A History of Wales,  p.286. 
81 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.118. 
82 Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics, 1867-1939, p.68.   
 49
which under the auspices of the Duke of Westminster, Lord Penrhyn and Lord 
Emlyn, campaigned vigorously in Welsh constituencies. Many places saw 
Liberal majorities slashed. Lloyd George did well to gain re-election in 
Caernarfon Boroughs, and in Flintshire where the Committee was particularly 
active Samuel Smith’s majority was reduced by a thousand votes.83  
 The Liberals still retained an overwhelming number of MPs in Wales, 
and between 1895 and 1899 they clawed back much of their support 
nationally. Their success at by-elections, however, was short lived as the 
advent of the Boer War initiated a Conservative government recovery. The 
Conservative Party’s overwhelming victory at the polls in 1900 where it 
gained 334 seats and an overall majority of 134 came as a direct result of their 
support for the conflict.84 Patriotic support for the War was somewhat muted in 
the Principality where many Liberals opposed the conflict. In Wales 28 
Liberals were returned, a net gain of two seats over the Conservatives, and out 
of ten Liberal candidates hostile to the Boer War nine were returned.  The 
‘Khaki Election’ is probably best remembered in Wales for the return of Keir 
Hardie at Merthyr Tydfil, the very first Independent Labour Party member in 
Wales.  
 
NORTH-EAST WALES ELECTIONS 1880-1906.  
 From 1880 a trend was started in Wales, which witnessed the regular 
return of Liberals in parliamentary elections at the cost of Conservative 
members of the landed gentry. Nowhere was this trend in Wales more 
emphatically announced than in the North-east Wales constituency of East 
Denbighshire where the Wynnstay interest in the form of the Seventh Baronet, 
Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, was finally overthrown at the 1885 general 
election. Nearly 200 years of parliamentary representation in the constituency 
by the Williams-Wynn family came to a close when the Seventh Baronet was 
beaten by his radical Liberal opponent, Osborne Morgan by 393 votes. 
Surprisingly, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn came within a whisker of retaking 
the seat in 1886 by reducing the Liberal majority to 26, and it was not until 
1892 when Osborne Morgan extended his majority to 756 that the constituency 
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became safe for the Liberals. After this Sir Watkin finally withdrew from 
parliamentary challenges and the Liberals comfortably held the division in 
1895. They increased their majority at a by-election on Morgan’s death in 
1897 and the seat went uncontested in 1900 and 1906.  
The 1885 election in the West Denbighshire constituency was a battle 
of landed interests. Colonel Cornwallis-West, Liberal, took the seat from C.S. 
Mainwaring, the Conservative candidate, with 60 per cent of the vote. Having 
defected to the Liberal Unionists Cornwallis-West took the seat unopposed in 
1886, but at the 1892 election he was ousted by the Liberal, John Herbert 
Roberts, finally ending the landed interest in the constituency. By 1895 it 
became a safe Liberal seat, which went uncontested in 1900 and 1906.   
At the 1885 election in the Flint Boroughs the Liberals held on against 
the landed interest of the Conservative candidate, P.P. Pennant, by a mere 122 
votes. The Flint Boroughs constituency was a marginal seat and even though 
the Radical Herbert Lewis, held it at the 1886 and 1892 elections it never 
became completely safe for the Liberals. In July 1895 Pennant kept the Liberal 
majority down to 165, and in 1900 it only rose to 350. In Flint County another 
landed battle ensued in 1885 when Lord Grosvenor, nominally a Liberal, 
defeated the Mostyn family member H.R.H. Lloyd–Mostyn, representing the 
Conservatives, by over 1600 votes. At a by-election in March 1886 the 
constituency fell to the radical Liberal Samuel Smith, a Liverpool merchant, 
who was unopposed at the general election held the same year. But, Sir Robert 
Cunliffe a landowner, representing the Liberal Unionists, put up a stout fight 
against him in 1892 gaining over 40 per cent of the vote. Colonel H.R. L 
Howard, another Conservative landowner from St. Asaph, polled well against 
Smith at the 1895 election coming within 450 votes of unseating him on an 
electorate of 10,500, proving that the landed interests in the region were still 
capable of attracting a large vote. 85 This was borne out by the fact that George 
T. Kenyon a member of the landed Kenyon family took the Denbigh Boroughs 
for the Conservative party in 1885 with a majority of 306, the constituency 
being represented by him, with one exception in 1895, until 1906. However, 
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the facts cannot be avoided by 1906 the region of North-east Wales, with this 
one notable exception, was overwhelmingly Liberal in its affiliations.  
Table 1.8: General election Results in Wales, 1885-1900. 
Year 
 
      Party. No. Elected. Total votes. % of Vote. 
1885 Conservative    4   79,960  38.9 
 Liberal  29  119,328  58.3 
 Ind Lib/Lab    1     3,859    1.9 
 Ind Lib    0     1,907    0.9 
     
1886 Conservative    6    60,048   40.0 
 Liberal  32  119,328   46.9 
 Lib Uni    1    19,609   13.1 
 Lib/Lab    1   
     
1892 Conservative    3    56,692   25.8 
 Liberal  30  141,465   64.5 
 Lib Uni    1    21,346     9.7 
 Lib/Lab    1   
     
         
 
1895 Conservative    8   98,256   39.2 
 Liberal  24 144,216   57.5 
 Lib Uni    1     5,546     2.2 
 Lib/Lab    1   
     
1900 Conservative    6   61.885   34.5 
 Liberal  26   95,702   53.4 
 Lib/Lab    1    10,135     5.7 
 Lab    1     9,598     5.3 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
  
 
Table 1.9: Election winners in North-east Wales 1885-1900 
1885      
Constituency. Electorate. T/O%. Candidate. Maj. % Vote. 
Denbigh Boro’s   3,414  94.2 G.T. Kenyon-C   306  54.8 
Flint Boro’s   3,773  94.0 John Roberts-L   122  51.7 
E. Denbs   8,297  87.6 G.O. Morgan-L   393  52.7 
W. Denbs   8,899  85.2 W.C. West-L 1594  60.5 
Flint County 10,081  78.3 Lord Grosvenor-L 1626  60.3 
1886      
Denbigh Boro’s   3,414  90.9 G.T. Kenyon-C   211  53.4 
Flint Boro’s   3,773  85.6 John Roberts-L   424  56.6 
E. Denbs   8,297  84.9 G.O. Morgan-L     26  50.2 
W. Denbs   8,899  ----- W.C. West-LU ----- ----- 
Flint County 10,081  -----  S. Smith-L ----- ----- 
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Table 1.9 cont  
1892 
Denbigh Boro’s  3,414   90.9 G.T. Kenyon-C     98  51.5 
Flint Boro’s  3,710  85.6 J.H. Lewis-L   359  55.3 
E. Denbs   9,941  84.9 G.O. Morgan-L   756  55.0 
W. Denbs   9,915 ------ J.H. Roberts-L  2,333  66.9 
Flint County 10,075 ------ S. Smith-L  1,452  59.4 
   1895      
Denbigh Boro’s   4,137  91.6 W.T. Howell-C  209  53.3 
Flint Boro’s   3,581  90.6 J.H. Lewis-L  347  55.5 
E. Denbs 10,242  83.5 G.O.Morgan-L  1784  61.1 
W. Denbs   9,290  82.3 J.H. Roberts-L  1603  60.9 
Flint County 10,774  78.4 S. Smith-L  606  53.6 
1900      
Denbigh Boro’s   4,137  87.4 G.T. Kenyon-C  110  51.5 
Flint Boro’s   3,581  88.6 J.H. Lewis-L  347  55.5 
E. Denbs 10,242  ----- S. Moss-L  ----  ----- 
W. Denbs   9,290  ----- J.H. Roberts-L  ----  ----- 
Flint County 10,774  78.4 S. Smith-L  606  53.6 
 
Information taken from: Arnold J. James and John E.Thomas, Wales at Westminster, A History 
of the Parliamentary Representation of Wales, 1800-1979 (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 1981). 
 
Table 1.10: Percentage of the Conservative Party Vote. 
 
Region 
 
1885 
 
1886 
 
1892 
 
1895 
 
1900 
United 
Kingdom 
 43.5  51.4  47.0  49.1  50.3 
Wales  38.9  40.0  35.6  41.4  34.5 
North Wales  41.7  38.9*  39.4  42.9  47.9 
North-east 
Wales 
 44.2  38.6  41.7  43.8  47.2 
North-west 
Wales 
 40.2  40.8*   34.4  39.0  ------ 
North-west Wales constituencies were: Caernarfon Arfon, Caernarfon Eifion, Caernarfon 
Boroughs, Merionethshire and Anglesey.  
*1886. North Wales including North-West Wales figures are inflated by Lib Unionist 
participation- in the West Denbighshire constituency Cornwallis west lib unionist was 
unopposed. 
In 1900 only the Caernarfon Boroughs constituency was contested     
     Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
What the demographic, social and economic developments tell us is 
that by the early years of the twentieth century Wales was a far more 
anglicised country than it had been 100 years earlier. Even though the rural 
more westerly regions of the Principality were still essentially Welsh in their 
outlook, the anglicisation process that took hold in the east of the country was 
spreading ever westwards. In theory this was good news for the Conservative 
party, especially in those regions, including North-east Wales, which were 
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closest to the English border. As North-east Wales contained a high 
concentration of estate lands with English speaking landlords and large 
numbers of Anglican Church communicants, there potentially existed a more 
receptive audience for the Conservative message. Although this did not 
convert into political parity with the Liberal party, after all Denbighshire and 
Flintshire were still in essence Nonconformist and Liberal in their political 
allegiances, the fact that the Conservatives did better in the more easterly areas 
of North Wales is not coincidental. Moreover, in North-east Wales, the 
traditional Liberal orthodoxy of Free Trade came under severe pressure in 
those areas where large-scale industrialisation took place, especially in districts 
dominated by the steel trade where foreign imports affected profitability and 
employment levels. Consequently, the Conservative policy of economic tariffs 
had it was believed potential if advocated properly. Thus, even though, the 
Liberals dominated the political scene at the end of the nineteenth century 
there was still plenty for the Conservatives to draw strength from support and 
develop.  
Between 1885 and 1900 the Denbigh Boroughs division remained in 
Conservative hands, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn came very close to unseating 
Osborn Morgan in East Denbighshire and regaining the constituency in 1886 
and West Denbighshire only came into the radical Liberal fold from 1892. At 
the same time the two Flintshire constituencies were nearly lost for the 
Liberals in 1895, with two Conservative landowners, Colonel Howard in Flint 
County and Philip Pennant in Flint Boroughs, making huge inroads into the 
Liberal majorities, and neither of these seats were retained convincingly in 
1900. Even as the Principality became a bastion for the Liberal party, the 
Conservative remained a vibrant force in North-east Wales.   
What the election results prove was that between 1880 and 1906 the 
Conservative Party in North-east Wales was not nearly as marginalized as it 
was elsewhere in Wales. Its average share of the vote in the region held up 
reasonably well, polling in most cases at above or near forty per cent and even 
achieving 47.2 per cent at the 1900 general election. Their cause was helped 
by the significant presence of the Primrose League which maintained high 
membership figures, even in the west of the region where Liberalism was at its 
strongest. This suggests that there was strong support for the party throughout 
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North-east Wales aided by certain geographic and demographic circumstances. 
Here the Conservative vote was stronger and more resilient than it was in the 
rest of North Wales and in the Principality as a whole. Despite winning only 
one constituency regularly, the Denbigh Boroughs, its performance in 
comparison to the more westerly, more rural constituencies of North Wales 
where Welsh nonconformity and a deteriorating landlord-tenant relationship 
went had in hand is striking. (see Table 1.10).          
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH-EAST WALES, 
1906-1910. 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF CONSERVATIVE 
HEGEMONY. 
Between 1885 and 1906 the Conservative party dominated 
government, holding power, apart from two short periods of Liberal 
government, for nearly twenty years.1 A landslide election victory in 1900 
suggested that this dominance was set to continue but by 1904 with public 
opinion turning against Arthur Balfour and the Conservative government it 
became increasingly clear that the Liberals were on course to win the next 
general election. One reason for the collapse of government support appeared 
to be Balfour’s 1902 Education Act, which was met with approval by most 
Conservatives and even some Liberals, but caused dissent amongst 
Nonconformists. Another was the launch of the Tariff Reform campaign by 
Joseph Chamberlain in May 1903, following a series of by-election defeats. 
Intended as a means to reverse by-election losses, Tariff Reform was borne out 
of a conviction that Britain’s industrial supremacy and her links with the 
Empire needed safeguarding. Chamberlain argued for a revision of Free Trade 
orthodoxy through the introduction of protective tariffs that guaranteed 
preferential treatment to imperial imports. This appeared to steady the 
Conservative party as many MPs rallied to his cause and by-election results 
improved in the latter half of 1903.2 
Chamberlain’s support was substantial receiving backing from those 
who supported agricultural protection as well as those who maintained 
industrial interests, his faction numbering over 170 Conservative MP’s.3 
Opposed to his views were a group of powerful Free Trade and Unionists, 
including Lord Devonshire and Lords Robert and Hugh Cecil who believed 
they represented a large and growing strand of Free Trade Conservatives in the 
country. Between the two factions stood the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, 
who advocated a compromise approach of retaliation against those countries 
                                                          
1 The Liberal party was in power for a short period during 1886 and between 1892 and 1895. 
2 Ibid., p. 30. 
3 Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, p.4.  
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which imposed excessive duties on British exports. According to E.H.H Green, 
Balfour’s more cautious approach was borne out of an ‘overriding desire to 
preserve the unity of the party’, his concept of retaliation ‘an idea that Britain 
should introduce duties on imported goods as a way of forcing protectionist 
nations to negotiate their tariffs downwards’.4 This it was hoped would satisfy 
those demanding Chamberlainite protectionist policies, but placate Free 
Traders by falling well short of a full tariff programme. Unfortunately for 
Balfour the argument degenerated into open warfare with both sides attacking 
each other rather than the Liberals. From the autumn of 1904 the swing against 
the government increased with by-election losses, most notably at Norwich 
and St Albans, as the arguments over Tariff Reform deepened, and by 
November 1905 Balfour’s position as leader became vulnerable. With the pro-
tariff National Union, the body that represented the Conservative Associations 
and grass root support, in revolt against his moderate approach and Free 
Traders hectoring for the defence of fiscal orthodoxy, Balfour was increasingly 
unable to command the support of the party.5 On 4 December 1905 he finally 
relinquished the seals of office, anticipating that a Liberal administration 
would struggle to govern effectively given the divisions that existed between 
its leaders over Home Rule and thus, he hoped perform badly at the imminent 
general election.6 
This proved a forlorn hope and at the general election of 1906, the 
magnitude of the Conservative defeat matched their worst expectations as the 
party was reduced to a rump of 157 MP’s with the Liberal party winning 400 
seats and achieving a majority of 130 over all other parties. To add to the 
misery Balfour and all but four of his cabinet were amongst those defeated. 
Green argues that the size of the loss was exacerbated by the Liberal-Labour 
electoral pact agreed in 1903, which produced a united anti-Tory front.7 The 
effectiveness of this can be seen with Labour candidates contesting just 52 
seats, two-thirds of them in Conservative regions or in double member 
                                                          
4 E.H.H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp.19-20. 
5N. Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, The British General Elections of 1910 
(London: Macmillan, 1972) pp.35-36. 
6 A.K. Russell, Liberal Landslide, the General Election of 1906 (Newton Abbot: David and 
Charles, 1973) pp. 32-34. 
7 E.H. H.Green, ‘Radical Conservatism, the Electoral Genesis of Tariff Reform’, The Historical 
Journal, volume 28, 1985, pp.681-683.  
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constituencies, with only thirteen three-cornered contests, leaving the Liberal 
party ‘fairly free from disruptive attacks’.8 The pact and the enormity of their 
defeat fuelled Conservative fears that they faced an extended period in 
opposition as well as raising concerns that the Labour party now wielded 
undue influence over the government signalling the ‘transformation of the 
Liberal party into a quasi-socialist party’.9  
These developments prompted some Conservatives, after 1906, to try 
to cut the ground from underneath Labour by pursuing constructive populist 
policies that might attract working class votes and re-establish the party as an 
electoral force in the new political environment. At the heart of these 
ambitions stood Tariff Reform, as the means to make the party more electable 
by offering job security to the working-class from expanding imperial markets 
and the protection of British domestic industry from foreign competition, the 
revenue from which could be used to pay for social reforms. It was hardly 
surprising, then, that after the election defeat Joseph Chamberlain renewed his 
attack on the party machine to bring the organisation under his control, his aim 
being to sideline party traditionalists and neutralise opposition to Tariff 
Reform.10  By the end of 1908 the Chamberlainite National Union had brought 
much of the local party machinery under its control, with the vast majority of 
constituency associations committed to the full Tariff Reform programme.11 
As a result, the party started to do well in by-elections, commencing with a 
surprise victory in Mid-Devon on 17 January in 1908. A further six seats were 
won during the next eleven months with the swing against the Liberal 
government exceeding ten per cent.12 To add to the Liberal woes the House of 
Lords rejected much of its legislative programme including such important 
Nonconformist measures as the Education and Licensing Bills. The 
Government also managed to alienate influential groups and supporters. Its 
education policy for example, antagonised Anglicans as well as Catholics, and 
with the 1902 Act remaining unaltered Nonconformists grew increasingly 
disaffected. Government land policies also alienated Liberal landowners and 
                                                          
8 D. Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-1918 pp21-23. 
9 Ibid., p.685. See also D. Dutton, ‘The Unionist Party and Social Policy, 1906-1914’, The 
Historical Journal, 1981, p.871.   
10 D.Dutton, His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, pp.127-128. 
11 Blewett, The Parties, the Peers and the People, p.64. 
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the 1908 Licensing Bill generated opposition from the pro-Conservative 
Brewing industry, which lobbied the House of Lords to reject the legislation. 
Thus, even though many historians, amongst them David Dutton and E.H.H. 
Green, have seen the Edwardian period as one of crisis for the Conservatives, 
the four years between 1906 and 1910 can actually be interpreted more 
positively.13 The party after all succeeded in stopping much of the Liberal 
party’s radical legislation and revived its election fortunes, despite the 
inhibiting nature of the Liberal/Labour election pact, culminating in an 
improved performance at the two 1910 general elections.   
 This chapter will examine the progress of the party in North-east Wales 
after the electoral disaster of 1906. It will demonstrate how this failure 
prompted a reorganisation of the party in the region, itself part of the Tariff 
Reformers bid to seize control of local party organisation, and how this 
impacted on the different Conservative party constituency associations. It will 
also show how the Conservative party successfully exploited the Liberal 
party’s inability to amend Balfour’s Education Act, resulting in successful 
local election campaigns and how each constituency association selected 
parliamentary candidates during the period – the first time this had been 
achieved since 1895. It will finally conclude that in spite of continuing Liberal 
party popularity in the region largely caused by its support for Nonconformist 
issues and the introduction of Lloyd George’s Budget in 1909 the period 
marked an important step forward in the Conservative party’s long-term 
revival in the region.  
 
THE 1906 GENERAL ELECTION IN NORTH-EAST WALES. 
 As the general election approached the problem the Conservative party 
faced in North-east Wales was how to attract suitable parliamentary candidates 
given the steady but inexorable decline it had faced in its fortunes since 1885. 
At a general meeting of the West Denbighshire Constitutional Association held 
on 24 February 1905 a resolution was passed to contest the constituency, but in 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Blewett, The Parties, the Peers and the People, p.47. 
13 See for example Dutton, His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, pp.1-5 and Green, The Crisis of 
Conservatism, p. 1. 
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the face of Liberal dominance there were few interested candidates.14 Colonel 
H.R Hughes, of the Kinmel Park estate, struck a more realistic tone when he 
declared that a Liberal victory was a foregone conclusion and the ‘result could 
not fail to be a heavy Conservative defeat, probably the worst the Party has 
ever sustained and therefore a most unsatisfactory outlay of money’.15 
Consequently the decision of the Association was overturned, with the Liberal 
Sir John Herbert Roberts returned unopposed. It was a similar story in East 
Denbighshire where since 1897 the seat had been held uncontested by the 
Liberal Samuel Moss. The North Wales Guardian noted, rather 
understandably, that in the political climate which prevailed ‘the Unionist 
candidate had one been brought forward – would have stood but a poor chance 
of being returned for East Denbighshire’.16 The only contest in Denbighshire 
took place in Denbigh Boroughs where the sitting MP, a Conservative, George 
T. Kenyon, uncle of the Fourth Baron Tyrell Kenyon, was standing again. In 
Flintshire, however, both constituencies were contested. In Flint Boroughs Sir 
John Eldon Bankes, a successful judge and local landowner was chosen to 
fight the constituency. In the County division, Harold Edwards, the son of the 
Bishop of St. Asaph was selected shortly after Balfour had chosen to resign. 
With the election prospects looking bleak for the Conservatives in the region – 
even in Denbigh Boroughs which they had held since 1885 they must have 
been apprehensive given the prevailing political climate – the attention now 
turned to the campaigns and the issues to see if the candidates could make up 
ground.  
The issue of Tariff Reform dominated the general election campaign. 
Given the difficulties he had had uniting the party on the issue Balfour’s 
election address remained vague on the subject merely stating that he believed 
in ‘adapting our policy, in fiscal matters as in all matters to the changing 
conditions of a changing World’.17 At the same time most Conservatives 
believed that some sort of fiscal reform was needed to reduce unemployment 
                                                          
14 DRO, Plas Nantglyn MSS, West Denbighshire Constitutional Association, Minutes and 
Committee Minutes 1903-1914,DD/PN/204, General Meeting of the Association, 24 February 
1905.   
15 Ibid., H.R.Hughes Kinmel Park Estate to Annual General Meeting, 28 October 1904.   
16North Wales Guardian, 20 July 1906. 
17  I. Dale, ed, Conservative party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997 London: Routledge, 
2000). See ‘Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1906. 
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and thus Balfour added to his address that should the electorate ‘return the 
Unionist party to power, it is to the reform of our fiscal system that its 
attention ought first to be directed’.18  Consequently, 98 per cent of 
Conservative candidates mentioned Tariff Reform during their campaigns.19 
However an analysis of Conservative election addresses undertaken by A.K. 
Rusell shows that the Conservative party was split as to what form the fiscal 
system should take as 55 per cent of Conservative candidates shared Balfour’s 
position on retaliatory taxes while 40 per cent supported Chamberlain’s Tariff 
programme in one form or another.20     
Such divisions of opinion were also evident in North-eat Wales where 
Tariff Reform was also the leading question in the campaign, but the 
Nonconformist issues of Welsh Church Disestablishment and education also 
strongly featured.21 In Denbigh Boroughs G.T.Kenyon campaigned vigorously 
on the issue of Tariff Reform.  In a speech at Denbigh he argued that by 
placing tax on freely imported goods the Conservatives ‘would stimulate 
decaying British industries, provide work for the unemployed and ensure relief 
from starvation for millions of people in Britain’.22 Tariff Reform proved, as 
elsewhere, a difficult policy to sell in North-east Wales and was not helped by 
the schism between the Free Trade and Tariff Reform factions. Indeed, rather 
foolishly, Kenyon’s election address drew attention to these divisions: 
 
As regards the fiscal question there had been a divergence of opinion amongst 
our party between what the other side chose to call Balfourites and 
Chamberlainites, but from subsequent speeches from these two gentlemen it was 
quite clear that both aimed at the same thing - an improvement in the trade of 
the country.23  
 
Kenyon’s opponent was Clement Edwards, chief architect of the Trades 
Disputes Act of 1906, and former personal secretary to Lloyd George (see 
                                                          
18 I. Dale, ed, Conservative party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997 London: Routledge, 
2000).  
19 Russell, Liberal Landslide, the General Election of 1906,p65 
20 Ibid. 
21 Morgan, Wales in British Politics. pp.214-218.   
22 Denbighshire Free Press, 6 January 1906. 
23 Denbighshire Free Press, 6 January 1906. 
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Appendices, p322). He quickly latched on to the fact that the Conservative 
party was split on Tariff Reform while pointing out that initially Kenyon was 
unsure about a full Tariff Reform programme – first supporting Balfour’s 
position, against the apparent wishes of his local party, then to comply with it 
joining the ranks of the Tariff Reformers in time for the election campaign.24 
Such divisions and differences of opinion on Tariff Reform between members 
in local parties was not unusual at the 1906 election, and obviously caused 
difficulties for the Conservatives in presenting a coherent argument on the 
policy. In his study ‘Middle Class Realignment and Party Politics In Norwich, 
1900 -1932’ B.M. Doyle points out that in the double member constituency of 
Norwich there was not only conflict between an existing Conservative member 
but also between a prospective candidate and his father who was leader of the 
local Conservative Constituency Association:  
Problems for the Conservatives stemmed from divisions within their own party 
and personalities. The Conservative candidate in…1906 was Ernest Wild a local 
man … who was proud of his Tariff reform credentials, whilst his father, the 
leader of the local party, was a weak Balfourite. The division between candidate 
and party leader was exacerbated by the stance of the other Conservative 
member, Samuel Hoare who was an out and out Free Fooder.25              
 
 Similar divisions were also evident in Flintshire where the Liberals were 
also able to exploit divisions over Tariff Reform in the Conservative party. In 
Flint Boroughs, Sir John Eldon Bankes, unlike G.T Kenyon, supported 
Balfour’s retaliationist position on Tariff Reform. In his election address 
Bankes confirmed that: 
 
Upon the fiscal question I am a supporter of the policy associated with 
Mr.Balfour, I believe in as little restriction upon the absolute freedom of trade as 
possible, but I think that the time has come to endeavour to obtain free access 
for our  manufactures to the markets of such foreign countries as are now largely 
closed to us by hostile tariffs. These tariffs do greatly hamper the export trade of 
                                                          
24 North Wales Times, 30 December 1905. 
25 B.M. Doyle, ‘Middle Class Realignment and Party Politics in Norwich, 1900-1932’, University 
of East Anglia, PhD, 1990,p.54.   
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the country, and thereby reduce the amount of work available for our 
workingmen.26 
 
A few days later Bankes argued that Tariff Reform was a policy ‘that should 
change from time to time, not only on account of things at home, but because 
of things abroad’.27 While campaigning on behalf of the Liberal cause in the 
constituency Lloyd George seized on his comments as evidence of vacillation 
and division in the Conservative party. At Holywell, during the second week 
of campaigning, he ridiculed Bankes by saying that he ‘had read since he came 
into the constituency…the address of the Conservative–Unionist-Fiscal 
Reform-Balfourite Retaliation candidate; he really did not know, but he did not 
think from his address he really knew himself what he was’.28  
 In Flint County Harold Edwards, also supported Balfour’s fiscal 
policy.29 This was evident at Prestatyn where he argued that he approached the 
question of Tariff Reform as ‘a firm believer in Free Trade. But to be 
successful Free Trade must be universal. As things stood, though our hands 
were tied behind our back while the foreigner hit us in the face.’30  His 
campaign, though, was undermined by a sustained attack on him in the local 
Liberal press as the newspapers sought to expose differences between him and 
his father over fiscal policy. As the Rhyl Record and Advertiser, commented: 
 
The Bishop of St. Asaph has been heard to declare that if a candidate Liberal or 
Conservative were to come out as an opponent of Free Trade he would be 
inclined to appear on the platform to oppose him. Well known as the Bishop’s 
views are to many people on the fiscal question, we should like to be informed 
whether they are shared by his son? 31  
 
Perhaps more damaging was the newspaper’s assessment of Edwards’ 
first campaign speech, which it claimed was ‘more Liberal than 
Conservative’.32 This accusation was also levelled at Lord Mostyn who took 
                                                          
26 The County Herald, 12 January 1906.  
27 Flintshire Observer, 18 January 1906.  
28 The County Herald, 19 January 1906. 
29 Flintshire Observer, 4 January 1906. 
30 Ibid., 25 January 1906. 
31 Rhyl Record and Advertiser, 6 January 1906. 
32 The County Herald, 13 January 1906. 
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Balfour’s line that retaliatory taxes against countries which imposed duties on 
British exports was the way forward, rather than a full blown Tariff Reform 
programme. In a speech at Rhyl he announced that ‘on the fiscal question he 
was himself rather inclined to be a Free Trader. He had been brought up a Free 
Trader and had always been one’.33 If Lord Mostyn was (or so it appeared) a 
little confused on Tariff Reform, then he was of no more certainty over his 
party’s prospects at the forthcoming election, when he declared ‘with regard to 
the Conservative Party they may say they had a long innings, and perhaps it 
was now the time of the other side to go in’.34 He further asserted that the 
Liberal candidate, Herbert Lewis, ‘was a gentleman born in their parish, [who 
had] lived in Mostyn for many years and was the friend of many of them. He 
was a model member of parliament and he only wished Mr. Lewis was on their 
side and that they had not to fight him’.35 Lord Mostyn could hardly have 
given his political opponents a more ringing endorsement.  
It would appear, then, that the problem for the Conservative candidates 
in North-east Wales was their failure to speak with any clarity or unity on 
Tariff Reform. G.T. Kenyon’s late conversion to the policy and his attempts to 
demonstrate party unity only helped highlight the differences between party 
leaders on the initiative.  Eldon Bankes appeared unclear as to what the Tariff 
programme actually was and Lord Mostyn admitted he was both a Free Trader 
and a Balfourite. These divisions reflected the discord and confusion over the 
issue in the party nationally. According to A.K. Russell 55-60 per cent of 
Conservative candidates across the United Kingdom took refuge in advocating 
‘vague evasive’ Balfourite formulas during the election campaign.36 On the 
other hand ‘very few candidates, even among the Tariff Reformers, came out 
with a clear definition for Chamberlain’s general Tariff…and rather 
more…went out of their way to make it clear that, although supporters of fiscal 
reform they were hostile to anything approaching protection’.37 Given this 
uncertainty it is hardly surprising that the policy failed to make any positive 
                                                          
33 Flintshire Observer, 28 December 1905.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Russell, Liberal Landslide, p.87. 
37 Ibid. 
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impact during the campaign in North-east Wales or the United Kingdom as a 
whole.  
Forced onto the defensive over Tariff Reform, the Conservative party 
was also under pressure over the education question. Balfour’s 1902 Education 
Act was still the law of the land, but Liberals were pledged to administering it 
differently pending its alteration.38 A sense of injustice was strongly felt by 
Nonconformists throughout Wales, who demanded that voluntary Anglican 
and Catholic schools be brought under public control.39 In Denbigh Boroughs 
G.T Kenyon tried to counteract these arguments by suggesting such control 
would mean the end of Bible teaching in schools, commenting ‘he believed 
himself that not one parent in a hundred desired that their children should not 
be taught the Bible’.40 In Flint County Harold Edwards went a step further by 
saying ‘if they handed over the voluntary schools to the local authorities that 
particular religious education which they desired would become illegal’.41 
Such arguments had little impact and education remained a vote winner for the 
Liberals. Indeed, it was a topic that the Conservatives would have been better 
advised to avoid altogether during the election campaign.  
Unable to convince the electorate on Tariff Reform policies and 
ignored on education, Conservative candidates in North-east Wales faced an 
uphill battle. Unsurprisingly the election results were disastrous for the party. 
In Denbigh Boroughs G.T Kenyon, the one sitting Conservative MP, fell to 
Clement Edwards with a majority of 503 the largest majority ever recorded in 
the division. Kenyon later claimed he lost the constituency because working-
class Labour voters were not canvassed in Wrexham until already committed 
to his radical opponent, a conclusion confirmed by the Denbighshire Free 
Press: 
 
The victory is really due to the increased Labour vote. Since 1900 the character 
of the Wrexham electorate has been changed by the increase of votes to the 
extent of 800, practically all colliers and miners who have come into the 
                                                          
38 North Wales Times, 9 December 1905  
39 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, pp.184-187. 
40 Denbighshire Free Press, 13 January 1906. 
41 Flintshire Observer, 4 January 1906. 
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borough from East Denbighshire principally, and who supported the radical 
candidate.42  
  
In Flint Boroughs and Flint County the Liberal candidates, Howell Idris and 
Herbert Lewis, were returned with large majorities. The swing to Lewis in 
Flint County was over ten per cent compared to the general election of 1900 as 
Harold Edwards’ share of the vote crumbled to just above 36 per cent. In the 
Boroughs Bankes’ vote remained at the same level as 1900, which given the 
general collapse of the party and the swing to the Liberal party everywhere at 
the 1906 general election, was something of an achievement.  (see tables 2.2 
and 2.3). Here then amongst the despair of 1906 were the seeds of optimism, 
evidence that the Conservative vote could survive in reasonable order the 
Liberal onslaught.  
The election in North-east Wales largely corresponded to the same 
trends and fortunes faced by the Conservative party nationally. The Liberal 
party galvanised by their support for Free Trade were able to exploit divisions 
in the Conservative party over Tariff Reform and label the policy as the 
harbinger of food taxes. As Russell comments: 
 
Tariff Reform….never commanded the brains and hearts of the people, it was 
certainly tried and found wanting by all those commercial and consumer groups 
interested first and foremost in cheap food and raw materials.43 
 
Consequently, across the country voters rejected Tariff Reform and opted for 
the ‘fiscal status quo’.44 Overall, the Liberal party won 400 seats (see table 2.1) 
and its gains were remarkable, winning 223 seats from the Conservatives and 
losing only four as it succeeded in totalling 400 seats. In London they gained 
31 seats and made significant other gains across the country. Even in the rural 
areas where they had not done well since 1885 the Liberals made substantial 
gains. In Lancashire the Liberal party won 33 seats, gaining 22 from the 
Conservatives; in the South-east they won 32 seats gaining 27 seats from the 
                                                          
42 Denbighshire Free Press, 27 January 1906. 
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Conservatives and across all the Scottish regions the Liberals gained 22 
seats.45    
In North-east Wales, the Conservative party’s average share of the vote 
fell by just over 7.5 per cent compared to 1900 in the three constituencies it 
contested. (see table 2.3).  This was a little more than the party suffered 
nationally as its share of the vote fell by nearly seven per cent. This is probably 
explained by the fact that the party only contested three seats in the region and 
that the ten percent drop in Harold Edwards’ vote in Flint County, where Lord 
Mostyn gave the popular sitting Liberal MP, Herbert Lewis, a ringing 
endorsement skewed the results. By comparison, in the whole of Wales the 
Conservative vote fell by only 4.7 per cent compared to 1900, but now its 
share of the vote fell below thirty per cent for the first time and it lost all six 
MPs who had won in 1900. One ray of sunshine, however, was that the share 
of the vote for the party in North-east Wales averaged nearly 40 per cent, 
which compared favourably to the share of the vote as a whole in the 
Principality. (see table 2.3).  What the results indicated, bad as they were, was 
that there was still a substantial vote in the region to be harnessed and 
galvanised.  
Table 2.1 
The 1906 General Election. 
 
Party U.K. seats % of the vote Wales seats % of the vote 
Liberal 400 49.5 32*2 60.82 
Conservative 157 43.4   0 29.8 
Labour   30   5.9   2   7.9 *3 
Irish 
Nationalist 
  83   0.6   
*2 Includes 4 Lib- Lab candidates gaining 8.3% of the vote. 
*3 Includes Independent Labour candidate gaining 2.3% of the vote. 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997 (Aberystwyth: Y Lolfa, 1998). 
Table 2.2 
General Election in Northeast Wales, Results 1906 
 
Constituency 
   
 Liberal 
      
% 
 
Conservative
      
% 
 
Majority 
 
Denbigh East 
 
Unopposed
    
Denbigh West Unopposed     
DenbighBoro’s   2533 56.4   1960  43.6 Lib +   573 
Flint County   6294 63.8   3572  36.2 Lib + 2722 
Flint Boro’s   1899 55.5   1523  44.5 Lib +   376 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
                                                          
45 Russell, Liberal Landslide, p62. 
 67
Table 2.3. 
Percentage Vote of the Conservative Party. 
 
Region                           General Elections 
 1885     1886  1892  1895  1900  1906 
United Kingdom 43.5  51.4   47.0  49.1  50.3  43.4 
Wales 38.9  40.0   35.6  41.4  34.5  29.8 
North-east 
Wales 
44.2 38.6      41.7  43.8  47.2  39.7 
    Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Election, 1885-1997.    
  
REORGANISATION AND RECOVERY, 1906-1910. 
The 1906 election defeat demonstrated that the Conservative Party 
organisation was ill equipped for new types of challenges (Labour). The 
Liberal Party had reorganised their associations and party machinery, as early 
as1902, whereas the Unionists had been ‘struggling with the combined effects 
of apathy, inexperience and division’.46 A.K. Russell has noted that as late as 2 
January 1906, a mere five days before polling, the Conservatives were still 
appealing for volunteer workers to help canvass voters while the system of 
party agents representing area offices and established to bring Central Office 
into closer contact with local party organisation, had almost completely broken 
down.47 In the aftermath of the general election defeat the party organisation 
appeared in urgent need of repair. Under pressure from Chamberlain who was 
keen to capture the party structure for his Tariff Reform campaign, Balfour 
agreed to a party meeting at which he announced the setting up of a small 
committee to examine party organisation.48 So it was in May 1906, a standing 
advisory committee was formed, its aim to liase between the Balfourite Central 
Office and the Chamberlainite National Union. As a direct challenge to these 
initiatives and to Balfour’s authority as leader, a separate committee was 
established by the National Union to look at party organisation. This greatly 
alarmed Unionist Free Traders as it looked like a plan to seize control of 
Central Office.49 However, the Conservative leadership successfully repulsed 
Chamberlain’s attack by delaying any immediate actions or decisions and 
Chamberlain’s stroke in early July 1906 largely ended hopes of a successful 
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Chamberlainite challenge.50 Instead the Chamberlainite National Union now 
turned to ensuring control of its own affairs and removing any influence 
Central Office had over its business. An organisational committee took over 
from Central Office to supervise agents and local parties with the result that by 
July 1906 the National Union structure had been reorganised with most 
provincial divisions abolished as each county was made responsible for its 
own organisation.51  
In Wales this de-centralisation scheme saw Glamorganshire and 
Monmouthshire made into separate divisions while the eight South Wales 
constituencies outside these counties continued as a separate division. In North 
Wales, the NWDNU was left as it was prior to the 1906 general election with 
all twelve constituencies comprising the division. A new Executive Council 
and Finance Committee was established in May 1906 with Lord Penrhyn 
elected President; the Earl of Powis, Vice-President; Lord Kenyon, Chairman; 
L.A. Brodrick, Treasurer and R.A. Mainwaring, Secretary (see Appendices, 
Structure of Wales/North-east Wales Conservatives 1885-1918 pp320-321).52 
Each member of the Executive Committee came from the landed gentry and 
each was a committed Tariff Reformer, confirming the takeover by the 
Chamberlainite faction.  
On 30 March 1906 Conservative representatives from all over the region 
met at Eaton Hall, the seat of the Duke of Westminster, to discuss the party 
organisation. Lord Kenyon opened the proceedings by reading a letter from 
Lord Penrhyn, who was unable to attend, but emphasised that there was: 
 
…. A paramount need and imperative necessity for a thorough revision, and 
where necessary complete construction of the electoral machinery in all the 
constituencies; and I hope that in dealing with this part of the question the policy 
of the new broom and the clean sweep, wherever it is wanted may be 
adopted….. I should like to go a step further and say that as the last election 
taught us the lesson that Labour have come to stay, it seems to me that we ought 
accordingly to consider whether it would not be wiser for our party to search in 
some constituencies for Unionist or Conservative working men who would be 
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willing to serve efficiently as our parliamentary representatives instead of our 
going on in the old groove of the selection of candidates amongst a limited 
number of persons, who are higher in the social scale. 53 
 
What Lord Penrhyn had identified was the need to modernise the party 
and incorporate a more diverse membership, including working class 
candidates. As a staunch supporter of Tariff Reform his recommendations 
reflected the wider aims of the Chamberlainite Tariff Reform faction to 
capture the party organisation, extend the party’s appeal and remove 
opponents of Tariff Reform. As Dutton confirms: 
 
Reorganisation and the ultimate triumph of tariff reform were inextricably 
linked in Chamberlain’s mind…The old structure, Chamberlain believed, had 
been finally discredited ‘and a great democratic and representative organisation’ 
should now be substituted in its place…the party’s representative association 
should now be reviewed with the object of popularising them, and of securing 
working class involvement.54   
 
Thus Lord Penrhyn hoped to make the party more inclusive, attract working-
class votes and undermine the advance of Labour and its electoral pact with the 
Liberal party. It was with the intention of addressing this and the concerns of 
party activists that the following resolutions drafted at Eaton Hall were 
unanimously passed:     
 
1. That it is desirable to perfect and extend the organisation of the Unionist Party 
so as to enlist the counsel and co-operation of all ranks in the promotion of its 
aims. 
2. That it is desirable that every seat should be contested at the next election, and 
that every candidate should be selected with reasonable dispatch.  
3. That it is expedient to enlist the services of women of all ranks in furtherance of 
the ends of the Party. 
4 That this conference is of the opinion that several efforts should immediately be 
made in each constituency to raise by annual subscriptions a fund which all 
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Unionists should be invited to subscribe, according to their means for the 
purpose of organisation and the furtherance of Unionist principles.  
5. That a representative committee be appointed to confer with the committee 
appointed by Central Council of the National Union as to the best means for 
carrying into effect in conjunction with the county and borough Associations in 
North Wales the above resolutions.55 
 
The problems that faced the NWDNU were those it had faced prior to the 1906 
general election – the constituency association was and is very much, as Stuart 
Ball points out, ‘the vital unit of organisation within the party’. Its centrality 
has been buttressed by a constantly re-iterated doctrine of local autonomy’.56 
As a result not all constituency associations in North-east Wales complied with 
the resolutions and those that did only applied them in piecemeal fashion.    
The West Denbighshire Constitutional Association proved receptive to 
Lord Penrhyn’s suggestions and the NWDNU’s resolutions. A review held 
shortly after the election revealed that there were difficulties in a number of 
areas – most notably the failure to appoint a parliamentary candidate and the 
lack of funds.57 In this they were not alone. Russell confirms that by the end of 
1905 ‘the whole Unionist organisation had become distinctly rather sleepy’ 
while T.A. Jenkins’ study of the Conservative party in Thornbury, a rural 
county constituency in Gloucestershire – not too dissimilar to West 
Denbighshire - reveals a Conservative Association in December 1906 ‘sunk by 
apathy’ in many areas with local committees ‘virtually moribund’ in others.58  
However, the West Denbighshire Association took the decision to appoint a 
sub- committee to ‘consider the present and future position of the party’.59  
After deliberating the four-man sub-committee reported to a General 
Meeting of the Association held on 23 April 1906, making a number of 
recommendations, which they proposed be adopted by the late Summer of 
1906: 
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a. Voluntary work be utilised in preparing the Register. 
b.  A secretary be appointed without salary for one year, but whose travelling 
expenses and out of pocket expenses be paid by the Committee. 
c. An agent or agents be paid by the Association to appear in the Revision Courts on 
behalf of the four registration districts (Llangollen and Llansilin; Ruthin and 
Denbigh; Colwyn Bay and Abergele; Llanrwst, Pentrefoelas and Cerrig-y- 
Drudion). 
d. The appointment of a Chairman in each electoral division (i.e. County Council 
division). 
e. The formation of parish committees. 60  
 
These resolutions did not directly address those concerns expressed by the 
NWDNU, but did address the problems of Conservative organisation in the 
constituency. All the resolutions were adopted, a secretary and four revision 
court agents were appointed, but bearing in mind the Eaton Hall meeting it was 
decided not to have them printed as rules as it was envisaged that the 
resolutions emanating from the NWDNU would in due course also be 
adopted.61 Indeed, over the next couple of years the West Denbighshire 
Association started to implement the NWDNU’s as well as their own 
recommendations.  
During 1906 the Association set about set about introducing a new 
organisation structure, including the appointment of a Chairman in each 
electoral division, and the formation of Conservative committees in each 
parish in the constituency.62 The new structure was adopted during the latter 
half of 1906 and by the end of 1907 the Association reported ‘the scheme 
began in 1906 is being perfected as much as possible and has succeeded in 
breathing new life into the cause of Unionism …parish committees have been 
organised in 43 parishes’.63 To aid the new structure successful meetings were 
held in villages and towns throughout the constituency while thousands of 
leaflets were distributed.64  
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Not content with these new ideas and structures the Association went 
one step further in 1908 and adopted a working-class candidate, Sam 
Thompson, as per Lord Penrhyn’s recommendations. Thompson was an ex- 
miner who hailed from Tylorstown in the Rhondda Valley, where in 1902 he 
became Chairman of the town’s Conservative club and Chairman of the 
Rhondda Conservative Association before becoming a member of the South 
Wales Division of the National Union. Thompson was engaged by the Tariff 
Reform League for the 1906 general election campaign and was a sub-agent to 
Griffith-Boscawen at the East Denbighshire by-election in April 1906. He was 
also one of the main speakers engaged by the West Denbighshire Conservative 
Association for a series of meetings held during January 1908 aimed at 
educating the farming community and working men into the benefits of 
colonial preference and protection policies.65 As a result he came to the 
attention of party leaders who subsequently championed his candidature for 
West Denbighshire, still without a parliamentary candidate in June 1908. In 
recommending him to Colwyn Bay Unioinists Lord Kenyon remarked: 
 
That in Mr. Thompson, whom he warmly recommended as a candidate for the 
division, they had a man who would prove that the other party did not possess a 
monopoly of able workingmen politicians ….he would like to see a local 
resident come forward but as none suitable could be found, he hoped Colwyn 
Bay would support Mr.Thompson who was a good fellow and a very zealous 
worker.66 
 
Sam Thompson not only fulfilled Lord Penrhyn’s ambitions to field working 
class candidates in North Wales, but also gave the West Denbighshire 
Constitutional Association an opportunity to adopt a candidate who knew the 
difficulties faced by Conservatives in the constituency, having previously 
campaigned in this Liberal stronghold. Although the leaders would have 
preferred a local candidate, Thompson’s knowledge of Welsh was a bonus 
enabling the Conservative party to speak to the largely rural electorate in their 
native tongue. Consequently at a meeting of the West Denbighshire 
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Conservatives at the end of June 1908 Thompson was selected as candidate. 
The Denbighshire Free Press commented: 
 
West Denbighshire in adopting a workingman Conservative candidate has given 
a lead to other constituencies. The importance of this step lies in the fact that 
there is a movement afoot having for its object the formation of a Conservative 
labour group in the House of Commons, and it only needs the return of Mr. 
Thompson and a few others like him to ensure the successful inauguration of the 
movement.67 
   
Parliamentary campaigns were expensive and according to Ball most 
‘local Associations expected their candidates to be men of standing and of 
means. They normally had to provide the expenses for each election, to pay a 
substantial annual subscription to the constituency association and of course to 
maintain themselves’.68 This was obviously not possible with Sam Thompson, 
but the West Denbighshire Association’s finances were in a healthy state - 
some of the wealthiest landowners in North Wales lived in West Denbighshire 
such as the Mainwaring and Wynne families.69 Furthermore, to ensure that 
funds were in place the Association instituted a new subscription collection 
scheme in April 1907 whereby parish committees were made responsible for 
collecting small subscriptions and a new body of collectors was created to 
approach all probable subscribers with a view to maximising funds. So 
successful was this system that by the end of 1907 over £320 had been 
collected with a balance in hand at the bank of £85. This enabled the 
Association to support Thompson with campaign literature, some of which 
was in Welsh, and distribute free the newspaper ‘The North Wales 
Conservative and Unionist’.  Even so, to fund Thompson’s campaigns many 
West Denbighshire Conservatives doubled their subscriptions during 1909 and 
1910.70  This probably explains why Sam Thompson was one of only eight 
working class Conservatives standing at the January 1910 general election – 
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less well off constituency associations were simply unable to afford the 
expense of running such a candidate.71 Thus, what the West Denbighshire 
Constitutional Association did between 1906 and 1910 was re-invigorate 
Conservatism in Denbighshire by overhauling its organisation, adopting a 
systematic approach to subscription collection, furthering the political aims of 
the party with concentrated leaflet distribution, and appointing a working class 
candidate. In doing so it not only applied most of the NWDNU’s resolutions 
but also introduced some of their own schemes.   
In November 1907, on the retirement of G.T. Kenyon, the Denbigh 
Boroughs Association chose William Arthur Ormsby-Gore, son of the Third 
Baron Harlech, as their parliamentary candidate, thus ignoring Lord Penrhyn’s 
advice (see Appendices, p323).72 His selection owed much to his family’s 
political connections and the landed network that existed in the region. Lord 
Kenyon, Chairman of the Denbigh Boroughs Association, was Lord Harlech’s 
cousin and thus had very strong family connections. Furthermore, Lord 
Harlech was the former Tory MP for Oswestry and Chairman of its Unionist 
Association, and, perhaps even more significantly, was a regular contributor to 
the Denbigh Boroughs Constitutional Association while his wife Lady 
Harlech, was President of the Wrexham Women’s Unionist Association. Lord 
Harlech’s subscription of £100 each year was obviously important, but the 
relationship between the Kenyon and Harlech families would surely have been 
the deciding factor in Ormsby–Gore’s appointment. Nevertheless, the choice of 
a landed aristocrat did not appear an inspired one given that Wrexham was the 
largest town in the constituency and the centre of the mining industry in the 
region and was lost in 1906 so the party believed, to working class votes going 
to Labour.73   
Yet the Conservatives had developed strong ties with the working-class 
in the division. As early as 1905 the Wrexham Conservative and Unionist 
Workingmen’s Association was formed and by 1908 it claimed to have 800 
members, most of whom were on the electoral register.74 This was in stark 
contrast to the Independent Labour Party, formed in 1897, which despite being 
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one of the first four established in Wales, and the only one in the North of the 
country, suffered from low membership.75 The allure of the Conservative party 
in the town was probably based on a deliberate move by the Wrexham 
Association to emphasise the social aspect of its organisation. The emphasis, 
as with most Conservative Workingmen’s Associations, was on social events, 
spurning the puritanical temperance atmosphere of many Liberal and Labour 
Associations.76 Between 1906 and 1910 the Association redoubled its efforts 
to increase working class membership: meetings were held on a regular basis 
and picnics, garden parties, fetes, social gatherings and snooker competitions 
were all held in a bid to generate working-class support. Attendances were 
often high, for example, the third annual picnic to Horsley Hall Rossett, five 
miles south of Wrexham, attracted approximately 500 people.77 Yet to ensure 
that the Conservative cause was not forgotten every gathering was 
accompanied by a political speech introducing Conservative opinions under 
the guise of convivial entertainment.  
Without permanent premises of its own between 1905 and 1908 the 
workingmen’s movement met at several locations in the Wrexham area, but 
finally in May 1908 the Association moved to a permanent premises in the 
town centre.  At the opening Dr. Edward Jones, chairman, in reviewing the 
history of the Association said: 
 
It had now been in existence about three years and as they knew had been 
labouring under a very great disadvantage for want of suitable premises, but in 
spite of this their political enthusiasm was such that they had put up with the 
conditions. The membership had grown to such an extent that the leaders of the 
Conservative party thought that recognition should be given to what was 
undoubtedly that portion of the party which had always been ready and willing, 
although a new force in the town to throw in its lot in the time of need… The 
membership had greatly increased and he hoped during the next year to see 
instead of 800 a membership of 1800.78 
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With such large membership and now a permanent premises the future 
looked bright for the Association. Although no membership figures were 
published at the annual meeting in February 1909 it was reported ‘the 
membership had greatly increased and the balance in the bank [had more] than 
doubled’.79  
Unfortunately there is little information available regarding attempts by 
the Conservatives to harness working class support elsewhere in the region. It 
appears that in Flintshire there were no sustained efforts to increase working 
class membership. Nonetheless, the East Denbighshire Association appeared to 
be doing more to attract working–class members as at the end of October 1909 
a new Unionist Club was opened at the Plas Kynaston estate, a few miles south 
of Wrexham, for the workingmen of the Cefn, Rhosymedre and Acrefair 
polling districts which immediately attracted 130 members.80  No further 
information exists as to the success of such initiatives in East Denbighshire 
and it was probably only in the industrial areas in and around Wrexham, 
perhaps understandably given the loss of working class votes in 1906, that 
most efforts were made.  
Resolution 3 at the Eaton Hall meeting stated that it was ‘expedient to 
enlist the services of women’. This did not mean that Conservatives in North-
east Wales suddenly anticipated an extended role for women in political 
debate. Female suffrage was still some way off and while every Conservative 
leader since Disraeli expressed sympathy for women’s suffrage they did not 
take the opportunity to extend the franchise when in office. As J. Lovenduski, 
P. Norris and C. Burgess have pointed out ‘the Conservatives were almost 
continuously in office between 1886 and 1905 and hence had no need to run 
the risks involved in extending the franchise’.81 With the change in the 
political landscape after 1906 the profile of women’s franchise increased in 
prominence, but even now attitudes towards the subject were mixed in the 
Conservative party – G. E. Maguire concludes that – ‘if the Conservative 
leadership was tepidly in favour of women’s suffrage, much of the rank and 
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file were not’.82 Yet their potential as party activists, women made excellent 
canvassers, was certainly acknowledged and this gave the Conservative party 
the incentive to embrace women as party workers.83 
The Denbigh Boroughs Association was the first in North-east Wales to 
organise a women’s membership with the creation in June 1907 of the 
Wrexham Conservative and Unionist Women’s Association.84 The Wrexham 
Women’s Association held a variety of functions, often heavily biased towards 
social and convivial entertainments, but as with the Workingmen’s Association 
there was also some emphasis on political induction. As a result the Women’s 
Associations meetings educated their members in the issues of the day 
including Free Trade and Tariff Reform. In Wrexham the Association proved 
to be so successful that by June 1907 it was, according to the North Wales 
Guardian, one of the ‘most flourishing ladies organisations in the whole of 
North Wales and the Border counties’.85  
The Wrexham Association also gave women a political voice, albeit a 
minor one, for the first time. At the inaugural meeting of this body in June 
1907, one of its members, Mrs. Collum, appeared eager to promote women’s 
roles in politics while acknowledging their accepted position as Conservative 
women: 
 
She need not apologise to those of the superior sex for women taking an interest 
in politics for she was sure at the present time everyone realised that women 
must take an interest in politics because politics meant the welfare of the nation. 
They could not separate women from the nation for a nation was only composed 
of homes after all and just as women had their proper sphere so they had their 
own sphere in the wider life of the nation … she thought in influencing public 
opinion and in forwarding the Unionist cause in a legitimate way, the women 
would be doing a great public cause.86 
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Mrs. Collum’s speech very much reflected the dual roles Conservative women 
were expected to perform in the early twentieth century society. This was a 
careful blend of private and public roles, designed not to undermine men’s 
dominant position in politics-supporting Conservative party policy, but 
emphasising the virtues of a stable home. As Beatrix Campbell concludes: 
‘Women, for Conservatism, embodied the link between private and public: for 
Conservative women, the home was never fully separated from ‘the world’, it 
was always the altar of Conservatism’s moral values. The home and the family 
were the crucible and the cause of capital accumulation’.87 Thus women were 
seen as vital for creating a happy domestic environment, the backbone of a 
secure wealthy stable capitalist state, from which men, and in particular 
Conservative men, could influence and direct political and economic affairs. It 
was by perpetuating this careful balancing act that the Wrexham Women’s 
Association continued to flourish.  
At the Association’s First Annual General Meeting held in November 
1908, Mrs. W.C Bridgeman (wife of William Bridgeman MP for Shropshire) 
lectured the members on party organisation and Mrs. Fletcher (wife of the 
Conservative MP for Hampstead) even spoke on Tariff Reform.  Furthermore 
women remained important party workers.  At a Wrexham Women’s Association 
meeting in December 1908 Harold Tilby, candidate for Flint Boroughs, during 
his speech noted that ‘ladies were infinitely better canvassers – they stuck to the 
job’.88 However, despite their new found voice this was where the role of women 
in Conservative politics in North-east Wales chiefly stayed until the post-war 
widening of the franchise. Indeed, while the Women’s Association played a vital 
role during the Denbigh Boroughs 1910 election victory working arduously 
behind the scenes with canvassing and clerical work it still remained an ancillary 
organisation. As elsewhere the leadership of the Women’s Association came 
exclusively from the landed classes, but what it did do in conjunction with the 
Workingmen’s Association was successfully build an army of party activists in 
the Denbigh Boroughs constituency which acted as a template for other 
associations in North-east Wales during the post 1910 election period.   
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Elsewhere implementation of the NWDNU’s resolutions was less 
thorough. In East Denbighshire the Conservative and Unionist Association 
created a new divisional structure by 1908. Little evidence remains of how this 
structure operated, but it was based on the model in operation in West 
Denbighshire with a number of polling district committees created each with a 
chairman and secretary. At the Annual Meeting in February 1908, Major 
Radcliffe, organising secretary of the NWDNU, praised the organisational 
developments that the Association had undertaken. According to the North Wales 
Guardian: 
 
He commended the arrangement the better organisation of the division and 
referred to the fact that for the ‘first time for many years the finances of East 
Denbighshire showed a balance on the right side a circumstance which spoke 
highly of the President Sir Watkin and the agent Mr. Leah. It showed a great 
deal of work had been done during the past year and that there was much 
enthusiasm amongst the Party.89  
 
Unfortunately no further evidence exists to demonstrate how this 
situation was achieved. At this stage the East Denbighshire Association was 
the most secretive in North-east Wales – power was retained by just two 
officers: Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn as President and Treasurer and Lord 
Kenyon as Vice –President aided by Mr. J Leah as organising secretary and 
constituency agent. Amongst the Watkin Williams–Wynn and Kenyon papers 
there is no information about how Conservative affairs in East Denbighshire 
were run during this period nor are there any substantial articles in the local 
press concerning meetings or conferences, with the exception of the short 
article on the Annual meeting for 1908. Apart from the encouraging words 
uttered by Major Radcliffe on the re-organisation of the division and the 
opening of the new workingmen’s club at Plas Kynaston in October 1909 there 
is nothing more on the adoption of the NWDNU resolutions. In addition Sir 
Watkin Wynn’s almost omnipotent power as President of the Association and 
his authority as the major landowner in the region would have made criticism 
of his actions unlikely and so it becomes difficult to judge the progress of the 
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party in East Denbighshire during this period, although the words of Major 
Radcliffe indicate that some form or reorganisation plan was instituted.  
Only the Flintshire Constitutional Association failed to respond 
positively to the NWDNU’s resolutions. When Harold Tilby, the Tory 
candidate for Flint Boroughs visited Caerwys in February 1908, he commented 
on the lack of Conservative workers in the area:  
 
There were unattached men who owned no party - they were the most important 
men in the Kingdom, because it was the unattached who decided the fate of 
governments. If the Party was not a living organisation then they could be 
certain those unattached men would drift…into the camp of the opponent’.90  
 
Tilby’s comments were designed to galvanise efforts in the constituency, 
warning his assembled audience that an election could be held ‘before the 
Conservative party were ready for the fray’.91 His warning was ignored and 
organisation in Flintshire remained poor with the result that two more election 
defeats followed in 1910.The Association’s 1910 general election report 
blamed the poor results on:  
 
The leaders in the localities – with some bright exceptions - are much too 
apathetic-and leave the working of the campaign to the rank and file. This is 
most disastrous for experience shows that the rank and file generally will not 
attempt to carry on the necessary work except under the direction and with the 
assistance of their natural leaders.92 
 
By blaming the leaders in the localities the report diverted criticism away from 
the Association’s failure to improve its organisation after 1906, which begs the 
question, why did the Association fail to adopt the NWDNU’s resolutions and 
incorporate the much-needed changes? First, it is possible that Lord Mostyn 
saw the Eaton Hall resolutions as an attempt to undermine his authority. 
Mostyn had professed sympathies for the Balfourite position on fiscal reform 
and in opposition to the Tariff Reform wing of the party, which had captured 
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the National Union, was thus in conflict with the NWDNU officers, who were 
all passionate Tariff Reformers. Once the Chamberlainite National Union set 
about in 1906 purging its own organisation of Central Office influence, a 
Balfourite such as Lord Mostyn would have been a potential obstacle to 
leading Tariff Reformers in North Wales and thus the object of attack which is 
how Mostyn interpreted the Eaton Hall resolutions. The fact that no Flintshire 
Constitutional Association member was elected to an officer’s post at the 
NWDNU’s elections in August 1906 would only have reinforced Mostyn’s 
suspicions, breeding petty jealousies and resentment resulting in a resistance 
by the Flintshire Constitutional Association to implement changes emanating 
from this organisation. According to Ball, jealousies were not unusual in the 
party in Wales and he points out that in South Wales during the reorganisation 
of the National Union in 1906 ‘a good deal of mutual jealousy existed’ as its 
organisation became fragmented. With so many landowners jockeying for 
position and holding differing views the possibility of petty jealousies growing 
and fermenting cannot either be discounted during the party’s re-building 
exercise in North-east Wales.93   
 On the other hand, petty jealousies and political rivalries do not 
necessarily explain why the Flintshire Constitutional Association failed to 
reorganise itself after 1906. Lord Mostyn must surely have been aware of the 
party’s organisational shortcomings in Flintshire. A far simpler reason may be 
that Lord Mostyn was simply ill equipped and incapable of supervising 
change. Ormsby-Gore’s description of him during a 1913 Flint Boroughs by-
election campaign meeting hinted at his lack of leadership skills. ‘Lord Mostyn 
was full of fuss’, Ormsby-Gore informed his mother, ‘but doesn’t get much 
forwarder’.94   
Flintshire aside, what the evidence suggests is that between 1906 and 
1910 significant efforts were made to improve the Conservative party’s 
organisation in North-east Wales. These efforts were part of a National Union 
strategy to obtain control over the local constituency associations and propel 
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them towards a firmer Tariff Reform commitment. At the same time the 
NWDNU’s resolutions benefited those constituency associations which 
implemented them. New divisional structures were put in place, which brought 
the associations into closer contact with their members and the drive to 
incorporate working-class and women’s membership had long-term benefits 
for the local organisations, both in securing votes and in improving 
canvassing. Even though the response to the NWDNU resolutions was 
somewhat piecemeal, in general organisation was still in a better state by 1910 
than it was in other Welsh regions. According to Felix Aubel, in many Welsh 
constituencies prior to 1918 there were ‘no active divisional Associations in 
existence’.95 In North-east Wales the situation compared favourably with this 
picture, as associations now existed in every division. Furthermore, the 
attempts to revitalise the party organisation came at a time when strained 
relations between Central Office and the National Union was distracting unity 
of purpose. This according to Neal Blewett had an adverse effect on 
organisation as ‘the slow corrosion of the once superb….machine and the 
strained relations between the National Union and Central Office had sapped 
the vigour and vitality of the constituency association, even the traumatic 
shock of 1906 had failed to revitalise them’.96 This perhaps is too much of a 
generalisation as T.A Jenkins’ essay on Conservatism in Thornbury reveals 
and as this thesis demonstrates reorganisation plans were established by 
constituency associations after the 1906 general election. Thus the evidence 
tends to confirm Duttton’s assertion that ‘the shock of defeat in 1906 induced 
many Unionist Associations to review their positions and initiate change’.97 
Even so, changes were not universally applied, inadequacies in organisation 
remaining in areas across the country, and the North-east Wales constituency 
associations would still suffer from organisational inadequacies at and after the 
1910 general election despite the efforts made after 1906.    
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RECOVERY AND REORGANISATION: TARIFF REFORM, 
CAMPAIGNING AND THE PRIMROSE LEAGUE 1906-1910. 
In spite of his defeat in Flint County at the 1906 general election there 
appeared to be no imminent threat to the position of the Conservative 
parliamentary candidate Harold Edwards. However, subsequent attempts by 
his father, the Bishop of St Asaph, to reach an accommodation with the Liberal 
party over Welsh education had serious implications for his candidature. On 9 
April 1906 the new Liberal government took the opportunity to amend 
Balfour’s 1902 Act introducing a new Bill which proposed to bring all public 
schools under local authority control and to make religious instruction 
optional. The Bill attracted opposition from all quarters of the Conservative 
party and eventually met its nemesis in the House of Lords. Thereafter, 
education receded from the forefront of Welsh politics, but in March 1908 a 
compromise measure was introduced by the Bishop of St.Asaph after a 
consultation with Lloyd George. It recommended the transfer of all public 
schools to local authority control, with three days set aside for religious 
denominational education each week.98 This measure also failed but not before 
it caused consternation amongst Churchmen and Conservatives alike. This was 
especially so in North-east Wales where the diocese of St.Asaph was situated.  
In early 1909 L.A Brodrick, treasurer of the NWDNU, informed Harold 
Edwards that the financial support for his candidature would ‘no longer be 
forthcoming because he thought that those persons who contributed to the fund 
would be no longer willing to do so because of… the Bishop of St.Asaph’s 
education policy and because he entertained as his guest the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’.99 A perplexed Harold Edwards wrote to the chairman of the 
NWDNU, Lord Kenyon, who replied: 
 
It is no doubt that the Bishop did excite a great deal of resentment by his 
Education Bill. It was ascribed by many to the influence of Mr.Lloyd George 
and colour was given to this by the visit paid to the Palace by Mr.Lloyd 
George… Now the question is how does this effect your position as candidate 
for the County? Are the sins of the father to be visited on the son? Mr Brodrick 
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says yes that he cannot raise money for your campaign…If this is the case I am 
afraid it does show that a certain number of your supporters are dissatisfied …100  
    
Lord Kenyon further informed Edwards that there was no intention to 
replace him, but suggested that he lay the matter before the Flintshire 
Association which at this stage was unaware of the situation.101 Edwards wrote 
to P.T Davies- Cooke, Chairman of the Association’s Finance Committee, who 
promised to put the matter before the party leaders. He received a reply from 
Basil Philips, Acting-Chairman of the party in the absence of Lord Mostyn, 
who said: 
 
There has no doubt been a great amount of uneasiness among the rank and file 
of the party since the Bishop introduced his Education Bill and also entertained 
Lloyd George, and in the event of a contest a great many Conservatives and 
Churchmen will not give you the support they would like to on this account. Till 
I received your letter I had no idea that Mr. Brodrick and Lord Kenyon were 
taking action in this matter, nor has anyone discussed the situation with me…It 
is no use not looking facts in the face and I am afraid that after the events that 
have happened it would be useless for you to try and win the seat.102 
 
 Finally, a meeting was arranged between Edwards and Davies-Cooke. 
Accompanying Davies Cooke was Randle Mainwaring, co-Treasurer of the 
NWDNU. Davies-Cooke informed Edwards that at a meeting held by the 
leaders of the Flintshire Association it was decided that:   
 
I was not a suitable candidate because my views on Tariff Reform were not 
sound, and much emphasis was laid upon this unsoundness being the reason for 
my unsuitability. Not one of these gentlemen, however, asked me what my 
views on Tariff Reform were. I pointed out that I had never heard a hint that my 
views on Tariff Reform were unacceptable, and from the first had proclaimed 
myself a loyal supporter of Mr. Balfour. Their reply amounted to this that ‘they 
wanted more than Balfour they wanted Birmingham’…. 103  
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Birmingham was the adopted home of Joseph Chamberlain, chief architect of 
Tariff Reform policies during the early twentieth century, and faced with this 
and finding his position untenable Edwards finally resigned, stating ‘that this 
dissatisfaction was quite sufficient to compel me at once to announce my 
retirement from the work of candidate’.104    
The leaders present at the meeting, which precipitated Edwards’ 
resignation, were Lord Kenyon, Davies-Cooke, Basil Philips, Hugh Peel, 
Frank Hurlbutt, P.P. Pennant, J Lloyd- Price and E.Morgan. All were members 
of the Flintshire Constitutional Association’s executive committee and Lord 
Kenyon, Pennant, Peel, Davies–Cooke and Hurlbutt were all known to be 
Tariff Reformers as was L.A.Brodrick, who in his role as a Treasurer of the 
NWDNU had initiated the move against Edwards. Lord Kenyon, Pennant and 
Randle Mainwaring were also senior members of the NWDNU, which was 
affiliated to the National Union, the organisation that had been captured by the 
Tariff Reform wing of the party. The assurance that Tariff Reform was the real 
reason for Edwards’ unsuitability is probably true; the evidence suggests that 
his father’s relationship with Lloyd George was merely an expedient to mount 
a campaign against him. After all, the Bishop of St. Asaph, Lord Kenyon, and 
Pennant were all involved with Lloyd George in attempts to find compromise 
solutions to the education question.105  It was not suggested that disciplinary 
action be taken against these senior Tories.  
Curiously, given Lord Mostyn’s announcements on Free Trade and 
retaliation policies, Harold Tilby, a businessman and county councillor, was 
adopted candidate for Flint Boroughs on 18 January 1908, and Colonel 
Howard, a landowner from St.Asaph, was adopted candidate for Flint County 
after Edwards’ resignation. Both were committed Tariff Reformers, so all 
Conservative candidates in North-east Wales now represented the fiscal reform 
wing of the party, indicating that the Chamberlainite movement against Free 
Traders and Balfourites had by 1909 succeeded.  
Tariff Reform became an integral policy to the Conservative party in 
North-east Wales because it offered protection for British industry by placing 
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taxes on imported goods and thereby promised to increase industrial output 
and create employment. It proposed preferential agreements with the Colonies, 
a move designed to secure unity in the Empire and prevent countries such as 
Canada reaching a fiscal alliance with the United States. As an agricultural 
policy it would, by placing taxes on imported foodstuffs including meat, 
encourage farm production and alleviate rural unemployment.106 The revenue 
from such proposals might also be used to fund social amelioration and a 
reduction on land rates. Such a range of possibilities meant Tariff Reform was 
an infinitely malleable policy, which could be moulded to suit a number of 
political and economic contexts. 
This was clearly the attraction in the economically and socially diverse 
regions of North-east Wales where it could be tailored to different social 
circumstances. Speeches by Harold Tilby in Flint Boroughs in February 1908 
and by Sam Thompson a little later in West Denbighshire, demonstrate how 
they adjusted Tariff Reform to suit the different types of constituency in the 
region. Flint Boroughs was largely an industrial constituency, most of its 
contributory boroughs situated in and around the coal and quarrying areas of 
North-east Wales. At Caerwys, for example, Tilby outlined the employment 
advantages Tariff Reform offered and the apparent damage government Free 
Trade policies were inflicting on local industry:      
 
They should deal…with the question of how to get more employment for their 
own people. Rhyl had borrowed for improvements £14,000 and one of the 
questions asked was where did they get the cement. They were told Belgium. 
Why not Caerwys cement so much nearer home? The reply was that Caerwys 
cement was sixpence a ton dearer. It was strange that cement could be made in 
Belgium and exported to this country at a cheaper rate than manufacturers 
within a few miles of where the cement was required. 107 
 
According to Tilby the only way of protecting industry and increasing local 
employment was by implementing Tariff Reform policies.    
By contrast West Denbighshire was the most rural constituency in the 
region with farming the largest employer. To turn the tide against the Liberal 
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party Sam Thompson had to embrace these agricultural voters and persuade 
them that Liberal policies were not working. At Llanbedr near Ruthin, 
Thompson explained how Free Trade was impeding agriculture and what the 
Conservatives intended to do about it:       
 
They had lost in this country by far the greatest part of the trade in all cereals; it 
had been taken way by foreign countries. The farmers had turned to breeding 
cattle and butter making. The foreigners were now taking away a great deal of 
their market in meat and they were selling a great deal of foreign meat as Welsh. 
The foreigners sent in these goods without paying a halfpenny towards the taxes 
of the country… what objection could there be to calling on foreigners to pay 
the taxation, which we had to pay? 108 
   
For Conservatives in North-east Wales Tariff Reform offered an 
attractive and an all-embracing cure for both industrial and agricultural ills. It 
gave a formulated policy that might galvanise the party in the same way Free 
Trade had the Liberals in 1906 and hopefully avoid the ignominy of another 
election defeat. It was of little surprise then, that by 1908 local Conservatives 
had moved to endorse the full programme, believing as Ormsby-Gore did ‘that 
the principles of Tariff Reform were of a national character, and that they 
made for building up and security of their industries, made for more 
employment and a more prosperous time than had existed during the past few 
years’.109 Yet to win the next general election whenever it was called required 
more than just flexible and attractive policy, it needed organisation, volunteers, 
money and enthusiasm, the ‘nuts and bolts’ of electoral management to which 
the party had long-looked to the Primrose League to help facilitate. In the 
period between 1906 and 1910 the Primrose League extended the party 
message throughout the region. Without it the Conservative party’s ability to 
reach a wide audience and to maintain a large number of party workers would 
have been severely restricted.  
 However, despite its importance and the vital role it played in 
Conservative politics by 1906 the League was in decline.  Pugh asserts that the 
Conservative general election victories in 1895 and 1900 ‘induced a certain 
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complacency in Primrose League circles’ [and that] ‘the peculiar dependence 
of local Habitations on patronage and initiative of leading families often 
inhibited their political vigour….some neglected their political function in 
favour of an unchanging routine of social activities’.110 This complacency 
inevitably led to a number of Habitations closing across the country as a result 
of which the League ‘sometimes failed to provide effective assistance to the 
party’.111 Between1886 and 1904 a number of Habitations closed in North-east 
Wales, from a peak of 21 habitations in 1886 only thirteen remained in 1904 
(see Table 2.4).  Those that closed included the Rossett Habitation which had 
previously claimed over 200 members, and the Holywell Habitation whose 
Ruling Councillor was Lord Mostyn. All of the other Habitations that closed 
had less than 200 members, although the failure to re-open the Wrexham 
Habitation was more than offset by the flourishing Workingmen and Women’s 
Associations in the town.  In spite of these closures those thirteen Habitations 
that survived membership remained buoyant and League functions continued 
to play an integral role in North-east Wales society. For example, the Denbigh 
Habitation recorded a membership in excess of 800 during the period 1908-
1909, with 136 new members joining in 1907-1908 and 58 in 1908-1909. 112 
Regular well-attended meetings and functions were held by the Habitation. 
The most successful gathering during the period was the League fete held at 
Denbigh Castle in August 1909, at which over 1,200 members from the local 
Habitations attended. The proceedings followed their usual course and the 
Denbighshire Free Press reported that:  
 
It was a great success from every point of view, the large number present, the 
excellence of the arrangements throughout, the splendid tea provided, the 
glorious fine weather, and the useful eloquent and convincing speeches made by 
speakers of proved ability, the pleasant relations between all classes, the 
charming music, the enjoyable dancing, every element combined to make it a 
memorable gathering. 113 
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Leading Conservatives from all over the region attended. In addition the fete 
was given a political slant with two open-air platforms upon which a string of 
speakers including Colonel Mesham, Orbsby-Gore, Lawrence Brodrick and 
Colonel Howard, attacked Lloyd George’s recently introduced Budget.  
The League remained vibrant in Flintshire despite a number of closures. 
Here the Hundred of Maelor Habitation, whose Ruling Councillor was Lord 
Kenyon, retained a membership in excess of 300 and held regular functions 
and social events. The annual fete at Iscoyd Park in September 1908 attracted a 
large attendance and heard a speech by Harry Barnston, the prospective 
Unionist candidate for Eddisbury, Chester. The North Wales Guardian 
concluded ‘the fete was a magnificent success’.114 This set the template for 
League activities in the region for at nearly every function held between 1906 
and 1910 the political speech remained an integral part of the proceedings, 
communicating the Conservative message to a wide audience was after all its 
raison d’etre. The League demonstrated this political potential when the 
Denbigh and Ruthin Habitations provided a number of party workers and 
canvassers to Ormsby-Gore’s successful general election campaign in Denbigh 
Boroughs in January 1910. Thus the Primrose League remained an integral 
component in the Conservative party machine in North-east Wales and the 
work undertaken by those remaining Habitations were vital to the success and 
survival of the party in the region.  
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Table 2.4. Primrose League Roll of Habitations: Denbighshire and Flintshire 
1904.  
Denbighshire Habitation No Founded Officers  
 
Llangollen 
   
  563 
 
August 1885 
  
 
Brynkinallt 
 
1335 
 
2 April 1886 
 
Lord Trevor-Ruling Councillor 
 
   Lady Trevor-Dame President  
 
Ruthin 
  
  904 
 
25 November 
1885 
 
George Denton-Ruling Councillor 
Llanrhaidr Hall 
 
     
Henllan   921 December 1885 Mrs Williams-Wynn-Dame President  
   Plas-yn-Cefyn.  
     
Colwyn Bay 2505 26 June 1885 The Hon Mrs B. Brodrick-Dame 
President. Coed Coch Estate 
 
 
   G.B. Mortimer Jones-Ruling Councillor  
   Glan Conway.  
     
Abergele 1503 12 May 1886 Countess of Dundonald-Ruling 
Councillor. Gwrych Castle 
 
 
   The Hon M.F. Hughes-Ruling 
Councillor. Kinmel Park. 
 
     
Llangedwyn 1586 4 June 1886 Dowager Lady Williams-Wynn-Ruling 
Councillor. Llangedwyn Hall, 
Oswestry. 
 
     
Denbigh 1049 20 January 1886 Colonel Mesham-Ruling Councillor  
   Pontrufydd Hall.  
     
Flintshire  Nos  Founded Officers 
Mostyn, 
Llawynegryn 
 680 19 October 1885 Henry  John Raikes-Ruling Councillor 
   Llwynegryn Hall, Mold. 
    
Hundred of Maelor  726 26 October 1885 Lord Kenyon-Ruling Councillor 
   Lady Kenyon-Dame President 
   Gredington 
    
   St Asaph  790 5 November 1885 Mrs Roberts Wynn-Ruling Councillor 
   Plas-yn-Cefyn. 
    
Hope 2111 19 July 1886 Mrs T.Roper –Dame President 
   Plas Isa, Nr Mold. 
    
Flint 1668 19 July 1886 Thomas Bate-Ruling Councillor Kelsterton 
   Miss J.M. Evans-Dame President Flint 
   . 
Habitations Closed 1886-1904: Holywell, Chwilir, Rhyl. Habitation Opened: Hope. 
Taken from: Bodleian Library, (BLO), Primrose League MSS, ‘The Roll of the Habitations 
1904’.  
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LOCAL CONTESTS: THE EAST DENBIGHSHIRE BY-ELECTIONS, 1906 
AND 1909 AND COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTIONS OF 1907. 
 There were three tests of Conservative strength in North-east Wales 
between 1906 and 1910: the County Council elections of 1907 and two by-
elections, both in East Denbighshire. The first by-election came in 1906, just 
six months after the general election, and was caused by the appointment of 
Samuel Moss, the sitting Liberal MP, as a County Court judge. The decision 
by the Conservatives to contest the election appears strange, given the 
constituency was uncontested at the 1895, 1900 and 1906 general elections. 
Several factors can explain the decision. First the Liberal party was 
experiencing difficulties in adopting a successor to Moss. E.G.Hemmerde was 
finally adopted but only after a tortuous election process that saw 21 Liberal 
and Labour nominations caused divisions amongst the party as district 
committees championed their nominee.115 Thus the Conservatives saw an 
opportunity, as the Liberals appeared uncertain and divided over whom to 
select. At the same time NWDNU meeting at Eaton Hall in March 1906 had 
appeared to energise the party in the region, especially with the selection of 
candidates, while an opportunity also arose to field an experienced 
parliamentarian, Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, whose Trevalyn estate lay a few 
miles north of Wrexham. After a successful academic career Griffith-
Boscawen became a Conservative MP for Tonbridge in 1892 and from 1895 to 
1900 he was a Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beech, and from 1900 a parliamentary charity 
commissioner.116 He was defeated at the 1906 general election, and 
consequently when the opportunity arose in East Denbighshire the party in 
London urged him to stand.117Griffith-Boscawen was from the Tariff Reform 
wing of the party and provided the East Denbighshire Association with an 
opportunity to contest the election with a candidate who had strong local 
connections.  
The early optimism that had greeted Griffith- Boscawen’ selection 
candidature soon dissipated once the campaign started and the reality of the 
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task to be faced dawned. Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, the Unionist 
Association’s Chairman admitted they faced a difficult task in the division, 
given the size of the Liberal majority, and a little fatalistically hoped that ‘the 
majority would be greatly reduced even if their candidate was not returned’.118 
Griffith-Boscawen privately accepted that defeat was likely, but remained 
determined to show ‘that they, the Conservatives and Unionists of East 
Denbighshire were not the negligible quantity some people appeared to think 
they were’.119 The centrepiece of the Conservative campaign was Tariff 
Reform. Tariff Reform policies were, he believed, especially relevant to 
industrial constituencies like East Denbighshire, where coal mining and steel 
making were the prominent employers. In a speech at Wrexham on 19 July 
1906 he sought to build working-class support by arguing that Tariff Reform 
policies were essential if coal mining was to survive in the district.120 He 
stressed that even if East Denbighshire coal mining did not suffer from foreign 
competition, ‘they must remember that their coal was largely supplied to 
manufactories of all kinds... and that if these works were closed by foreign 
goods being purchased instead of English goods, there would nationally not be 
the same demand for coal’.121 He went on to point out that coal mining would 
not be the only industry to suffer if the government persisted with Free Trade 
policies:    
 
There were also great steel works in that district. A few years ago England led 
the way with regards to iron and steel, but they were now only third to Germany 
and America who were importing all kinds of iron and steel goods which could 
be made at home, but which they preferred to get from abroad instead of 
employing their own people.   Mr Chamberlain advised that an enquiry be 
made…with a view of seeing if they could not arrive at a system which would 
better the conditions of the working-class, but the Radical party absolutely 
refused to look at the question and were quite content to employ the foreigner 
and did not care whether an article was made in England or made abroad. 122  
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His Liberal opponent E.G Hemmerde, did not attack the Conservatives 
on Tariff Reform, but chose instead to campaign on the ‘scandal’ of Chinese 
slave labour in the Transvaal (the previous Conservative government was 
implicated in decisions made by mine owners in the Transvaal to employ 
cheap Chinese and not local labour) which had brought the Liberals success at 
the general election. The choice proved a good one, in demonstrating the 
Conservative party’s insensitivities to the working-classes, and both sides 
accepted that the election turned on this. When the by-election result was 
announced and it was revealed that the Liberals had comfortably held the seat 
with a majority of over 2,700, Griffith-Boscawen lashed out bitterly arguing he 
had been beaten by ‘downright misinterpretations on the subject’.123 During a 
later interview with the North Wales Guardian he proffered a more sober if 
damaging analysis pointing to deficiencies in the party’s organisation: 
 
The people want educating in Conservative principles. They have never heard a 
thing but from the radical standpoint. Start a Conservative organisation, fight 
every election from parish council upwards and I believe you would win.124 
 
Nor with the passage of time did his view alter, in his book Memories, 
published in 1925, he could write about the by-election with little fondness: 
 
In July 1906 there occurred a by-election in East Denbigshire…I think from my 
personal point of view it was a mistake, since I had not the slightest chance of 
getting in. The constituency had never since its foundation returned a 
Conservative. It consisted chiefly of the North Wales coalfield, and to search for 
Tories in places like Coed-Poeth, or that delectable spot Rhos-llanerch-grugog, 
was like looking for a needle in a haystack.125        
   
The result suggested that little had changed since the 1906 general election. 
Despite the Eaton Hall meeting four months earlier, the Conservative party 
appeared to have made little progress with organisation in the constituency and 
Tariff Reform had once more brought scant obvious advantage. The only 
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crumb of comfort the Conservatives could draw from the result was that their 
share of the vote had not eroded significantly since the last time the 
constituency was contested in 1897.   
 
 
Table 2.5 
East Denbighshire By-Election 1906. 
 
14.08.1906 Candidate          Party   Vote          
%       
 E.G. Hemmerde       Liberal   5917     65.4   
 A.Griffith-
Boscawen 
     Conservative   3126 
+2791 
34.6    
Last time constituency contested: 
By-Election 28.09.1897 
Samuel Moss (Lib) 5,175, 64.5%: G.T. Kenyon (Con) 2848, 35.5%. 
     Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
  
Between the first by-election in August 1906 and the second in April1909 
the political situation altered considerably both at national and local level. The 
education question had receded from prominence by 1908. Church 
Disestablishment briefly caused some dissent in Conservative ranks when 
Asquith introduced a new Disestablishment Bill in April 1909, but it aroused 
little excitement and was withdrawn in June of the same year when the Budget 
debate took precedence over every other piece of Liberal legislation. One topic 
came to dominate politics when, at the end of 1908, Reginald Mckenna, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, provided the Cabinet with evidence that suggested 
Germany was accelerating its naval building programme and demanded that 
the government build six dreadnoughts and not the four that it earlier agreed 
to. Asquith compromised and promised that four would be built immediately 
with four more to follow if deemed necessary. The compromise did not placate 
the Conservative party. The press helped fuel major panic as they and leading 
Conservatives pressed for the immediate building of eight Dreadnoughts to 
protect the country. The party was also concerned that Germany’s naval 
building programme threatened to de-stabilise their major policy initiative, 
Tariff Reform, as any threat to British naval supremacy also threatened the 
security of the Empire and thus Colonial Preference. 
                                                                                                                                                             
125 A. Griffith-Boscawen, Memories, p.57.   
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This provided the context for the East Denbighshire by-election, which 
took place in April 1909, triggered by the appointment of E.G. Hemmerde as 
Recorder of Liverpool. The Conservative candidate was Sir Foster Cunliffe, a 
local landowner, whose campaign concentrated on Tariff Reform and the naval 
crisis. Speaking at Cefn Mawr on 22 March 1909 Sir Foster Cunliffe said: 
 
They were at present Free Traders in a protectionist world… There was first of 
all the need of protecting themselves against foreign commercial attack, which 
was known in one of its aspects as retaliation …They were liable to the evils of 
dumping which upset trade, which had the effect of throwing a large number of 
people out of work and which had a detrimental effect upon the country from 
every point of view and they could not allow their trade to remain in the 
unstable and insecure position it was in the present day … They proposed to 
fight the foreigner with his own weapon.126  
 
He also asserted that Tariff Reform was the only policy that could solve 
unemployment and help maintain Britain’s trading position in the World by 
offering a preference to her Colonies thus consolidating the Empire as a single 
powerful unit. He further argued that Britain’s position in the World and the 
security of the Empire could only be maintained by strengthening the Navy:   
 
If the British race in all its varieties was to carry out its great work in the World 
they must maintain their power and consolidate the Empire, that was the policy 
he was asking them to support… a policy of Imperial consolidation against one 
which he was afraid savoured very much of…internal disruption and external 
insecurity.127  
 
This time Hemmerde was drawn into the Tariff Reform debate. During a 
speech made at the Caxton Hall, London, in February 1909 he said: 
 
If you increase prosperity in this country by Tariff Reform, you increase it by 
throwing people out of employment in other countries. You are becoming 
prosperous by the misery of others.128  
                                                          
126 North Wales Guardian, 26 March 1909 
127 Ibid. 
128 North Wales Guardian, 2 April 1909. 
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The Conservatives seized on this as an example of the Liberals always putting 
the interests of the foreigner before those of the British, precipitating an angry 
exchange of letters between the candidates in the local press. Hemmerde 
accused Sir Foster Cunliffe of introducing an ‘infamous falsehood’ to the 
campaign, to which Sir Foster Cunliffe responded by stating that he had 
checked the contents of Hemmerde’s speech for accuracy, and was certain that 
he had interpreted Hemmerde’s words properly.129 
What is interesting about the exchange is that the Conservatives by 
advocating Tariff Reform and naval security for once set the agenda throwing 
Liberals onto the defensive. This in itself appeared to be a breakthrough for the 
Conservative party in the region having spent many years deflecting criticism 
of its policies from angry Nonconformists. However, the result hardly changed 
from the by-election in 1906, the Liberal majority was reduced by 70 votes and 
the Conservative share of the vote went up slightly by 1.5 per cent. 
Accordingly, the Conservatives felt that they had fought a successful campaign 
and was used by supporters to vindicate their stance on Tariff Reform, further 
convincing many that this policy was the only positive initiative that the party 
had.130  It was less clear of course whether a full Tariff Reform programme 
benefited the party in the region, for the result had hardly shown a large swing 
to the party and since the area was largely unaffected by unemployment the 
appeal of Tariff Reform was much diminished. On the other hand it gave the 
Conservatives a broadly based, potentially attractive, policy to debate without 
repeatedly having to defend their position on Church Disestablishment, 
education and landlordism.  
 
Table 2.6 
East Denbighshire By-Election 1909. 
 
2.04.1904    Candidate   Party   Vote   % 
 E.G. Hemmerde Liberal   6265  63.9 
 Sir F. Cunliffe Conservative   3544  36.1 
   +2724  
    Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
                                                          
129North Wales Guardian, 2 April 1909. 
130 North Wales Guardian, 26 March 1909. 
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Although parliamentary polls were generally disappointing, the 
Conservative party performed well at local elections in the region. This was 
demonstrated by their achievement at the 1907 county council elections, which 
came shortly after the withdrawal of a new Education Bill in 1907. With this 
withdrawal popular support for another county council election revolt against 
the Act ebbed away. Disillusion set in amongst Nonconformists which 
threatened the security of many Liberal-held council seats. Even Welsh-
speaking areas were threatened by a Conservative backlash caused by the 
Liberal party’s inability to amend the 1902 Act. As a result, come the election 
Liberal seats fell to Conservatives everywhere and nowhere was this backlash 
felt more strongly than in Denbighshire and Flintshire.    
In Denbighshire the Conservatives gained six council seats and the 
Liberal Party’s majority was more than halved to ten. The Conservative party’s 
gains were in the western part of the county with victories at Glan Conway, 
Colwyn Bay and at Abergele where two seats were taken and in the eastern 
part of the county with victories at Cefn Mawr and Llansantffraid Glyn Ceriog. 
The final outcome of the election was that the Liberals held 29 county council 
seats and the Conservatives 19.  In Flintshire the Conservatives made seven 
gains, two losses and tied the number of seats on the council with the Liberals, 
each party winning 21 seats. Hawarden was captured by a Liberal Churchman, 
Canon Drew, son- in- law to former Prime Minister Gladstone, who was 
implacably opposed to the Liberal party’s education policy. The implication 
for control of the council was obvious - should Drew vote with the 
Conservatives, as he would do on education, the Liberal control of the council 
would be threatened. As it was the Liberals retained control of the council, as 
thirteen out of fourteen aldermen were Liberals. Understandably the 
Conservatives felt aggrieved, a sense of injustice pervading the party when the 
number of votes each side had polled at the election became clear. The Bishop 
of St Asaph commented: 
 
In this county which is Mr. Herbert Lewis’s constituency the Radical Party 
polled 6,161 votes and their opponents 6,568 thus giving the friends of the 
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Voluntary schools a majority in the whole electorate of 407 votes, although the 
result in the council is the return of 21 on each side.131  
. 
An editorial in The Denbighshire Free Press asserted that ‘a closer 
inspection of the election returns reveals that….the Conservative reaction has 
been most strongly felt in the urban areas, and in the districts immediately 
associated with and influenced by them’. 132 This was not strictly true. In 
Flintshire Conservative gains were made in the rural areas of Whitford (a small 
village between Mostyn and Holywell), at Cilcain and Argoed (two rural areas 
near Mold) and at Caerwys. Rhyl West was a strongly urban working-class 
community and Rhyl East was largely middle class. In Denbighshire gains 
were made in the urban middle-class resort town of Colwyn Bay, and in the 
rural areas of Abergele Rural, Glan Conwy, Llanfairtalhaiarn, and 
Llansantfraid Glyn Ceiriog. In the industrial town of Wrexham the 
Conservatives already held two wards, and it was in the urban working-class 
sprawl of Cefn Mawr, seven miles south of Wrexham, that the Conservatives 
made their other gain. Accordingly, the Conservatives were gaining seats in all 
types of areas – their strength not just reliant on an anglicised urban base. 
 The 1907 county council elections marked something of a political 
watershed for the Conservatives in Wales. Although the Liberals retained 
majorities on all county councils, with the exception of Flintshire, they had for 
the first time lost the political initiative. The Liberals lost a total of 59 council 
seats. In Radnorshire the Liberals held a majority of just seven, in 
Pembrokeshire four and in Breconshire the majority was only one. Throughout 
North Wales the Liberals lost ground. Six seats were lost in Anglesey, seven in 
Caernarfonshire, three in Montgomeryshire and one in the Liberal stronghold 
of Merionethshire. While by-election results confirmed Liberal strength in the 
Principality, the county council elections marked the first real turning point in 
Conservative fortunes. This was reflected in the results in Flintshire where the 
Liberals only retained power on the county council with the help of aldermen 
and in Denbighshire where the Liberal majority was greatly reduced. 
 
                                                          
131 Flintshire Observer, 14 March 1907. 
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CONCLUSION.  
Failure to capture any parliamentary seats in 1906 should not obscure 
the relatively large, even respectable number of votes gained by the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales. The disappointment of the election 
precipitated a substantial re-organisation of the party through the 
implementation of resolutions passed by the NWDNU. These brought about an 
expansion in the number of Conservative district and parish committees as 
well as the introduction of new initiatives. For example, Women’s and 
Workingmen’s Association were successfully founded in Wrexham, 
parliamentary candidates were selected in all constituencies and the West 
Denbighshire Association took the bold step of adopting a working-class 
candidate. The East Denbighshire by-elections of 1906 and 1908 were 
similarly contested; revealing that the Conservative vote had indeed remained 
steady and comparable to the 1890’s.The by-elections also provided an 
opportunity to engage the East Denbighshire electorate in political debate for 
the first time in nearly ten years. Finally, membership grew steadily in the 
Primrose League Habitations throughout the region. This was all evidence of a 
party not in decline but one stabilising its position and slowly adapting to the 
changed circumstances of the post-1906 political landscape. Such party 
activity in North- east Wales came at a time when apathy and infighting 
afflicted the party nationally. It is thus to their credit that the constituency 
associations in North-east Wales did much to improve their organisations, 
albeit not in all cases, and that the situation was a lot brighter here than 
perhaps could be expected for a party that had done so badly at parliamentary 
polls.  
       
                                                                                                                                                             
132 Denbighshire Free Press, 16 March 1907. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH–EAST WALES, 
1910-1914                           
 
INTRODUCTION: THE 1910 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THEIR 
AFTERMATH. 
At the end of April 1909 Lloyd George introduced his ‘People’s 
Budget’, the object of which was to raise money for social reforms and provide 
revenue for naval defence.1 This resulted in an overhaul of the existing tax 
system and seven new taxes including four new land taxes. For the Liberals the 
Budget had a galvanising effect, land taxes were popular with the public and 
party members, helping boost morale and drew the support of their electoral 
partners the Labour party.2 For Conservatives the Budget appeared socialistic 
and confirmed their suspicions ‘that Liberalism was abandoning Gladstonian 
principles of finance in favour of something far more radical and unpleasant’.3 
By promising to redistribute wealth to pay for reform Liberals threatened the 
future of the landed elite, those who made up one third of Conservative MP’s 
in the House of Commons, and two thirds of those who voted against the 
measure in the House of Lords.4 One important by-product of the Budget 
controversy was that Tariff Reform now emerged as a galvanising force, at last 
uniting the Conservative party behind a policy that for many was their only 
positive initiative and the only one capable of challenging the Budget. When 
the House of Lords rejected the Finance Bill on 30 November 1909 plunging 
the country into a general election, Balfour, who remained privately 
unconvinced of the policy’s merits, made a joint pledge with Joseph 
Chamberlain, which committed the party to the Tariff Reform programme.5  
The Conservative party recovered well at the January 1910 election, 
gaining 47 per cent of the vote, up from 44 per cent in 1906, and winning 273 
seats, only two less than the Liberals. Most of the 116 seats gained by the 
Conservatives were won in the rural regions of southern England, with little 
headway made in the industrial and metropolitan areas of the North while they 
                                                 
1 Dutton, ‘His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’, p.72 
2 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, p.72.  
3 Green, The Crisis Of Conservatism, p.144.  
4 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, p.77. 
5 Ibid., pp.120-121. 
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actually lost seats in Scotland.6 Moreover, the Liberal party was kept in power 
with the support of the Labour party and the Irish Nationalists who won 40 and 
83 seats respectively. Ironically, given the party’s improved showing, Tariff 
Reform came in for criticism in the months following with some 
Conservatives believing that it even cost them votes as Liberals returned to the 
dear food mantra of 1906. More alarming, election defeat left the House of 
Lords vulnerable to attack as the Lords’ rejection of the Budget precipitated a 
showdown between the government and the Second Chamber with an alliance 
of radical Liberals, Irish Nationalists and Labour demanding the House of 
Lords veto be removed. The Liberal cabinet first vacillated, but eventually 
gave way and by mid March 1910 introduced proposals to curb the power of 
the Lords that later formed the basis to the Parliament Bill.7 With many peers 
threatening resistance to such reform, a political impasse was reached within 
parliament, which in turn raised the prospects of another election. In May 1910 
Edward VII died suddenly and in a spirit of conciliation a conference was 
arranged to try and find a way out of the constitutional difficulties. When this 
failed in November, Asquith announced a dissolution and a second general 
election within twelve months. Balfour believing food taxes to be deeply 
unpopular, considered dropping them from the Tariff Reform programme, but 
opted instead for a compromise.8 At a political rally held the day after 
dissolution he declared that ‘I have not the least objection to submit the 
principles of Tariff Reform to referendum’, thus committing Tariff Reform to 
referendum, as a way of ridding the party of its food taxes incubus.9 His 
announcement alienated those committed Tariff Reformers in the party 
grouped around the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen 
Chamberlain, and generated bitter arguments in the party and marked a retreat 
from the full Tariff programme agreed with Joseph Chamberlain.10 
                                                 
6 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, pp.134-141. 
7 There were three resolutions that formed the basis of the Parliament Bill. The House of Lords 
could not amend finance bills, all other bills should be passed providing that two years had 
elapsed from the point of introduction and the maximum life of a parliament should be reduced 
from seven to five years. 
8 J. Vincent, ed, The Crawford Papers, the Journals of David Lindsay Twenty-seventh Earl of 
Crawford and Tenth Earl of Manchester (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) p. 176 
entry for 16 November 1910.  
9 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, p.177. 
10 R.J.Q. Adams, Bonar Law (London: John Murray, 1999) p. 44.  
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  The December 1910 general election produced a similar result to 
January, although this time the two main parties were tied on 272 seats with 
the Liberal government kept in power by Labour and the Irish Nationalists. 
Following quickly on the second defeat the Commons passed the Parliament 
Act in May 1911 followed eventually by the Lords in August. According to R. 
J. Q Adams ‘the passage of the Parliament Act marked the end of 18 months of 
intense struggle which had cost [the] party much in unity and perhaps in 
confidence’.11 Furthermore, three successive election losses proved disastrous 
for Balfour. He was heavily criticised for not displaying strong leadership and 
for alienating both the Tariff Reform and Free Trade wings of his party.12 
Finally, under severe pressure he resigned in November 1911 and was replaced 
by an inexperienced Andrew Bonar Law.  
Although a keen Tariff Reformer Bonar Law was aware of the failings of 
the policy as an electoral strategy and its divisive affect on the party. As a 
result he concluded that a new strategy was required to unite the party. 
Between 1911 and 1914, Bonar Law attempted to construct support within his 
party around a tough campaign on defending and restoring the constitution to 
its pre-1911 status. Law built on the anxieties that many Conservatives 
expressed at attempts by the Liberal Government to introduce Welsh Church 
Disestablishment and Irish Home Rule before they made good their promise to 
reform the Second Chamber, as outlined in their preamble. In particular he 
utilised the campaign against Irish Home Rule to try force the government to 
the ballot box.13 On the surface this appeared to play upon their electoral 
strengths for between December 1910 and August 1914 the party won 16 by-
elections.  However, the government remained steadfast against an election 
and many-feared civil war in Ireland, as Unionist opposition to Home Rule and 
support for Ulster hardened between 1912 and 1914. Jeremy Smith asserts that 
the Conservative leader ‘fought the Home Rule on constitutional grounds; he 
                                                 
11R.J.Q. Adams, Bonar Law, p.49.  
12 Ibid., pp54-55. 
13 Since 1910 Irish Home Rule became a distinct possibility as to remain in power the Liberal 
government was dependent on the support of Irish Nationalist MPs. For support to pass Lloyd 
George’s Budget Irish Nationalist demanded the removal of the House of Lords veto so that a 
Home Rule bill could pass with the will of the Commons. See Blewett, The Peers, the Parties 
and the People pp.146-148. Conservative opposition to Home Rule was steeped in a belief that 
Home Rule would destroy British and Empire unity and threaten the protestant Anglican religion.    
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resisted a settlement and advocated extreme courses of action, such as 
amending the Army Annual Act or involving the King, in order to smash the 
Liberal Government. It was power politics at its most brutal’.14 The prospect of 
civil war was only finally avoided when European conflict broke out in August 
1914 and an uneasy truce descended upon British politics.  
This chapter will examine the political situation in North-east Wales 
during these dramatic years, exploring how national events impacted upon the 
local political environment.  It will demonstrate how Tariff Reform first split 
the party then united it as the National Union wielded its influence in the 
region and then spilt it again at the December 1910 general election. It will 
explore the effects of the People’s Budget and House of Lords Reform on the 
Conservative party and how William Ormsby-Gore succeeded in regaining the 
Denbigh Boroughs despite his landed background and total lack of 
parliamentary experience. It will analyse how and why Church 
Disestablishment came to play a pivotal role in Conservative politics, 
especially when the government introduced a new Bill in 1912, and why this 
issue overtook Irish Home Rule in importance to Conservatives in the region 
even though it dominated national politics. It will also show that by using 
Church Defence as a single issue strategy at the Flint Boroughs by-election in 
1913 the party came close to toppling the Liberals and that by adopting much 
needed organisational changes its future looked far more optimistic in the 
region than at any time since 1885.Finally, this chapter will take a close look at 
organisation and the steps that the party took to improve it in North-east 
Wales. 
 
THE JANUARY 1910 GENERAL ELECTION IN NORTH-EAST WALES. 
 
In Wales Lloyd George’s Budget dominated the January 1910 general 
election, and the proposed taxes on licences, mineral rents and land were 
popular with the majority of Welsh people.15 This did not extend to the 
                                                 
14. J. Smith, The Tories and Ireland, 1910-1914, Conservative Party Politics and the Home Rule 
Crisis (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000). The Army Annual Act formally gave parliament 
authority over the armed forces, without which it would have no legal power over the army. For 
Conservative attempts to amend see Dutton ‘His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, pp.227- 230.   
15 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.249. 
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Conservative party in Wales which roundly condemned the People’s Budget. 
In his capacity as Chairman of the NWDNU Lord Kenyon argued that the 
Budget ‘was likely to have far reaching effects in a country district like this; 
the Budget would vastly add to unemployment. Country gentlemen and others 
employing labour would seriously consider how to reduce expenses, and the 
only way many of them could do so would add to the unemployed’.16 The Earl 
of Denbigh described the Budget ‘as a downright swindle’, and the 
introduction of a super tax on high incomes ‘as one of those plausible 
socialistic measures for taxing people able to bear it, but is...certain to operate 
with great injustice on many individuals’.17 
Consequently, when the Lords rejected the Bill on 30 November 1909, 
thus precipitating a general election, the decision was greeted enthusiastically 
by Conservative leaders in North-east Wales. To Lord Mostyn ‘the Lords had 
acted within what they considered their rights, in saying in simple terms that 
the Budget should be laid aside for a few weeks and during that time, it was 
suggested, that the members of the House of Commons should consult the 
constituencies just to see whether they agree or do not agree with the 
Budget’.18 His response was typical of landowners in the region, but was also 
supported by Sam Thompson, the working-class candidate in West 
Denbighshire. At a joint meeting of the Denbigh Boroughs and West 
Denbighshire candidates at Ruthin on 7 January 1910, Thomson endorsed 
Ormsby-Gore’s words that the Second Chamber had every right to say ‘consult 
the people’ on an unjust Budget that overtaxed the professional and middle 
classes, and claimed that the  
 
Budget was ‘a poverty incubator it was based on wrong principles. They could 
not make the poor rich by making the rich poorer. The only way to improve the 
workers was to lift them up from the bottom not reducing them from the top. It 
was a most disastrous policy setting class against class’.19  
 
                                                 
16 Denbighshire  Free Press, 8 May 1909.  
17 FRO, Birch Cullimore MSS, Earl of Denbigh Papers, D/BC/495 Undated Newspaper article 
circa June 1909. 
18 Flintshire Observer, 13 January 1910.  
19 Denbighshire Free Press, 8 January 1910.  
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To have such a representative from a working class background 
supporting the local landed interest’s view that taxing the wealthiest elements 
of society would only exacerbate the social divide appeared to be a coup for 
local Conservatives. It was exactly what the NWDNU had called for two years 
earlier - working class candidates who could demonstrate that the Conservative 
party was a socially inclusive institution while promoting its goals and aims. 
Yet if this was the party’s intention in North Wales then the move seriously 
backfired in West Denbighshire. Thompson’s campaign meetings during 
January 1910 were constantly disrupted by Liberal supporters and at 
Llandyrnog where local Conservatives attempted to portray the Budget as a 
revolutionary unconstitutional measure Thompson and other speakers were 
greeted with cries of ‘chuck the Lords out’.20 Worse was to follow at a meeting 
at Abergele. Here, when attempting to blame the Liberal government for 
introducing contentious legislation and dividing society Thompson was 
taunted with shouts of ‘House of Lords’ from sections of the audience before 
the meeting descended into an open brawl.21 Thus, rather than unite the voting 
public behind him as a working class candidate Thompson only seemed to 
alienate many voters. Even so in Flint Boroughs Harold Tilby sought to cast 
the Budget as a divisive socialistic measure which did nothing to improve the 
conditions of the working class in comparison to the wealthier sections of 
society. In the first week of campaigning he declared during a speech at Bagillt 
that: 
 
The Budget does not do a single thing to equalise the proportions between the 
two classes…In the judgement of the Unionist party the Budget was socialistic. 
He did not object but the country had never given a mandate for socialism. If the 
Bill was socialistic the government was legislating without a mandate and surely 
there was in that justification for asking the opinion of the people.22     
 
Colonel Howard made similar claims to Tilby in Flint County, 
believing the Budget ‘could inconvenience the rich man, subject him to 
considerable annoyance. It required no argument to show it was the poor man 
                                                 
20 Denbighshire Free Press, 8 January 1910.  
21 Ibid., 22 January 1910.  
22 Flintshire Observer, 6 January 1910. 
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who felt taxation more than the rich man’.23 As with Thompson in West 
Denbighshire Tilby and Colonel Howard’s meetings faced heckling and 
constant disruptions when they attempted to portray the Budget as socially 
divisive finance bill that only impoverished the poor.24  By contrast Liberal 
candidates were receiving positive responses to their platform speeches on the 
Budget and its plans to alleviate poverty and redistribute wealth were proving 
to be, as elsewhere in Wales, extremely popular in the region. As a result 
Liberal candidates stressed the importance of the Budget as part of the 
government’s attempts to relieve social injustice while arguing that the House 
of Lords had merely acted in their own interests by rejecting it and other 
Liberal legislation.  
Given the enthusiastic response to the Liberal position it is not 
surprising that the Conservatives failed to make any progress when attempting 
to portray the Budget as a divisive measure. Other measures that Conservative 
candidates supported in the region, in particular Tariff Reform and opposition 
to Liberal plans to disestablish the Church in Wales, also received a mixed 
response from voters.  All candidates championed Tariff Reform, highlighting 
the benefits of the policy to British trade, employment security and social 
welfare. Accordingly, at Wrexham on 5 January 1910, Ormsby-Gore in 
addressing workers at the Cambrian Leatherworks warned that Free Trade was 
damaging the British leather industry and undermining their jobs by allowing 
the free importation of manufactured goods from Germany and America: 
 
Free trade was neither free nor fair to the British workingman…the only 
effectual way to solve the unemployment problem was to expand the old 
industries and open up new ones and that could only be done means of Tariff 
Reform’.25  
 
Ormsby-Gore was joined on the platform by John Gill, the manager of the 
leatherworks, who said although ‘he had been a Liberal all his life... [he] was 
induced by Tariff Reform… and other things to make a change, and in 
particular he should like Tariff Reform to have a chance of proving what good 
                                                 
23 Flintshire Observer, 2 December 1909. 
24 See for example Flintshire Observer 6 and 13 January 1910. 
25 North Wales Guardian, 7 January 1910. 
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it would do’.26 This was a bold move as the directors of the leatherworks, 
including Edward Hughes leader of the Wrexham Liberals, were all staunch 
Free Traders. Gill’s conversion during the campaign seemed to impress the 
workmen since Ormsby–Gore later claimed that the owners ‘left no stone 
unturned to influence their men, in the direction of Free Trade, but the men 
voted for me in an overwhelming majority.’27  
Elsewhere the influence of local employers and the different economic 
circumstances worked against the Conservatives. Harold Tilby in Flint 
Boroughs and Colonel H.R.L Howard in Flint County advocated the adoption 
of Tariff Reform policies to help develop local industries and reduce 
unemployment in the area.28 Unfortunately for them the Liberal candidate in 
the Boroughs division was John Summers, owner of the steel works at Shotton, 
and a supporter of Free Trade. Summers argued that ‘as a panacea for 
unemployment it seemed to him that Tariff Reform was absurd. It would be 
proved that Free Trade had not only been successful, but was the only true 
commercial policy for the people of this country... With imports and exports 
free employment would be greater and wages would be higher’.29 
Circumstances bore his argument out, since Shotton employed over 3,000 
men, this easily offset recent job losses in agriculture, lead mining and 
coalmining in the region. Tilby and Howard faced a daunting task if they were 
going to overturn the large Liberal majorities in the two constituencies upon 
these arguments. 
Taking a similar line in East Denbighshire, David Rhys, Sir Foster 
Cunliffe’s replacement in the division, tried to convince the electorate that 
Tariff Reform was beneficial for local trade and employment. Rhys’ line on 
Tariff Reform was well aimed since East Denbighshire with its coal mining 
districts south and east of Wrexham was the most industrial constituency in the 
region. However, unlike South Wales the East Denbighshire coalfield was not 
dependant on exports as its coal supplied local industry, notably the Brymbo 
                                                 
26 North Wales Guardian, 7 January 1910. 
27 Ibid., 11 February 1910. 
28 Flintshire Observer, 9 December 1909. 
29 County Herald, 21 January 1910  
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steelworks and the Ruabon terracotta works.30 Unable to deploy with effect the 
full range of Tariff Reform arguments, Rhys’ campaign was also hit by the 
distribution of a Liberal party pamphlet in the constituency during the last 
week of campaigning which argued that if the Conservatives were returned to 
power basic foodstuffs would be taxed.31 In West Denbighshire Sam Thomson 
faced a different but nonetheless uphill task in his advocacy of Tariff Reform. 
Thompson’s constituency was the most rural division in the region, so he 
tailored his message to circumstances, arguing the imposition of agricultural 
tariffs would expand farm production and alleviate rural unemployment.32  
Nevertheless, such a line was easily typecast as the old Tory landed policy of 
the Corn Laws and ‘Hungry Forties’ as Sir John Herbert Roberts, the sitting 
MP, stated at Prion, ‘a tax on corn would eventually benefit the landlord and 
no one else, and such a tax would also mean a tax on every other consumable 
article’.33 
With the notable exception of Denbigh Boroughs, Liberal candidates 
successfully exploited the Conservative party’s commitment to Tariff Reform. 
Most of their arguments had been fruitfully used before and there was very 
little new that Tariff Reformers could say, which would sway a predominantly 
Liberal electorate. As Neal Blewett points out: 
 
The fiscal controversy had been debated continuously for the past seven years. It 
was virtually impossible to say anything new. Tariff Reform was presented as it 
had been for the past seven years as the panacea for all the country’s economic 
ills from unemployment to the alleged flight of capital, and as it had been for the 
past eight months as the alternative to a detested Budget. Free Trade was 
defended as it had been for generations by a unique blending of economic facts 
and metaphysics for it was as much a faith as an economic system.34 
 
Furthermore, even though it was united in its support for Tariff Reform 
in January 1910, the policy did little to enhance the Conservative party’s 
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chances of electoral success. Only in Denbigh Boroughs could the party claim 
that the policy had increased Conservative votes. Otherwise and elsewhere the 
policy proved a hindrance. Indeed, in areas such as Flintshire and East 
Denbighshire, which were not suffering from its worst excesses it was hardly 
worth advocating Tariff Reform as an ameliorative to unemployment. In West 
Denbighshire, a rural Liberal bastion, the policy was dismissed as one that 
would only extend the grip the aristocracy held over land.    
If there was nothing new to say about Tariff Reform then surely there 
was little more that could be said about Welsh Church Disestablishment and 
Disendowment, which had been at the forefront of Welsh politics since the 
mid-nineteenth century. The issue, however, still had the potential to polarise 
opinion with many Nonconformist Liberals feeling aggrieved, especially after 
a Church Disestablishment Bill failed to progress beyond a second reading in 
April 1909, that little had been done by a Liberal government to disestablish 
the ‘alien’ Church in Wales. At the same time many Conservatives were 
determined to resist any attempt to disestablish the Church. This was 
especially true in North-east Wales with its high concentration of Anglican 
communicants (see Appendices Religious  Communicants, North-East Wales 
1905 p 318). Here landed Conservative leaders, all strong supporters of the 
Established church, in conjunction with local leading Churchmen led a 
rearguard action against the introduction of a new Disestablishment Bill. This 
had seemed unlikely after April 1909, but the re-emergence of Church 
Disestablishment as an issue was based on a promise that, if returned to power, 
the Liberals would introduce a new Bill. This was further fuelled when in 
December 1909 Asquith made references to religious equality in Wales during 
a speech at the Albert Hall.35 Many Liberals now featured Disestablishment in 
their election addresses. As a result opposition to Disestablishment quickly 
formed a central plank of Conservative campaigns as crowded Church Defence 
meetings, attended by senior local Conservatives and Churchmen, were held 
during the first week of January at Wrexham and St. Asaph.36 The 
Disestablishment campaign was thus drawn along political lines and the 
Conservative inclined Denbighshire Free Press appealed to Liberal 
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Churchmen to vote with Conservatives in defence of the Church. 37 As a result 
Thomas Williams, Vice-President of the Denbigh Liberal Club defected to the 
Conservatives.38   
Williams took the Conservative line that disendowing the Church 
would deprive it of vital funds it used to employ ministers and further religious 
causes in Wales. Williams argued that ‘a great injustice would be done to the 
cause of religion in Wales if the national Church was deprived of the resources 
which she had enjoyed since time immemorial and for those funds to be 
applied for secular purposes’.39 Such a move was seen as a coup for the 
Conservatives in Denbigh Boroughs – one they exploited to the full as the 
local Tory press ran articles on Williams’ defection and his support for the 
Conservative position on Disestablishment and Disendowment.40  
Yet the Conservatives also found themselves under attack over the 
issue as it also came to the fore in East Denbighshire. Here, their candidate 
David Rhys, a Methodist preacher, astounded Nonconformists when he 
unwisely defended the role of the Established church during his campaign 
meetings. By repeatedly accusing Rhys of deserting his calling Liberals not 
only succeeded as branding him as a traitor to his religion, but also as traitor to 
Wales. According to the North Wales Guardian, ‘many Nonconformist 
ministers have stated publicly that a Tory Nonconformist, as Mr. Rhys 
happens to be - must necessarily be a traitor to his country. [This] in a 
stronghold of Nonconformity, render the candidate’s task all the more 
difficult’.41  Such comments did not bode well for Rhys in the pit villages and 
rural areas of East Denbighshire which were overwhelmingly Nonconformist. 
Disestablishment was thus an issue that, depending on the circumstances, 
could benefit both political parties in North-east Wales. Here the resistance to 
Disestablishment found a significant voice while on the other side of the 
argument many Liberals pushed for the introduction of a new Bill, ensuring 
that a major political battle continued in the region until a Disestablishment 
Bill became law in 1914. By comparison, even though 26 Liberal candidates 
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featured it in their election addressees, in other parts of Wales the overriding 
issue was the Budget with little attention paid to Disestablishment.42   
It was not just that the Conservatives had to fight long and bitter 
rearguard actions with the Liberals on such contentious issues as Church 
Disestablishment in North-east Wales. Another factor that gave the Liberal 
party the ascendancy in the region was Lloyd George’s own personal 
popularity.  Elevated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s post by Asquith in 
1908 Lloyd George was held in high regard by the majority of Welsh people, 
even before the introduction of the 1909 Budget, and was highly revered in 
this corner of Wales which his own constituency bordered on to and where he 
had done much campaigning.       
Such was the support for Lloyd George locally that towards the end of 
the campaign in Flint Boroughs Harold Tilby commented rather sourly:  
 
My opponents have never been able to touch me by argument all through the 
contest and they have never been able to shake one’s faith in one’s cause; they 
adopt the tactics of trying to howl me down. The only argument I have had to 
face throughout the Boroughs has been the argument of ‘three cheers for Lloyd 
George’. The Radical Party have abandoned principle and have started hero-
worshipping. They have set up an image and they say ‘let us bow down and 
worship it’.43 
 
In the final analysis Lloyd George’s popularity in North-east Wales was not a 
decisive factor in the election results, although it clearly helped, as the 
circumstances surrounding the government’s decision to go to the country and 
the issues debated favoured the Liberal party. Furthermore, despite the massive 
focus the Conservatives gave the issues what the campaign in North-east 
Wales seemed to prove, Denbigh Boroughs not withstanding, was that Church 
Defence and Tariff Reform failed to move the public, given the subsequent 
Liberal successes.  In all the constituencies, barring Denbigh Boroughs, 
Liberals were returned with large majorities. In Flint Boroughs the Liberals 
increased their majority by 51 votes while in East Denbighshire they improved 
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their share of the vote by over three per cent compared to the by-election of 
1909.44 In West Denbighshire Sam Thompson was defeated by over 3,000 
votes, his advocacy of Tariff Reform and working-class background evidently 
failing to make an impression on the constituency’s largely agricultural 
electorate. Elsewhere there were encouraging signs for the party. In Flint 
County Colonel Howard reduced Herbert Lewis’ 1906 majority by over 500 
votes, increasing the Conservative share of the vote to 43.6 per cent. Liberals 
later claimed that their vote here was adversely affected by an inward 
migration of people from the West Midlands seeking new industrial jobs, 
which left the constituency more anglicised.45 Certainly, an improved 
Conservative vote suggests that there was a solid block of support for Howard 
amongst the working classes but these might have been expected to vote 
Liberal for as Henry Pelling suggests ‘a decline in distinctively Welsh 
characteristics was compensated for, so far as Liberalism was concerned, by 
the emergence of a solid industrial vote’ in the constituency.46 The increased 
Conservative vote therefore implies that the party message had been well 
received, and that the party was slowly climbing back to the position it had 
occupied in the polls at the 1900 election, when it claimed 46 per cent of the 
vote.  
These trends in Flint County were evident in Denbigh Boroughs where 
a significant block of working class voters in the Wrexham area gave Ormsby-
Gore his sensational victory. And sensational the victory certainly was for a 
comfortable Liberal majority of 573 was overturned by Conservatives who 
gained a majority of eight, demolishing previous Liberal predictions of a 
majority in excess of 1,000 for their candidate Clement Edwards.47 Ormsby-
Gore attributed his victory to Tariff Reform, declaring after the election that 
‘he would just like to call their attention to the fact that Tariff Reform was 
winning all up and down the country and he was proud to say that his was the 
first Tariff Reform victory in Wales’.48 The situation was of course more 
complex than this and while Tariff Reform may have been a factor in Ormsby- 
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Gore’s victory, it was by no means the most important one. Problems had 
beset the Liberal campaign from the start. Edwards was not the most loyal of 
Welsh Liberals, objecting to the education compromise sought by Lloyd 
George and the Bishop of St Asaph, and rebelling over the Liberal position on 
Church Disestablishment.49 This streak of independence alienated many of his 
supporters and was, as he himself acknowledged the major factor in his defeat:  
 
I don’t quarrel with my friends in the least but they were as conscientious in 
regarding my attitude as wrong as I was in regarding it as right. But it came out 
that some of them were rather lukewarm and did not work as strenuously and as 
vigorously as they had done in 1906. They voted I have no doubt all right, but 
when certain men assumed an attitude of less zeal and energy; their weakened 
brethren thought there was some cause for it and abstained from voting or voted 
the other way.50  
 
There was also much local apprehension at several planned Liberal reforms - for 
example, Thomas Williams’ defection to the Conservatives over Church 
Disestablishment. Ormsby-Gore suggested, subsequently, his strong poll was 
based upon a ‘considerable number of Socialist, Liberal Churchmen and even 
Nonconformist votes’.51 More significantly Ormsby-Gore’s success turned on the 
increased support from the working class, a reversal of the 1906 results when 
G.T Kenyon lost because of a failure to canvass the workingmen of the 
constituency.52   
The January 1910 election demonstrated the extent to which 
Conservatives had developed strong ties amongst sections of the working-class in 
the intervening period. Ormsby-Gore’s decision to visit factories and address the 
workingmen was well rewarded.53 In Wrexham during the campaign he spoke at 
the Cambrian Leatherworks, the Cambrian Ironworks and the Great Western 
Railway sheds and Soames Brewery. The Brewing trade had long been 
associated with the Conservative party, which since the late nineteenth century 
had argued for ‘the right of the respectable man to enjoy the pleasures of a quiet 
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pint free from the interference of Liberal temperance reformers’, and gained 
useful political support as a consequence.54 This support was encouraged by the 
Brewing trade, anxious to defeat such measures as the 1908 Licensing Bill, 
which not only donated to the Conservative party but also provided committee 
rooms and meeting places inside public houses.55 From within his own local 
party Ormsby- Gore was guaranteed support from the brewing trade – Wrexham 
brewery owners Charles Murless and J.A. Chadwick were members of the 
Denbigh Boroughs Unionist Association Executive Committee. He was also 
invited to speak to workers at the F.W. Soames brewery, one of the largest in 
Wrexham, where he attacked the Liberal party’s record on temperance reform: 
 
The Liberal record for the last four years had been one of continued hostility to 
the brewery trade, and the Labour party had surrendered themselves to the 
temperance fanatics who thought the people could only be made temperate by 
Act of Parliament and because the employer and employed in the brewery had 
banded themselves together to protect their legitimate industry. The Liberal 
party in the Licensing Bill and in the Budget had included unjust measures of 
political revenue. 56  
 
This was a powerful political message to all those who enjoyed drinking alcohol, 
and especially to those workingmen in Wrexham where the breweries were one 
of the largest employers in the town. It was also reported that Wrexham brewers 
gave thousands of pounds to Ormsby-Gore’s campaign which was put to good 
use as much of it was used for canvassing and maximising the Conservative vote 
by ferrying people in cars to the polls on election day.57 By comparison the 
Liberals lacked the same support and supplies for their voters. The North Wales 
Times later claimed that one of the major factors in Ormsby- Gore’s victory was 
the support he received from the ‘landlord and the liquor trade’.58  
Ormsby-Gore also believed that a visit to the Independent Labour party at 
their offices in Wrexham, where he was invited to address members, aided his 
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victory.59 During his speech here he highlighted the social reform aspects of 
Tariff Reform and attempted to allay working class animosity to aristocratic 
landowners.60 He subsequently claimed that ‘Independent Labour men voted 
solidly for my opponent in 1906, several supported me and many abstained this 
time’.61 Finally, Ormsby-Gore’s victory owed something to organisational 
improvements. According to the Denbighshire Free Press: 
 
Another element in the triumph has been the splendid organisation of the 
Unionist party. Four years ago it was admittedly unsatisfactory, but the 
organisation has since been remodelled on more business like lines and the great 
utilisation of the working class element has been a great factor in its success. 
Yeoman service has been rendered by the members of the Wrexham 
Conservative Workingmen’s Association and the work done by the members of 
the Women’s Unionist Association in the clerical department, canvassing etc is 
beyond all praise. 62           
 
  Since the 1906 general election, the Denbigh Boroughs Association 
had made strides to improve its organisation determined to avoid the apathy 
that had infected the party and address the criticisms from leading 
Conservatives in the division. T.J Rouw, chairman of the Ruthin Unionist 
Association, for example, speaking at the end of March 1906 said  ‘there was 
one thing they could not shut their eyes to and that was the apathy of the party; 
there was not the kind of interest thrown into the last election as was done in 
the past’.63 In many places Conservative organisation had simply broken down 
and was in desperate need of overhauling.64 This obviously left the 
Conservative party vulnerable to attack and Denbigh Boroughs was just one of 
many constituencies to feel the full force of a well organised Liberal party, 
which canvassed the constituency thoroughly and supported its candidate with 
leading party speakers, most notably Lloyd George. What was more surprising 
was the Denbigh Boroughs Association’s positive response to its 
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organisational inadequacies; Conservative organisation in many areas was still 
poor by 1910, the party machine failing to learn the lessons of 1906 as electors 
went uncanvassed, registration was ignored and constituency associations 
became mere social venues for the landed rich.65 In Denbigh Boroughs work 
commenced on repairing Conservative organisation soon after the 1906 
election defeat as party activists combined with leaders to re-structure 
Conservative forces in the constituency.  
The poor sate of organisation, especially in Wrexham, was addressed. 
Shortly after his appointment Ormsby- Gore commented ‘the organisation in 
Wrexham and Holt is much better than I expected. Since the general election 
the towns have been divided into wards, registers have been divided up among 
the leading Conservatives and are in goodish order’.66 With the West 
Denbighshire Constitutional Association taking care of Denbigh and Ruthin’s 
registration work in the revision courts, and thus helping reduce costs, the 
prospects for maximising the Conservative vote were a lot brighter for the 
Conservatives in the constituency.  
When these developments were added to the progress made with the 
newly founded ranks of working-class and women members who 
systematically canvassed and distributed Conservative propaganda during the 
election campaign, the Conservative party had a committed and loyal party 
support, which contrasted totally with the shambolic state of Clement 
Edwards’ following. This support concentrated its activities in Wrexham, 
where the overwhelming amount of electors lived, in an attempt to avoid a 
repetition of the dismal failure to canvass properly during the 1906 general 
election campaign. According to Ormsby- Gore it was this concentrated effort 
in Wrexham that delivered the Conservative votes and tipped the balance in his 
favour: 
 
The increase in the Conservative vote was almost entirely in Wrexham. In 
Denbigh the Liberals have always had a majority of votes – votes in Denbigh do 
not change very much. In Ruthin the parties are evenly balanced. Holt has 
always provided a big Conservative majority out of its 200 electors. This time 
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Holt was overwhelmingly Conservative. I fancy that 450 voters in Wrexham 
voted Conservative for the first time in their lives at this election.67     
 
Although canvassing and leaflet distribution did take place in other areas, 
especially in Denbigh where members of the Primrose League fulfilled this role, 
it was the decision to target their resources at Wrexham and develop thriving 
women’s and working men’s associations that paid dividends for the 
Conservatives. 
Lastly, Ormsby-Gore benefited from forces favourably inclined to the 
Conservatives who were perhaps more deeply rooted in the Denbigh Boroughs 
than it might appear from the election result in 1906. Denbigh Boroughs while 
not a safe seat had returned Conservatives prior to 1906 at the previous five 
general elections, four of them won by the Tory landowner G.T. Kenyon.  In part 
this was due to the anglicised nature of many Welsh boroughs seats. Aubel 
asserts that this was because they had voting patterns more akin ‘to that of 
England’ and had been ‘ever since the Middle Ages… with their castles and 
fortified town walls… the outposts of English influence in Wales’.68  Certainly 
all four boroughs in the Denbigh Boroughs constituency had middle age 
fortifications associated with Edward the First’s conquest of Wales and the 
proximity of Holt and Wrexham to the English border made them vulnerable to 
English influences.  In theory this made voters more inclined towards the Tory 
party in Denbigh Boroughs and there was every reason to believe that with the 
right candidate fighting a more disciplined campaign the Conservatives could 
win back the seat at this election. This was something that candidate and party 
leaders recognised alike. In his papers Ormsby- Gore recounts a meeting held 
between himself and Lord Kenyon in November 1907. Acknowledging that party 
organisation was vastly improved Ormsby- Gore admitted ‘it will be my fault if I 
don’t get in’.69 In delivering victory in January 1910 and allaying Conservative 
fears of further marginalisation in the region Ormsby–Gore earned himself a 
fearsome reputation as a campaigner as well as this panegyric by Kenneth O. 
Morgan: ‘William Ormsby- Gore returned for Denbigh District… was to prove 
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the by far the most able and articulate Conservative yet returned for a Welsh 
constituency’70   
 
Table 3.1 
The January 1910 General Election 
Party    U.K Seats         % Wales Seats          % 
Liberal      275       43.2        27         51.1 
Conservative      273       46.9          2         30.4 
Labour        40         7.6          5         16.4 
Irish 
Nationalists 
       82         1.9   
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Election, 1885-1997.  
 
 
 
Table 3.2 
General election Results in North East Wales, January 1910. 
Constituency    
Liberal    
  % Conservative      % Majority 
Denbigh East 6865      67.4         3321 32.6     Lib + 3544 
 
    Denbigh West 
      
5854 
 
67.4 
         
        2829 
    
32.6 
 
Lib + 3025 
Denbigh 
Boro’s 
      
2427 
 
49.9 
         
        2437 
    
50.1 
 
Con + 8* 
 
Flint County 
      
6610 
 
59.7 
         
        4454 
    
40.3 
 
Lib + 2156 
 
Flint Boro’s 
      
2150 
 
55.5 
         
        1723 
    
44.5 
 
Lib + 427 
* Amended to 10. 
 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
 
Table 3.3. 
Percentage Vote of the Conservative Party. 
Region                           General Elections 
 1886 1892  1895 1900 1906 1910(J)  
United 
Kingdom 
51.4 47.0  49.1 50.3 43.4 46.8  
Wales 40.0 35.6  41.4 34.5 29.8 30.4  
North-east 
Wales  
38.6 41.7  43.8 47.2 39.7 38.2  
Taken from: Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
The victory in Denbigh Boroughs offset the other losses in Denbighshire 
while an improved performance in Flint County helped boost Conservative 
morale.71 In the five constituencies that the Conservative party fought in North-
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east Wales, they averaged 38.2 per cent of the vote, slightly down on their share 
of the vote in 1906, but still nearly eight per cent ahead of what the party 
achieved in Wales as a whole. Indeed, the results confirmed trends since 1886 
that in this corner of Wales the Conservative vote was far stronger and more 
resilient to the onslaughts of radical Liberalism, than it was in the Principality as 
a whole (see Table 3.3). In January 1910 the Conservative party was struggling 
to achieve a meagre 30 per cent of the vote in Wales, even though it also won 
Radnor.  Furthermore, since 1886 the Conservative vote in Wales had dropped 
by 10 per cent, but in North- east Wales it remained approximately where it had 
been 24 years earlier. Even though the Conservative share of the vote in North-
east Wales lagged some way behind what the party was achieving nationally 
what the results seemed to be indicating was that the Conservatives were still a 
strong and vibrant force in the region and were capable of winning seats given 
the right circumstances. Despite the disappointments in East and West 
Denbighshire the party also appeared far more entrenched than it was in Wales as 
a whole. Perhaps certain demographical factors favoured the party in North-east 
Wales, but the Denbigh Boroughs result demonstrated what could be achieved by 
the Conservatives in a region which otherwise was still overwhelmingly Liberal.  
In terms of the national picture, the Conservative 116 gains included 
fourteen in London, eleven in South-east England, eleven in East Anglia and 
eleven in the West Midlands. This perhaps should have been the spark to re-
ignite the party’s hopes for a speedy return to government - some Conservative 
supporters even suggesting that the party woo the Irish Nationalists in bid to 
regain power. However, such a move was quickly dismissed by the leaders 
refusal to contemplate such a suggestion, dependent, as it surely would be on 
some sort of Home Rule measure, an inconceivable thought to the bulk of 
Unionists who believed that this would signal the end of Empire.72 As a 
consequence the Liberal party remained in office with the support of Labour and 
the Irish Nationalists who in return for supporting the Budget expected a limit on 
the House of Lords veto, which could possibly signal the passage of Irish Home 
Rule legislation. In North-east Wales the situation was far simpler – 
overwhelmed by the Liberal onslaught in 1906 the party had regained a foothold 
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in the region. There was still a long way to go, but for the first time since 1900 
the party was showing electoral growth and more significantly had won the 
Denbigh Boroughs.  
 
‘ROUND TWO’ THE DECEMBER 1910 ELECTION. 
For the Conservative party the months between the two general 
elections of 1910 were marked by internal arguments over the validity of 
Tariff Reform as a policy. The policy’s supporters rejected the criticisms that 
Tariff Reform was a vote loser and remained convinced that the policy was 
still the party’s trump card. Austen Chamberlain, one of its chief proponents, 
argued ‘where we won, we won on and by Tariff Reform. Even where we lost 
it was the only subject in our repertoire about which people cared’.73 These 
comments were based on a belief that it was not Tariff Reform but the Peoples 
Budget and the House of Lords that caused the party problems at the previous 
election. Such implicit faith was placed in Tariff Reform that many of its 
advocates, rather than see its rejection or a dilution of its programmes, 
considered reform of the House of Lords and consorting with the Irish 
Nationalists, whom they saw as protectionists, in a bid to remove opposition 
and gain support for the policy. Yet many Conservatives were disenchanted 
with Tariff Reform as it had failed to deliver election victory or nullify the 
burdens of the 1909 Budget and cohesion was hardly helped when Balfour 
announced his pledge to submit Tariff Reform to a referendum, alienating 
those who implicitly supported the policy.74 Furthermore, unlike the Liberals 
the Conservative leaders went into the Constitutional Conference in the spring 
of 1910 without any clear alternative to the government’s veto scheme and as 
result ‘the election was upon them before they had any agreed plan before the 
public’.75  Thus when the conference broke down and Asquith sought a 
dissolution, announcing a second election within the space of a year the 
Conservative party was hardly ready for the rigours of campaign which would 
be fought on the terms of the Parliament Bill and the possible emasculation of 
the Lords’ powers.          
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By contrast divisions over party policy were ignored as the early part of 
1910, went well for Conservatives in North-east Wales as they carried their 
strong performance in the January 1910 general election through to the county 
council elections, less than a month later. Little changed in Denbighshire 
where the Conservatives lost four seats and gained three. The Liberals claimed 
that their gain of one seat, which increased their majority to twelve, was a 
great victory for progressive politics, but only one seat swapped sides – a gain 
for the Liberals in Colwyn Bay West. However, in Flintshire the Conservatives 
successfully attacked the extravagant Liberal spending on education and 
pledged themselves ‘to observe the strictest economy and to put an end to the 
frequent building of new schools’.76 As a result, the Conservatives obtained a 
clear majority on the council as they won 24 seats to the Liberals’ 18, 
representing their best result since county council elections began in 1889. 
They were helped by the return of nine Conservative councillors in twelve 
uncontested divisions. Walter Hargreaves, a Conservative was elected as 
Chairman of the Council and all the important police and education 
committees were dominated by Conservatives. Understandably the 
Conservative party was jubilant and the Flintshire Constitutional Association’s 
report for 1910 reflected ‘that in March the county council elections took place 
and for the first time in 21 years the Radical forces were routed’.77  
The breakthrough in local politics was a significant step forward for the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales, but the Conservative Associations still 
struggled to select parliamentary candidates for the December 1910 general 
election. After Sam Thompson decided he faced an impossible task in West 
Denbighshire and asked to be relieved from further candidature, the 
Constitutional Association unable to induce their preferred choice as 
candidate, R.Williams-Wynn, a vice president of the Association, to stand 
decided ‘to let the election go by default’.78 In Flintshire the situation was 
more complicated. Colonel Howard who fought the County constituency in 
January, was selected for the more winnable Boroughs seat, and had began 
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campaigning when the Constituency Association attempted to fill the vacancy 
in the County division. In November 1910 after several attempts to entice 
suitable candidates, the Association approached Sir J.D. Rees, Liberal MP for 
Montgomery, who then joined the Conservatives in protest against Lloyd 
George’s Budget measures. The original intention of the Constitutional 
Association was to offer him the Boroughs division, with Howard returning to 
the County division. However, Rees declined the offer prompting Howard to 
return to the Boroughs Constituency and leaving the County uncontested. In 
East Denbighshire the Unionist Association appointed Alfred Hood, a local 
businessman and Anglican, thus ending the party’s experiment with fielding 
Nonconformist candidates. The only other candidate was of course Ormsby-
Gore, the sitting MP for Denbigh Boroughs. Despite these difficulties with 
selecting candidates, the party still had cause for optimism. In two of the three 
contested constituencies, the Liberals fielded new and relatively unknown 
candidates in the region. E.T. John, an industrialist, was elected for East 
Denbighshire and in Denbigh Boroughs, Caradoc Rees, a barrister replaced the 
hapless Clement Edwards.  
At the December 1910 election the fortunes of the Parliament Bill took 
precedence `over all other issues. Every election address, barring two, featured 
the question and 51 considered nothing else, while 86 per cent of them 
suggested the constitutional question was the most important issue facing the 
electors.79 The December campaign in North-east Wales closely followed 
those held throughout the United Kingdom. In line with Conservative party 
policy, candidates characterised the Parliament Bill as a challenge to 
democracy and a threat to the unity of the Empire. Speaking at a meeting in 
Bwlchgwyn on 3 December, Alfred Hood, the East Denbighshire candidate 
said that ‘the removal of the House of Lords veto would result in the passage 
of an Irish Home Rule Bill, and that if they gave it to Ireland it meant the 
breaking up of the unity of the British Islands. It was only the first part of it, 
and it would probably lead to the breaking up of the Empire’.80 
Similarly, at a Flintshire Constitutional Association meeting in early 
December 1910 Dr. Twemlow, an Executive Committee member, likened the 
                                                 
79 Blewett, the Peers, the Parties and the People, p.327. 
80 North Wales Guardian, 10 December 1910. 
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government’s desire to remove the Lords veto to ‘an apparent socialist desire 
to remove the monarchy’.81 To Ormsby-Gore, in Denbigh Boroughs, the threat 
to the House of Lords veto surpassed any other issue in importance for if the 
veto was abolished then any Bill that the Liberal party ‘brought to the House 
of Commons would be passed whether the people said yes or no’.82 As a result 
he modified his position on Tariff Reform and instead gave his support to 
Balfour and his referendum pledge on the policy: 
 
After Mr. Balfour’s statement ...it had been made clear that no scheme of Tariff 
Reform would be carried over the heads of the people. He meant that the scheme 
of Tariff Reform that the Unionist party would introduce would be settled by the 
referendum. They should appeal direct to the electors, and whether the electors 
of the country said the scheme was or was not to be passed, the Unionist party 
would abide by that decision. I am standing at this election upon the 
referendum.83 
 
His position brought him into conflict with intransigent Tariff Reformers who 
feared that members of the Tory landed classes presented an obstacle to their 
programme by their willingness to sacrifice protectionist policies in favour of 
their resistance to the emasculation of the House of Lords.84 Certainly Alfred 
Hood and Colonel Howard remained faithful to the protectionist wing of the 
party by insisting upon the application of the full Tariff Reform programme 
should the Conservatives be returned to power, and thus the party was split once 
more in the region over the application of the policy. Ormsby-Gore’s decision 
was perhaps influenced by his family connection – he was the son of the Third 
Baron Harlech, a diehard peer who was implacably opposed to the Parliament 
Bill.  Fortunately for the Conservative candidates apparent divisions on Tariff 
Reform were not this time seized upon by the Liberal party who were 
concentrating their attacks on the House of Lords. However, Ormsby- Gore’s 
status as the only son of a leading nobleman brought about charges of elitism and 
indifference to the plight of others less fortunate than him by Lloyd George and 
                                                 
81 Flintshire Observer 9 December 1910. 
82 Denbighshire Free Press, 3 December 1910. 
83 Ibid., 3 Decmeber 1910. 
84 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, pp.158-161.  
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Caradoc Rees during the campaign. At Denbigh during the first week of 
campaigning Lloyd George unleashed the full venom of his rhetoric in a personal 
attack on Ormsby-Gore, the only aristocratic MP in the region: 
 
He [Lloyd George] had nothing to say about Ormsby-Gore who was no doubt a 
very nice and genial boy [but]…did he know the nation, did he know anything 
about its literature, could he speak its language, had he taken part in any phase 
in the life of Wales, except its rents. 85 
 
The Liberal attack on Ormsby- Gore was continued by their candidate in 
Denbigh Boroughs, Caradoc Rees, who said during the first week of 
campaigning: 
 
The contest was not between Mr Gore and himself it was between the two 
bodies of men who were in conflict for the simple reason that they represented 
different principles - Liberalism with its progressive policy or Conservatism 
which stood for the privileged classes against the masses’.86   
 
Yet despite these and other Liberal attacks on him it hardly affected the 
result in Denbigh Boroughs. On an unchanged electoral register the Tories 
held on to the seat by nine votes. This perhaps at first glance seemed unlikely 
when given the circumstances surrounding the election. Since 1910 Clement 
Edwards, whose candidature had divided the Liberal party in January 1910, 
had left to fight the East Glamorgan constituency and Caradoc Rees a new 
local candidate had been selected around whom local Liberals coalesced. Party 
workers also responded favourably to Rees and worked tirelessly to win back 
the seat for the Liberals, especially in ensuring supporters went to the poll.87 
At the same time the issue of the Parliament Bill seemed to be one that united 
the local Liberals in the constituency unlike the divisions brought about by 
Church Disestablishment in January 1910. Thus the Liberals represented a far 
more formidable opposition to Ormsby–Gore than they had in January 1910 
                                                 
85 North Wales Times, 10 December 1910.  
86 Ibid., 26 November 1910. 
87 North Wales Guardian, 16 January 1910. 
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and were confident they could win the seat back.88 However, in the final 
analysis it should be noted that the Conservative party was well entrenched in 
the constituency and despite Liberal confidence about their prospects they still 
faced a difficult task in winning back the constituency. Indeed, Denbigh 
Boroughs had been Conservative since 1885 – the only defeat suffered since 
then the Liberal gain as part of their clean sweep of Wales in 1906. Since then 
Clement Edwards had done much damage to the Liberal party’s reputation in 
the constituency - his decision to refuse to accept the result in January 1910 
and petition the Royal Court of Justice to have the result overturned because of 
voting irregularities resulted in an embarrassing climb-down as Ormsby-
Gore’s majority was increased to ten. Local Liberals attempted to persuade 
him not to proceed with the action, and his subsequent defeat in the Court only 
succeeded in alienating many of his supporters.89    
Furthermore, Ormsby- Gore’s growing reputation as a parliamentarian 
recorded in a series of weekly newsletters published in the local press could 
only have enhanced his candidature.90 Finally, the same level of organisational 
efficiency that contributed to success in January 1910 was also achieved at this 
election. In his victory speech at Denbigh Ormsby-Gore praised the help he 
had received from his Conservative Association and the Primrose League in 
providing support during his campaign.91 This he noted had been particularly 
evident on election day as party workers ensured that all registered 
Conservatives voted while a fleet of over 30 cars conveyed them to the polls in 
Wrexham.92  As a result the Conservatives held on to the seat again by the 
narrowest of margins. Overall, the results in North-east Wales demonstrated 
that little had changed since January. In Flint Boroughs Colonel Howard lost 
to John Summers who increased his majority by 82 votes and in East 
Denbighshire Alfred Hood was defeated, though not before a creditable fight 
that reduced the Liberal majority by nearly 300 votes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
88 North Wales Guardian, 16 January 1910. 
89 For a full account see Denbighshire Free Press, 11 February and 9 April 1910. 
90 North Wales Guardian, 9 December 1910.  
91 Denbighshire Free Press, 17 December 1910. 
92 North Wales Guardian, 16 December 1910.  
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Table 3.4 
The December 1910 General Election. 
Party 
 
U.K.Seats % Wales, Seats % 
Liberal 272 43.9 26 47.6 
Conservative 272 46.3 3 30.7 
Labour 42 7.1 5 19.1 
Irish 
Nationalists 
84 2.5   
 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997 
 
Table 3.5 
General Election Results in North-east Wales, December 1910. 
    Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
 
 
Table 3.6 
Percentage Vote of the Conservative Party. 
 
Region                           General Elections 
  
1892 
 
1895 
 
1900 
 
1906 
 
  1910(J) 
 
1910(D)
United Kingdom  47.0  49.1  50.3  43.4 46.8 46.6 
Wales  35.6  41.4  34.5  29.8 30.4 30.7 
North East Wales  41.7  43.8  47.2  39.7 38.2 39.6 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997. 
 
The results also confirmed the strength of the Conservative party’s vote in the 
region. It averaged nearly 40 per cent of the vote in the three constituencies it 
contested, nearly ten per cent more than the party achieved in Wales as whole. 
Although the party lagged some way behind what it was achieving nationally 
the retention of Denbigh Borough was a boost to Conservatives in the region, 
many hoping that Ormsby- Gore’s victories in 1910 would be a springboard 
for success in other constituencies.93 While the result in Flint Boroughs was 
disappointing the increase in the Liberal majority of 82 votes hardly 
represented a large downturn in Conservative fortunes and Colonel Howard 
                                                 
93 North Wales Guardian, 16 December 1910 see also Denbighshire Free Press, 29 January 
1910. 
Constituency  Liberal             %        Con.      % Majority 
Denbigh West  Unopposed         
Denbigh East     6449 66.9         3186  33.1 Lib + 3263 
Denbigh Boro’s     2376 49.9         2385  50.1 Con +      9 
Flint County  Unopposed         
Flint Boro’s      2098 56.9         1589  43.1 Lib + 509 
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still achieved 44 per cent of the vote (see table 3.5) At the same time in East 
Denbighshire Alfred Hood slightly increased the Conservative share of the 
vote compared to January 1910, as it topped 33 per cent.   
 What the results indicate is that although the House of Lords issue was 
well received by Liberal audiences it did not inflict any further damage on the 
party in North-east Wales. The results demonstrated actually just how 
entrenched the party was in the region despite the constant parliamentary 
election defeats and its failure to add to the victory in Denbigh Boroughs. Even 
though its average share of the vote was two per cent lower than it had 
achieved in 1892, and some way behind what it had gained in 1895 and 1900 - 
strong Conservative years nationally – since 1900 the party’ share of the vote 
remained strong at nearly 40 per cent which compared favourably with the 
party’s performance in Wales as a whole (see table 3. 6).  In December 1910 it 
still only achieved just over 30 per cent of the vote in the Principality nearly 
five per cent less than what was achieved in 1892, although the party gained 
Montgomery Boroughs and Cardiff Boroughs off the Liberals, but lost Radnor 
again.  
Nationally the party won the same number of seats as the Liberal party, 
but its share of the vote was slightly down gaining 46.3 per cent of the vote 
compared to the 46.9 per cent achieved at the January election. Despite the fact 
that the Conservative party was unable to gain power because of the support 
Labour and the Irish Nationalists gave the government the Conservatives and 
Liberals were equally matched. The status quo was also maintained in North-
east Wales where the Conservatives were still searching for a breakthrough in 
Flintshire despite the continued substantial vote and were still unable to mount 
a serious challenge to the Liberal party in a Denbighshire county division. Yet 
with the retention of the Denbigh Boroughs seat, albeit again with the 
narrowest of margins, and with the outstanding performance at the county 
council elections in Flintshire in March 1910, the future looked much brighter 
for the Conservative party in North-east Wales.  
 
 
 
 
 128  
PARTY ORGANISATION 1910-1914  
 Successive defeats brought the evident inadequacies of the national 
Conservative party organisation into stark relief. Decay in the party machine 
indicated that there was no supervision of constituency Associations to ensure 
efficiency and no procedures for selecting ‘the right men for the right seats’ 
while at the same time Central Office was in disarray.94 Consequently, Central 
Office had no control of office routine there was no proper system of reports 
from District Agents and no control of their expenditure. Lapsed subscriptions 
were not chased up and even though urgent work was completed all other 
problems and responsibilities were shelved if possible.95 Under the auspices of 
the Unionist Organisation Committee, appointed by Balfour in February 1911, 
which reported to leaders in April 1911, sweeping changes were introduced to 
party organisation. The responsibilities of the Chief Whip were to be limited to 
a management role in parliament, a Party Treasurer’s post was created to 
oversee party funds, and the new position of Chairman of the Party was 
introduced to take charge of Central Office its staff, as well as the party 
outside parliament. Thus responsibility for party organisation, and the 
provision of propaganda and speakers remained in Central Office’s hands 
while it and the National Union office were merged, but only Central Office 
retained executive authority.96 These changes strengthened the party leader’s 
position confirming his control over organisation. 97According to Dutton they 
also had a positive long-term effect on the party as ‘the new measures very 
considerably strengthened the Unionist party machine. In particular, the 
pruning of the Chief Whip’s functions and the creation of the office of 
Chairman were landmarks in the party’s transition into the world of modern 
politics’.98 However, as part of this review it was also identified that there was 
‘a need to make wholesale improvements in the methods of the local parties’.99  
                                                 
94 Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People pp.266-277.  Seep.267. 
95 Ibid, p., 267. Blewett  quotes from the new party chairman, Arthur Steel Maitland, in a report 
to Bonar Law. 
96 S.Ball, ‘The National and Regional Party Structure’, p.172. See also Dutton, His Majesty’s 
Loyal Opposition, p.136. 
97 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p. 62. 
98 Dutton, His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition. 136. 
99 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p59. 
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How to further improve their organisational structure after the December 
1910 election also remained a concern for the NWDNU. Notwithstanding the 
substantial vote in Flint Boroughs, a report on the general election written 
within days of the defeat by the Flintshire Constitutional Association, 
highlighted the problems the Conservative party were still having in the 
constituency and elsewhere in the region. It declared that the December ‘result 
was extremely disappointing’ and not helped by a lack of support from 
Conservative Central Office:100  
 
Head Office again failed entirely to render any effective help. Every kind of 
pressure was brought to bear in order to obtain platform assistance but without 
avail…Denbigh Boroughs, Cardiff and Montgomery Boroughs were fortunate in 
having the help of the heads of the Party and some of the leading speakers in the 
country went to the assistance of the candidates with the result that two of the 
seats were won and the other retained. In Radnorshire and Flint District 
Boroughs no assistance was received from leading men with the result that the 
former was lost and in the latter the majority was increased. 101    
  
The report was careful not to implicate anybody by name, even complimenting 
the Flintshire Constitutional Association’s leaders and the NWDNU for the aid 
they had given during the campaign but it went on to criticise poor 
organisation, weaknesses in local planning and the ineffectiveness of local 
clubs: 
 
The chief weaknesses are to be found in the local working. In the first place, 
canvassing, a most important part of the work was done badly. Our people do 
not begin a canvass early enough… It is to canvassing and re- canvassing that 
one must look at elections for results. As things are, it is not uncommon to find 
that canvassers take canvass books, sit down in their own houses and mark up 
the books as they think people will vote and the voters are never seen at all. One 
of the consequences is that some electors vote against us because they have 
                                                 
100 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Papers, Minute Book 1, 11 August 
1910-22 January 1921, D/DM/307/1, Report on the Election in the Flint District Boroughs, 
December 1910.  
101 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Papers, Minute Book 1, 11 August 
1910-22 January 1921, D/DM/307/1, Report on the Election in the Flint District Boroughs, 
December 1910.   
 130  
never been asked to vote for us… The clubs in some cases should give much 
greater help than they do. At the beginning of an election the Committees should 
pass a resolution saying that the Billiard Tables will not be open before 9-00 
p.m. (if at all) and that the Club premises shall be the Committee Rooms for the 
Election.102 
 
More optimistically the report indicated that there was ‘little or nothing to 
complain of in the matter of work and enthusiastic service during the last day 
or two of the campaign’, but that there was an urgent need for early planning 
and more central support.103 Finally it concluded that ‘what is required at once 
is, first, a Candidate, and secondly, more educative work amongst the 
Electors’. 104 
The report’s conclusions had wider ramifications. In early January 1911, 
the NWDNU met at Chester to assess the party’s performance at the general 
election. The meeting drew heavily upon the report of the Flintshire 
Constitutional Association by deciding on the following resolutions to be 
adopted by all Associations: 
1.Candidates should be chosen without delay. 
2.Separate Associations should be formed for each constituency. Their Chairmen 
should not hold office for more than one year… Thus fresh ideas would certainly 
be brought into play and more men would take an interest in the political 
organisation. It is hardly possible for any man to keep up the necessary strain of 
concert pitch, which is really required in political work, particularly when the 
constant defeats are taken into consideration… 
3.Clubs should be started everywhere and made to do political work and be used 
as political institutions only during elections. 
4.Junior Leagues should be started in each town. 105  
 
 
                                                 
102 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Papers, Minute Book 1, 11 August 
1910-22 January 1921, D/DM/307/1, Report on the Election in the Flint District Boroughs, 
December 1910.   
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Papers, Minute Book 1, 11 August 
1910-22 January 1921, D/DM/307/1, Report on the Election in the Flint District Boroughs, 
December 1910.   
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Resolution one was prompted by the failure of West Denbighshire and 
Flint County to field candidates at the December election.106 Finding suitable 
candidates to contest constituencies, where Conservative prospects were poor, 
remained a problem. In January 1910 the Conservative party had contested all 
34 constituencies in Wales, but in December only twenty Conservative 
candidates went to the polls, the same number as in 1906. Part of the problem 
was financial - funding candidates at parliamentary elections was an enormous 
expense and one that was difficult to justify if certain defeat was the outcome. 
At the same time finding a suitable candidate who was willing to risk his 
reputation in a Liberal stronghold was also extremely difficult.  
In spite of these encumbrances the associations in North-east Wales 
attempted to find new and suitable candidates, but progress was mixed. The 
Flintshire Constitutional Association quickly resolved its selection difficulties. 
In April 1911, D.F Pennant, a barrister, scion of the Penrhyn family and 
member of the Association’s Executive Committee was adopted to fight the 
County division, and in October Hamlet Roberts, a relatively unknown Welsh-
speaking Nonconformist from Pen y Groes near Caernarfon, was selected for 
Flint Boroughs. The West Denbighshire Association took much longer to 
adopt a candidate. Ever since Sam Thompson stood down as candidate in April 
1910 the Association had been searching for a successor and by May 1912 
were still looking for a parliamentary candidate.  
The situation worsened in December 1912 when E.W. Griffith, a local 
landowner, also turned down the opportunity to stand. Colonel Cornwallis-
West was then authorised to approach Central Office in London in the hope 
that they could find a suitable candidate. This was not a preferred route – the 
Central Office choice often meant the imposition of a wholly unsuitable 
candidate, especially in this corner of Wales where it was deemed necessary to 
have a Welsh-speaking candidate with some knowledge of local rural affairs. 
To this end the Association finally found a solution, and avoided approaching 
Central Office, when in October 1913 it appointed W. H. Williams, a Welsh-
speaking barrister who lived in Denbigh and was a member of the Denbigh 
Boroughs Unionist Association. Both Williams and Roberts in Flint Boroughs 
                                                 
106 The other North Wales constituencies that went uncontested by the Conservative party were 
Caernarfon Arfon, Caernarfon Eifon, Merionethshire, Anglesey and Montgomery County. 
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were unusual candidates for Welsh constituencies, Conservative 
Nonconformists who opposed Church Disestablishment. The vast bulk of 
Conservative candidates in Wales during this period came from the ranks of 
the landed and professional classes, most of whom were closely associated 
with the Anglican Church, and their candidature represented a risk to the 
Conservative party in the region.107 In January 1910 the candidature of David 
Rhys, a Nonconformist minister, in East Denbighshire failed spectacularly 
when the Liberals successfully tainted him as a traitor to his country and his 
calling and the Conservatives fell to a heavy defeat. The risk was at its greatest 
in West Denbighshire where the highest numbers of Nonconformists lived in 
North-east Wales and it was quite possible that the voters would behave in 
exactly the same as they had in East Denbighshire in January 1910.108 
Selection problems also faced the Unionist Association in East 
Denbighshire. Having lost by substantial margins at the 1906 and 1909 by-
elections as well as the two general elections in 1910 it proved extremely 
difficult finding a suitable candidate for the division. During 1912 attempts 
were made to lure Sam Thompson, who given his background appeared an 
ideal candidate for this coal-mining constituency, to stand. When this failed - 
Thompson preferring his role as a speaker on industrial matters and an 
organiser for the party – the Association again found themselves without a 
suitable candidate. In fact it was not until July 1914 that the Association finally 
solved their problem and selected J. Downes Powell, a Welsh-speaking 
barrister who lived in Liverpool and practised on the Chester and North Wales 
circuit. Downes Powell professed to be an expert on the Irish situation having 
lived in the country, which was appropriate at the time given the emphasis 
placed on Irish Home Rule by Bonar Law. The length of time it took to adopt 
candidates in East and West Denbighshire was a reminder to the local 
leadership of the difficulties in finding appropriate people to contest 
constituencies. Nevertheless, with Ormsby-Gore, the sitting MP due to stand 
again in Denbigh Boroughs, the Conservative party was again ready to fight all 
five constituencies in the region.       
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To support their candidates the Conservative Associations in North-east 
Wales conducted a number of political campaigns between 1910 and 1914.In 
particular, having chosen two new candidates, the Flintshire Constitutional 
Association proved the most active. In the autumn of 1911, D.F.Pennant, the 
Flint County candidate conducted an extensive campaign visiting all the major 
towns and villages in the division including places where the Conservatives 
could not be expected to poll well. These included the industrial heartlands at 
the east of the county - Connahs Quay, and Shotton both Liberal strongholds. 
The topics covered were varied, but Tory opposition to Welsh Church 
Disestablishment and Irish Home Rule featured, but the high cost of 
implementing Liberal social reforms, especially the Insurance Bill, was given 
particular attention. This was especially the case the nearer the Bill got to 
passing in the Commons. Between October and December 1911 Pennant 
attended meetings at Connahs Quay, Buckley and Mold at which Liberal plans 
for National Insurance and compulsory employer contributions were 
debated.109 At the meeting at Mold it was argued that the bulk of the cost for 
the Insurance Bill would be borne by employers, which would force the prices 
of goods up thus threatening the future of British industry. Pennant’s views 
were in tune with Conservative thinking at the time.  In June 1911 the South 
Staffordshire Ironmasters told Steel-Mailtand, the party chairman, that 
National Insurance contributions would push up costs when they were already 
having difficulties competing in world markets and in August the Birmingham 
Chamber Commerce demanded that unemployment insurance be dropped from 
the Bill. Such opposition led to the Conservatives adopting a critical stance on 
National Insurance.110 It was surely no coincidence that Pennant was a 
candidate in a steel-making constituency where Conservatives claimed that 
increased taxation would threaten the stability of the industry.111       
Pennant’s campaigning continued during 1912 taking the Conservative 
message to Rhyl, the biggest town in the constituency, as well as more Tory 
inclined places such as Hanmer in Flintshire Maelor and Cilcain and Nercwys 
in the centre of the division. Pennant also concentrated his efforts in Buckley 
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where the local Conservative machine had fallen into neglect and where in 
November 1912 a new committee was founded with the aim of improving 
party prospects at any ensuing general election. Pennant’s campaigning was 
less prevalent during the early 1913, as the Flint Boroughs by-election took 
precedence. However, at the end of the year and the early part of 1914 Pennant 
was again campaigning, visiting Hawarden, the home of the Gladstone family, 
Connahs Quay and the Primrose League fete at Gwysaney Hall near Mold. At 
all three Pennant and his supporting speakers attacked Liberal plans to 
introduce an Irish Home Rule and Welsh Church Disestablishment Bills.  
Hamlet Roberts’ campaigning in Flint Boroughs did not match that 
undertaken by Pennant in the County Division, perhaps a little surprising given 
that the Boroughs constituency seat was deemed more winnable. However, in 
1911 Tariff Reform still remained a positive policy issue for the Flintshire 
Conservatives and in October Roberts attended a meeting of the newly formed 
Holywell and Bagillt branches of the Women’s Unionist and Tariff Reform 
Association. At the end of 1911, however, and in the period leading up to the 
Flint Boroughs by-election in January 1913, the Flintshire Conservatives 
switched attack, and moved away from Tariff Reform as a campaign issue. At 
meetings at Buckley, Mold and Flint Liberals plans for Church 
Disestablishment, and in particular Disendowment were attacked.  
This was not unusual at this time – while the vast bulk of Conservatives 
saw Irish Home Rule as a threat to democracy and the unity of Empire, and 
coalesced around Bonar Law’s opposition to it, many Anglican Tories also 
saw the impending Welsh Church Disestablishment legislation as a personal 
affront. The Cecil family, in particular the Conservative MPs Lords Robert and 
Hugh Cecil, regarded ‘the protection of the Church as a special family 
responsibility and Lord Hugh was as moved to indignation by the 
Disendowment of the Church in Wales as by the People’s Budget or the attack 
on the House of Lords’.112  In North-east Wales there was also a pragmatic 
reason for opposing Church Disestablishment. Despite the fact that 
Nonconformists still outnumbered Anglicans it was in this corner of Wales 
where the highest concentration of Church–goers lived, and when used as a 
                                                 
112 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p.99. 
 135  
political tactic at Denbigh Boroughs in January 1910 Disestablishment had 
caused divisions in Liberal ranks. Thus, Church Disestablishment, rather than 
Irish Home Rule, started to dominate Conservative campaigning in North-east 
Wales.  
After 1910 every Conservative candidate in the region featured it on their 
campaign platforms. This included W.H Williams in West Denbighshire and 
J.Downes Powell in East Denbighshire, who because of the timing of their 
selection hardly had time to campaign before the outbreak of war in September 
1914.  Although he was more conciliatory than Ormsby-Gore on the issue, as 
was witnessed by his comments once the Church Disestablishment Bill had 
passed, speaking at Ruthin in May 1914 Williams said  ‘the present was no 
time to cripple an institution which had done so much for Wales in the cause 
of religion’.113 J. Downes-Powell also featured Church Disestablishment at his 
one and only public meeting held at Wrexham’s Conservative Club on 4 July 
1914. In opposing Church Disestablishment he said that ‘the government is 
creating an entirely new and at the same time a very dangerous precedent in 
passing an act of parliament which so over-rides the law as it has stood for so 
long’.114  
Representing the High Church wing of the party and closely associated 
with the Cecil family, through his engagement to Beatrice Cecil, Welsh 
Church Disestablishment almost became the sole preoccupation of Ormsby-
Gore’s campaigning in Denbigh Boroughs between 1910 and 1914. This was 
especially the case after a new Disestablishment Bill was introduced in April 
1912. Attending meetings to attack Disestablishment at Ruthin and Denbigh in 
late 1912 and early 1913 Ormsby-Gore became the leading Conservative party 
spokesman in North-east Wales on the subject. He was also centrally involved 
with other Church Defence campaigns across North Wales. At a demonstration 
held at Caernarfon on the eve of the Bill’s introduction, over 14, 000 people 
attended to listen to speeches from Ormsby-Gore and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Ormsby- Gore also spoke at the largest demonstration held against 
Disestablishment in the region at Wrexham on 9 August 1913 where 20, 000 
people attended and heard speeches from Lord Robert Cecil, the Bishop of 
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St.Asaph and Alfred Cripps, Chancellor of the Diocese of London.115 What the 
size of these attendances demonstrates was the depth of opposition to a new 
Disestablishment Bill. That over 20,00 people attended the demonstration in 
Wrexham when there were less than 17,000 Church communicants in the 
whole of Denbighshire suggests that people were willing to travel to support 
the anti-disestablishment cause and how intense the opposition to it was.116     
Even more impressive was Ormsby-Gore’s involvement with helping 
raise a petition protesting against the Bill signed by approximately 15,000 
Nonconformists from the Diocese of St. Asaph. At a Primrose League social 
held in Denbigh at the end of February 1914, Ormsby- Gore described the men 
who signed the petition, which included W. H. Williams and started in the 
Vale of Clwyd, as ‘honourable and courageous men’.117 Taking the matter 
further Ormsby-Gore presented the petition and deputation of Nonconformists 
from Denbigh to Prime Minister Asquith in London, who unceremoniously 
dismissed the deputation and their petition, arguing that it was not the right 
way to present the document. ‘It should be done by constitutional methods and 
addressed to the House of Commons’, he commented.118 When it came to the 
matter of Disendowment Asquith was equally scathing, stating that ‘if any 
specific reasoned objection to the financial aspect of the Bill were advanced he 
should be ready to pay weight to it…He did not think they had advanced their 
case’.119 Indeed, despite such protestations the Liberal government pressed 
ahead with the legislative process and a Welsh Church Bill received the Royal 
Assent on 18 September 1914. 
Nonetheless, what the campaign against Welsh Church Disestablishment 
succeeded in doing was unite the Conservative party in North-east Wales 
leaving behind any friction caused by the Tariff Reform debate. It was not just 
that Conservatives were opposed to Church Disestablishment on principle; 
many in North-east Wales also saw it as an opportunity to take the initiative 
away from the Liberal party. At the same time it would be wrong to assume 
that after 1910 the Conservatives in the region did nothing apart from oppose 
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Church Disestablishment. They shared the same fear of and opposition to an 
Irish Home Rule Bill that other Conservatives did in the country, but it was 
Church Disestablishment that galvanised them and on a political level gave 
them a topic upon which to attack the Liberals. 
The NWDNU’s second Resolution, and its recommendations to make 
organisation more democratic, caused several associations in North-east Wales 
problems. While electing new chairmen each year would according, to Lord 
Mostyn, ‘introduce young men more in touch with events’ at the a same time it 
would mean deposing men who had led their local associations for many years 
and had invested a lot of money and time furthering the Conservative cause in 
North-east Wales. The Flintshire Constitutional Association decided to put the 
resolution to a vote at its Annual General Meeting held in February 1911 and 
comfortably defeated it by twenty votes to twelve.120 According to Colonel 
Hurlbutt, of the Executive Committee: 
 
In Lord Mostyn they had had an admirable Chairman who had done more than 
his duty and it would be ridiculous to even suggest a change. Personally he 
should always be ready to propose Lord Mostyn as the best Chairman the 
Association could have. He did not agree with the resolution. 121 
 
In an apparent display of modesty Lord Mostyn responded: 
 
He had no wish to stand in the way. He had desired to stand down for the last 
ten years, but they had done him the honour of re-electing him and he greatly 
appreciated it…He honestly thought it would be better if they had not done so. 
He had quite made up his mind not to consent to accept office. He was of the 
opinion that it would be better to elect a younger man …However, as it had been 
so unanimous he would accept office for one more year. He hoped by next year 
they would have fully considered the question and that they would not think of 
electing him. 122 
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It is interesting to note that Lord Mostyn remained Chairman of the 
Association until his death in 1929 – demonstrating that the membership did not 
have the desire to remove one of Flintshire’s leading landowners whose family’s 
patronage dominated Conservative politics in the county. The Mostyn family had 
been the pre-eminent family in Conservative politics for some time in Flintshire 
and the Third Baron Mostyn was also the only Conservative aristocrat of any 
note in the county, apart from Lord Kenyon, and with his estate lands generating 
some of the highest return on rents in Flintshire this made Lord Mostyn one of 
the most influential figures in the county. When this was added to the regular 
donations he made to the Constitutional Association to keep it financially viable 
it was unlikely that anybody would wish to seriously challenge his authority. 
Perhaps, the only surprise was that the party Association even decided to put his 
position as Chairman to the vote. With Lord Mostyn’s continued tenure also 
came the decision to retain the system of one Association overseeing 
Conservative matters in two Flintshire constituencies. It was hardly likely having 
given Lord Mostyn their backing that the Association would then undermine his 
position by voting to split the Association into two separate autonomous 
constituency organisations.  
The Flintshire Association was not the only one to reject resolution two 
for Colonel Mesham in West Denbighshire, Lord Kenyon in Denbigh Boroughs 
and Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn in East Denbighshire all retained the 
Chairmanships of their associations without being subjected to an election. It was 
not that the local leaders necessarily wished to defy the NWDNU, some of them 
after all were officers in the organisation, but there were sound reasons why they 
maintained control. Ball points out: 
 
Before 1945 most associations were dependent upon a subvention from the MP 
or candidate who commonly gave between £200 and £400 per annum and was 
also responsible for finding the election expenses usually between £800 and 
£1,000. The remaining subscription income came from a handful of leading 
figures.123 
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In North-east Wales where Association often went long periods without a 
candidate it was clear where the main financial burden was going to fall. To 
continue the development of Conservative clubs and parish committees, to defray 
the expenses of delegates attending conferences, to provide the never-ending 
supply of propaganda literature and to fund the regular local and parliamentary 
elections, the associations needed to be on a sound economic footing. For this the 
local parties depended on their patron’s donations, as well as their annual 
subscriptions. For example, in July 1914 Lord Mostyn offered £100 per annum 
for two years to solve the severe financial problems in the Flintshire 
Constitutional Association and in Denbigh Boroughs regular large donations 
from Lord Kenyon and Lord Harlech rescued the Conservative Association from 
insolvency.124 It was not just that these Chairmen donated to their own 
Associations they also contributed to other party organisations. Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn made regular donations to the West Denbighshire Constitutional 
Association, and Lord Kenyon gave £50 to the Flintshire Constitutional 
Association in 1914.125  It would have been curious indeed to expect such people 
to stand down, give up their power, influence and standing, and in the process 
threaten the financial survival of the region’s Conservative Associations.  
Resolution three reflected the party’s disappointment that insufficient 
numbers of workingmen’s clubs had been established and those that had been 
formed had failed to fully participate in political work or deliver large numbers 
of working-class votes. With the notable exception of Wrexham, the failure of 
working class clubs or associations to engage in political activity was a constant 
source of irritation to the Conservatives in North-east Wales. However, any bid 
to politicise the workingmens clubs faced opposition. This was witnessed in 
Flintshire where using clubs merely as leisure venues rather than political 
institutions was partly blamed for the election defeat in Flint Boroughs in 
December 1910. Yet, it was difficult to promote Conservative clubs as political 
organisations when the party had previously promoted them as a place where 
workingmen could partake in leisure pursuits such as playing billiards while 
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indulging in drinking beer. This had been part of a wider Conservative party 
movement to identify itself with popular male culture and to reap the electoral 
benefits accordingly. 126 Nonetheless, after three election defeats between 1906 
and 1910 this strategy had obviously failed the party and as a new enemy 
emerged, that of socialism, a new direction was demanded for working class 
Conservatism. So after 1911, the NWDNU, attempted to transform the roles of 
these clubs. This became part of an effort to construct a male working-class 
Conservatism that would act as, Lawrence comments, as ‘a bulwark against the 
threat of a socialist rather than that of an austere Nonconformist state’, which had 
been previously promoted.127 Consequently, a number of new Conservative 
workingmen’s clubs were opened and the attempt to make existing clubs 
politically active intensified in North-east Wales.            
 In Flintshire during 1910 new Conservative clubs were opened at 
Buckley and Shotton and in a bid to make other clubs more politically active the 
Constitutional Association’s Report for 1910 commented that ‘a circular has 
been sent to the chairmen of all clubs’.128 This was followed by a Secretary’s 
report in February 1912 which stated that during 1911 all clubs had been or were 
being visited.129 However, the report went on to say that the response from the 
clubs had been mixed, despite the circular and visits, asserting that ‘some clubs 
are doing good work whilst others confine their attentions more to billiards than 
politics’.130  
The East Denbighshire constituency also witnessed Conservative 
attempts to make their workingmens clubs more politically active. Between 1911 
and 1913 six new Conservative clubs opened in the East Denbighshire 
constituency. On the opening of the last of these at Gresford in December 1913 
Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn commented that he ‘hoped members would make 
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best use of it for both instruction and recreation’.131 There was also positive news 
in West Denbighshire where a new club was opened at Llantysilio in 1911. The 
Constitutional Association’s report for the same year also revealed that ‘the 
existing Conservative clubs at Abergele, Llangollen, Denbigh and Colwyn Bay 
provide rallying points for political work’.132 What the evidence demonstrates is 
that there was a real determination amongst the Conservative Associations in 
North-east Wales to develop their workingmen’s clubs network and between 
1910 and 1914 a number of new clubs were opened. Although results were 
mixed – not all clubs became politically involved - the mere fact that these clubs 
had been founded exhibited a will to embrace working class support and 
demonstrated that Conservative party was aware that it could not survive in 
North-east Wales as a narrow based elitist organisation.   
Such an attitude was also discernible in the Conservative Associations 
response to the NWDNU’s final resolution as they attempted to form Junior 
Leagues in the region. The Junior Imperial and Constitutional League was 
formed in 1906. It aims were to create interest in politics amongst the young by 
forming junior associations in each constituency and throughout the British 
Empire with the intention of forging links with Conservative and Unionist 
Associations.133 It was hoped that this would advance the ‘cause of Imperial 
Unity…uphold Constitutional principles and …further the Conservative and 
Unionist cause’.134 The records show that only three Leagues were formed in 
North-east Wales – local party papers as well as press reports indicating that 
Junior Leagues were formed at Brymbo near Wrexham, Denbigh and at 
Wrexham itself - all in 1911. No membership records survive for any of the three 
branches and meetings of the Brymbo and Wrexham branches were rare; only 
one was recorded for each branch in February and October 1913 respectively 
with no details published about attendance figures or what type of function they 
were.  Even so a set of rules deposited at the Denbighshire Record Office for the 
‘Denbigh Junior Imperial and Constitutional League’ suggest that a successful 
branch was formed at Denbigh in 1910.Ormsby-Gore became its President and a 
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committee of twelve was elected annually to oversee its affairs. As with the 
Primrose League emphasis was placed on social functions, but the League’s rules 
emphasised its true purpose, the aim being to: 
 
Enrol in its ranks the younger members of the Party, who are not attached to any 
party organisation, and who under ordinary circumstances would not for some 
time take part in political work [and]…to form a band of workers in the each 
ward or polling district who will act as an election intelligence, canvass, 
distribute literature, carry information and trace removals.135 
 
According to the local press during 1911 four functions were held which 
suggest that initially it was relatively successful. All of these were social 
functions, including a fancy dress party in February 1911, which was attended by 
approximately 60 people.136 One more function was reported on - a joint social 
event with the Primrose League which took place in May 1912.137 After this the 
League appears to have died with no further functions or events reported, and it 
may well have been that there was simply no interest in it amongst young people 
in Denbigh – especially if it meant becoming involved in political work, 
something that hardly enthused Conservative club members either. Nonetheless 
in 1912 the Ruthin Primrose League Habitation became a juvenile branch, which 
apparently had over 400 members in 1914. However, given the small numbers 
that attended the Denbigh function in 1911 – it is possible that these figures have 
been exaggerated or more likely that the Primrose League records which the 
numbers have been taken from referred to a joint adult and junior membership in 
Ruthin and not as intimated a juvenile branch.138 There are no reports of any 
functions being held by the juvenile branch and thus the suspicions appear to be 
confirmed. Apart from the three Junior Leagues and the juvenile branch in 
Ruthin there were no Leagues formed in Flintshire or the West Denbighshire 
constituency. The Conservative Associations ultimately failed to create a mass 
youth movement in North-east Wales, but the evidence does demonstrate support 
for Junior Leagues in the bigger towns in the region, suggesting that this support 
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was strongest where there was a denser population and where transportation was 
easiest; rural areas failing to establish one League.                         
 
 
PARTY ORGANISATION: WOMEN IN CONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND 
THE PRIMROSE LEAGUE IN NORTH-EAST WALES, 1910-1914. 
In other areas the party developed and improved its organisation and 
related bodies such as the Women’s Unionist Association and the Primrose 
League. In Flintshire Conservative women’s groups were clearly flourishing. In 
1910 branches of the Women’s Unionist Tariff Reform Association were 
established under the leadership of Lady Mostyn. These were expanded and by 
September 1912 Lord Mostyn reported that 27 branches of the Women’s 
Unionist Association had opened since 1910 and that the membership numbered 
2,534. This he asserted ‘spoke well for the enthusiasm and strength of the 
Unionist women of Flintshire’.139 In the Denbigh Boroughs constituency the 
Women’s Associations were highly active holding regular demonstrations, 
meetings and outings. In May 1911 the Holt Women’s Association held a 
meeting at which Tariff Reform and the threat of socialism was discussed. The 
meeting closed with a performance of ‘John Bull at Market’, a Tariff Reform 
play devised by local Conservative ladies. The North Wales Guardian concluded 
‘the play was greatly enjoyed and it was hoped that they will be prevailed upon 
to give the same production before members of other branches’.140 In Wrexham 
the Women’s Association held bazaars and fetes to raise money for local   party 
funds.141 The annual outing was also a very well attended and much anticipated 
event. Approximately 1,000 attended the Wrexham Women’s Unionist outing in 
1912 and, over 900 people attended the outing to Belle Vue, Manchester in 1913. 
Such participation in party affairs as performing plays, holding bazaars, 
organising fetes and attending outings all conformed to the male image of the 
Conservative woman whose role in politics was still perceived as a supporting 
one, her main duties remaining in the home. As David Jarvis comments 
‘Conservatism could offer women many things, but nothing so vulgar as 
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feminism….politics for Conservative women would never take preference over 
domestic politics’.142 Nonetheless, women continued to be a vital part of the 
Conservative party’s organisation as enthusiastic canvassers and fundraisers, and 
their growing use in this field now proved that their contributions could not be 
ignored.143 It remained important to keep women ‘on side’, but channel their role 
in politics to furthering Conservative prospects at elections, while utilising them 
in the domestic household. As a result from 1906 they were also encouraged by 
the party to play an active role in defending the rights of the family against the 
unwarranted intrusions of a socialistic interventionalist state.144 In North-east 
Wales Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn even envisioned them as some sort of political 
vessel in the family home, a useful channel through which to disseminate the 
party message and so influence men to vote Conservative.145 Speaking to the 
East Denbighshire Women’s Unionists in August 1913 he emphasised:   
 
Let them tell their husbands what was best for the country...the Unionist cause 
today was a better one than the Liberals’ for a great change had taken place 
during the last three or four years. The Liberals were clinging to office like 
limpets to the wall…they must put their shoulder to the wheel and work. They 
must be prepared for an election at any time.146  
 
His speech was made to over 1,100 people who attended the Women’s 
Unionist fete at Plas Power near Wrexham, and in general women’s functions 
were some of the best attended Conservative party gatherings in the region.  
Women in North-east Wales, as they did across the country, played a 
part in the party’s defence of Ulster strategy; organising, attending and 
supporting rallies and demonstrations. In Wrexham, the largest group of 
Women Unionists in North Wales, held meetings in the late summer and 
winter of 1913 protesting at the passage of the Irish Home Rule Bill. Speaking 
at the Women’s Unionist outing to Belle Vue, Lady Harlech said ‘Home Rule 
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[was]…being forced through parliament without consulting the electorate…the 
Unionists had asked that a chance might be given to people of this country 
either by referendum or a general election to express themselves on [the] 
question and the answer had always been a blank refusal’.147 Such refusals 
made Bonar Law and the Conservative leadership even more determined to 
oppose Home Rule, believing it to be an Achilles heel for the government. 
With the possibility of the government imposing Home Rule and even 
coercing Ulster to adopt the terms of an Act, and Bonar Law became equally 
intransigent in his opposition and openly advocating resistance to it, the 
possibility of civil war in Ireland intensified. As a result women 
Conservatives/Unionists became increasingly involved with defence of Ulster 
plans. According to an article in the Times on 26 January 1914: 
 
During the past twelve months ambulance classes for women Unionists have 
been held in almost every district in Ulster, rich and poor working side by side 
learning first aid and making hospital garments and equipment. 148  
 
Similarly, the Flintshire Women’s Unionist Association passed a 
resolution at a meeting held in October 1913 stating that ‘they would assist the 
Women and children of Ulster in the event of Civil War’. It was not explained 
what this assistance would be, as once more no source material is available, 
but it demonstrated that even in this corner of Wales where Home Rule was 
apaparently less important than the cause of the Church Conservatives were 
gearing up to support the defence of Ulster. It was also further evidence that as 
the party leadership cranked up the rhetoric and the country hurtled down the 
path to civil war that women in North-east Wales were again joining in 
political debate.  
Many women were also members of and held high office in the Primrose 
League which was still the most important and largest exponent of 
Conservative party support in North-east Wales, and between 1910 and 1914 it 
remained a vital support cog in the party machine. By 1912, however, the 
League’s membership in the region had dropped to 2,882 and two more 
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Habitations had closed at Llangollen and Llwynegrin leaving only eleven in 
the whole of North-east Wales.  Yet by 1914 membership had risen again to 
4,305 – virtually every Habitation showing growth (see table 3.7).149  These 
numbers compare favourably to those recorded in 1886 when there were 21 
Habitations and 4,222 members, although no membership numbers were 
recorded for four Habitations this year.150 By comparison numbers also 
dropped nationally- there were over two million members in 1910, but by 1912 
this had dropped to 656,000. Yet in a similar pattern to that shown in North-
east Wales membership had risen to 800, 000 by the spring of 1914. Martin 
Pugh has suggested that this revival in League fortunes corresponded with a 
revival in Conservative party fortunes – between 1910 and 1914 it claimed 16 
by-election victories. He also argues that despite their steep drop from their 
high point in 1910 that the membership figures were ‘significant in that they 
suggest a formidable organised base for Conservatism’.151    
The situation in North-east Wales appears to bear out such 
observations. A revival in League membership numbers corresponded with a 
strong showing in the Flint Boroughs by-election of 1913 and good 
performances in county council elections. As Pugh asserts League members 
also remained a formidable organising force. In a letter thanking the Denbigh 
Habitation for their help in canvassing and support work at election times 
Ormsby-Gore commented that ‘he wished to congratulate the Primrose League 
on being one of the most potent influences that made the Denbigh Boroughs 
once more the blue spot in North Wales’.152  
  Furthermore, during 1912 a new Habitation opened at Buckley and 
District. This Habitation was led by P.T. Davis-Cooke, Ruling Councillor, who 
owned Gwysaney Hall a mile west of Mold. The Habitation only attracted a 
relatively small membership but hosted one of the largest pre-war League fetes 
in September 1911 when nearly 1,000 people attended. Moreover, by the 
summer of 1914 the League was still thriving as large crowds attended a 
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garden party at St. Asaph in May and a fete at Mold in July.153 Thus, the 
League still had the power to draw people to its functions in numbers 
reinforcing its position as a vibrant organisation in the region   
As party organisation improved after the First World War and women, 
who formed the bulk of League membership, were absorbed into Conservative 
party Associations, there was no longer a need to embrace the Primrose 
League. Even so the support role that the League played between 1910 and 
1914 in North-east Wales was vital to the party’s survival and growth. All the 
major landed families were sympathetic to its cause and the League provided a 
social outlet for many rural areas starved of entertainment. It was successful 
not just as a Conservative body, but also as part of the social fabric of the 
region.  
Table 3.7 
Primrose League Membership in North-east Wales 1912-1914. 
 
Habitation 1912 1913 1914 
Brynkinallt. --- 184 253 
Ruthin. 320 390 401 
Henllan. 402 432 450 
Abergele. --- 250 359 
Colwyn Bay. 520 550 592 
Denbigh. 813 848 803 
Hundred of Maelor. --- --- 596 
St. Asaph. 389 349 335 
Hope. 250 299 --- 
Buckley and District (Gwysaney). 188 203 207 
Mostyn Flint. --- 300 309 
    Taken from: BLO, Primrose League MSS, ‘The Roll of the Habitations 1912.  
 
Between 1910 and 1914 the Conservative party introduced a number of 
organisation changes, including a clearly defined command structure, which 
helped modernise the party and strengthen the role of the leader. The 
organisational changes made by the Conservatives in North-east Wales also 
marked an important step forward in the party’s democratic evolution. A 
number of organisation improvements were made in response to the 
resolutions passed by the NWDNU in January 1911. Candidates were chosen 
for all five constituencies and by 1914 all had embarked on or were preparing 
for political campaigns. New workingmen’s clubs were opened, with the hope 
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that their political work would increase, and while this did not entirely achieve 
its purpose the Conservatives now had a network of clubs that covered the 
region, which gave the party an opportunity to reach many more workingmen 
on the electoral register. Junior Leagues were also formed, with variable 
results, but women’s groups and memberships increased while the Primrose 
League remained popular in the region, thus ensuring vital support at election 
times. Organisation was still far from perfect but in comparison to the period 
prior to 1910 all local party Associations now embraced change as a means of 
advancing the Conservative cause.  
By contrast to the efforts made in North-eastWales modernisation was 
slow elsewhere. Arthur Steel-Maitland, the new party Chairman, discovered 
that Central Office lacked the influence to enforce immediate change on 
constituency Associations which guarded their autonomy jealously.154 
Nonetheless, by 1914 more than £25,000 was poured into local constituency 
Associations to help improve organisation, provide propaganda literature and 
supply public speakers. Central Office district agents became the conduit for 
such money and Associations were encouraged to seek help from their Agent. 
By the outbreak of War in 1914 organisation had improved significantly in 
constituency Associations across the country aided by the targeting of money 
to those which needed reform most.155 It is unclear how much of this money, if 
any, reached North-east Wales, but with all the region’s Association’s 
selecting parliamentary candidates, a target of Central Office, it is possible that 
they were rewarded with funds. Whether this was so or not the advances made 
in organisation in a region where electoral defeat was the norm, proved how 
determined the party was to survive, adapt and progress in North-east Wales.    
 
LOCAL CONTESTS: THE FLINT BOROUGHS BY-ELECTION OF 
JANUARY 1913 AND THE COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTIONS OF 1913. 
 The Flint Boroughs by-election, called on the death of John Summers in 
December 1912, was set for 21 January 1913 and could not have come at a 
worse time for the Conservative party nationally. In November 1912 Bonar 
Law withdrew the Conservative party’s referendum pledge on Tariff Reform 
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as he maintained that there was no need to put food taxes to a referendum 
when the Liberals refused to put Irish Home Rule to the electorate. This nearly 
cost him his leadership as leading Conservatives argued that removing the 
pledge would leave the party vulnerable to the cry of dearer foodstuffs.  A 
memorial presented to Bonar Law on 10 January 1913, containing the 
signatures of 229 Conservatives MP’s, while still pledging loyalty to him, 
asked him to reconsider his strategy. A few days later Bonar Law replied, 
arguing that he still saw the matter as a resigning issue, but maintained that the 
volte-face he was required to make to accommodate his party did not ‘involve 
any principle the adoption of which would have prevented us from loyally 
supporting the course of action desired by the majority of the party’.156 Bonar 
Law then agreed, safe in the knowledge that according to the party’s 
membership ‘a change of leadership would be fatal to the best of the interests 
of the party’, to comply with the request and not make food duties an issue at 
any subsequent election.157 However, having underestimated the will of the 
opposition in his party Bonar Law’s move was divisive, re-opened wounds 
barely healed on Tariff Reform, and offered the Liberal party an opportunity to 
re-open the Tariff debate at any forthcoming elections.158 
 This initially appeared to be the case in Flint Boroughs, the first test of 
political strength after Bonar Law’s policy u-turn. With Conservative party 
campaigning underway in the constituency during early January, at virtually 
the exact time their members memorial was being prepared, the tensions 
between party and leader cast a shadow over Conservative prospects and left 
them vulnerable to Liberal attacks on the imposition of food taxes. Even so, 
The Times believed that Bonar Law’s quick response ended speculation on the 
subject: 
 
Mr. Bonar Law’s reply to the Unionist members memorial will be received 
nowhere with more genuine satisfaction than in the Flint Boroughs. It puts an 
end to the chief difficulty with which the local leaders have been faced in this 
contest. Most Unionists have throughout been in agreement with the main 
stream of opinion in the party on food taxes, but it was obvious that effective 
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action against the attacks of their opponents could hardly be take on the very eve 
of the publication of Mr. Bonar Law’ letter. The happy settlement of the 
controversy has the hearty support of every section of the party here. 159   
 
A number of factors also gave the Conservatives cause for optimism in Flint 
Boroughs. Having chosen Hamlet Roberts in September 1911, the 
Conservatives stole a march on the local Liberal Party, which by the second 
week of January 1913 had still not selected a candidate. This allowed the 
Conservatives a week of unchallenged campaigning, and when the Liberals 
finally selected a candidate it sparked acrimony and arguments amongst party 
activists. Thomas Parry, a county councillor from Mold, was adopted, but not 
before Herbert Lewis, and Ellis Griffith, the Liberal MP for Anglesey, were 
accused of persuading Max Muspratt, the local party’s choice, to stand down 
in favour of Parry.160 With the recent division over food taxes a major concern 
for Conservatives, their campaign centred on Welsh Church Disestablishment. 
This proved to be an astute move as the issue was causing the Liberal party 
election difficulties in Wales. Fighting on Church Disestablishment the 
Conservative candidate at the East Carmarthenshire by-election in August 
1912 increased his poll by over a thousand votes.  
What is interesting is that Irish Home Rule received little attention 
during the campaign. Surprisingly given its pre-eminence by Bonar Law, only 
once did it achieve prominence during the campaign. This was at the start of 
the campaign when at a meeting in Flint, A.L. Horner, Ulster Unionist MP for 
South Tyrone, made an impassioned plea for support for Loyalists in Ireland 
who wished to maintain the union with Great Britain. Otherwise 
Disestablishment, and in particular the Liberal government’s plans to 
disendow the Church dominated the conservative campaign to the exclusion of 
all else. This was mainly because local Conservatives saw the benefits to be 
reaped from a campaign that centred on Church Disestablishment in a county 
where nearly half of those attending places of worship were Anglicans. Such a 
strategy caused concern in Liberal ranks as Thomas Parry, the Liberal 
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candidate, noted in a letter to William Jones, Liberal MP for Caernarfon 
Arfon: ‘I feel the struggle in Flint Boroughs is a very keen one. As you are 
aware the Church is stronger in these Boroughs than anywhere else in 
Wales’.161  
With the Conservatives concentrating on Church Disestablishment, 
largely ignoring Home Rule and avoiding Tariff Reform, and the Liberals 
concentrating on food taxes to highlight divisions in the Conservative party, 
but side- stepping Church Disestablishment, there was little in the way of 
competitive speech making. The Times reported that there was little activity by 
Nonconformists in the constituency and that on the Conservative side Hamlet 
Roberts adopted a novel approach to campaigning:162  
 
On the Unionist side a more important means of reaching the elector than public 
meetings has been canvassing, or rather the method of personal interview, for 
the candidate has a strong view that the solicitation of votes is contrary to the 
spirit of the ballot, although every elector he holds, is entitled to familiarize 
himself with the candidate’s views by talking with him face to face. 163 
 
It is more likely that Roberts wished to avoid public debates that would leave 
him vulnerable to the Conservative bogey of dear food. Public meetings were 
left in the hands of senior Conservatives. Church Defence meetings were held 
in Flint and Mold at which F.E.Smith and Lord Robert Cecil spoke and where 
the Bishop of St Davids encouraged people to oppose the imposition of a 
Welsh Church Disestablishment Bill by voting Conservative.164 Although the 
Liberals attempted to introduce the question of food taxes, the Conservatives 
adhered doggedly to their campaign strategy of defending the Welsh Church. 
An editorial in the Flintshire Observer commented: 
 
This by-election must be considered as a test of Welsh feeling upon the Bill for 
the Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Welsh Church…This is 
essentially a fight upon one issue Mr Hamlet Roberts the Unionist has declared 
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… he is fighting upon the single issue of the Welsh Church Bill. As might have 
been expected the Liberals have introduced innumerable other issues of a 
comparatively minor importance and the question of Disestablishment and 
Disendowment does not occupy that position in their speeches to which its 
gravity entitles it.165  
 
The Liberals attempt to build an effective election platform was counteracted 
by infighting which detrimentally affected their campaigning from the start. 
Herbert Lewis noted: 
 
I spoke at four largely attended meetings at Holywell, Bagillt and Flint last night 
and had a royal welcome, but I felt that there was something grandly wrong 
everywhere. At Flint only two men, one an Irishman would come on the 
platform…Mr Williams the best man in the Boroughs absolutely refused to 
attend the meeting. Secessions threatened on every hand. 166 
 
Unlike the Conservatives, the Liberals found it hard to attract speakers and 
were still appealing for people to address meetings a mere week before 
polling, the lack of support further evidence of divisions within the party 
apparently caused by the interference of two of the region’s MPS during the 
selection process.167 What support that was made available also proved of little 
help to the Liberal cause. Leaflets distributed around the constituency were 
several years old and contained inaccuracies; one Liberal pamphlet even 
depicting Balfour as leader of the Conservative party.168  
Given the nature of the Flintshire Constitutional Association’s 
complaints about lack of support and the disappointing general election result 
in December 1910, the by election was a triumph for Conservative party 
organisation and campaigning. The party halved the Liberal majority, came 
within 200 votes of taking the seat, and increased its share of the vote by over 
four per cent compared to the general election of December 1910. The Times 
commented: 
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The Unionists are well pleased with the result, the significance of which is 
shown by the fact that the majority is the smallest on record in the history of the 
constituency since 1895. The success of the Unionist campaign has exceeded 
general expectations the constituency having been always consistently Liberal, 
and the local party leaders are satisfied with the soundness of their decision to 
fight explicitly on the Church question. 169   
 
Table 3.8 
Flint Boroughs By-Election, 21 January 1913. 
                                       Party                        Vote                 % Share 
T. H. Parry.                    Liberal                     2152                    52.6 
J.H.Roberts                    Conservative            1941                    47.4  
                                                               Maj. +211 
 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
  
 Political historians have made little of the Flint Boroughs by-election in 
1913, the loss of the Unionist held Londonderry in Ulster in a by-election on 
31 January attracting more attention. This is understandable as Londonderry 
was lost at a time when Bonar Law’s chief policy initiative was to oppose Irish 
Home Rule, thus leading historians to question the success of such a policy. 
Also other by–election results between 1910 and 1914, even where the 
Conservatives won, have been used to explain the apparent weakness of the 
Conservative position leading up to the First World War.170 Yet, Flint 
Boroughs appears to point towards some sort of change in the comparative 
strength of the Conservative and Liberal forces in Wales at the time. This was 
a Celtic fringe seat and while it can be argued that the improved performance 
was as a result of a well organised single-issue campaign in an area where 
Anglicanism was strong, the Conservatives had not held the seat since the 
1840’s. Two points need making. Firstly, the Flint result, especially when 
taken in conjunction with the East Carmarthenshire result a few months earlier, 
although not emphatic evidence of a Tory revival before the Great War 
indicates that the Liberals were not as strong as they once had been in Wales – 
radical initiatives such as the push for reform in the field of Nonconformist 
education, were now not as relevant as they had been ten years earlier. There 
was also opposition amongst many Liberals to the Disendowment of the 
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Church. The Times reporting on the by-election commented that ‘the 
Disendowment proposals have disturbed the conscience of not a few Liberal 
Churchmen and some Nonconformists’.171 Secondly, and more significantly 
for the Conservatives Bonar Law’s reversal seems not to have influenced 
voters. Of course, it can be argued that perhaps without his u-turn and the 
subsequent Liberal reaction the Tories might have won. This was not, 
however, considered in the final analysis as both local and national press 
pointed to the success of the Conservative strategy as opposed to the ‘dear 
food’ cry of the Liberals. The Flint Boroughs result was actually an indicator 
of what could be achieved with the right policy – opposition to Irish Home 
Rule was flirted with and quickly dropped from the campaign - and right 
organisation, even though the Conservatives did not win the seat.  
Within two months of contesting the Flint Boroughs by-election the 
political parties were thrown into another round of county council elections. 
The elections proved a disappointment for the Conservative party in North–
east Wales. In Denbighshire little changed as 36 divisions were uncontested - 
the Conservatives gained one seat at Henllan, leaving the Liberals with a 
majority of 10 on the council. In Flintshire the Conservative party lost its 
majority as Liberals successfully exploited the rate increases implemented by 
the Conservative council during its period in office.172 The Conservative party 
claimed that they ‘had put the affairs of the County on a sound business 
footing’ [and were] ‘animated by the desire to serve the best interests of the 
ratepayers’, but its defence failed as 21 Liberals, 19 Conservatives, and 2 
Independents were elected.173 The party lost the urban seats of Mold East, 
Rhyl South, and Rhyl West to the Liberals. This was a severe jolt to the 
Conservative party which had hoped to do better given their performance at 
the recent by-election, and demonstrated that there was still much work to be 
done at the grass-roots level. The loss at Mold was felt keenly by the 
Conservatives who blamed the lack of local support given to their candidate, 
P.T. Davies-Cooke, for the defeat. Basil Phillips claimed that the Mold 
Conservative club, was doing little for the party’s cause: 
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He had heard that many men were not on the register who should have 
been…The club could do a little more in the division of perfecting the 
registration, and do a little more also than going there and using the club as a 
social club…As a political force he thought the club was worse than useless.174  
 
This proved that, despite the recent initiatives, little political work was 
undertaken in some clubs and the lack of political activity, in particular, at the 
Mold club highlighted the problems the party was still having energising a 
workingman’s movement in the region. This continued until after the First 
World War when concerns over workingmen’s votes in the age of full male 
franchise precipitated a concerted effort to embrace such support in North-east 
Wales.     
 
CONCLUSION.    
In spite of a disappointing showing in Flintshire at the county council 
elections of 1913, the evidence suggests that the period between 1910 and 
1914 was one of steady improvement and consolidation for the Conservative 
party in North-east Wales. The party capitalised on organisation changes it 
introduced in 1911, as it developed its grass roots movement by extending its 
clubs and Junior Leagues network. Although results were mixed, few Junior 
Leagues were formed and those new clubs that opened fail to advance the 
Conservative cause in many cases, the mere fact that the local Associations 
had the will to establish such clubs marked a step forward from the apathy that 
had afflicted them in the early years of the twentieth century. In addition, new 
Women’s Associations were established and memberships remained high, 
providing the party with a reservoir of enthusiastic canvassers and workers. 
These were roles that members of the Primrose League also fulfilled as it 
retained its position as the most important vehicle for disseminating the 
Conservative message in the region.  
Significantly, the party won and held Denbigh Boroughs, giving it an 
important parliamentary foothold in North-east Wales, helping to re-energise 
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the local Conservative Associations.175 The Flint Boroughs by-election also 
demonstrated the potential for success if the party fought on a united and well-
supported platform. In this respect Church Disestablishment had provided the 
party with just such a unifying cause, following the temporary retreat from the 
full Tariff Reform programme. Nationally the party’s future looked less certain 
as E.H.H Green has argued:  
 
Between 1910 and the outbreak of the Great War the Conservative party was in 
a mess. In 1909-1910 its main aims had been to win an electoral victory, defeat 
the People’s Budget and secure the position of the House of Lords. By the 
summer of 1911 it had failed on all three counts.176  
 
Green also contends that Bonar Law’s leadership was constantly questioned 
and that the party was far from united over his lead on Irish Home Rule.177 
Yet, by the outbreak of war, due to its string of by-election victories, the 
Conservatives had 287 MP’s, thirty more than the Liberals. Between 
December 1910 and August 1914 the Conservative party gained sixteen seats 
at by-elections, nine of them in three way contests of which seven could be 
attributed to a division in the Liberal /Labour vote. As such John Ramsden has 
commented that ‘by 1914 the Liberal party was on the ropes and the Unionists 
could look forward confidently to the election that could not be long 
delayed’.178 Green refutes this, arguing that the fate of the Conservative party 
depended on the state of health of the Liberal/Labour election pact, claiming 
that ‘reports of the Progressive Alliance’s death before 1914 have been greatly 
exaggerated’.179 He also asserts, that with the Liberal party planning to abolish 
plural voting in the near future, the Liberals might well have achieved a 
majority of 38 to 40 over the Conservatives in a May 1915 election.180 
Evidence appears to support Green’s claims. Seven of the by-election victories 
were either gained in constituencies that remained marginals or won in 
exceptional circumstances. Two Conservative victories at Poplar and Bethnal 
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Green in February 1914 also gave cause for concern. Sir Robert Sanders, a 
Conservative whip, commented: ‘In both divisions the Unionist poll was 
almost exactly 25 per cent below the promises – a very big percentage to 
deduct. On the whole the elections show a turn in our favour, but it cannot be 
called a great wave’.181 Thus on the eve of the Great War the Conservative 
party’s future still looked uncertain an extension to its long period in 
opposition remaining a distinct possibility. By contrast in North-east Wales the 
Conservative party had been marginalized even longer – not since 1886 had it 
won more than one seat in the region. However, a victory in Denbigh 
Boroughs in 1910 and an improved performance at the Flint Boroughs by-
election in 1913 had given the party cause for optimism.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH EAST WALES, 
1914-1918. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The outbreak of war in 1914 suspended the party political conflict over 
Irish Home Rule and in a spirit of conciliation Bonar Law and Carson offered 
Asquith a party truce for the duration of the hostilities. General elections were 
also suspended and an agreement was reached with the Liberal party to end the 
publication of partisan party literature and stop political speech making.1  The 
War, however, did not end inter-party tensions. The government’s decision to 
place the Irish Home Rule Bill and Welsh Church Disestablishment Bills on 
the Statute Book in September 1914 enraged Conservatives. Furthermore, by 
the spring of 1915 Conservatives were becoming concerned about the lack of 
commitment to war that the Liberal government was exhibiting.  Asquith’s 
grasp of war strategy seemed limited, the Liberals appeared unready for war 
and there was no machinery in place to prosecute the War.2 Lord Kitchener, 
whom Asquith had appointed Secretary of State for War, also proved 
incompetent in procuring munitions for his armies, and splits occurred in the 
Liberal Cabinet about the direction of the War. Admiral Lord Fisher (First Sea 
Lord), who was concerned about the wisdom of diverting ships from other 
theatres of war to the Near East under Churchill’s direction as First Lord of the 
Admiralty also resigned in May 1915.3    
Having guaranteed support for Asquith at the start of the War Bonar Law 
was also having problems keeping his own party in check, – the Irish Home 
Rule and Disestablishment Bills as well as the apparent lack of war strategy 
causing unrest amongst Conservative MPs. Thus with both leaders facing a 
number of difficulties and wishing to avoid a confrontation that could result in 
a general election the Conservative leader was summoned to Downing Street 
to discuss the formation of a Coalition Government.4  However, the coalition 
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that emerged at the end of May 1915 was a government of unequal partners. 
The Liberal party kept all leading government posts with Bonar Law given the 
junior role of Colonial Secretary as Balfour took over the Admiralty. This 
alienated many Tories and also succeeded in disaffecting some Liberals who 
believed, somewhat prophetically, that coalition marked the end of the Liberal 
party.5 Nevertheless, the new government would have been acceptable if the 
prosecution of the War had gone well, but the advent of coalition brought no 
improvement with the withdrawal of allied forces from the Dardanelles in 
December 1915, and an inconclusive naval battle at Jutland in May 1916 
where 6,000 British sailors lost their lives. These setbacks were further 
exacerbated by the launching of the Somme offensive in July 1916 where the 
British army suffered 60,000 casualties on the first day of battle. During Easter 
1916 a failed uprising also occurred in Ireland. This was ruthlessly suppressed 
and then the government set about negotiating a settlement for Ireland, which 
gave Home Rule to the South, but left most of the North in the United 
Kingdom. Foolishly the government did not consult the Conservatives, which, 
only succeeded in alienating Unionist supporters further. The government 
ultimately dropped the idea but not before much damage had been done to 
Asquith’s support.  
The issue of conscription also polarised Asquith’s Cabinet. To Lloyd 
George it was a necessity if Britain was to keep the army up to strength and 
wage war successfully. Lloyd George was ensured of support from Bonar 
Law, Churchill and the vast majority of Conservative MPs, Balfour was a 
notable exception, but was opposed by Kitchener, McKenna (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), Runciman (President of the board of Trade) and Lord Grey 
(Foreign Secretary) who believed that sufficient troops could be raised by 
voluntary means. On more than one occasion Bonar Law and Lloyd George 
threatened to resign over the issue, but in the end Asquith succeeded in holding 
the government together while he successfully avoided resignations, apart 
from Sir John Simon (Home Secretary), by vacillating, making concessions 
where necessary and unveiling elaborate enlistment schemes with elements of 
compulsion. However, in December 1915 Asquith finally gave way and in 
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January 1916 a Military Services Act was given royal assent enforcing 
conscription on single men and with a second act in May 1916 this was 
extended to married men.6 Yet the issue of conscription ultimately weakened 
Asquith’s position – his very success in avoiding wholesale resignations and 
adroitly holding the Coalition Government together alienating those Liberals, 
especially anti-conscriptionists, who supported him. It had also raised the 
possibility of Lloyd George resigning and forming a new government with the 
support of Bonar Law and the bulk of the Conservative party.7    
Moreover the withdrawal from the Dardanelles had shaken public 
opinion, the abortive naval battle in Jutland had further eroded confidence and 
the Battle of the Somme was ‘a spectacular and bloody failure though the 
public was not allowed to know its magnitude’,8 while in November 1916 
Lord Lansdowne (Conservative leader in the House of Lords) even suggested 
an early peace. In this moment of crisis Lloyd George entered into negotiations 
with Bonar Law and Carson (Irish Unionist leader) to force Asquith to 
reconstruct the government as a means of successfully directing the War.9 In 
particular a small three-man War Committee, of which the Prime Minister 
would not be a member, was recommended to manage the day to day running 
of the War. Asquith first considered and appeared to agree to such a 
suggestion, but then on advise from supporters rejected the notion as 
unworkable claiming that such a War committee would be ineffective without 
the Prime Minister’s presence. Under pressure from Lloyd George, Bonar Law 
and Conservative ministers Asquith resigned - perhaps to call his opponents 
bluff and as a means of fighting back, but to his surprise Lloyd George 
succeeded in forming a new ministry.10  
Lloyd George now led a Coalition Government in which Conservatives 
played a leading role. Bonar Law became Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Leader of the House of Commons while Lords Milner and Curzon were 
appointed to Lloyd George’s five-man War cabinet. At the same time Balfour 
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replaced Lord Grey as Foreign Secretary. By elevating Bonar Law and Balfour 
to senior positions in government and by appointing Curzon and Milner to his 
War cabinet, two influential leaders of party opinion, Lloyd George was 
restoring power and dignity to the Conservative party and assuring himself of 
Conservative support.11  
Even so many Conservatives still eyed the coalition, its Liberal partners 
and Lloyd George with suspicion. According to Turner ‘the Unionist party 
during the early spring and summer of 1917 was manifestly sullen about the 
coalition. A steady undercurrent of sectional grievances from the Irish question 
to the food production campaign rasped on Tory nerves’.12 Nonetheless, 
Conservative support for the Coalition remained intact as opposition support 
remained badly organised, and many Conservatives were concerned that the 
alternative might be the return of a Liberal dominated administration. 
According to Pugh ‘once committed to Lloyd George it seemed inconceivable 
to part with him, for the alternative was a renewed Asquith premiership that 
might lose the War or negotiate a humiliating peace’.13 Yet, 1917 was still an 
extremely difficult year for the new Lloyd George government. On the War 
front Britain and her allies came close to defeat. In February 1917 the Russian 
Revolution and the subsequent overthrow of the Tsar threatened to end the 
participation of Russia on the Eastern front thus leaving British and French 
armies exposed to the full force of the German army in the west. Although 
Russia remained temporarily in the conflict shortly after the Bolsheviks seized 
power in October 1917 Germany and Russia signed an armistice.14  A major 
German submarine offensive against Britain’s merchant shipping, which also 
deterred neutral countries from carrying stock bound for Britain, left the 
country with only six weeks of grain. The situation was only saved when a 
new strategy was deployed – that of organising merchant shipping in 
convoys.15 
Misguided faith was also placed in a new offensive on the Western front, 
launched during the spring of 1917, which failed causing heavy casualties 
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leading to mutiny in the French army, threatening France’s continuation in the 
War. Thus during 1917 the balance of power turned inexorably towards 
Germany, a situation which was only reversed when the United States entered 
the War, partly to protect its own shipping from the German submarine 
campaign and partly as result of German attempts to draw Mexico into an 
alliance.16  
On the domestic front Lloyd George also faced problems. As increasing 
numbers of skilled working men were called to the Front to be replaced by less 
skilled men and women, resentment and industrial unrest set in amongst 
Britain’s work force. In all over five and a half million working days were lost 
in 1917, more than double the amount for 1916, as workers downed tools in 
protest against the dilution of the skilled workforce and the fact that some 
skilled men earned less than those on piecemeal rates.17 Tensions increased in 
March 1917, when fears that workers unrest, similar to that in Russia, which 
overthrew the Tsarist regime, would occur in Britain. Strike organisers were 
arrested, but such fears forced the government to negotiate with the labour 
force. As John Stevenson comments ‘the power of organised labour was 
strengthened. Dilution agreements, wage increases and greater political 
concessions …illustrated their strong bargaining position’.18 This had long 
term consequences for British industry and politics during the post–War period 
as such actions and agreements led to an upsurge of interest in the problems of 
labour and the Labour party.  
Indeed, the Labour party benefited from the political alliances and 
manoeuvrings that occurred during the War. Lloyd George had taken few 
Radicals into his government in December 1916, the bulk of his support cam 
from the right wing of the Liberal party and the Conservative party. Moreover, 
Asquith largely failed to give a lead to any of the Liberals who had followed 
him into opposition, leaving it to backbenchers to oppose Lloyd George. As a 
result many radical Liberals became disaffected with both Asquith and Lloyd 
George and drifted towards the Labour party, which consequently was 
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transforming itself into the party of Opposition.19 It was also during the War 
that the electoral pact between the Liberal and Labour parties fell apart which 
had long term benefits for the Conservative party as it removed the electoral 
pact which had done so much damage to it before the War.  
Yet the Conservative party’s new found status as a party of power 
appeared threatened by extensions to the franchise and redistribution of 
constituencies being considered by the government during 1917. In August 
1916 Asquith’s coalition had set up a Speakers Conference to consider the 
franchise, but it reported to Lloyd George in January 1917. It recommended 
that all men over the age of 21 and women aged thirty and above be given the 
vote. Many Conservatives feared that this would enfranchise some of what 
they believed to be the most unstable elements of society – immature men 
without the experience of or yet the capability of considered opinion and 
women who were too emotional to make an objective judgement on political 
views.20 They were also concerned that a redistribution of constituencies – it 
was proposed to establish uniform constituencies of between 50,000 and 
70,000 inhabitants -  would lose them a number of rural seats and that the 
proposed amalgamation of borough seats into existing county divisions would 
also deplete their stock of MPs. Even so the government adhered closely to the 
recommendations and the Representation of the People Bill was introduced, 
subsequently becoming law on 6 February 1918. In all the Act increased the 
British electorate from 7.7 million, the number of those registered in 1910, to 
21.4 million.21 Of these 8.5 million were women aged thirty or over, who now 
represented 39.6 per cent of the total electorate, and 12.9 million were men.22   
What the Representation of People Act did was further tie the 
Conservatives to Lloyd George. In spite of Tory misgivings, Lloyd George 
seemed to offer the Conservatives a means of retaining power and avoiding 
electoral defeat. He was clearly the most popular leader and enjoyed the 
support of the masses, and would surely ensure a majority for the Coalition at 
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any subsequent general election while containing the growing menace of the 
Labour party. This not only guaranteed support from the Conservatives, but 
also underpinned their backing for Lloyd George’s coalition until 1922.23   
In the final analysis the War thus benefited the Conservative party 
nationally as it returned to government, albeit as partners with the Liberals, but 
after December 1916 as the dominant party in Lloyd George’s coalition. This 
situation seemed unlikely after 1910 when defeated for a second time within a 
year and with the subsequent marginalisation of the House of Lords, the Tory 
party’s brake on radical legislation, many Conservatives feared a very length 
period in the political wilderness. As Smith notes ‘after a decade craving 
office, the coalition under Lloyd George returned the Tories from the 
wilderness and confirmed on them ultimate control of the executive, the lack 
of which had been the prime source of their pre-War distemper’.24 
On the other hand the War ushered in a very difficult period for the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales. Not only did it virtually lose its 
political identity as the War effort consumed the local leadership and 
organisation fell into decay, but the redistribution of seats in 1918 also saw it 
lose its only MP in the region. Moreover, the reduction in the number of 
constituencies from five to three – as the two Boroughs seats were 
disenfranchised and the two new county divisions of Denbighshire and 
Flintshire as well as the urban/industrial constituency of Wrexham   now 
demographically favoured the Liberals and the Labour party. This chapter will 
therefore examine the issues and developments in national politics had on the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales between 1914 and 1918. It will 
analyse the relationship between the local Conservative Associations and their 
Liberal counterparts and compare it to the situation nationally during the 
period of war. It will show that despite the tensions over Irish Home Rule and 
Welsh Church Disestablishment, which polarised the two parties in the period 
leading up to and in the early part of the War, relations between the two parties 
generally remained cordial during the period of conflict. It will also 
demonstrate how the party survived the War even though the constraints put 
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on it by agreements forged with the Liberal party and the loss of leadership to 
the War effort seriously hampered its progress.  
 
THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ON THE CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY IN NORTH-EAST WALES. 
During the first eighteen months of War the Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee ran the campaign for securing new recruits for the armed forces. 
This became an inter-party initiative with Conservative Central Office looking 
after the organisation of recruiting meetings, the Liberal offices providing 
recruitment literature and Malcolm Fraser, ex editor of the Standard and the 
Daily Express as well as press advisor to the Conservative party, helping with 
the management of the press.25 According to Ramsden: 
 
The entire effort was run like a political campaign with the canvassers, speakers, 
stewards and publicity all run on tried and familiar lines. District and 
Constituency Officers were similarly involved and in many areas the national 
example was followed with the agents of both parties working under a mayor or 
Lord Lieutenant.26                 
  
This template was basically the same one followed in North-east Wales, 
with the Liberal and Conservative parties immediately promising to support the 
drive for recruitment for the War effort. As the Denbighshire Free Press noted 
on 5 September 1914 ‘all the political parties have agreed to devote their 
organisation to the work of stimulating recruiting’.27 In Flintshire a county 
council recruiting committee was formed from representatives of both parties in 
early November 1914, the Flintshire Constitutional Association formerly 
agreeing to such a measure at their Finance meeting on 7 November 1914.28  
Unfortunately, there is no further source information to demonstrate how this 
committee functioned, but in Denbighshire where recruitment also became a 
function of a county council committee there are detailed newspaper accounts 
which describe the role local politicians played in the recruitment drive. Here 
                                                 
25 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p.124. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Denbighshire Free Press, 5 September 1914. 
28 FRO, Flintshire Unionist and Conservative Association Papers, D/DM/307/1, Finance 
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Conservatives in the West Denbighshire Constitutional Associations took senior 
posts as recruiting officials for the County, and became involved with placing 
adverts in the local press for recruits, organising public recruiting meetings and 
the canvassing of eligible males for service. The Recruiting Committee was led 
by the Lord Lieutenant of Denbighshire, Colonel W.C. Cornwallis-West, a 
former Liberal Unionist MP, Conservative County Councillor and Vice President 
of the Constitutional Association. In a reversal of roles Colonel John Mellor, 
Vice President, and Colonel Mesham, President of the Association, became 
Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively of the Recruiting Committee. Colonel 
T. Wynne Edwards, Chairman of the Constitutional Association’s powerful sub – 
committee to appoint parliamentary candidates, was also appointed as the 
Recruiting Officer for the county. All of these men were wealthy local 
landowners who already held ranks in the Territorial Forces and saw the holding 
of such office as their patriotic duty.29 To be at the forefront of recruiting at a 
time of War would seem natural for such men from affluent and politically 
influential backgrounds. It would be wrong to assume that local Liberals did not 
play a prominent part in supporting the War effort it was just that the county 
notables – those who were already officers in the county yeomanry or Lords 
Lieutenants tended to come from the ranks of the Conservative inclined landed 
elite. Indeed, there was overwhelming support from the ranks of Liberals for the 
War effort. This was especially true of the Liberal MPs and candidates in the 
region, with one notable exception, who threw aside political prejudices and 
joined with the Conservatives in lobbying for the country’ involvement in the 
War.    
As a result in Denbighshire and Flintshire inter-party co-operation 
replaced rivalry as political campaigning on the anticipation of a general election 
gave way to collaboration at the advent of War. On 5 September 1914 the 
Denbighshire Free Press acted as a mouthpiece for all political parties in the 
region when it stated that: 
 
The political campaign which has been contemplated in the early autumn will 
resolve itself into a series of joint meetings in which the issues for which this 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Denbighshire Free Press, 8 August 1914.    
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country is fighting will be laid before the public by leading speakers and the 
need enforced for a general response to the call to arms.30    
 
The joint meeting held in Denbigh at the end of September 1914 by Sir John 
Herbert Roberts, Liberal MP, and W. Henry Williams, Conservative candidate 
for West Denbighshire, typified the political response to the War and the sense of 
outrage at what was perceived to be the threat that Germany had posed to the 
British way of life. According to the Denbighshire Free Press: 
 
Sir Herbert Roberts said the ‘War was the greatest war waged in the history of 
the World and the most appalling havoc to human life and property’. Mr. Henry 
Williams said ‘a blow was being struck at the very roots of civilised society, for 
if the World was Germanised the cause of freedom and even handed justice 
would be put back a century to what it was when Britain overthrew Napoleon at 
Waterloo’. 31   
 
Such sentiments were reinforced by the outpourings of support for inter-party co-
operation by Conservatives across North-east Wales. C.C.Mott of the West 
Denbighshire Constitutional Association reflected the determination of 
Conservatives in the region to set aside political prejudice for the good of the 
British war effort:  
 
For the present the utmost exertions of men of all parties are required for the 
unsparing prosecution of the most righteous war that this country has ever 
waged and to that end it is our duty to make common ground with all who are 
working towards that object.32 
 
It also appears that the Conservatives in North-east Wales supported the 
efforts of government throughout the early part of the War. This contrasted with 
the party at Westminster where resentment towards Bonar Law his leadership 
and his war policy were harboured by many leading Conservative MPs who also 
became increasingly dissatisfied by the lack of ruthlessness displayed by 
                                                 
30 Denbighshire Free Press, 5 September 1914. 
31Ibid., 26 September 1914.  
32 DRO, West Denbighshire Constitutional Association Rules and Correspondence 1915-1925, 
Account of the Association for 1915. 
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Asquith’s governments in waging war and the failure of Conservatives to fill top 
positions in the coalition from May 1915.33 However, no dissent was 
forthcoming from the Conservative party in North-east Wales as it remained 
silent about the efforts of Asquith’s governments and their own party’s 
leadership’s between the outbreak of War in 1914 and December 1916 – there 
are no reports in the local press or party papers.  It is unclear why this was so. It 
may have been that Conservatives in North-east Wales held an opinion similar to 
that of Sir Watkin Williams–Wynn who expressed ‘a desire not to take part in 
any politics during the War’- his decision to allow part of his estate to be used as 
a munitions factory an expression of his support for the War effort. As a very 
influential Conservative in the region many party officers may have followed his 
lead and a number of Conservatives may also have seen their commitment to 
recruiting or other wartime activities as their most important function, ignored 
their political duties and therefore did not wish to comment. On the other hand, it 
may simply have been that the Conservative party in North-east Wales supported 
Bonar Law and his role in Asquith’s government and had no intention of publicly 
undermining his leadership – displaying unity and loyalty, unwilling to 
contribute to any divisions in the party, while patriotically supporting the 
wartime Liberal government as well as Asquith’s coalition.  
 This was in contrast to other Conservative Associations in Britain, such 
as the Newcastle Upon Tyne and Hornsey Conservative Associations which both 
wrote to the National Union in the summer of 1916 complaining about the way in 
which Asquith’s Coalition Government was conducting the War. In particular, 
the Newcastle Upon Tyne Association expressed grave concerns about the way 
the War effort was being run: 
 
The General Council of the Newcastle Upon Tyne regrets the dilatory, 
indecisive methods of which the War has hitherto been carried on and strongly 
urges the Unionist members of the Coalition Government to do their utmost to 
carry on the War more energetically with its view to an early and decisive defeat 
of the enemy. 34  
                                                 
33 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, pp148-149. See also Smith, The Taming of 
Democracy, p.62.   
34 Liverpool University, Archives of the British Conservative and Unionist Party, Minutes of the 
National Union Executive Committee, 1897-1956. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978). 
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Such was the concern shown in Conservative circles that a special conference of 
the National Unionist Association was held on 9 August 1916 at which Bonar 
Law spoke and outlined the Government’s position.35 Furthermore, dissent at 
Westminster about the ineffectiveness of the government’s conduct of the War 
intensified during 1916 as over 100 Conservative MPs joined the Unionist War 
Committee which, according, to Smith ‘proved a more effective vehicle for 
prodding the government, and their own leadership in the coalition towards a 
more rigorous approach to the War. Its influence…was decisive in repositioning 
Bonar Law alongside Lloyd George.’36     Indeed, it was during the political 
crisis of December 1916 that Bonar Law played a major part in discussions that 
led to Asquith’s resignation and Lloyd George acceding to the Premiership – his 
refusal to take the Prime Minister’s post and his commitment that the 
Conservatives would serve under Lloyd George ensuring that a new government 
was formed. While a small number of Conservative MPs retained reservations 
about Coalition Government the vast bulk of the party embraced and remained 
faithful to Lloyd George’s wartime administration.  
This was also true in North-east Wales where in December 1916 
Conservatives joined with local Liberals to support the advent of a new 
government. Here Lloyd George gained support from Thomas Parry Liberal MP 
for Flint Boroughs and his faithful lieutenants in the region - Sir John Herbert 
Roberts, West Denbighshire MP and leader of Welsh Liberals from 1915, and 
Herbert Lewis, Flint County MP and Under Secretary at the Board of Education 
from 1917. What is more surprising was the enthusiastic endorsement he 
received from his former foes the landed leaders of the Conservative party. These 
were the very people whom Lloyd George had condemned for their privileged 
lifestyles in speeches in the area during the 1906 and 1910 general election 
campaigns while his tax pledges contained in the People’s Budget in 1909 had 
been roundly condemned by landed Conservatives as socialistic measures which 
threatened the livelihoods of individuals. Yet by December 1916 it had become 
clear that they saw in Lloyd George a dynamic energy that would reinvigorate 
                                                                                                                                    
Meetings of the Executive Committee 8 June 1916 and 13 July 1916.  
35 Ibid., Special National Union Association Conference 9 August 1916.    
36 Smith, The Taming of Democracy, p.62. 
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the country and the War effort. Colonel Mesham, President of the West 
Denbighshire Constitutional Association, was one of the first politicians in the 
region to comment on Lloyd George’s accession to the premiership when he 
said: 
 
He had the greatest confidence in the new Prime Minister who had proved 
himself a man of energy, strength and individuality and great foresight. He 
would no doubt prove the right man in the right place and they believed he 
would bring the War to a successful issue. 37              
 
 Mesham’s comments were echoed by Lord Kenyon, the leading 
Conservative in North-east Wales who had made no public announcements 
against Asquith but eagerly embraced the advent of Lloyd George’s government 
in December 1916. Speaking at St. Asaph at the end of December 1916 he said: 
 
Just now we were passing through a great crisis. We all hope, however, now 
that... Lloyd George has taken up the reigns that the government will worthily 
represent the spirit of action, which dominates this country. I little thought three 
or four years ago as a strong and ardent Tory I would welcome Lloyd George to 
the premiership. Yet with all my heart I do so now and I don’t think there is a 
single Conservative I have met that does not say the same thing. 38 
 
As an ex-chairman of the National Union, and one of the leading Conservatives 
not just in North-east Wales but also in the Principality as a whole, these were 
powerful words indeed. Moreover, his words appeared to strike a chord with 
Conservatives in the region for at a public meeting held in Denbigh on 23 
December 1916, which was attended by members of both the Liberal and 
Conservative parties Lloyd George’s new government was overwhelmingly 
embraced. According to the Denbighshire Free Press: 
 
Colonel Mesham moved the resolution offering Lloyd George most cordial 
congratulations upon his attaining through his own personal merits and great 
ability  the high office of Prime Minister and expressing its right hearty goodwill 
                                                 
37 Denbighhsire Free Press 30 December 1916. 
38 Ibid., 23 December 1916.  
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and confidence in him and the strong and powerful government he has 
appointed and determination to support in every way possible his righteous 
intention to bring this iniquitous war to a victorious end39.  
 
Mesham’s speech also acknowledged the change in political emphasis of 
the new government. It was not just that local Conservatives saw in Lloyd 
George a dynamic and energetic leader who would conduct a more vigorous war 
campaign - there was a recognition that the Prime Minister had installed a ‘strong 
and powerful’ government, which now included and was dependent on 
Conservatives, and thus their party had a major say in the administration. 
Naturally with an administration that included Conservatives at the highest level, 
including Bonar Law as Chancellor of the Exchequer, any policy decisions 
would have to pay due deference to them. Consequently, it was not unreasonable 
for Tories to assume that a radical Liberal agenda would have to be dropped.  As 
a result Conservative support for Lloyd George’s government was assured in 
North-east Wales.  
Yet there were dissenting political voices, and, in particular, the issue of 
conscription caused a breach in Liberal ranks in North Wales. Three of the MPs 
who voted or abstained during the First Reading of the Conscription Bill on 6 
January 1916 came from this part of the Principality. While Ellis Davies in 
Caernarfon Eifion abstained on the First Reading then voted with the government 
on the Second Reading as did Caradoc Rees, E.T John, East Denbighshire MP, 
remained steadfastly against conscription and was one of only three Welsh MPs 
who voted against the Bill on the Second Reading. From this point John became 
a critic of Coalition Government and in particular an opponent of Lloyd George 
whom he later accused of cosying up to the Conservatives and betraying his 
radical instincts. This had serious repercussions for John who then failed in his 
bid to be selected for the new division of Wrexham, which included most of the 
old East Denbighshire constituency in 1918.  However, it would be wrong to 
assume that the issue of conscription caused any major political disruption in 
North-east Wales. The Conservatives universally supported it and while the issue 
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brought a number of Liberal protests nationally and even divided the Cabinet the 
dissent was restricted to just E.T. John in North-east Wales.40         
Thus, what evolved during the War was an atmosphere of co-operation 
between the Conservative and Liberal parties in North-east Wales. This was 
initially fostered by the exigencies of the War situation. The Conservative party 
leaders were in the best position to further the recruitment effort; many in the 
region were active or former soldiers of senior ranks while many held positions 
of influence as county officials. At the same time Liberals were quick to establish 
their support for the War. Leading Liberals in the region joined up while most of 
their MPs spoke patriotically about defending their country and waging a 
justifiable war against the enemy. When conscription was debated in parliament 
and Lloyd George acceded to the Premiership and led what was a primarily 
Conservative coalition three of the four Liberal MPs in the region remained loyal 
to the Prime Minister. It would have been major surprise if they had not – Sir 
John Herbert Roberts in West Denbighshire and Herbert Lewis in Flint County 
were very closely associated with Lloyd George, they had been involved with 
him during the Temperance, Church Disestablishment and education campaigns 
in Wales and both had benefited from his election speeches in their 
constituencies when he achieved high office. In turn Thomas Parry in Flint 
Boroughs was a close ally of Herbert Lewis who had persuaded the Flintshire 
Liberal Association to adopt him in 1913 – he too became a close ally of the 
Prime Minister who remained in close touch with these North-east Wales MPs, 
referring to them as ‘his teetotal friends at Rhyl’.41 They therefore remained loyal 
Lloyd George men and were not going to desert him even if he consorted with 
the Conservative party. At the same time despite his support for Welsh Home 
Rule and his radical credentials E.T.John had only returned to Wales in later life 
having spent nearly forty years in the North-east of England and thus did not 
have the same sort of allegiance to Lloyd George or the same degree of 
‘Welshness’ that other Liberal MPs had in the region.42 Consequently, his 
position was far more precarious with his constituency association, which 
supported Lloyd George, while the other three Liberal MPs, despite later 
                                                 
40 See for example, Flintshire Obvserver,21 October 1915. 
41 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.277. 
42 Ibid., p255. 
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misgivings in Flintshire, were able to carry their associations with them and help 
promote a bi-partisan approach to politics in North-east Wales. 
 For the Conservative party in North-east Wales such a bipartisan 
approach laid the foundation for close co-operation with the Liberals during 
peacetime. In particular support for Lloyd George’s government fostered close 
ties with the Liberal party in Denbighshire and Wrexham. In Denbighshire the 
meetings conducted at the beginning of the War and the enthusiastic 
embracement of Lloyd George as Prime Minister saw such close ties forged 
between the two parties that by the end of the War it became universally 
accepted in the division that the Liberal candidate represented the Conservative 
party’s best interests against the Labour candidate who was standing in the new 
Denbighshire division. Similarly in East Denbighshire the ties that were forged 
between Edward Hughes of the Liberal party, Lord Kenyon, and latterly Sir 
Watkin Williams-Wynn witnessed the selection of a mutually acceptable Liberal 
candidate for the new Wrexham constituency. In Flintshire a different set of 
circumstances evolved – while the Constitutional Association remained loyal to 
Lloyd George and his government, the local Liberal Association distanced 
themselves from the Conservative party as they attempted to reassert their radical 
credentials. Even so, Thomas Parry’s loyalty to Lloyd George and his coalition 
and his ability to retain support from his Association also ensured Conservative 
support for his candidature.     
 Yet the experience of cross-party co-operation during the War was not 
entirely a positive experience for the Conservative party in North-east Wales. 
Indeed as war came to an end in November 1918 the Conservative constituency 
associations were struggling to survive in North-east Wales. A combination of 
factors including apathy, an unwillingness to become involved in partisan 
politics as well as financial concerns all threatened their existence. In particular 
the changes proposed in the Representation of the People Bill in 1918 threatened 
to permanently marginalize the party as a parliamentary force in the region.            
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THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ON THE CONSERAVTIVE 
PARTY IN NORTH-EAST WALES: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE 
PEOPLE ACT 1918. 
 During the War several leading Conservatives changed their mind on the 
franchise issue. Women, they believed, had proved themselves worthy of the 
vote by the responsibilities they had undertaken in the service of their country. 
Thus, despite their party’s misgivings, the Conservative leadership decided not 
to oppose the Representation of the People Bill. Their decision was based, as 
McCrillis concludes, on a realisation ‘that opposition to such a measure that 
enfranchised valiant servicemen and patriotic civilians would undermine the 
Unionist claim to represent all Britons’.43 
What is surprising, given the protests of Conservative MPs and the 
discussion amongst the party’s leaders, is that the new franchise brought no 
comment from the Conservatives in North-east Wales.  Perhaps this was 
because that by 1918 they viewed such an extension to the franchise as an 
inevitability. It is unlikely that they would have opposed an extension of 
voting rights to men, especially those who had patriotically served in the 
armed services, no matter what class they came from and their views on 
women voters also appeared quite enlightened. Indeed, before the War the 
Conservative Associations in North-east Wales attempted to develop the role 
of women in their organisations and the only Conservative MP in the region, 
Ormsby–Gore, was known to publicly support women’s suffrage, although in 
private he had misgivings about female suffrage and the methods adopted by 
suffragettes to gain support for women’s votes.44 The Wrexham Unionist One 
Thousand were also known to support women’s suffrage while Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn saw women as powerful political agents in the home - vessels 
though which men could be persuaded to vote Conservative. Although this is 
hardly evidence that he was pro-women’s suffrage, his failure to comment on 
the subject suggests that he accepted the new franchise. Equally, the failure of 
the region’s other most powerful Conservatives, Lords Kenyon and Mostyn, to 
comment on any aspect of the new enlarged franchise also suggests that they 
either accepted the situation as a fait accompli or viewed it with equanimity.  
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 It was the proposed redistribution of seats under the Representation of 
the People Bill that caused major consternation within the Conservative party 
in North-east Wales. The Bill promised to reduce the number of constituencies 
from five to three and under the guidelines set down for redistribution, 
Denbigh Boroughs would be disenfranchised and the East and West 
Denbighshire constituencies would be merged to create the county division of 
Denbighshire. A new single borough constituency of Wrexham would be 
created and Flint Boroughs and Flint County would be merged into the single 
division of Flintshire. It was forecast that these changes would benefit the 
Liberal party, as the new constituencies of Denbigh and Flintshire would 
include all the rural areas where Liberalism was strongest and offset the 
Conservative strongholds in the anglicised boroughs seats. The removal of 
Denbigh Boroughs also promised to deprive the Conservative party of their 
only MP in North Wales. Yet despite their stronger position viz the 
Conservatives the Liberals also had cause for concern – with a reduction in the 
number of seats they faced the possibility of losing at least one MP in the 
region even if they won all three of the new constituencies.  
An attempt was made to challenge these proposed changes. On 7 July 
1917 delegates from the Denbigh Boroughs, East Denbighshire and Flintshire 
Constituency Conservative Associations met at the Queens Hotel in Chester to 
discuss the imminent changes.45 The meeting concluded that the region should 
retain four MPs and not the three proposed. A sub-committee consisting of D.F 
Pennant, Conservative parliamentary candidate for Flint Boroughs, J.M Leah, 
secretary of the East Denbighshire Association and R.C Roberts, secretary of 
the Denbigh Boroughs Association, was formed ‘to endeavour to secure this 
result’.46 A proposal was drafted whereby Denbighshire would retain two 
divisions, Flintshire one and a composite constituency consisting of the 
Denbigh and Flint Boroughs would be formed.47 D. F Pennant presented the 
proposal to the Boundary Sub Commissioner who sat at Ruthin on 12 July 
1917.  
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All to no avail, for on 5 November 1917 the Boundary Commissioners 
ratified the redistribution changes and Sir George Cave, Home Secretary, took 
an uncompromising stance towards those who sought to amend them.48 On 15 
November 1917 D.F Pennant’s proposal was put to the House of Commons 
Committee sitting on the Representation of the People Bill. Sir Herbert 
Roberts Liberal MP for West Denbighshire, proposed that the ‘existing 
contributory boroughs of Denbigh, Holt, Ruthin, Wrexham, Caergwrle, 
Caerwys, Flint, Holywell, Mold, Overton, Rhuddlan, and St.Asaph be 
constituted one constituency called the Denbigh and Flint Boroughs… [and] 
that the two counties [of Denbighshire and Flintshire] should have four 
members instead of five’.49 Ormsby-Gore, Cardoc Rees (Liberal MP for 
Caernarfon Arfon) and E.G. Hemmerde (former Liberal MP for East 
Denbighshire) all seconded the proposal. The proposal received limited 
support from outside the region and in reality had little chance of success. Sir 
George Cave refused the amendment citing that ‘each of these boroughs would 
have a population of under 70,000… a departure from the rules laid down. 
These boroughs were very scattered and some of them a good distance from 
each other. They had not much in common, some being industrial and some 
agricultural’.50 Even the amendments proposers began to have second thoughts 
and Ormsby-Gore resigned himself to losing his seat well in advance of the 
final parliamentary verdict on the proposal in spite of the grievances aired by 
his Denbigh Boroughs Constituency Association. When asked by the London 
correspondent of the Liverpool Courier the sitting MP for the Denbigh 
Boroughs said, ‘It is inevitable that in any redistribution we must be merged in 
the county. I accept the situation and am expecting to have to look out for 
another constituency’.51  
The National Union estimated that the proposed changes contained 
within the Representation of the People Bill would have cost the Conservative 
party 105 seats at the previous election. Yet despite all the evidence the 
Conservative leadership remained steadfast in their decision not to oppose the 
Bill. Even a survey conducted by the National Union which revealed that 
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constituency agents were overwhelmingly against reform, refused to alter their 
minds as they ignored the advice. Such resistance was later justified as sixteen 
rural seats were retained on amendment and a number of suburban 
constituencies favourable to the Conservatives were created. As a result the 
Conservative party, despite the grim warning from the National Union, 
probably gained about thirty seats from redistribution.52 Even so this was of 
little comfort to the Conservatives in North Wales as the loss of its only MP in 
the region under the terms of redistribution, threatened to undermine its hard 
fought survival. On the other hand relations between Ormsby-Gore, the 
Denbigh Boroughs MP, and his constituency party in Wrexham were less than 
straightforward.  
 
 WIILIAM ORMSBY-GORE AND THE WREXHAM UNIONIST 
ASSOCIATION. 
On 8 August 1914 William Ormsby-Gore was called-up by his regiment 
the Shropshire Yeomanry. According to the Denbighshire Free Press his call-
up meant that ‘he would be unable to fulfil any political or other engagements 
as he will be entirely occupied with his military duties and can therefore take 
no part in politics of any kind’.53 This, however, did not prevent him from 
becoming embroiled in political argument. Just two months later, believing 
that the Liberal party had made misleading statements about him, Ormsby-
Gore wrote to the editor of the Denbighshire Free Press complaining that: 
 
My political opponents are (again) spreading the report assiduously that I am not 
going to stand again for the constituency at the next election. This passes all 
bounds of fairness. My military duties prevents my taking part in any politics or 
in visiting my constituency and it is hard that such circumstances should be 
taken advantage of in order to spread those lying reports with the intention of 
doing me harm personally.54    
  
Such suggestions, according to Ormsby-Gore, and the fact that the Liberal 
government had placed the Welsh Church Bill on the Statue Book after the 
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War had started, a measure he had fought against from the moment he became 
MP, made him even more determined to stand again in the constituency. He 
commented that as ‘the government had placed the Welsh Church Bill upon 
the statute book at such a moment only redoubled his desire to meet Caradoc 
Rees upon this issue…and I am anxious for an opportunity of appealing to all 
fair–minded in the Denbigh Boroughs to reject a man who supports such a 
party’.55 
The Liberal party, however, rejected Ormsby-Gore’s assertions. At a 
special meeting of the Denbigh Boroughs Liberal Council held at Wrexham a 
week later Ormsby-Gore’s comments were discussed. D.S Davies, successful 
Liberal candidate in Denbighshire at the 1922 general election, who chaired 
the meeting said ‘that as far as he himself was aware there had been no attempt 
whatsoever on the part of the Liberal party or its leaders to injure Mr. Gore’.56 
Those Liberals present also ‘strongly denied the truth of the statement 
contained within Mr. Gore’s letter and the meeting strongly protested at such 
imputations’.57 
The meeting was also convened to hear from Caradoc Rees, narrowly 
defeated by Ormsby-Gore in December 1910, who announced his decision to 
stand down as the Liberal candidate in the division adding that: 
 
So long as his opponent (Mr. Ormsby – Gore) was a member of His Majesty’s 
Forces and could not be in the division and might be called abroad it would be 
absolutely improper for him to do any political work. The War therefore 
compelled him to be out of action in the Denbigh Boroughs.58        
  
Rees’ decision to stand down helped divert an awkward situation, as there 
was meant to be a political truce in the division between the two parties. In 
particular Denbigh Boroughs was one of the most marginal seat in Britain and 
any assertions that the Liberals were unwilling to support Ormsby-Gore or 
spreading rumours that he was about to stand down could have undermined 
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Conservative chances to retain the only seat they held in North Wales. Yet there 
appeared to be some truth to Liberal assertions that Ormsby-Gore was going to 
stand-down. At the Liberal party’s special meeting it was claimed that ‘Mr Gore 
had intimated to more than one of his constituents his intention of withdrawing 
his candidature’.59 A trawl of the local press and Conservative party papers 
provides no evidence of this, but a letter to his mother in March 1912 provides an 
insight in to how Ormsby- Gore felt about his party, both locally and nationally, 
and his intentions towards the Denbigh Boroughs constituency, in particular the 
Wrexham Unionist Association:  
 
I don’t think I had better refer to the continued and insatiable dissatisfaction at 
Wrexham. I certainly do not want to stand anymore, but suppose I shall have to. 
I am conscious all the time that I a doing no good and that the Wrexham people 
will never cotton on to me and that I hate the work and the Welsh more every 
day. I feel the Church is worth defending but have little hope that we shall be 
successful… In fact I think the whole attitude of the Unionist party is indifferent 
to the Church Question. If there is an election I shall be beaten so perhaps the 
Wrexham people better look out for an understudy who will satisfy their 
unending demands financial and social better than I do.60   
 
His apparent determination to continue fighting the seat was at odds with the 
above comments and by the time War broke out Ormsby–Gore held different 
views on many topics to leaders in the Denbigh Boroughs Association as well as 
those held by Conservatives elsewhere in North Wales. By October 1914 his 
views on and actions against Welsh Church Disestablishment were well 
documented, but by this date dissent against the Bill was starting to evaporate 
within his own party in North-east Wales. Ormsby-Gore’s words suggest that his 
own constituency party were tiring of the issue and in West Denbighshire the 
Conservative candidate, W.Henry Williams, accepted that Disestablishment was 
inevitable and was now prepared to work with his political opponents ‘in a 
Christian spirit’ to solve the difficulties over the issue.61 While it made strategic 
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sense for the Conservatives to fight an anti-Disestablishment campaign at Flint 
Boroughs in January 1913, it no longer made sense to fight a measure that had 
successfully passed its parliamentary stages, gaining a majority of 84 on its 
second reading in April 1914. As Morgan points out the subject of 
Disestablishment could no longer ‘lend passion to debates, in which every 
argument had long been exhausted’.62 As passionate as he was in his defence of 
the Welsh Church and the loss of its endowments Ormsby-Gore was becoming 
an increasingly lone voice on the subject within his party, both locally and 
nationally. 
 Secondly, Ormsby-Gore’s involvement with the diehard element, those 
vehemently opposed to the loss of the Lords veto, in both Houses of Parliament 
also appear to have caused a breach with his party as early as 1911. During the 
December 1910 general election campaign he broke ranks with other candidates 
in North-east Wales who were appearing on Tariff Reform platforms, as he 
believed opposition to the Parliament Bill and the House of Lords veto took 
precedence over any other issue. Throughout 1911 Ormsby-Gore was then 
involved with a group of diehard MPs in Parliament in coercing members in both 
Houses to vote against the Parliament Bill. He attempted to gain support from the 
Bishop of St.Asaph, a close ally in Church Defence campaigns, and prompted his 
father, Lord Harlech, to secure support from Lords Powys and Penrhyn, both 
leading officers in the NWDNU. However, he failed with all three – the Bishop 
of St. Asaph actually voted with the government and Lords Powys and Penrhyn 
abstained from voting. In fact of those who voted against the Parliament Bill, 
only the Earl of Denbigh and Lord Harlech had any connections with North–east 
Wales. Conspicuously, Lord Kenyon, Ormsby-Gore’s constituency Association’s 
chairman, and Lord Mostyn walked out of the House of Lords before the vote 
was taken on 10 August 1911.Whether he knew well in advance that their 
support was not forthcoming, the failure to secure such support must have been a 
blow to Ormsby-Gore.  
 Thirdly, and finally the other main area in which Ormsby-Gore differed 
with his Association party was over women’s suffrage. In November 1910 
Ormsby–Gore publicly supported female suffrage in a treatise he wrote for the 
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Unionist Women’s Franchise Review. This publication ‘charted the support for 
women’s votes within the party and made an essentially Conservative case for 
the enfranchisement of women’.63 Ormsby-Gore’s support for female suffrage 
was very much in line with many influential party figures who were becoming 
increasingly convinced that women would actually favour the Conservatives. Yet 
his public views were at odds with those he held in private, and with those held 
by the Wrexham Association which supported women’s suffrage and had a very 
active and well supported Women’s organisation. Writing to his mother in March 
1912 he commented ‘aren’t the suffragettes too awful. If it wasn’t for the 
Wrexham people I’d vote against the Bill’.64 Even though MPs have often 
supported Bills that they do not personally agree with, to appease their 
constituency parties, by 1914 Ormsby-Gore must have felt increasingly isolated 
within his own Constituency Association, especially the party at Wrexham.   
Ormsby-Gore was not likely to face the same fate as the hapless Harold 
Edwards who was forced to resign as candidate for Flint County in 1909. He had 
far too many influential friends and relations for this to take effect. These 
included his father, Lord Harlech, chairman of the Oswestry Association, and 
Lords Hugh and Robert Cecil, whose sister Beatrice he married in 1913.Thus any 
move to stand down would surely have to be initiated by his own volition. This 
lends truth to the Liberal assertions that indeed it was Ormsby-Gore who had 
intimated he would resign. It also explains why he seemed so philosophical when 
asked about redistribution and the loss of his seat at Denbigh Boroughs. Here 
was a candidate who was obviously desperate to move constituencies even if it 
was forced upon him by the terms of the Representation of the People Act. At the 
same time his distaste for political work, the Welsh people and his own 
constituency people at Wrexham, demonstrate how far in a relatively short period 
relations between him and his local party had deteriorated.  
Given his position as one of only four Conservative MPs in Wales, the 
influence and connection of his landed aristocratic family in local Conservative 
party circles, such ill feeling towards the Welsh also appear to reinforce Aubel’s 
conclusion that the social exclusiveness of the Conservative party’s leadership in 
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Wales had a negative impact on its prospects in the Principality.65 On the other 
hand Ormsby-Gore’s views were not typical of all landed Aristocrats in Wales. 
As Cragoe points out there were very few landowners ‘who would have been 
prepared to run the gauntlet of communal hostility and public censure’ that an 
overt display of social exclusiveness and hostility to local Welsh people would 
have brought with it.66 In particular, and fortunately for Conservative party 
prospects the landed leaders in North-east Wales were also amongst those 
unwilling to take such risks. Having learnt the lessons of the late nineteenth 
century the landed Conservative leadership were careful not to harbour such an 
antagonistic attitude towards the Welsh people in the region. Indeed, Ormsby–
Gore’s views were not generally shared by the party in North–east Wales or 
nationally. In November 1918 Ormsby-Gore stood and won the safe seat of 
Stafford, a constituency he held until he was elevated, on the death of his father, 
to the peerage in 1938. After the War he moderated his views on many issues, 
seeing himself as being on the left of his party67, but his strident support for the 
diehard cause, his intransigent opposition to Church Disestablishment and 
latterly his antipathy towards Lloyd George were at odds with the pragmatic and 
more inclusive brand of Conservatism that was being purveyed by the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales during the Great War.      
 
PARTY ORGANISATION, 1914-1918. 
At a special meeting of the National Union Executive Committee held on 
6 August 1914, its chairman Sir Arthur Steel Maitland explained that: 
 
The meeting had been called with the object of obtaining the Committee’s 
approval for arrangements for the temporary cessation of political activity 
during the War. He stated that he had seen Mr. P. Illingworth, the Liberal Chief 
Whip, who had agreed and instructed that all his speakers should be closed 
down and that all his allied organisations were to cease operations too.68 
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The inter-party truce, including the suspension of election activities, was 
extended to local constituency associations. Initially, the truce was beneficial to 
the Conservative Associations in North-east Wales as it meant that costs could be 
reduced, in particular the expensive outlay of running parliamentary candidates 
and campaigns. However, as the War drifted on support for the coalition 
deprived them of the canvassing and registration work, no matter how expensive, 
that remained their primary responsibility and a loss of individual political 
identity duly followed.  
The long-term consequences brought about by the disruption of war 
meant that when it ended Conservative party organisation, in particular in 
Denbighshire, had to rebuild from scratch. This was in part due to the boundary 
changes contained within the Representation of the People Act, 1918, but the 
situation was exacerbated by the inactivity of the NWDNU, which failed to meet 
during the period of conflict. Again it is unclear why this was so – the most 
simple explanation being that its leaders including Lord Kenyon and Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn were occupied elsewhere with the War effort, including 
recruitment and munitions manufacturing, and showed little interest in becoming 
involved in politics. A search of party archives, including a search of National 
Union records and the Bonar Law papers also failed to discover any responses 
from the NWDNU to those subjects and matters that animated Tories in other 
regions – even to such controversial measures as Irish Home Rule. Without such 
a body the constituency associations were left rudderless in North-east Wales and 
with no clear directives to follow, it is perhaps not surprising that decay and 
apathy set in amongst the party organisation.  
Yet it would be wrong to assume that there was no Conservative party 
activity in North-east Wales between 1914 and 1918. For example, the 
constituency agents, unlike the Area agents, whose role as Ball points out, were 
to be faithful servants ‘to the association, carrying out in detail the instructions of 
its officers’ services’ were retained.69 With the associations wary in the early 
stages of war that an election could still be called they remained important cogs 
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in the machine.70  In East Denbighshire J.M Leah kept his post even though the 
Conservative Association failed to meet for the first three years of the conflict. In 
West Denbighshire C.C. Mott was retained, despite his recruiting work for the 
county, while the sub-agents for the polling districts were put to work helping 
with the War effort. In Denbigh Boroughs all four-borough agents were retained 
and in Flintshire the Association secretary, J.Emlyn, oversaw the work of two 
agents until he joined up in January 1915. The agents kept their posts and 
continued to work alongside the Liberal agents in the county ensuring that all 
registration matters were settled before any appearances in the Revision Court.71    
Left to their own devices the associations in North-east Wales met 
infrequently during the War, but were not unlike many Conservative and Liberal 
associations the length and breadth of the country that failed to meet on a regular 
basis even prior to the conflict. As Stuart Ball, Andrew Thorpe and Mathew 
Worley point out ‘in most instances, the Liberal and Conservative executives met 
irregularly, primarily at election times, on occasion to appoint a prospective 
parliamentary candidate, or to confirm arrangements for the annual general 
meeting’.72 In East-Denbighshire, the Unionist Association failed to meet at all 
until June 1918 when at a special meeting of the Finance Committee it was 
decided to produce a list of potential subscribers, Mrs.Fitzhugh was appointed as 
Vice-president and the Wrexham Unionist Association, as result of constituency 
redistribution, was formally invited to merge with the Association. The failure of 
the Association to meet until this date reflected the decision of its President and 
Treasurer Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn not to become embroiled in politics during 
wartime. As Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn provided much of the finance and the 
facilities for this Association it is hardly surprising that it failed to meet during 
the War.  
The Denbigh Boroughs Unionist Association also held very few meetings 
during the War. With their MP, Ormsby-Gore on military service and their 
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chairman involved in war work again this was hardly surprising, but an entry in 
Major Hugh Peel’s papers indicate that a meeting of the Denbigh Boroughs 
Executive Committee was held at the Queens Hotel in Chester on 17 August 
1917 to discuss the Representation of the People Bill, finance and any other 
business. No further comments or reports in the local press can be traced about 
the proceedings or conclusions drawn, but one further meeting is noted in Major 
Peel’s papers. This was of the Finance Committee which met on 4 June 1918, 
and agreed the transfer of £128 from Denbigh Boroughs to the new Wrexham 
constituency Association when it was formed in June 1918. 73 The failure of this 
Association to meet regularly during the War is perhaps unsurprising, but it 
hardly met as a cohesive unit prior to the conflict, as the distances between the 
two boroughs of Wrexham and Holt in the east of Denbighshire and the more 
westerly boroughs of Ruthin and Denbigh, approximately thirty miles away, 
were hardly conducive to the regular holding of meetings. Indeed, prior to the 
War the Holt Unionist Association, the Wrexham Unionist One Thousand, the 
Denbigh Conservative Association and the Ruthin Unionist Associations all held 
separate annual and regular meetings at which delegates were chosen to sit on the 
Executive committee of the Central Unionist Association of the Denbigh 
Boroughs. As was pointed out by the Home Secretary in 1918 in geographical 
terms the redistribution of the constituency under the terms of the Representation 
of the People Act made much sense.74   
 The West Denbighshire Constitutional Association which held regular 
finance, general and annual general meetings before the War – meeting at least 
five times a year between 1910 and 1914 – met just twice during the War, but 
produced bank statements and generated a small amount of correspondence. On 
10 February 1915 an agreement was reached between C.C. Mott, the 
Association’s secretary, and the Liberal Association for a political truce to last 
for the duration of the War. In a letter to Colonel Mellor, Vice-president, 
confirming the agreement, Mott also advised that the Association’s sub agents be 
retained, in case a return to political activities became necessary.75 The two 
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meetings held sadly went unreported apart from a few lines in the Association’s 
Minute books. The first meeting held at Ruthin Castle on 25 October 1915, 
discussed financial matters and agreed to retain the services of the agents.76 The 
second meeting held at the end of June 1917 merely agreed the appointment of 
G.Denton as Secretary, who then informed Lord Kenyon of his new position.77 
After this the West Denbighshire Association went into decline and failed to 
meet again, an Association only reforming formerly on 1 March 1923. A number 
of factors were responsible for this. Firstly, many of the leading officers of the 
Association became involved with recruiting and the War effort. This appears to 
have bred apathy towards party work. Also in a climate of political co-operation, 
the Association seemed more than willing to allow Sir Herber Roberts, Liberal 
MP for the division, to represent their cause in opposition to the Representation 
of the People Act - perhaps deferring to him because of the experience he had as 
a parliamentarian and as leader of the Welsh Liberals.78 Finally, the death of 
William Mesham from natural causes in May 1918, who had led the Association 
since its creation in 1886, was a blow. Only a minor member of the landed gentry 
William Mesham presided over a highly successful Conservative Association. 
Under his leadership the Association was not only financially viable, but also 
funded a working-class parliamentary candidate, helped finance the Boroughs 
Association in Denbigh and formed a successful Junior Imperial League in the 
constituency. Mesham also presided over the most successful Primrose League 
Habitation in North Wales, at Denbigh. His death removed one of the major 
driving forces of Conservatism in the region.                 
Only the Flintshire Constitutional Association met on anything like a 
regular basis during the War, meeting at least once every year between 1914 and 
1918 and twice during 1915. Although this did not match the regularity of the 
meetings held prior to the War, the Flintshire Association held more meetings 
than any other Association in the region. The Finance Committee met most often, 
assembling not just to discuss financial affairs, but also other matters. It was at 
the Finance Committee meeting held on 14 July 1915 that a Central Office 
communiqué was read out instructing the Association to meet with the Flintshire 
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Liberal Association and ‘settle most of their differences in Registration work 
before appearing in the Revision Court’.79 As a result the Secretary reported that 
‘he had met the Liberal Agent and they had jointly framed an agreement to cover 
the contentious points’.80 At the end of January 1916 an Annual General Meeting 
was held at which officers and an Executive Committee were elected.81  
Co-operation with the Liberal party continued throughout the War, but in 
March 1918 the Constitutional Association met to discuss the possibility of 
fielding a parliamentary candidate should a Labour candidate run in the new 
division of Flintshire at any future election. While the decision was deferred, and 
on the conclusion of the War the Association supported the candidacy of a 
Liberal, the meeting demonstrates the nervousness of the Conservatives with 
regards to the Labour party. As it turned out the Conservatives had good grounds 
to be wary about the influence of Labour in the division, when after the War 
relations with the Liberals quickly turned sour as accusations that they had 
formed a secret alliance with Labour at local elections turned out to be true. This, 
however, provided the impetus for the Conservative party to look to their own 
survival and prompted a review of organisation – leading to the formation of a 
very successful constituency Association. 
 
PARTY ORGANISATION – FINANCE 1914-1918. 
Given the sporadic nature of meetings and the ending of partisan politics 
caused by the inter-party truce and the support for the War effort, party 
subscriptions and donations dried up, threatening the very survival of the 
associations in North-east Wales. To prevent complete collapse cost cutting 
became a priority. Already in difficulties, with a substantial overdraft and having 
to be bailed out by Lords Mostyn and Kenyon during 1914, the Flintshire 
Constitutional Association was now in extreme financial trouble. In November 
1914 the Secretary agreed to accept half his salary for the War, and a meeting 
with the Bank Manager was arranged. As a result further cost savings were 
undertaken. In January 1915 the Association decided that local agents were to be 
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paid at half the usual rate for 1915 with no pay at all for 1916.82 During 1915 it 
was also decided to sell the Association’s chief propaganda outlet, The Flintshire 
Observer, which was a huge drain on resources.83  
In West Denbighshire similar financial arrangements were made. In 
February 1915, C.C. Mott, the secretary of the Constitutional Association, 
suggested that sub-agents accept half pay for the duration of the War, and 
reduced his own salary accordingly.84 At the end of October 1915 the Executive 
Committee also decided that from then until the end of the War salaries would be 
paid at 1915 levels, with Mott receiving nothing but a pension payment. Yet the 
annual accounts show that with subscriptions drying up the Association made a 
loss of £23 in 1914. Fortunately after 1914 with political campaigns stopping  the 
few subscriptions and donations the Association received meant that it had 
balance of over £73 at the end of 1916, but it dropped again to a mere £29 in 
1918. This was a paltry sum when compared to, for example, 1912 when the 
Association collected over £420 in subscriptions, paid out £365 in expenses but 
still had a balance of £140 in its bank account.      
In Denbigh Boroughs the Unionist Association’s financial condition 
deteriorated more quickly than most as subscriptions plummeted. A set of 
accounts produced by Major Hugh Peel, Treasurer, show that in 1914 the 
Association amassed £125 in subscriptions but that between 1915 and 1918 a 
mere £57 was collected.85 As in other associations remedial action was 
undertaken to ensure survival. After 1914 the Wrexham ward secretaries 
received no pay until an appeal for remuneration was made in August 1917, 
leaving a balance at the bank in July 1918 of £128.86  
While cost cutting exercises were undertaken in an attempt to ensure 
survival, lack of funds still had serious repercussions for the associations in 
North-east Wales. Without adequate funds it would have been impossible to 
organise regular meetings, pay agents and secretaries, run political campaigns of 
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any kind (whether in support of Liberal candidates or not), pay for party 
literature or defray expenses. This, in part explains why the West Denbighshire 
Constitutional Association failed to meet after the War. Its funds would have 
been expected to go to a new party organisation in the new constituency of 
Denbighshire but the paltry sum of £29 would not have funded much and was 
hardly likely to supply the impetus to an already apathetic party organisation in 
the county. By contrast the new organisation in Wrexham was the benefactor of 
the sums collected by the Denbigh Boroughs Association. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the Wrexham Constitutional Association also failed to meet on a 
regular basis in the period directly after the War and quickly ran out of funds as it 
failed to attract subscribers. Thus lack of funds, in particular the failure to attract 
subscriptions, made it virtually impossible for Conservative Associations to 
operate at pre-1914 levels. The failure to attract subscribers was in part caused by 
economic conditions. During wartime many people made economies and 
subscriptions would have been seen as an unnecessary expense while subscribers 
seemed unwilling to donate once inter-party truces were made.87  
What emerges is a mixed picture of Conservative party organisation 
during the War. Indeed, as the War progressed and inter-party rivalry ceased 
depriving Conservative Associations of their raison d’etre – to field and support 
candidates – the party’s source of income dried up. While economies were 
introduced resulting in the survival of the party for the duration of the War its 
long-term future was hampered by its lack of funds. At the same time other 
factors had a negative effect on party organisation. The continuation of Coalition 
Government after 1916 and the support for Lloyd George meant that the 
Conservative message was muted and became increasingly irrelevant in a Liberal 
dominated region. In East Denbighshire Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn decision to 
avoid politics and his omnipotent control over Conservative politics in the 
constituency meant that the Unionist Association failed to function as a body 
until June 1918. Fortunately for Conservative politics in the area, a new 
Association was formed for the Wrexham constituency, but it subsequently 
suffered from a degree of apathy as the initiative passed to the local Liberal party 
once their choice of candidate had been selected to fight the division in 1918.   
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In West Denbighshire matters were simply left to drift after the death of 
William Mesham and the Association ceased to function once constituency 
boundaries were re-drawn in 1918. This would have been fine if the Borough 
Associations of Ruthin and Denbigh had seized the initiative and established an 
organisation to represent the new division of Denbighshire. As it was apathy and 
decay set in and the result was that a new large constituency of over 30,000 
voters, including the resort town of Colwyn Bay, the market towns of Denbigh 
and Ruthin as well as many rural areas, were left without a central Conservative 
organising body. On the other hand, the Flintshire Constitutional Association 
continued to meet, even if on an irregular basis, spurred on by financial 
difficulties, and concerns over the emergence of Labour in the county. 
Consequently, a determination to maintain an organisation existed amongst 
Conservatives in the county that stood the Association in good stead for the 
battles ahead with the Liberal and Labour parties.  
 
CONCLUSION. 
 The Great War largely had a negative effect on the Conservative party in 
North-east Wales. Unlike the party nationally which found itself revitalised by its 
participation in Coalition Government, the local parties found themselves 
submerged in their alliance with the Liberals, their effectiveness as separate 
entities seriously curtailed by local agreements especially on electioneering and 
voter registration. Furthermore, many leading Conservatives in the region 
became involved in the War effort, helping raise troops and manufacture 
munitions, if not actually serving themselves. This meant that such influential 
Conservatives as William Mesham, Lord Kenyon, Lord Mostyn and Sir Watkin 
Williams–Wynn were deflected from their work as leaders of their Conservative 
Associations. 
  The Representation of the People Act reduced the number of 
constituencies in the region to three and those that remained because of boundary 
changes favoured the Liberal party. This naturally had an adverse affect on the 
Conservative Associations in the region, which were already struggling to 
survive. The combined factors of the War, political agreements with the Liberals, 
the death of William Mesham and redistribution under the Representation of the 
People Act witnessed the demise of the West Denbighshire Association, and the 
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Denbigh Boroughs Unionist Association also ceased to exist as a result of 
redistribution. Moreover, Sir Watkin Williams–Wynn’s decision not to 
participate in politics for the duration of the War left the East Denbighshire 
organisation rudderless as matters were left to drift without its autocratic 
president and treasurer. Only the Flintshire Constitutional Association soldiered 
on during the War and it emerged reinvigorated as conflict with the local Liberal 
Association at county council elections ensured that it remained in fighting trim.  
 Thus by the time the General Election was called in November 1918 the 
Conservative party appeared to be in a sorry state in North-east Wales. Yet the 
War   did present some advantages for the party in the region. A potential schism 
was avoided between the party in Wrexham and Ormsby-Gore, which given the 
antipathy from the MP towards his local Association would surely only have 
resulted in his resignation and a major propaganda coup for the Liberals. At the 
end of the War the Flintshire Association reorganised itself as a single 
constituency Association ending one of the major bones of contention between 
itself and the NWDNU. Finally, the merger between the Wrexham and Holt 
Unionist Associations and the East Denbighshire Unionist Association to form 
the new Wrexham Constitutional Association helped democratise Conservative 
politics in the area. Out went the secretiveness of the old East Denbighshire 
Association to be replaced by an organisation that included women and working 
class members, which had its accounts regularly audited and publicly disclosed. 
Even though these were only small crumbs of comfort to the party, which felt it 
was making inroads into the Liberal hegemony prior to the War, it at least 
showed that the party could survive and adapt. Furthermore, the effect of national 
politics meant that the Liberal party in the region also had cause to be concerned 
as Labour now started to emerge as a force. The challenge for the Conservatives 
in the post-War world now involved deciding how far to submerge themselves in 
a political marriage with the Liberals to marginalize Labour or whether to invoke 
an early divorce and present themselves as the only viable alternative to the new 
perceived socialist threat.   
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH-EAST WALES 1918-1922. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Conservative party was revitalised by its participation in war–time 
government. The return to government in May 1915 allayed pre-war fears that 
the three general election defeats represented permanent exclusion from 
power. Becoming the major partner in Lloyd George’s Coalition further 
bolstered the party’s position, and its ascendancy was confirmed at the 1918 
coupon election when it won 332 seats, just short of an outright majority, 
compared to their Coalition Liberal partners who won 127. The opposition 
parties could only muster 234 MPs between them, which included 58 for 
Labour, leaving a majority of 239 for Lloyd George’s coalition.1 However, 
from the outset the new Coalition Government was beset by problems. 
Industrial disruption increased, with nearly 35 million working days lost 
during 1919.2 High levels of income tax helped fund social policies such as 
expensive building programmes, but bred discontent amongst the middle 
classes as concerns grew about the unstable economy and the damaging effects 
of income tax on people’s livelihoods. The Middle Class Union, a body 
formed to express the grievances of the middle classes, was borne out of such 
concerns.3  Along with ratepayers associations they agitated for reductions on 
government expenditure and a return to fiscal orthodoxy. Their anxieties 
coincided with sentiments held by many Conservative backbenchers whose 
constituency associations were becoming concerned about the party’s 
direction, policies, and even future independence. These latter concerns were 
exacerbated by an attempt to fuse the Conservatives and Liberals into a single 
party in 1920. The plan was only scuppered when Coalition Liberal MPs, 
whose co-operation had been taken for granted by Lloyd George, rejected the 
notion.4  At the same time the government’s failure to control public 
expenditure and the excessive demands this subsequently made on the tax 
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payer convinced many Conservatives that the coalition was failing in its duty 
to provide a successful defence against the growing menace of socialism.5  
Conservative anxieties intensified when in 1920 the Anti-Waste League 
emerged under the leadership of the Fourth Marquis of Salisbury, which 
enjoyed support from the highly influential press barons, Lords Rothermere 
and Northcliffe. Fielding independent Anti-Waste candidates, often against the 
coalition candidate and campaigning under traditional Tory issues, the League 
won a series of by-elections in late 1920 and early 1921, seriously threatening 
to undermine the Conservative party’s prospects, tied as it was to Coalition 
Government.6 As a result the call for Conservative independence amongst 
party associations rose to a clamour.7  Consequently, by 1922 Lloyd George’s 
authority over the Coalition went into serious decline, his only support coming 
from a small group of senior Conservatives including Austen Chamberlain, 
who replaced Bonar Law as Conservative leader when he retired due to ill 
health in March 1921. Chamberlain believed that the increasing demands for 
Conservative independence which came form the constituency associations 
was indicative of ‘pre-war Tories who have learned nothing and forgotten 
nothing and who are I am quite convinced unrepresentative of the bulk of the 
electorate’. Yet it was Chamberlain who was clearly out of touch with the 
constituency grass roots and an increasing number of party backbenchers who 
were becoming increasingly disaffected with their leader’s position.8 During 
1922 the signs of party revolt became more evident. According to Green ‘the 
desire amongst Conservatives to re-establish the independence of their party 
grew apace in the first half of 1922 and…by September evidence that local 
Conservative Associations were increasingly willing to disregard the orders of 
CCO [Conservative Central Office] and run independent candidates was 
indeed widespread.’9  
If this was not bad enough other matters also engulfed the government. A 
settlement was finally reached over Ireland in the Autumn of 1921, but not 
before Lloyd George had threatened to resign and the government given 
                                                 
5 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, pp119-121. 
6 K.O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 98-99.  
7 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, pp119-121. 
8 C. Cook, The Age of Alignment, p. 15. 
9 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p129. 
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reassurances to disaffected Unionists not to coerce Ulster. Lloyd George’s 
moral standing, already brought into question by the Marconi Scandal in 1913, 
was also challenged by his apparent readiness to sell honours on the open 
market. Such were the rumours of corruption that surrounded the June 1922 
Honours List Lloyd George had to accept the appointment of a Royal 
Commission, which investigated the whole system of awarding honours. In 
September and October 1922 the Chanak Crisis also brought the Prime 
Minister into conflict with Lord Curzon, the Coalition’s Conservative Foreign 
Secretary, and probably sealed the government’s fate. With Lloyd George 
supporting Greece in their conflict with Turkey, despite Britain’s historic 
position as a defender of theTurks, and Turkish forces routing their Greek 
enemies and thus threatening British troops at Chanak in the Near East the 
possibility of another war loomed. In their reluctance to support another war 
many Conservatives also harboured fears that the government might exploit 
the crisis to hold a ‘khaki style’ general election.  
These fears were realised when the Coalition leadership attempted to 
bring the party into line by calling a general election.10  When this was met 
with resistance Austen Chamberlain, called a meeting of the party at the 
Carlton Club on 19 October 1922 to reassert his authority. The move backfired 
as Bonar Law, re-emerging after illness, and Stanley Baldwin, President of the 
Board of Trade spoke out against Coalition. A vote taken to continue support 
for Lloyd George’s government was decisively lost, and over seven years of 
Conservative participation in Coalition was abruptly brought to an end. On 23 
October 1922 Bonar Law formed a Conservative ministry and one of his first 
tasks was to dissolve parliament and call a general election. 
Such anti-coalition sentiment did not develop in North-east Wales. Part of 
the reason lay in the fact that every constituency in the region returned 
couponed Liberals at the 1918 general election and as a result apathy and 
neglect infected party organisation in many areas resulting in a failure to 
register Conservative opinions until the coalition had fallen in 1922. At the 
same time leading Conservatives in the region, most notably Sir Watkin 
                                                 
10 J. Ramsden, Real Old Tory Politics 1910-1935, The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, 
Lord Bayford, 1910-35, p. 191.  
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Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon, still believed, as Austen Chamberlain did, 
that the coalition was the best form of defence against the spread of socialism.  
This chapter will therefore examine the effects of the 1918 general 
election and the resultant extension of Coalition Government on the 
Conservative party in North-east Wales. It will conclude that the support for 
coalition proved a mixed blessing for the Conservatives in North-east Wales. It 
will demonstrate that continued support for Lloyd George’s coalition had a 
negative impact on Conservatism in Denbighshire, where the party only 
survived because of the diligence shown by the two surviving Primrose 
League Habitations in the county On the other hand it will establish that a 
general distrust of the local Liberal party’s aims and ambitions, but not 
Coalition Government, in Flintshire saw the party slowly revive and re-
organise itself. It will also show how the party in Wrexham took the 
opportunity to reorganise itself during he period of coalition, and how despite 
their emasculation caused by participation in coalition politics, the 
Conservatives in North-east Wales incorporated the working class and in 
particular women into their organisations, which had long term benefits for the 
party.  It will finally attempt to explain why the Conservatives in North-east 
Wales seemed less concerned with matters of national politics and anti- 
coalitionist concerns, including the Honours Scandal and the Chanak Crisis, 
and concentrated more on addressing problems within their own associations.   
 
THE 1918 GENERAL ELECTION. 
As the War entered its final conclusive phase in the autumn of 1918, 
Lloyd George started to make plans for a general election that would, he 
hoped, be conducted under an electoral pact with the Conservatives, the aim 
being to extend Coalition Government into a period of reconstruction. On 5 
November 1918, six days before the Armistice, Lloyd George saw the King 
and requested a dissolution and an election date was set for 14 December.11 
Yet many Conservatives viewed the Coalition Government and continued 
support for Lloyd George with suspicion. As Green asserts ‘Lloyd George’s 
pre-war actions and rhetoric left a legacy of bitterness that was difficult if not 
                                                 
11 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, p.317.  
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impossible to erase’.12  Thus, to allay Conservative fears and ensure that the 
Coalition Government survived an election programme needed to embrace 
Conservative policies. Consequently, an election campaign programme was 
hastily agreed between Bonar Law and Lloyd George, which included two 
major elements - patriotism and stability. Unity was the key word, outlined by 
Bonar Law at meeting of Conservatives on 12 November 1918, as meaning 
that ‘Britain’s problems needed to be approached with efficiency and 
pragmatism, not partisan rancour’.13  
At the same time Lloyd George agreed to Conservative demands on 
Imperial Preference, Protection, provisions for Ulster in any Irish Home Rule 
Settlement and the Welsh Church. In a letter to Bonar Law, Lloyd George 
outlined the Coalition Government’s election programme. Amazingly, given 
his previous dogmatic rejection of the Conservative twin policies of Imperial 
Preference and Protection, he now said: 
I have already accepted the policy of Imperial Preference…to the extent that a 
preference will be given on existing duties and on any duties which may 
subsequently be imposed. On this subject I think there is no difference of 
opinion between us…I am prepared to say also that in order to keep up the 
present standard of protection and develop it to the utmost extent possible it is 
necessary that security should be given against the unfair competition to which 
our industries have been in the past subjected by the dumping of goods below 
the actual cost of production.14   
 
Lloyd George’s volte-face has to be understood in the context of Coalition 
Government. Having split with those Liberals who supported Asquith in 
December 1916 and become dependent on Bonar Law and virtually the entire 
Conservative party for survival he had to abandon much of his political 
heritage and throw sops to those whose support he needed.  To this end Lloyd 
George’s letter also promised that in any settlement on Irish Home Rule he 
could not ‘support the forcible coercion of Ulster’. In addition the Prime 
Minister confirmed that as the War had created ‘financial problems which 
                                                 
12 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p118. 
13 McCrillis, The British Conservative party in the Age of Universal Suffrage, p.35. 
14 House of Lords Record Office (HLRO), Bonar Law Papers, BL/95/1, Copy of Letter sent from 
Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 2 November 1918. 
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must be taken into account’, he would without making any definite proposals 
‘ensure that the Welsh Church would receive financial compensation in lieu of 
its lost endowments’.15 Given his concessions there was little resistance from 
Conservatives to the programme. However, the letter also contained references 
to the need for social reform and reconstruction after the War, which would 
‘improve the physical condition of the citizens of this country through better 
housing, better wages and better working conditions’.16  This it was anticipated 
would also keep social reforming Coalition Liberals on side.17 
Many Conservatives believed that the party had to co-operate with 
other sympathetic elements so that the rise of the Labour party and socialism 
could be checked. They also believed that to achieve long lasting post-war 
reform and reconstruction sectional interests ‘had to be submerged in a party 
of national unity’.18 As a result, Liberal and Conservative party organisers 
divided up the constituencies, an agreement being reached between 
Conservative party leaders and Frederick Guest, the Coalition Liberal whip, 
not to contest 158 seats in which Lloyd George candidates were standing.19 
Conservative and Liberal supporters of the Coalition ‘were automatically to be 
returned’, and the half-dozen Labour MPs who had opposed the War were to 
be challenged with ‘the patriotic section of the Party being left alone’.20 In all 
362 Conservatives and 145 Liberals were awarded government support, or the 
coupon, as it was later called.  
In Wales nineteen Liberals and eight Conservatives who supported the 
government sought representation. But the election was marked by the number 
of Labour candidates who stood for parliament. In all twenty-eight Labour 
candidates went to the polls, the majority of them in South Wales, the highest 
number the party had ever fielded in the Principality. In addition ten anti-
Coalition Asquithian Liberals were selected to fight Welsh seats. In North-east 
Wales under the election agreement thrashed out between the party organisers, 
three Coalition Liberal candidates were selected to fight the three 
                                                 
15 House of Lords Record Office (HLRO), Bonar Law Papers, BL/95/1, Copy of Letter sent rom 
Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 2 November 1918.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity pp35-36. 
18 McCrillis, The British Conservative party in the Age of Universal Suffrage, p.28. 
19 Ibid., p.35. 
20 Turner, Britain and the First World War, p.132. 
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constituencies. In Flintshire, both County and Boroughs seats had consistently 
returned Liberals before the War, which made the selection of a Liberal appear 
likely for the new county division. The sitting Boroughs MP, Thomas Parry, 
was the Liberal Association’s nomination despite the opposition of many in 
the Liberal organisation who supported Asquith, and regarded Parry as an ally 
of Lloyd George. There was some discussion amongst Conservatives as to 
whether the Association should field a candidate of their own if Labour stood 
at the election.21 But at a meeting of the Flintshire Constitutional Association 
held on 16 November 1918 a succession of speakers pledged loyalty to the 
Coalition as the best defence against the spread of Labour. As a result the 
Executive Committee agreed to support Thomas Parry providing the Liberal 
party confirmed his candidature.22 On 23 November the acting Liberal agent 
confirmed Parry’s nomination and the Constitutional Association finally 
agreed to support him. The Flintshire Observer noted that ‘among the Unionist 
Party the feeling seems general to adhere to the Coalition policy’,23 and in spite 
of the rumours that the Labour Party would field a candidate Thomas Parry 
was returned to Westminster unopposed.  
In Wrexham and Denbighshire contests were assured when Labour 
candidates were brought forward in both divisions. Moreover, in Wrexham 
E.T. John failed in his bid to win the Liberal nomination. Given that John was 
the Liberal MP for East Denbighshire he might have expected to win this 
nomination, but his views were clearly unacceptable to the Wrexham Liberal 
party Chairman Edward Hughes -  he could hardly have endeared himself to 
Hughes, one of Lloyd George’s closest allies in North-east Wales when he said 
he was an ‘out and out opponent of Lloyd George’s Government considering it 
a Coalition of the classes against the masses’.24 It was not surprising therefore, 
when Sir Robert Thomas won the Liberal nomination at a selection meeting 
held in Wrexham on 13 November 1918, beating John by 31 votes to 22.25   
                                                 
21 FRO, Flintshite Constitutional Association Minute Book 1, D/DM 307/1, Meeting of the 
Executive Committee, 16 November 1918. 
22 FRO, Flintshite Constitutional Association Minute Book 1, D/DM 307/1, Meeting of the 
Executive Committee, 16 November 1918. 
23 Flintshire Observer, 14 November 1918. 
24 Denbighshire Free Press, 14 December 1918.  
25 North Wales Guardian, 15 November 1918.  
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Thomas, who claimed to be an enthusiastic supporter of Mr. Lloyd 
George and the government, was a shipping magnate, a director of several 
public companies, and a former High Sheriff of Anglesey, and was thus a 
different type of Liberal to those who had represented the radical cause prior to 
the War.26 He was also supportive of his party’s accommodation with the 
Conservative Party.27 As such on 18 November 1918 he was invited to address 
a Wrexham Unionist Association meeting held to discuss his candidature. 
According to Thomas:  
 
He declared himself an enthusiastic supporter of the policy enunciated by 
Mr.Lloyd George in agreement with Bonar Law and hoped the new government 
would be a business government with the give and take, which the times 
demanded. He did not wish to conceal the fact he was a Liberal, but he was a 
sane Liberal and believed it was possible for Conservatives and Liberal to work 
together.28 
 
By echoing the sentiments of Lloyd George and Bonar Law and thus 
reinforcing the need for Conservatives and Liberals to work together, emphasis 
being placed on the need for a business government and not a tax and welfare 
reforming government that had antagonised so may Tories before the War, the 
Unionist Association expressed approval at such conciliatory words and 
unanimously decided to adopt him as candidate.29 Sir Robert Thomas’ 
selection also shows how a far the local Liberal party had moved to 
accommodate the Conservatives. In part this was motivated by the fact that the 
Liberals needed Conservative votes in the constituency. While the new 
constituency contained all the industrial areas formerly in the East 
Denbighshire division, traditionally inclined towards the Liberals, it also 
contained the town of Wrexham, where a large number of workingmen had 
voted Conservative in 1910 to win the Denbigh Boroughs seat for Ormsby-
Gore. In addition there were many more working class as well as female votes 
                                                 
26 North Wales Guardian, 15 November 1918. 
27 Jones, The Political Dynamics of North-east Wales, p.60. 
28 North Wales Guardian, 23 November 1918.  
29 NLW, Wrexham Conservative Party Records, Vol 1, Minute Book of the Wrexham and East 
Denbighshire Unionist Association, 1918-1926. Special meeting of the Association 15 November 
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unaccounted for in the new constituency now that the franchise had been 
extended. With a strong Conservative presence in Wrexham, which included 
the support of successful workingmen’s and women’s Conservative 
organisations, the Liberals surely had to take account of Conservative 
sensibilities. The selection of Sir Robert Thomas was one way of 
accomplishing this.          
At the same time the selection of Sir David S. Davies, a local wealthy 
industrialist who enthusiastically embraced Lloyd George’s and Bonar Law’s 
election programme, as Coalition Liberal candidate in Denbighshire 
emphasised the desire amongst leading Liberals and Conservatives in the 
constituency to reach an accommodation with each other. However, his 
selection exposed differences of opinion within the Liberal ranks. Delegates 
from the Liberal Associations of West Denbighshire and the Denbigh and 
Ruthin branches of the Denbigh Boroughs attending the Liberal selection 
meeting at the end of November 1918 were surprised to discover that Sir John 
Herbert Roberts, the sitting Liberal MP for West Denbighshire, had suddenly 
retired and nominated Davies as his successor, who was subsequently selected.  
A number of delegates were unhappy about the situation believing that they 
were faced with a fait accompli ‘before anyone had time to think’ and 
attempted to persuade Aneurin Evans, a solicitor and Denbigh Liberal 
Association member to stand.30 Consequently Evans received support from ‘a 
considerable body of agriculturalists and other electors in the division who 
thought that as an industrialist Davies [was] an unsuitable candidate to stand as 
an Independent Coalition Liberal’ in the rural constituency.31 Evans initially 
agreed and nomination papers were prepared for him. At the last minute a split 
in the division was avoided when Evans withdrew stating that his candidature 
would mean a serious division in the Coalition forces. But, it is not hard to see 
why many Liberals were concerned and considered Davies an unsuitable 
candidate. Sir John Herbert Roberts represented a link to the past and pre-war 
radical Nonconformist policies. Moreover, as a fearsome defender of Free 
Trade his decision to stand down and nominate Davies, an industrialist who 
embraced protection policies, must have seemed a betrayal of radical 
                                                 
30 Denbighshire Free Press, 30 November 1918.  
31 Ibid., 7 December 1918.  
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principles to some Liberals in Denbighshire. The ideological lurch towards 
Conservatism by endorsing the government’s election programme and in 
particular the twin policies of Imperial Preference and Protection must have 
encouraged some radical Liberals to look elsewhere for their political 
affiliations. Nonetheless, in 1918 the Liberals fought the election under one 
banner but by 1922 the fissures that appeared here opened up and resulted in 
an Independent Liberal being brought forward.    
Even so there were many who supported Davies and despite the internal 
bickering within the Liberal party local Conservatives met the choice of 
Davies with approval. Indeed, by supporting the government’s manifesto 
which included a degree of preference and protection and advocating that 
those responsible for the War had to be punished so that reconstruction could 
promote the ‘unity and development of the Empire’, Davies guaranteed 
himself the full support of Conservatives during the election campaign.32 The 
Conservatives went even further in supporting him by entering the internal 
Liberal dispute. A meeting of Conservatives held at the Ruthin Constitutional 
Club passed a resolution stating that ‘this meeting supports the candidature of 
Sir David S. Davies the recognised official Liberal candidate in order to 
prevent as far as possible the unfortunate split which threatens to occur in the 
ranks of the Coalitionists in the division’.33 Local Conservatives were urged to 
vote for Davies, the Denbighshire Free Press, the constituency’s leading 
Conservative newspaper, issuing a rallying call: 
 
In the absence of a Conservative candidate the members of that party will 
undoubtedly be anxious to support that candidate pledged to support Mr.Lloyd 
George, Mr. Bonar Law and the Coalition Government who have by their 
guidance, determination and wise statesmanship made it possible for our 
magnificent soldiers, sailors, and airmen to win the war and secure the blessings 
of peace. If the late government could be trusted to do this surely they are now 
to be trusted to secure the full benefits of a righteous and lasting peace….it will 
be the duty of every true Unionist loyally to support and vote for Sir David 
S.Davies.34 
                                                 
32 Denbighshire Free Press, 7 December 1918.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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Such unequivocal support for the coalition demonstrated the determination of 
Conservatives to shore up support for the government in opposition to Labour in 
the constituency.    
Finally, what the selection of Sir Robert Thomas in Wrexham and Sir 
David S. Davies in Denbighshire and the endorsement of Thomas Parry in 
Flintshire suggested was how far the two main political parties in the region had 
shifted ground politically since 1914 to accommodate each other. This reflected 
the national political situation in November 1918, as much had changed since the 
outbreak of war. The Liberals were now irrevocably split – the events of war 
dividing their party into disparate blocks and the Conservatives had returned to 
government. However, it was the man who had been the radical scourge of 
Conservatives in his pre-war incarnation, but now led what was essentially a 
government of the right who appeared to have changed the most. Once nearly a 
Liberal Unionist and an admirer of Joseph Chamberlain the War had as Smith 
concludes ‘brought out his Chamberlainite qualities…of boundless energy and a 
determination to defend Britain’s imperial inheritance’ while Tariff Reformers in 
his government were allowed a free reign.35 Such moves must have seemed an 
abnegation of Liberal principles by his former Radical colleagues.  But it wasn’t 
just the Prime Minister who had shifted ground his faithful lieutenants in North-
east Wales had also done so. In particular Sir John Herbert Roberts in West 
Denbighshire and Edward Hughes leader of the Wrexham Liberals had helped 
install candidates who were acceptable to local Conservatives while Thomas 
Parry Liberal MP in Flintshire remained a faithful supporter of coalition and 
willingly embraced Bonar Law’s and Lloyd George’s election programme and its 
sops to the Conservative party. Their apparent lurch rightwards to embrace 
Protection and government based on business principles agitated many in their 
local parties, but in 1918 these remained mere grumbles as the Liberal 
Associations supported their candidates.  
However, a similar lurch to the left could be detected amongst the local 
Conservative Associations. Their support for Liberal candidates perhaps could be 
attributed to the coupon, which was awarded to them under the local agreement 
                                                 
35 Smith, The Taming of Democracy, p 65. See also Morgan, Consensus and Disunity p 21.  
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that stopped Conservatives bringing forward their own candidate. Their view of 
Lloyd George’s government was also possibly tempered by the promise to take 
into account any financial difficulties faced by the Welsh Church, as a result of 
the Welsh Church Disestablishment Act – a piece of legislation resisted by 
North-east Wales Conservatives more forcefully than Home Rule in the period 
leading up to the First World War.36 Their support surely also reflected Bonar 
Law’s appeal for unity and the rejection of coercion in Ulster. However, Lloyd 
George’s endorsement of preference and anti-dumping policies that reactivated 
radical Conservatism – not seen in the region since the 1910 elections when most 
Conservatives in North-east Wales believed that Tariff Reform was a solution to 
local industry’s ills as well as a means of raising money for social welfare – 
helped steer the Conservatives towards an accommodation with the Liberal party. 
As Smith points out ‘wartime collaboration also encouraged a centrist political 
ethos amongst some of the Conservative and coalition leaders which welded the 
Liberal progressivism of Lloyd George to a revitalised radical Unionism’.37   
When he commented in December 1918 that Lloyd George had made it ‘possible 
for our brave sailors and soldiers to win the War and that gratitude as well as the 
country’s wisdom should be shown in sending Mr. Lloyd George and the 
Coalition Government to carry out the equally important work of peace and 
reconstruction’, Lord Kenyon, one of the region’s chief proponents of pre-war 
Tariff Reform policies, was surely signalling Conservative approval for centre 
ground politics in North-east Wales – a meeting of radical Conservatives and 
Coalition Liberals in the middle ground to help the cause of peacetime 
reconstruction and all the welfare programmes that came with it. 
Even so to support Lloyd George and those Liberals he led was still a 
bold move – especially when one considers the antipathy that he engendered 
amongst local leading Conservatives with his direct taxation proposals contained 
in his 1909 People’s Budget.  Ironically, it was surely the protection of Lloyd 
George and his Coalition Government that ultimately they sought in 1918 as a 
bulwark against apparent socialistic measures, including a major threat to landed 
wealth, contained in Labour’s manifesto. In particular, Labour’s manifesto 
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pledge to ‘introduce large schemes of land reorganisation’… to free the ‘soil 
from landlordism and reaction’ must have struck fear into the very hearts of 
those powerful landowners in North-east Wales such as Sir Watkin Williams–
Wynn and Lord Mostyn.38 At the same time Labour’s plans to nationalise much 
of Britain’s industry, including the coal mines, threatened the business interests 
of many landowners in the region. Therefore it is not hard to see why local 
Conservatives saw in Lloyd George and the conciliatory election programme he 
had devised with Bonar Law an opportunity to sideline Labour’s prospects and 
protect their own interests in North-east Wales.  
 
THE 1918 GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. 
Campaigning began during the last days of November. Such was the 
nature of the programme and the wording of the subsequent manifesto which 
appeared on 21 November 1918 that both coalition partners had little difficulty 
supporting it. According to John Turner: 
Most Conservative addresses were devoted to general support of the coalition 
and an appeal to the electors to return the government which had won the War 
and could be relied upon to govern well in peace. The coalition programme was 
supported in general and anodyne terms. Coalition Liberals addresses were little 
different, though more detailed emphasis was laid on the proposals for 
reconstruction in the Coalition manifesto.39 
 
What was not anticipated or planned for was the type of election campaign that 
emerged. Initial concerns were raised that apathy existed amongst the voters, but 
during the last two weeks of campaigning reports from Unionist agents showed 
that obtaining reparations from Germany, punishing the Kaiser and the exclusion 
of former enemy aliens were the most important election issues, even surpassing 
reconstruction and social reforms in significance. The least important issue was 
seen as the safeguarding of British industries.40  Thus, the coalition election 
campaigns became overtly patriotic and jingoistic as candidates presented the 
government, in particular Lloyd George, as successful War leaders while arguing 
                                                 
38 1918 Labour Party General Election Manifesto [Online] Available: http: www.labour-
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39 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, p.325. 
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that Germany be forced to pay the maximum in reparations. It was the same in 
Wales, where, according to Morgan: 
 
The so called coupon election of December 1918 was marked… by intense 
patriotic frenzy. The Welsh elections were described as a great ceremony of 
congratulation, a national tribute to the greatest Welshman ever born.  Thus in 
Cardiff there were‘hang the Kaiser’ rituals. In Aberdare the newly enfranchised 
women electors were urged that a vote for the ILP meant an acquittal for the 
filthy murderous Huns who had defiled women and children, tortured Welsh 
troops and strangled British trade.41  
 
 
The rhetoric was less pronounced in North-east Wales, but even so the 
Coalition Liberal campaigns were tinged with patriotic fervour and 
accompanied by anti-German sentiment.  While speaking to a crowded 
meeting in the pit village of Rhos near Wrexham at the end of November Sir 
Robert Thomas praised the role that Wales played and the contribution made 
by the local coal miners to the War victory. ‘No part of the British Empire had 
played a more glorious part in bringing the war to a triumphant 
conclusion…he also wished to pay a tribute to them as colliers for their 
glorious contribution to the war. If they had not flung bombs at the enemy they 
had flung coal at them–so that the men could be kept going’.42 Similarly, at a 
campaign meeting in Denbigh on 13 December 1918 Sir David Davies argued 
that ‘Germany should pay to the last farthing and the guilty ones punished to 
the full. The German nation could well afford to make reparations to the full 
and it must be such that she could not again be in a position to force the 
nations into war for generations to come’.43  
Thomas and Davies also kept to the government’s election programme 
laid down at the beginning of the campaign by Lloyd George and Bonar Law. 
Campaigning in the Wrexham constituency on the need for unity to solve the 
country’s problems in peacetime Thomas also argued that ‘Home Rule for 
Ireland was essential…but there must not be coercion of the North-east corner 
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of Ireland’.44 These sentiments were guaranteed to appease Conservative 
concerns over Ireland and on fiscal policy Thomas declared himself a Free 
Trader, who was opposed to the imposition of tariffs that raised the price of 
food, but that ‘if they could give some mutual preferential treatment to the 
Colonies which would result in drawing closer the bonds of unity between the 
old country and the Dominions he would say ‘Amen’ to it’.45 This followed the 
lead Lloyd George’s had taken in his letter to Bonar Law and was clearly 
designed to ensure Conservative support while not alienating the large Liberal 
vote in the division. Such was the care that Thomas took to ensure support 
from both sides of the political divide that at a major campaign meeting held at 
the Drill Hall, Wrexham during the first week of December those who 
appeared on his platform included Conservative Councillor Thomas Sauvage, 
who presided, Sir Ellis Jones-Griffith, Liberal MP for Anglesey, Edward 
Hughes leader of the Wrexham Liberals and Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn.  
According to Sir Ellis-Griffith ‘the presence on the same platform of Sir 
Watkin Williams-Wynn and Sir Robert (Thomas: candidate) was a good omen 
and an indication of real unity in the contest they were waging  in the 
division’. 46                                                                   
Such unity was also evident in Denbighshire where Sir David S. Davies 
argued ‘that in the work of reconstruction agriculture and its development 
would play a very important part’.47 If the content of his campaign speeches 
was a little vague as to how such reconstruction would be achieved, his 
programme nonetheless was designed to please members of both local 
Coalition parties. In particular Davies’ campaign concentrated on promises 
‘that reconstruction must be such as to promote the unity and the development 
of Empire and be worthy of the sacrifices our brave men have made, must 
involve wise legislation in regard to public health, housing, conditions of 
employment, wages and other kindred important matters’. 48 Consequently, his 
programme contained elements that would appeal to local Conservatives, most 
notably on the development and protection of Empire, and would also satisfy 
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the demands from Liberals for social reform. His programme was clearly 
successful in its intentions for as the Denbighshire Free Press noted one of his 
campaign meetings held in Denbigh, was ‘crowded by men and women of all 
parties …the platform was as regards chairmen and speakers as representative 
of both parties in the Coalition as the audience; to be precise there were four 
Nonconformist Liberals and four Church Conservatives supporting the 
candidate’.49 
  Such a situation would have been unthinkable before the Great War 
when divisions between Liberals and Conservatives, especially over the 
Church Disestablishment question, seemed intractable and even post-war the 
issue still had potential to cause division. In his election programme letter to 
Bonar Law, the Prime Minister had kept his promises vague on the amount of 
compensation to be awarded to the Welsh Church in lieu of its lost 
endowments and any anti-Church rhetoric would be sure to alienate potential 
Conservative supporters and voters.  As a result in Wrexham Thomas was 
keen to ensure the pre-war political friction remained moribund, especially 
since the Church Disestablishment Act was yet to finally receive the Royal 
Assent. Speaking to a meeting of Wrexham Conservatives at the end of 
November 1918, Thomas careful not to alienate such a group said:  
 
If there was to be a question of the rearrangement of details he should be 
perfectly in favour of a round table conference to discuss the matter…if there 
were any sharp differences of opinion on Disendowment he should desire to 
come down and consult the wishes of his constituents.’50  
 
This pacified local Conservatives on the issue and Disestablishment failed to 
make any impact during the election campaign. In Denbighshire Davies totally 
avoided the issue, no doubt aware that in this more rural constituency, where 
in many areas the Welsh language and Nonconformity still dominated, 
Disestablishment still had the potential to split his support.  
What emerged from the campaign was just how far the Liberal candidates 
had compromised radical ideals to shore up Conservative support in the 
                                                 
49 Denbighshire Free Press, 14 December 1918. 
50 North Wales Guardian, 23 November 1918. 
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constituencies. While their pledges remained in line with Bonar Law and 
Lloyd George’s programme their utterances on Tariff Reform and Church 
Disestablishment, unheard of from pre-war Liberals, must have pleased local 
Conservatives. At the same time by appearing on the same platforms where 
Liberals promised to pass legislation on public health, housing and 
employment the local leading Conservatives must have assuaged any doubts 
that the Liberals may have harboured about securing their support. This was 
not unusual and was symptomatic of what was happening elsewhere. 
According to Morgan: 
 
The emphasis during the campaign on new issues such as housing was noted. 
The literature of a Unionist minister such as Laming Worthington-Evans in 
Colchester which stressed pensions and other social themes was not untypical. 
Generally the ‘coupon so much maligned, was a verdict, soberly arrived at, on 
the new politics of wartime, that centralised politics’ for which Lloyd George 
had called during the campaign.51       
 
With this new ‘centralised politics’ also being practised in North-east Wales and   
contentious issues being avoided so as not to offend the Conservatives’ political 
sensibilities the campaigns were largely dull affairs. The Denbighshire Free 
Press commented that ‘the war has so mollified the political atmosphere that 
very few of the differences are recognised nowadays’.52 The North Wales 
Guardian reported that in Wrexham ‘the excitement aroused by the close 
contests in Denbigh Boroughs seemed a remote memory’.53 As if sensing that 
Labour were not going to make headway against the coalition forces the 
electorate seemed apathetic to the campaign despite the massive increase in the 
number of voters. Turnout in both constituencies was low in comparison to the 
1910 general election. In Wrexham nearly 70 per cent of the electorate went to 
the polls compared to the 93 per cent who polled in Denbigh Boroughs in 
December 1910. In Denbighshire the turnout was just over 58 per cent compared 
to the 83 per cent turnout in West Denbighshire in January 1910, the last time the 
constituency was fought. The results also reflected Lloyd George’s continued 
                                                 
51 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p42. 
52 Denbighshire Free Press, 30 November 1918. 
53 North Wales Guardian, 20 December 1918. 
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popularity in the region as well as an ascendant patriotism that accompanied the 
War victory. Both factors were significant in limiting the appeal of Labour. In 
Denbighshire E.T John, who had swapped allegiances to join the Labour party 
after his failure to be selected as a Liberal in Wrexham, made no impact as his 
campaign speeches contained demands for Home Rule for Wales and 
disarmament.54 These were hardly issues that were going to endear him to voters 
who were shrouded in patriotic fervour. In Wrexham Hugh Hughes, the Labour 
candidate also made the mistake of attacking Lloyd George as a hypocrite whose 
government now depended on big landowners, or as he put it ‘a vote given to the 
Coalition was a vote for Toryism’.55 Both Labour candidates were subsequently 
heavily defeated, E.T John obtaining less than 17 per cent of the poll and barely 
three thousand votes. In Wrexham Hughes faired a little better, but was still 
defeated by over fourteen thousand votes.  
Table 5.1 The 1918 General Election.  
Party % Share Candidates MPs elected 
Coalition Conservative 32.5   362    332 
Coalition Liberal 12.6   145    127 
Coalition Labour   0.4       5        4 
Coalition Independent   0.1       1        1 
Coalition NDP   1.5     18        9 
Total Coalition 47.1   531    473 
    
Conservative   6.1      83      50 
Liberal 13.0    276      36 
Labour 21.4    361      58 
Sinn Fein   4.6    102      73 
Others   7.8    260      17 
Total 100.0 1,623    707  
Taken from: C. Cook, The Age of Alignment, Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922-1929 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1972).  
 
Table 5.2 The 1918 General Election in Wales. 
 
Party        Seats Won          Votes         % Vote 
Coalition Liberal           19         208, 116             39.3 
Labour           10         180, 414             34.0 
Conservative             4           59, 592             11.2 
Liberal             2           51, 382             13.0 
Nat Democratic              1           22, 824               4.3 
Taken from: C. Cook, The Age of Alignment.  
 
 
                                                 
54 Denbighshire Free Press, 14 December 1918. 
55 North Wales Guardian, 29 November 1918. 
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Table 5.3. 1918 General Election Results in North-east Wales.  
 
Constituency Candidate     Vote         %    T/O 
Denbigh D. S. Davies (Co Lib)    14, 773      83.3   58.2 
 E.T. John (Labour)      2, 958      16.7  
   +11. 815   
Flintshire T. Parry (Co Liberal)  Unopposed   
Wrexham R.J. Hughes (Co Lib)    20, 874      76.3   69.7 
 H. Hughes (Labour)      6, 500      23.7     
   +14, 374   
Taken from: B.Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
The support for Coalition Liberal candidates was more substantial in 
North-east Wales than it was in Wales or in the United Kingdom as a whole. In 
Denbighshire Davies gained 83.3 per cent of the vote and in Wrexham Sir R.J. 
Thomas won 76.3 per cent compared to 39.3 per cent the Coalition Liberals 
achieved in the Principality (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). This reflected the 
strength of Liberalism that had been carried over from pre-war days as well as 
the undoubted support Lloyd George still had in the region. Lloyd George’s 
reputation was obviously still strong in North-east Wales and voters were not 
about to desert the man they had so faithfully supported at campaign rallies in 
all three constituencies prior to the Great War – despite any internal 
grumblings local Liberal Associations might have. The support for the War 
appeared as robust here as an in any other part of Britain and the Coalition 
Liberal candidates’ decision to demand the maximum war reparations from 
Germany while praising the contributions made by local people to the War 
effort struck a chord with voters. What the results in North-east Wales also 
demonstrated was that any fears the Conservative and Liberal parties 
harboured that Labour might gain a substantial vote from disaffected radical 
Liberals was unfounded. The Labour party did perform well in the Principality 
where they registered their biggest success yet winning ten seats, but these 
were mainly restricted to industrial seats in the southern half of the country. In 
all nineteen Coalition Liberals were returned in Wales and the two Coalition 
successes in North-east Wales were typical of many Coalition Liberal victories 
throughout Britain. Many of the Coalition Liberals’ best performances came in 
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rural seats, of which Denbighshire was one, and surprisingly in some mining 
seats, which included Wrexham.56 As Turner explains: 
 
Couponed Liberals were almost entirely excluded from urban middle class seats. 
In all other seats they outperformed their Labour and Asquithian opponents 
…Their best performances were registered in mixed-class, urban/rural and rural 
areas… in mining seats Coalition Liberals, often former Lib-Labs in Durham 
and Wales, outperformed even the Labour party. 57   
 
Indeed, considering it fielded 361 candidates, of which only 58 were elected 
the election, must have been a disappointment for the Labour party as it 
achieved virtually nine percent more of the vote than the Coalition Liberals but 
won nearly 100 seats fewer. However Labour’s position was not nearly as bad 
as it was for Asquithian Liberals who contesting 276 constituencies won over 
twenty two per cent of the vote and had just 36 MPs elected. The 
overwhelming winners were the Coalition Conservatives who from 362 
candidates had 332 MPs elected; over 90 per cent of their candidates were 
successful.  
 
COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1919. 
The first county council elections in six years were greeted by 
indifference and apathy in Denbighshire, but in Flintshire they resembled 
many of the pre-war contests. A week before the contests took place in 
Denbighshire there was a joint meeting of electors from the Liberal and 
Conservative parties to decide how the county council elections should be 
fought. According to the Denbighshire Free Press the meeting had been 
convened in a spirit of Coalition and it was decided that the elections should be 
held under an alliance between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the 
Coalition candidates declaring that they had no political allegiance. 58 In all 
there were eleven contests only three attracting inter-party rivalries – Labour 
candidates winning against the Conservatives at Chirk and at Esclusham while 
a Liberal broke ranks with his party at Stansty and Acton to defeat a 
                                                 
56 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, pp. 406-407.  
57 Ibid,. p.408. 
58 Denbighshire Free Press, 1 March 1919.  
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Conservative by 51 votes. Otherwise all councillors returned professed to have 
no political allegiance.  
In Flintshire some local Liberals were opposed to the Coalition and 
were unenthusiastic about continuing an agreement with the Conservatives, 
which they believed only existed for parliamentary elections.59 As Jones’ inter-
war study of Liberalism in North-east Wales confirms: 
 
The relationship between the Tories and Liberals in North-east Wales did not 
mirror the political marriage of the national parties. From the outset the 
Flintshire Liberals made their hostility towards the Conservative Party known. 
Many of its most influential figures, like Henry Gladstone and Thomas 
Waterhouse, were opposed to the Coalition.60 
 
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to reach a county council election 
agreement between the parties, but this fell through when a Constitutional 
Association meeting refused to sanction a Liberal plan that would have meant 
the loss of four Conservative held council seats: 
 
The meeting was unanimously opposed to the proposal which had been put 
forward by the County Council whips of the Liberal Party for an arrangement 
for not contesting seats in the County Council Election which would have 
involved handing over four seats at present held by Unionists to Labour 
candidates. 61  
 
To make matters worse rumours spread amongst Conservatives that the 
Liberal party had a secret working arrangement with Labour which were given 
credence when the local press ran stories that the two parties had secured an 
election pact. The County Herald, a Liberal newspaper, reported ‘The Liberal 
party has adopted the Labour party programme’ [including] ‘trade union rates 
of wages and free education for all grades.’62 Such a development was not 
surprising since many of the Flintshire Liberals had long considered 
                                                 
59 Jones, The Political Dynamics of North-east Wales, p.64. 
60 Ibid., p.97. 
61 FRO, Flintshire Constitutional Association, Minute Book 1 D/DM/307/1, Annual Meeting of 
the Constitutional Association, 1 February 1919.  
62 The County Herald, 28 February 1919.  
 213
themselves to be progressives representing workers interests and able to 
support many of the Labour party aims. This made them unwilling to 
collaborate with the Conservatives whom they considered to be too 
reactionary.63 As a result Conservatives took a hard line against the Liberal 
party deciding to field their own candidates in 18 contested county council 
seats in Flintshire. The result of such contests was that Labour won ten seats 
most of them in working-class industrial areas, the Liberals won four seats, the 
Conservatives three and Independents one. When these were added to the 
unopposed returns the new council consisted of fifteen Liberals, thirteen 
Conservatives, twelve Labour and two Independents. The results indicated that 
Labour was making progress in Flintshire, but while the Conservatives had six 
fewer candidates returned than in 1913 they still managed to hold nearly as 
many seats on the council as the Liberals. Certainly the most significant 
feature of these elections was that for the first time the Labour Party gained an 
electoral foothold in North-east Wales. Obviously, this had wider implications 
for the future of party politics in the region as the threat from Labour brought a 
new dimension to inter-party rivalries in the region. However, as the first test 
of political strength since the extension to the franchise and one which they 
felt was forced on it the Constitutional Association appeared to be happy with 
the results claiming that ‘with more time and workers we hope to do even 
better and to make the party a real fighting force in the county’. This statement 
contained a number of significant elements. Firstly it demonstrated how 
willing and eager the Conservatives were to join the political affray, despite 
the fact that there was a parliamentary election truce in place. Secondly it 
demonstrated how quickly the Conservative party had responded to the 
challenge of the county council elections and finally it showed how 
determined it was to re-establish an efficient party organisation in Flintshire. In 
spite of the apparent torpor in Denbighshire the Flintshire Constitutional 
Association was flying the Conservative flag in North-east Wales.          
 
 
                                                 
63 Jones, The Political Dynamics of North-East Wales, p.65.  
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ADJUSTING TO A NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: LABOUR, WOMEN 
AND DEMOCRACY. 
 In the immediate aftermath of European conflict, when patriotism 
appeared more important to the British public than the country’s industrial 
problems, there seemed little opportunity for the Labour Party to extend 
political influence. This apparently was confirmed when it only won 58 seats 
at the 1918 general election. Yet its failure to gain many seats did not reflect 
the party’s true support in the country as over 21 per cent of the electorate 
voted Labour. Furthermore, Labour correctly anticipated that the 
circumstances surrounding the 1918 general election were particularly 
unfavourable to them. The party believed that once peace returned, and the 
problems of reconstruction were faced by the country, opportunities would 
arise for it.64 This proved to be a correct assessment as between 1919 and 1922 
the Labour Party made 13 by - election gains during a period marked by severe 
industrial unrest.  
For Labour these by-election victories and the withdrawal of Sinn Fein 
from Westminster confirmed its position as the main opposition to Coalition 
Government. Furthermore, a disappointing performance nationally in 1918 
was not evident in the Principality where it took 34 per cent of the vote and 
won ten seats. Nonetheless, their results in North-east Wales were poor; being 
heavily defeated by Coalition Liberals in the two constituencies it contested - 
Denbighshire and Wrexham. Even so Labour had won twelve seats in 
Flintshire at the 1919 county council elections and local Conservatives were 
convinced that Labour, with its apparent links to socialism, posed a serious 
threat to democracy. According to Councillor William Horton, chairman of the 
Colwyn Bay Constitutional Club: 
 
We are now in the throes of political developments of vast importance and no 
good purpose can be served by hiding the gravity of the position or toning down 
the objects and schemes of those who are creating the trouble. Our 
Constitutional government is challenged by the extreme faction of the Labour 
Party.65  
                                                 
64 Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924, p.25. 
65 North Wales Pioneer, 9 October 1919. 
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Councillor Horton’s comments reflected Conservative fears everywhere that 
Labour, if elected, would replace constitutional government with a communist 
regime similar to that in Russia. According to J.Whitaker (chairman of the 
labour committee of the National Unionist Association) ‘the principles of the 
Labour party when mild were socialism and when extreme were 
bolshevism’.66 With such fears permeating the party at all levels during the 
early 1920s moves were undertaken to entice working class supporters away 
from the Labour party. In particular an attempt was made to challenge 
Labour’s position as an automatic beneficiary of Trades Unions levies, which 
helped fund its candidates and thus further its goals. At the 1920 National 
Union of Conservative Associations conference there were calls from the floor 
for the establishment of constituency labour committees to combat ‘the 
socialists and extremists in the ranks of organised labour’.67 
To this end a conference of Flintshire Constitutional Association 
members, also attended by delegates from the Denbighshire and Wrexham 
Associations, was held in Rhyl on 16 October 1921 with the object of forming 
a Unionist labour committee for Flintshire. It was hoped that such an 
innovation would ‘restore trade unionism to its original ideals and free it from 
the domination of the Socialistic Party, whose last thought was to bring about a 
state of revolution or bolshevism in this country’.68A determination was also 
expressed to free the workman from the obligation of contributing to the trade 
union levy – ‘the Socialists no longer had the right to compel by force the 
feeding of the Socialistic exchequer with the levies and contributions from 
trade unionist funds’.69 By offering workingmen a different political identity it 
was hoped to gain some influence over the mass ranks of the newly 
enfranchised working classes who worked in the steelworks, coal pits and on 
the land in North-east Wales. Moreover, with many more people now 
enfranchised and Labour showing the first signs of making inroads into the 
two traditional parties hegemony in the region the Conservative leadership 
                                                 
66 Flintshire Observer, 22 October 1921. 
67 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p.120. 
68 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association Minute Book 2, Annual and Committee 
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69 Ibid. 
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realised that they had to broaden the party’s appeal if they were going to avoid 
being marginalised further. 
By March 1922 a labour committee was appointed, and at a meeting held 
in Flint, Mr. G.E.M. Walker, organising secretary of the labour wing of the 
Unionist Party commented: 
 
The movement was spreading and in North Wales the progress was rapid. 
Though they had only a short time ago started in Flintshire they had the officials 
of the North Wales Miners Federation taking very serious notice of them’.70   
 
At the annual meeting of the Flintshire Constitutional Association held in 
Shotton later the same month it was reported that the conference held in Rhyl 
had been a great success and that ‘four branches of the labour wing of the 
Unionist Party had been established and were at work’.71  
In May 1922 a labour wing of the Conservative party was formed in 
Wrexham.  Mr Walker now attended meetings in the industrial districts of 
Brymbo, Rhos and Cefn, all within a few miles of Wrexham, where it was also 
decided to form labour committees.72 At the annual meeting of the Wrexham 
Constitutional Association on 18 May 1922 it was further agreed to elect eight 
workingmen from the labour wing of the Party to serve on the Executive 
Committee,73 and on 25 May a set of rules for this new group were ratified.74   
The labour wing initially played a central role in the Association having 
members selected to sit on the Executive Committee annually, and supplying 
regular monthly reports on the committee’s progress. It was still in existence 
during 1924 when it was asked to continue supplying reports to the monthly 
meeting of the Executive.75 However, the labour committees generally failed 
to make any impact in North-east Wales. In Flintshire, despite the fanfare that 
greeted the formation of labour committees, there were still only four branches 
in existence six months later. After August 1922 no mention is made of labour 
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committees in the Association’s Minute Book and it appears that the 
organisation simply petered out.76 In Wrexham a similar story also emerges. 
No records exist that give membership numbers and the labour wing only 
featured intermittently in the party’s deliberations after October 1922. No 
reference was made to this body during 1922 and despite the evidence that 
shows it still was in existence at the end of 1924 the implementation of new 
rules for the organisation were deferred indefinitely, suggesting that it too was 
losing impetus.  
The apparent failure of labour committees reflected the difficulties that 
the party was having nationwide with the movement, which was only 
successful in a few places. Lancashire proved to be the most ardent supporter 
of Unionist labour committees collecting £5,425 for this movement between 
1918 and 1922 while only £978 was raised for ordinary purposes.77 By 
contrast Cheshire, one of the English counties adjoining Flintshire and 
Denbighshire did not have a single labour committee until 1925. In 1921 the 
Yorkshire Area Executive Committee was asked to include labour committee 
representatives, but refused to do so until it deemed that the movement had 
made progress in the county. On the other hand the Eastern Area fully 
supported the labour committees and according to Ramsden ‘urged its local 
parties to promote the interests of working men and spent a great deal on 
propaganda for that purpose’.78 Nevertheless, McCrillis argues that 
Conservative labour committees were largely unsuccessful as they failed to 
attract a large number of wage earners and existed in only a third of the 
constituencies in England and Wales, many of them with less than twenty 
members.79 He suggests that this had less to do with any policy differences and 
had more to do with class division and administration difficulties. The 
Conservative party of the 1920s relied heavily on its upper and middle class 
membership and was often unwilling to welcome working class wage-earning 
members. Conversely, workingmen were less attracted to the political 
machinations of the local Conservative Association than they were to the 
                                                 
76 FRO, Flintshire Conservative and Unionist Association, Minute Book 2, DM/302/2, Meeting 
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77 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p.253. 
78 Ibid. 
79 McCrillis, The Conservative Party and the Age of Universal Suffrage, p.110.  
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workingmen’s clubs.80 Even so, as McCrillis concludes labour committees 
‘were an important part of the Conservative response to the full 
enfranchisement of wage earners and the increased power of the working class 
after 1918…[as they] tried to attract wage earners by offering them a different 
political identity’.81 Certainly, the Conservative party in North-east Wales 
strove to make labour committees an integral part of their organisation. When 
one considers that the Wrexham and Flintshire constituencies had labour 
committees in existence three years before Cheshire, a Conservative 
stronghold, then it is a testament to Conservative party determination and 
diligence at a time when it was not even contesting parliamentary elections in 
the region. Indeed, even though there is little evidence to suggest that the 
movement had any lasting impact in the region, just by getting such 
committees formed at a time when the Conservative party had little appeal in 
the industrial working-class areas outside of Wrexham and when so few 
existed nationally was an achievement.  
The development of Conservative women’s organisations in North-east 
Wales proved to be more successful than the attempt to organise a mass labour 
movement. Initially, many Conservatives believed that women lacked the 
experience or the capacity to make sound political judgements. It was also 
feared that this political inexperience ‘would cause them to succumb to 
socialistic evangelism’, and concerns were expressed about the growth of such 
organisations as the Women’s Institute, which were seen as socialistic and 
‘feminist in their outlook’.82 It was hardly surprising therefore that ‘the 
enfranchisement of women under the Representation of People Act of 1918 
created considerable trepidation in the ranks of the Conservative Party’. 83     
Yet, a fear of independently-minded females voting Labour, spurred on 
the Conservative party into promoting itself as the bastion of feminine 
domesticity, the intention being to harness a mass movement of Conservative 
women who were adherents to the principle of home, husband and children, 
but were party members and workers. It was an appeal designed to develop 
                                                 
80 McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage, p. 111.  
81 Ibid. 
82 D. Jarvis, ‘The Shaping of Conservative Electoral Hegemony, 1918-39, in Party, State and 
Society, Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820, eds, J. Lawrence and M. Taylor (Aldershot: 
Solar Press, 1997) p 45. 
83McCrillis, The Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage, p.46. 
 219
women’s roles in politics, and in particular Conservative politics, but appease 
the significant number of male members who were opposed to women gaining 
equality with men in political matters. What emerged were the Women’s 
Unionist Organisation and a network of branches that carried out an extensive 
range of political and social activities. It also attracted a large number of 
members who gave substantial assistance to the Conservative party.84 As a 
result between 1918 and 1929 the Conservative Party created a mass 
organisation for women, the most important and successful group that helped 
create the Conservative hegemony between the wars  – by the end of the 
1920’s there were approximately one million women members.85   
In North-east Wales the Conservative Associations also actively 
encouraged women to become party members. On 14 June 1918, the Wrexham 
Unionist Association decided to allocate a place for a woman’s representative 
in the exclusively male organisation, and at a special meeting later in the 
month it was agreed that the Women’s Unionist Association would provide 
three members to sit on the General Purposes committee.86  In August 1919 
five women were also co-opted on to the powerful Finance Committee and a 
woman was elected to stand on a sub- committee, which was appointed to 
‘confer with the President in the event of emergency’.87 Finally, at the annual 
meeting of the Association in April 1921, eight women were asked to sit on 
the Executive Committee and the Women’s Association was finally formally 
invited to amalgamate with the Men’s Association, thus founding the 
Wrexham Parliamentary Constitutional Association, although an autonomous 
women’s division was retained.88 In practice this meant that there were two 
Conservative bodies in the constituency linked by an executive committee, 
which oversaw all work. This was not unusual as McCrillis notes: 
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More commonly women created separate divisional branches and sub-branches 
that paralleled the existing male division. Men and women then formed a joint 
divisional executive committee. 89      
 
Through their representation on the Executive Committee women also 
started to play a leading role in the Association – taking part in the selection of 
parliamentary candidates, including negotiations with the local Liberal party 
over the choice of Sir Robert Thomas’ successor as coalition candidate, and 
providing constituency representatives to the NWDNU. In April 1921 Mrs. 
Fitzhugh, president of the Women’s Association, joined Sir Watkin Williams-
Wynn and Edwin Hughes, Finance Committee member as representatives to 
this body. Nonetheless, men still dominated and took the leading positions in 
the Association with Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn remaining as President and 
Treasurer. In spite of this women now carried out a wide range of political 
activities including campaigning and registration work. Thus, as the period of 
Coalition Government drew to end in 1922 the barriers that had prohibited 
women from undertaking any form of political work prior to the War were 
slowly being removed.  
As in Wrexham the Flintshire Constitutional Association proposed that 
their rules be changed so that all presidents and secretaries of the Women’s 
Unionist Association could become members of the Executive Committee.90  
This was ratified at the annual meeting of the Association in February 1919, 
but a separate Women’s Unionist and Conservative Association was retained. 
By January 1921 women had seven places on the Executive Committee. 
Moreover, in February 1921 the Hon. E. Mostyn proposed that a lady be 
appointed to fill the vacant position of secretary. This in itself is interesting – 
Mostyn’s father was the Third Baron Mostyn, President of the Association, 
and thus he represented the landed elite those powerful inheritors of the male 
dominated world of land and wealth. Yet in proposing a female secretary, he 
was probably acknowledging, as other Conservatives already had, the benefit 
of female members, who proved diligent and committed workers, when given 
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the opportunity, to the Conservative party. However, according to the 
Flintshire Constitutional Association Minutes for an Executive meeting held 
on 12 February 1921: 
 
Mr. Owen and others from the Shotton area gave their views on the whole 
position. Mr. Owen did not favour the appointment of a woman secretary and 
considered her appointment would not be acceptable in his district. 91    
 
Mr. Owen’s views were endorsed by Mr. Ingham, Treasurer of the Northwich 
Unionist Association, who commented that ‘he did not favour the appointment of 
a lady secretary’.92 The proposal was subsequently lost proving that the 
association was not yet ready to accept women fully to senior posts and 
consequently all the major appointments in the organisation still went to men. 
Yet, encouraged by their new found status on the Executive Committee women 
started playing a more active role in the advancement of the Conservative cause 
and worked tirelessly in their canvassing and fundraising efforts and helped with 
the plans for a reorganisation scheme that was instituted during 1921. During the 
same year a new women’s branch was formed in Prestatyn, and the Rhyl branch 
organised whist drives and dances with the intention of raising funds for the 
Association.93 While sadly no information exists as to how successful these were 
in December 1921 women’s branches in the western part of the constituency 
decided ‘to have 1,000 copies of a circular letter printed with official heading for 
the purpose of calling meetings for the formation of new branches in the 
constituency, it being felt they would materially assist this important work’.94 
Despite their inability to become officers in the Association women were fast 
becoming an integral part of Conservative party politics as they developed a 
network of branches in the constituency to help further the Conservative cause. 
Mr. Pocklinghorne, the Association’s new Secretary noted in his annual report 
for 1921 ‘on every hand the ladies set an example to the gentlemen and have 
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been untiring in their work’.95 The work that women undertook during this 
period helped set the foundations for the success the party enjoyed in the 
constituency at the 1924 general election. 
What the evidence demonstrates is that by 1922 women Conservatives 
were starting to play an important and developing role in politics in North-east 
Wales. Not only were they continuing their useful work as fundraisers and 
canvassers, but they were also expanding their role by becoming directly 
involved in the running of Conservative Associations. The attitude of the 
Flintshire Constitutional Association was less positive towards women than the 
Wrexham Association, and in general the Conservative party in North-east Wales 
were slow to realise the potential of women. But they were not alone – fears of 
independently minded women who did not fit the Conservative profile raised 
doubts about their suitability in many quarters. In his study of the Conservative 
party in the West Midlands, for example, Jonathan Bates asserts that ‘conflicts 
between men and women were not uncommon. Following expansion women 
made up the great bulk of the associations membership and did most of the work, 
but a small elite of men… retained effective control’.96 Certainly men retained 
control of party organisation in North-east Wales, but while there was a general 
reluctance to relinquish power or elevate women to senior positions, in general 
relations remained harmonious between male and female Conservative members. 
Indeed, any fears that the associations harboured about female members soon 
dissipated when women started to prove their value to the party by outperforming 
men in their political activities and thereafter were welcomed into the 
Conservative organisation. Not only this, but in S.A Smart, the female Central 
Office Agent for North Wales, the Conservative Associations quickly realised 
that they had a tireless and determined organiser who helped keep the flame of 
Conservatism burning in Denbighshire while helping with the reorganisation 
plans the Flintshire Constitutional Association introduced in the post war   
period. 97   
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PARTY ORGANISATION, 1918-1922. 
According to McCrillis the onset of Coalition politics during the First 
World War affected ‘all political parties including the Unionist party which lost 
much of its cohesiveness and drive’.98 Party organisation suffered, membership 
dwindled, subscription levels fell as fundraising events ceased and many of the 
party activists who volunteered for military service never returned from the 
battlefields.99 This weakness of organisation continued into the peace as the 
Conservative party struggled to adjust to the nature of Coalition politics. Bates’ 
study of the party in the West Midlands argues that Conservative organisation 
during this period was ‘all but destroyed by the war but the Coalition was a 
greater influence. Activists were alienated by its inherent compromises [and] 
without activists support no appeal for new members was possible’.100  
In North-east Wales, however, the Wrexham and Flintshire Conservative 
Associations continued to operate. While the extent of party activity was less that 
that conducted in the pre-war years it was only in Denbighshire that support for 
Coalition Government seriously adversely affected Conservative party 
organisation. Nonetheless, the situation was hardly helped by the continued 
failure of the NWDNU to meet on a regular basis. According to records this body 
only meant once between 1918 and the end of 1922 and that was in early 
February 1922 when Lord Powis was elected as President, Lord Kenyon was 
elected chairman and Lord Mostyn, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, Hugh Peel, and 
P.T Davies- Cooke (Executive committee member of the Flintshire Aassociation) 
were chosen as Vice- presidents. A brief report was given of activity in each 
constituency, in particular noting the high level of party work being conducted in 
Flintshire. Nonetheless, the report of activity in Denbighshire was over optimistic 
when it claimed that a ‘number of meetings had been held and the work was 
generally progressive’.101 In reality work was limited to the Ruthin Women’s 
Association’s collection of funds - attempts to re-start a constituency association 
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failed as endeavours to draw together under a single body the work being done 
by individual Conservative groups in Denbighshire came to nothing.            
After 1916 the West Denbighshire Conservative Association had folded, 
moth-balled for the duration of Coalition. Matters were further exacerbated when 
boundary changes were enforced under the Representation of the People Act and 
the Boroughs of Denbigh and Ruthin were amalgamated with West Denbighshire 
to form the new Denbighshire constituency. Even so, it was coalition politics that 
was blamed for the lack of Conservative activity in the new division.  E.J 
Swayne, a member of the Denbigh Boroughs Conservative Association 
Executive Committee referred to the ‘apathy which had of recent years pervaded 
the Unionist party due to the fact that the Boroughs had lost its direct 
representative in parliament and also the absence of party warfare due to their 
part in the Coalition’.102 However, Conservatism did not completely die in the 
constituency for between 1918 and 1922 the party flame was kept alight by a 
well organised network of Conservative clubs, especially those at Denbigh, 
Colwyn Bay and Ruthin. The most active of these clubs was the Conservative 
club at Colwyn Bay. The club held political debates during its annual meetings. 
Fears that a snap election could arise quite suddenly while the party was 
unprepared fuelled these debates, and with an eye on the future the club urged its 
membership to keep the electoral register up to date. William Horton, the club’s 
chairman, declared at a club meeting in July 1920 that ‘at the moment the 
Coalition Government was necessary to quell disorders at home and to secure 
peace. But…it was very desirable that the register should be kept up to date as 
the political prophets were of opinion that a general election might take place in 
the early spring’.103  
The Denbigh Constitutional club also held regular meetings throughout 
the period of Coalition Government. At the club’s annual meeting in March 1920 
the hope was expressed that political activities would be resumed and that 
members would remember that the aim of the club was political and not merely 
social.104 However, little or no political work was undertaken and at a further 
meeting of the club held in January 1921 members were ‘encouraged to do 
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propaganda work and assert the principles of Unionsism’.105 This again came to 
nothing as club members displayed no inclination to become involved in political 
work. But a final attempt was made in March 1921 to resurrect Conservative 
party organisation in Denbighshire. The Denbighshire Free Press reported that: 
 
At a meeting held at the Constitutional Clubroom, Denbigh for the 
reconstruction of the Borough and District Association steps were taken with 
that object and the holding of suitable public meetings for propaganda purposes. 
Miss S.A. Smart, the Central Office Agent for North Wales addressed the 
members and was supported by Sam Thompson the West Denbighshire 
Secretary and organiser. 106 
 
Unfortunately for Smart and Thompson the attempt once more proved futile as 
apathy overtook party members in the constituency and no further public 
meetings were held until the general election was called in October 1922. Then 
with the organisation still dormant hurried efforts were made to bring the 
organisation into working order.  
  Finally the Conservative party in Denbighshire was also kept alive by the 
activities of the Primrose League in Abergele and Colwyn Bay. Every other 
Habitation in North-east Wales closed in 1914 and failed to re-open after the 
end of hostilities in November 1918. Yet, both the Colwyn Bay and Abergele 
Habitations remained active during the First World War. In 1915 the Abergele 
Habitation achieved its highest membership figure of over 360 since its 
inception and still boasted a membership of 255 when it finally closed in 1920. 
As War broke the Colwyn Bay Habitation had 592 members and still had over 
400 members in 1920. This suggested that there was still the appetite for 
Conservative party politics in the Denbighshire constituency, and in October 
1919 the League held a function at Bryn Dinarth, the home of William Horton. 
The North Wales Pioneer reported that ‘there was a large attendance’ who 
listened to political speeches by Horton and Gwendolyn Brodrick, the Dame 
President, and enjoyed tea and the music of the Colwyn Bay Pavillion 
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Orchestra.107 Despite such functions and the attempts to rekindle political 
activity in Denbighshire the Conservative party’s existence remained limited 
to irregular social functions, club meetings and Primrose League gatherings.    
Enmity between Liberals and Conservatives in Flintshire fostered by 
the Liberal party’s support for the Labour programme at the 1919 county 
council elections continued throughout the period of Coalition. In November 
1919 a Liberal Association meeting discussed the ‘embarrassment’ felt by 
Liberals throughout the constituency with regards to their electoral agreement 
with the Conservatives and declared that ‘the coalition form of government 
was most unsatisfactory’.108 Unhappy with Coalition Government and an 
alliance with the Conservatives whom they felt they had nothing in common 
with, and led by Liberals with strong radical credentials, the local Liberal 
Association hankered after a united party which would cut all connections with 
the Conservative party. According to the Liberal Association’s Secretary, 
Thomas Waterhouse, the party’s ‘whips were not doing anything to promote 
the bringing together of Mr Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith.’109   In reality the 
two factions of the party were never going to reunite and in May 1920 the spilt 
between Coalition and Independent Liberals was finalised when amidst charge 
and counter charge the Coalition Liberals withdrew from the National Liberal 
Federation Conference at Leamington.110 Yet many in the Flintshire Liberal 
Association yearned for a return to a radical progressive agenda and although 
they continued to support their Coalition Liberal MP, Thomas Parry, they 
retained an antipathy towards the local Conservative party which they refused 
to work with.  
On the other hand the Constitutional Association was more than willing 
to work with the Liberal Association and attempts were made to share 
expenses and revision work in the division courts with their Liberal 
counterparts.111 These approaches were ignored and when accompanied by the 
Liberal party’s county council election agreement with Labour concerns grew 
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in the Constitutional Association as to the Liberal Party’s intentions. Fearing a 
permanent split with their coalition partners as the Liberal Association 
apparently moved closer to the local Labour party the members of the 
Constitutional Association’s Executive Committee decided to contact Thomas 
Parry and ascertain his position towards Coalition Government.112   From April 
1920 the Association made regular contact, including face-to-face meetings, to 
seek confirmation that he still supported the Coalition Government. As late as 
March 1922 Parry confirmed that he was a staunch supporter of Lloyd George 
and the policy of the Government and agreed to make such a declaration to the 
Association’s annual meeting.113 This went some way to allaying Conservative 
fears about co-operating with the Liberal party at future general elections.114 
Such was the goodwill expressed on both sides that the Constitutional 
Association even attempted to secure support from Parry after the Coalition 
Government had collapsed at the end of October 1922.  
The antipathy that existed between the Constitutional and Liberal 
Associations in Flintshire had long-term benefits for the Conservative party as 
it encouraged them ‘to make greater provision for their own future’.115 After 
the War the Association’s finances were slow to recover, undoubtedly affected 
by the parliamentary electoral agreements between the Liberals and 
Conservatives and the apparent lack of partisan politics in the division, despite 
the contested seats at the county council elections. In June 1919 a special 
appeal for subscriptions was launched and in April 1920 the Treasurer 
announced that over £176 had been collected. Nevertheless, just six months 
later he reported to the Executive committee that unless regular subscriptions 
were forthcoming it would be impossible for the Association to continue.116 
This was reaffirmed in January 1921 when the Secretary’s Report for 1920 
commented on the damaging effect Coalition Government was having on the 
Association’s finances adding that:             
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When approaching several gentlemen who are supposed to be staunch 
constitutionalists for subscriptions I have been met with the following question - 
What is your party’s policy, when you have got a policy to place before us we 
shall be pleased to subscribe to your funds? So my Lords, ladies and gentlemen 
you will see how difficult it is for me as secretary to get people to subscribe.117 
 
When the poor state of finances was matched by a similar decay in the party 
machine, the Secretary noting in 1919 that constituency organisations in Mold, 
Holywell and Flint were all very apathetic, a committee was appointed in 
January 1921 to discuss the future of the Association. In April 1921 it reported 
back and made a number of recommendations that when acted upon finally 
secured the future of the Association. Firstly, the services of a full – time agent 
were dispensed with. Secondly, it was decided to form two divisions within the 
Association, - the Eastern and Western divisions – each with a sub-committee 
and chairman. Each sub-committee was made responsible for a number of 
local parish associations in their division. The Eastern division initially 
consisted of parish associations at Hawarden, Hope, Mold, Northop, and Flint 
and the Western of parish associations at Prestatyn, Rhuddlan, Holywell and 
Caerwys.118  Each division also appointed a part–time agent whose role was 
now clearly defined. The agent was to pay personal visits to each parish 
association and form new ones where possible, organise meetings, collect 
subscriptions and attend to registration work. He or she was also to keep a 
diary and report fortnightly to the Divisional chairman who in turn was 
expected to report to the constituency Association’s Executive Committee. 
Such was the success of the new organisation scheme that the Secretary’s 
Report for 1921 noted: 
 
The new divisional scheme adopted has been fully justified. Today we have a 
real live organisation. The county is being well organised …local committees 
have been formed in many parts of the county… Our hope is to establish in 
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every parish a working local committee. Although we have really only been 
working for six months out of the twelve we have seen good results… The 
future is bright and hopeful.119  
  
In contrast to the antipathy between the two parties in Flintshire, Liberals 
and Conservatives maintained cordial relations in the Wrexham division. 
These had been formed and fostered during the 1918 general election when 
leaders from both local parties had appeared on Sir Robert Thomas’ campaign 
platform to ensure a united front. Furthermore, the Wrexham Liberal 
Association was led by Edward Hughes, a close ally of and sympathetic to 
Lloyd George’s aims, who was thus far more accommodating with the local 
Conservatives. At the same time both parties retained a common interest, 
unlike the progressive Liberals in Flintshire, in defeating and keeping out 
Labour in the constituency. This extended to agreements over the choice of 
parliamentary candidates. During 1921 the Coalition Liberal MP, Sir Robert 
Thomas, announced that he would not be seeking re-election in the 
constituency. The Wrexham Constitutional Association suggested several 
names from their own ranks as a possible Coalition candidate and a deputation, 
which included Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon, was instructed 
to liase with local Liberal leaders.120  Consequently, a joint meeting was held 
with Liberal Association delegates on 15 November 1921.121 After lengthy 
discussions between the two parties it was decided to ask Evan R. Davies a 
Liberal to address the meeting. The lure of Davies was strong for both parties. 
Davies had a long association with Lloyd George, having assisted him in his 
election bids in Caernarfon Boroughs, becoming one of his closest advisers. 
After the War Lloyd George asked him to become his political secretary, the 
position he held while seeking selection in Wrexham.  To Edward Hughes, 
Davies’ appeal was obvious, but to the local Conservative leadership to have 
someone in close contact with the Prime Minister also appeared to be of 
enormous benefit, especially as it was believed that Lloyd George and the 
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Coalition Government represented the best defence against the Labour party 
and socialism.122 After addressing the meeting Davies was duly unanimously 
selected by both parties as parliamentary candidate.  
However, such support for the Coalition Liberals had a negative impact 
on the Conservative party’s campaigning in the division. Between 1918 and 
1921 little political activity took place as the Association also attempted to 
address its financial difficulties. With a deficit of £57 at the bank reported in 
April 1921 remedial measures were approved. This included an appeal for 
subscriptions, with Sir Watkin-Williams Wynn writing to the chairmen of each 
polling district asking for a list of names of people likely to subscribe. In 
addition the Secretary was instructed to arrange for social events to take place 
in the polling districts, the proceeds from which were to go to the central 
fund.123 Nevertheless, by May 1922 the Association was still heavily in debt, 
the appeal for subscriptions failing to attract sufficient funds, and even more 
drastic cost cutting exercises were implemented. The Association’s 
investments were sold off, the Secretary’s salary was reduced to £25 and social 
functions, always very popular in the Wrexham area, continued in an attempt 
to bring in more money.124  By the end of 1922 the deficit was reduced to a 
manageable level of £19. 
The party also used the immediate post-war period to reorganise its ranks. 
A new structure was established which involved devolving power, similar to 
the process adopted in Flintshire, as section chairmen were chosen to preside 
over four new divisions – simply known as Sections A, B, C and D. Each new 
section contained local branch associations from four geographical areas: A 
Section consisted of seven local branches south of Wrexham, Section B seven 
branches to the west of the town, Section C six branches north and east of 
Wrexham and section D included the borough of Wrexham and Stansty. From 
each of these four divisions a number of representatives were chosen to form 
an Association Executive Committee, which also included Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn (Chairman and Treasurer) and Lord Kenyon (Vice-President) 
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where all major decisions were taken. What emerged was a new more 
democratic organisation, which devolved power from the centre of the 
organisation, but ultimate control was still retained Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn 
and Lord Kenyon. 
 The evidence suggests that the Coalition alliance with the Liberals had 
beneficial effects in some areas but damaging consequences in others. In 
Denbighshire the support for Coalition Government and the loss of its 
Boroughs MP caused by the redistribution of seats in 1918 only bred apathy – 
attempts to revive Conservative organisation in the division failing to get off 
the ground. In Wrexham the period of Coalition allowed the local 
Conservative Association to regroup, address its financial difficulties and 
reorganise its Association. Nonetheless, it too suffered from apathy as little 
party activity was undertaken between 1918 and 1921. By contrast the 
antipathy that was felt by local Liberals towards Conservatives in Flintshire 
helped galvanise the Constitutional Association as it completely overhauled its 
organisation and addressed its financial shortcomings. By the time the general 
election arrived in October 1922 it was tending to registration work, collecting 
subscriptions and holding political meetings. 
 The apathy experienced in certain parts of North-east Wales, mirrored the 
experience of Conservative Associations in other parts of the country. As a 
result of war and the period of Coalition which resulted, uncertainty as to the 
party’s future was created amongst activists. This had a knock-on effect on the 
collection of subscriptions. As Ramsden points out ‘the mood of party activists 
did not make possible great advances in fund raising’.125 Yet more than ever 
resources were needed to pay for the increased cots incurred by associations as 
result of the extended franchise. In particular agents, needed office space with 
its attendant utility costs, clerical equipment and transport to visit all parts of 
the constituency.  Ramsden asserts that ‘administrative costs amounted to 
about four fifths of the local parties outgoings’.126 This probably explains why 
in Flintshire Lord Mostyn, still the major contributor to the Constitutional 
Association’s funds, agreed to dispense with a full time agent, costing in 
excess of £200, and replace him with two part- time agents at £50 per annum 
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each.127   In addition extra finance was needed to pay for propaganda, which 
replaced registration work in importance now that so many people were 
enfranchised. Notwithstanding these new costs Bates asserts that ‘with normal 
activities suspended, many associations were able to cut expenditure to an 
absolute minimum and so despite falling subscriptions build up substantial 
reserves’.128 By contrast, in North-east Wales with the Flintshire and Wrexham 
Associations already in debt prior to the War, and funds required to implement 
new schemes and re-organisation this proved impossible. In their case the 
draconian measures taken were merely to ensure survival.  
 
PARTY ORGANISATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF COALITION, 1918-
1922.  
When it came to the Coalition government and Lloyd George’s leadership 
the Conservative Associations in North-east Wales generally remained 
supportive throughout the period 1918-1922. In 1918 most in the Conservative 
party accepted that an alliance with Lloyd George was indispensable. As 
Green asserts his popularity was seen as a vital component in ‘combating 
Labour’s appeal to a mass electorate’.129 Even the attempt to fuse the 
Conservative and Liberal parties during 1919 and 1920 brought acceptance 
from the Conservative leadership; Bonar Law agreeing after much persuading 
to submerge the Conservatives in an anti-socialist centrist party with Lloyd 
George.130 Less certain was support from Conservative grass roots for such a 
move. When the National Union of Conservative Associations met at 
Birmingham in June 1920 a delegate from Shrewsbury called for ‘a more 
rigorous assertion of Unionist principles within the Coalition’.131 However, 
criticism against the Coalition amongst the associations gathered was at this 
stage muted – the powerful pro-Coalition associations from Lancashire and 
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Birmingham swamping any more negative comments – and in North-east 
Wales the idea of fusion brought no comment at all.132  
In Denbighshire this was perhaps unsurprising given the state of decay of 
party organisation, but in Wrexham and Flintshire it may simply have been 
that the Conservatives were quite happy for fusion to go ahead without 
commenting on the subject. In Wrexham, it is possible that such  trust had 
been placed in Lloyd George’s leadership and the constituency’s Liberal 
candidate, as was witnessed in Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn’s and Lord 
Kenyon’s support prior to and during the 1918 general election campaign, that 
the Conservative leadership were happy for a long term arrangement with 
Coalition Liberals to take place. As it later transpired at a selection meeting for 
the 1922 general election campaign Conservative members voted against the 
leadership and refused to endorse a Liberal as suggested, but in 1920 Sir 
Watkin Williams-Wynn’s power was omnipotent and remained so in 
November 1921 when Evan R. Davies, Liberal, was unanimously given the 
support of the Conservative Association when selected to fight the Wrexham 
constituency. Even at this stage, when anti–coalitionist sentiments were 
growing elsewhere Wrexham appeared solidly pro-coalition and thus it is not 
too much of a leap of the imagination to suggest that the local leadership may 
have approved of inter-party fusion.  On the other hand, it would seem 
unlikely that Conservatives in Flintshire would support fusion given the 
antipathy that existed between them and local Liberals. Yet, the Constitutional 
Association fully supported Thomas Parry their local Coalition Liberal MP and 
saw him as a bulwark against the more progressive tendencies of the local 
Liberal Association. The Constitutional Association may well have supported 
a fusion of Conservative and Liberal parties especially if this meant an exodus 
of pro-Labour activists in the local Liberal Association and a consensus based 
on anti- socialist policies.  
Elsewhere in the country there was unease amongst grass roots 
Conservatives and aversion to Coalition Government grew and festered as 
fears surfaced that the government was failing to provide a bulwark against 
socialism – its wasteful expenditure on social reform that made excessive 
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demands on the tax payer indicative of its own socialistic tendencies. As a 
result movements like the Anti-Waste League started to gain support amongst 
Conservatives with many party members even joining its ranks. 133 With anti-
waste measures proving extremely popular amongst the Conservative 
Constituency associations, their rank and file the middle class taxpayers who 
resented such Government waste, pressure was brought to bear on Coalition 
Tory MPs to embrace the anti-Coalition and retrenchment sentiments 
expressed by the Anti-Waste lobby.  
The accommodation of anti-waste sentiments by the Conservative 
Constituency associations had serious consequences for the Government. As 
the revolt of the middle class taxpayers gathered momentum concerns over the 
spread of socialism fuelled Tory discontent and recriminations caused by 
events in Ireland spread constituency unrest.134 William Bridgeman, the MP 
for Oswestry, experiencing hostility from his own Constituency Association, 
led by the Third Baron Harlech, warned party leaders in February 1922 of the 
unrest in the constituencies. When the Coalition Government finally fell as a 
result of the Carlton Club revolt in October 1922 Bridgeman noted, ‘one thing 
is for certain about the crisis is that it certainly was not the result of a Carlton 
Club plot, but came up from below with great force from the 
constituencies’.135   
By contrast such constituency rebellion had little effect on the North-east 
Wales Conservatives. The Anti-Waste League made little impact – a county 
councillor standing on an Anti-Waste programme won Broncoed in Flintshire 
at the county council election in 1922 – otherwise the movement was largely 
ignored. It was not that the Constituency associations were insensitive to or 
ignorant of national political developments – attempts to establish labour 
committees proved that – but without Conservative MPs to support they could 
not directly influence events at Westminster, and therefore there was little 
point in agitating for economy.  
The lack of candidates in the region also goes some way to explaining 
why the local Conservative Associations in North-east Wales failed to respond 
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to major political events during the last months of Coalition Government in 
1922. In particular the election scare in January, the Honours Scandal in June, 
which seemed to confirm what many Conservatives believed that Lloyd 
George was a morally bankrupt leader, and the Chanak Crisis in the Autumn 
all failed to trigger much comment from the Conservative Associations in 
North-east Wales. Only one major issue drew any attention from the 
associations in the region, and that was the situation in Ireland and even this 
was reserved for questions to a prospective parliamentary candidate in 
Wrexham.  
As the signing of an Anglo-Irish treaty neared in the Autumn of 1921, 
Evan R. Davies, the new Coalition Liberal parliamentary candidate for the 
Wrexham division, reassured the Constitutional Association that he was in 
total agreement with the Conservative party’s leadership and Coalition 
Government’s policy on Ireland. This included assurances about the limits of 
concessions to be given in any negotiations and a promise that Ulster would 
not be coerced. Many Conservatives regarded an Anglo-Irish treaty as a 
betrayal of the Union, the Southern Irish Unionists and surrender to 
terrorism.136 Yet Evan R. Davies words appeased the Wrexham Constitutional 
Association, helped ensure continued support for the coalition in the 
constituency, and his own selection as a coalition candidate. 
With the signing of the Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921 there appeared 
to be an opportunity for the Coalition Government to call an election to exploit 
the treaty’s successful conclusion. During December rumours were rife that 
this was going to happen, but Sir George Younger, party Chairman, warned 
Austen Chamberlain that if the government decided to call an election the 
majority of Conservatives would not support it. Younger was careful at this 
stage not to suggest that the Coalition should end, but a letter sent by him to 
constituency chairmen on 9 January 1922, outlining government’s plans drew 
an angry response as MPs, party chairmen, and agents all claimed that an 
election would take the Conservative party’s independence away.137 Younger’s 
initiative drew a response from the NWDNU at its meeting on 9 February 
1922. Alfred Hood, former candidate in East Denbighshire and member of the 
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Wrexham Constitutional Association Finance Committee, commented that he 
did not consider Conservative party independence as a factor in any future 
general election, and that the work of the coalition should continue, so that 
trade in the country could improve: 
 
He considered the whole situation in the country serious and apart from political 
tactics he could not see why a general election should take place in the near 
future. The coalition government had got two years to run. A general election 
would disturb the possibility of some slight improvement in trade and not tend 
to reduce taxation.138  
 
His words matched the sentiments held by his constituency Association President 
and Vice-President, Sir Watkin Williams–Wynn and Lord Kenyon, who believed 
that coalition should continue, especially given the threat from Labour in the 
constituency. Yet they were at odds with the aims of Sir George Younger and 
most Conservatives, especially grass roots activists, who wished, despite any 
comments to the contrary, to reassert party independence, and thus avoid an 
election under the umbrella of coalition. 
Apart from this there was little comment from North-east Wales on the 
burning issues of the day. Without candidates to campaign for or support the 
meetings that were held by the Conservative Associations concentrated more on 
reorganisation, the election of officers, the integration of women and 
workingmen, and struggling finances. This was understandable as with no 
candidate it made sense to concentrate on internal affairs. Furthermore the party 
leaders in North-east Wales were favourable towards and still clung to coalition, 
and in particular Lloyd George, as a means of combating socialism. In particular 
the Conservative leadership in Wrexham believed that a withdrawal of support 
for the Liberals would split the anti-socialist vote and let Labour in. 
There were also sound strategic reasons for continuing support of Lloyd 
George. Whenever the Conservatives had employed an anti-Lloyd George stance 
at pre-war elections, they had, with the exception of Denbigh Boroughs, been 
soundly beaten. Lloyd George was and remained a powerful political ally in 
North Wales and while his grip was slipping nationally he still retained much 
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support in his political heartlands. Realising that Lloyd George had presided over 
a government that reimbursed the Welsh Church, given significant concessions 
on Protection and was key to gaining support from his political allies (for 
example Thomas Parry in Flintshire and Edward Hughes leader of the Wrexham 
Liberals) in the war against socialism it made sense to cling to his lapels.   
Finally, Conservative leaders such as Lord Mostyn and Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn had significant coal mining interests in North Wales. When the 
government refused to take mines into public ownership as recommended by the 
Sankey Commission in August 1920 these leading Tory landowners in Wales 
were able to hang on to their lucrative mining interests.  Thus they did well out 
of Lloyd George’s Coalition Government and were unlikely to see the Prime 
Minister as anything else but a bulwark against the socialistic tendencies of 
Labour who had promised to nationalise the mines. It is unlikely therefore that 
they would be over critical of Lloyd George and probably explains why they 
made no comment on controversial issues that engulfed him such as the Honours 
Scandal. Even after the Chanak Crisis developed and Britain stood on the brink 
of war once more local Conservatives still took the Austen Chamberlain line that 
support for Coalition Government was needed to combat socialism.       
In conclusion, the Constituency associations supported Coalition 
Government and probably would have been contented if it had extended its 
lifetime. The one factor that superseded all else and bound the Conservatives to 
the Liberal party was their distaste for Labour and its connections to socialism 
which threatened the livelihoods of several leading landowners in North-east 
Wales. In spite of what was happening nationally the Wrexham Association still 
saw their partnership with the Coalition Liberals as paramount in marginalizing 
the Labour party and avoiding the spread of socialism in the constituency. Even 
in Flintshire where relations were poor between the two Coalition parties the 
Constitutional Association repeatedly sought confirmation from their MP that he 
supported Coalition Government and thus acted as a buttress against the 
socialistic tendencies of the Liberal Association. This apparent socialistic 
tendency once more influenced Liberals in Flintshire to seek accommodation 
with the Labour party at the 1922 county council elections. 
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COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1922. 
The 1922 County Council elections were the last contested under the rule 
of Coalition Government.  As with the 1919 elections the Liberals in Flintshire 
were diametrically opposed to any form of an alliance with the Conservatives. At 
a Flintshire Constitutional Association Executive Committee meeting held in 
January 1922 the secretary reported  ‘Mr Gomer- Owen, County Liberal Agent 
stated that there was no working arrangement by which the Liberal Association 
would cooperate with the Unionists at local elections and that the Coalition 
compact only operated with regard to parliamentary matters’.139 Once more this 
triggered fears of a pact between the Liberals and the Labour party, which was 
subsequently confirmed at a meeting held between the two parties in Flint shortly 
before the elections. A letter sent to the Mold and Buckley Labour council from 
the secretary of the Buckley Liberal Association verified the election 
arrangement between the two parties: 
 
As you are aware an agreement has been made between Liberal and Labour 
leaders in this county to this effect that where Liberals hold the seats at present 
you have pledged yourselves to assist them and on the other hand where Labour 
hold the seats Liberals have pledged themselves to support you. 140 
 
Such comments drew an angry response from the Conservatives who now 
instead of seeking an election agreement with the Liberals decided to 
concentrate their efforts on winning more seats on the county council. At a 
meeting of the Constitutional Association’s Executive Committee it was 
agreed to ‘concentrate efforts on the capture of seats on the County 
Council…and that no bargain should be made with the other side’.141  
Political programmes were once more set aside as the enmity between the 
Liberal and Labour parties and Conservatives overrode everything else. The 
letter sent by the Buckley Liberal Association to the local Labour party 
reflected the Liberal party’s ambitions in Flintshire: ‘let us stand shoulder to 
shoulder our unity is our strength. Help us to keep the flag flying and together 
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we could inflict a crushing defeat upon the Conservative forces from which 
they will never recover’.142 Responding to such comments the Constitutional 
Association, accused their opponents of behaving dishonourably and ‘that 
where possible every Labour man be opposed’.143 The Liberal/Labour party 
pact affected 16 seats, but the Conservatives performed well keeping the same 
number of councillors returned at the 1919 elections. They only suffered two 
losses to the Liberals, made three gains off Labour and won the new wards of 
Shotton (Hawarden) and Prestatyn. Labour had eight councillors returned but 
lost seats to an Independent at Golftyn and to the Liberals at Hawarden, Rhyl 
West and Bagillt West where there was a three way party contest. Indeed, the 
Liberals performed well given the national political climate and the general 
falling popularity of the government as seventeen of their candidates were 
returned.  
What the Flintshire county council elections proved was that the 
Conservatives could still win in diverse areas and that they were able to limit 
the impact of the Liberal/ Labour pact. Not only did they hold on to their seats 
in such rural Flintshire Maelor strongholds as Bangor–is-y-Coed, Hanmer and 
Overton but they also won seats in the working class industrial areas close to 
the Dee estuary at Ewloe, Shotton, Sealand and Queensferry. They also won 
seats in the prosperous urban areas of Prestatyn and Rhyl East. Even though 
the results did not match the heady pre-war days when the Conservative Party 
controlled the council it was still an outstanding success in the era of three way 
party politics. Furthermore, the county council elections had helped galvanise 
the Conservatives and put the party back on a campaign footing which in turn 
spurred them into making improvements in organisation. Thus the attempts by 
the Liberals and the Labour party to destabilise and marginalize the 
Conservative party in Flintshire only succeeded in energising it demonstrating 
that it remained a significant force in the county.     
In total contrast the county council elections in Denbighshire were a 
tepid affair where once again the Coalition election agreement between 
Conservatives and Liberals dominated the proceedings. Conservatives stood as 
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Coalition Unionists, all the retiring county council members, barring one, 
sought re-election and only eight contests took place to which no party was 
ascribed the victor or vanquished. In the largest urban conurbation in the 
county, Wrexham, not a single contest took place and the Denbighshire Free 
Press gloomily reported that ‘party politics did not appear to be a factor and on 
the whole the contests passed off peacefully’.144 
The 1922 county council elections reflected the different ways the local 
political parties in North-east Wales responded to Coalition Government and 
each other. In Flintshire, while the Constitution Association supported the 
Coalition Government the Liberal Association largely did not and large cracks 
appeared in the local alliance almost immediately the War had ended and the 
council elections only served to exacerbate the strained relationship between 
the local Conservative and Liberal parties. The situation was hardly helped by 
the county council election pact between Liberals and Labour, which led to so 
much animosity between Liberal and Conservative Associations. By contrast 
the elections in Denbighshire reflected the torpor the Denbigh division 
Conservative Association had fallen into. Here support for Coalition 
Government bred apathy and indifference amongst Conservatives who showed 
no inclination, especially at local elections, to be involved in partisan politics. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 Nationally the period of Coalition Government marked a difficult time for 
the Conservative party. Initially seen as an indispensable bulwark against 
socialism and as a necessary alliance to complete the difficult task of 
reconstruction, resentment against the Coalition Government soon started to 
pervade Conservative ranks. Appalled by the high levels of taxation and 
disaffected by the government’s apparent failure to prevent the spread of 
socialism the resentment became a full-scale rebellion against the Coalition led 
by the Conservative Constituency Associations. This rebellion resulted in the 
defeat of the Coalition Conservative leadership at the Carlton club in October 
1922 and the end of seven years of political alliances. By contrast in North-
east Wales the Conservative Associations remained largely supportive of the 
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coalition throughout its lifetime. This support, however, created its own 
difficulties for the Conservative party in the region. Unlike most regions in 
Britain the local parties did not even have the benefit of a Conservative 
coalition candidate to support or nurture and the Liberal party maintained the 
upper hand in negotiations that took place between the two parties, as was 
witnessed by the selection of Evan R. Davies as Coalition Liberal candidate in 
Wrexham during 1922. It was hardly surprising therefore when, with the 
reason for their existence, the selection and support of candidates, was 
removed from them that Conservative organisation started to decline in the 
region. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the post-war period marked a 
collapse of the Conservative party in North-east Wales. Although the party lay 
dormant in Denbighshire it was not dead as the activities of the Primrose 
League and the Constitutional Clubs proved; indeed it quickly revived itself 
when an election was called in October 1922. In Wrexham the party enjoyed 
good relations with the local Liberal party, but it still took advantage of the 
situation to reorganise itself and integrate and extend its female membership. 
In Flintshire the Conservative party actually benefited from the period of 
coalition and the hostility shown it by the local Liberal Association. 
Unhindered by Coalition agreements which hampered Conservative 
Associations elsewhere, the party overhauled its divisional structure and made 
plans for its future. The bitter opposition displayed by Liberals and Labour 
party members towards them only galvanised the Conservative forces in the 
county. As result when the Coalition Government fell the Conservative party 
Association was ready for an election. Nevertheless, Aubel has commented:  
 
The electoral boundary changes of 1917-18, together with the extension of the 
franchise, largely confirmed the seemingly permanent relegation of Welsh 
Conservatism into a minority political cause during the inter-war years.145  
 
This was only partly true in North-east Wales. In Denbighshire there were 
organisational problems, but even here there was a determination to keep 
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Conservative politics alive. In Wrexham and especially in Flintshire the party 
was revitalising itself after along period of inactivity brought about by War 
and was laying plans for its long-term future. As ever what the period between 
1918 and 1922 proved, despite differing fortunes in various parts of the region, 
was that the Conservative party remained a resolute and embedded force and 
given the right set of circumstances could still flourish.  
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CHAPTER 6. 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN NORTH EAST WALES, 1922-1924. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 In October 1922 the Conservative party led by Bonar Law emerged 
from seven years of political coalitions to form a government in its own right 
for the first time since 1905. The wisdom of its decision to end its participation 
in coalition was subsequently confirmed by the general election that 
established its status as the dominant party in British politics. The 
Conservatives won 344 seats with their nearest challenger the Labour party 
gaining 142. For both factions of the Liberal party the election was a disaster, 
with Asquith’s Liberals winning 62 seats and Lloyd George’s faction securing 
just 53 seats from the 144 constituencies it contested. The Conservative 
majority over all other parties was 73.1 The decisive election victory appeared 
to give Bonar Law and his party an opportunity to govern unfettered for a full 
term of five years. However, as early as March 1923 the government was 
rocked by several by-election defeats, including Mitcham where Griffith-
Boscawen, the Minister of Health, was defeated and in May 1923 Bonar Law 
was forced to resign when ill health once more overtook him. With Austen 
Chamberlain still estranged from the cabinet two contenders were left to vie 
for the premiership – Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary and acting Prime 
Minister and Stanley Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. With Bonar 
Law refusing to offer advice, the decision to choose a new Prime Minister 
became a complicated one, but the King finally chose Baldwin – fearing that 
appointing Curzon, a member of the House of Lords, would lead to damaging 
constitutional and political complications. 2  
There were a number of concerns that immediately faced Baldwin. With 
unemployment rising, it was feared that the Labour party would make a 
‘permanent and decisive advance among working class voters’ unless the 
government adopted a new constructive economic policy.3 Moreover, criticism 
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was mounting from Conservative backbenchers and the press about the way 
the government was running the country.4 Consequently Baldwin decided to 
go to the country adopting a Tariff Reform programme in a bid to cement the 
government’s position and widen its appeal.  
The December 1923 election proved a disaster for the Conservative party. 
By electing to go to the country on Tariff Reform Baldwin helped reunite the 
two Liberal party factions. The large Conservative majority gained in 1922 
was wiped out as the party won 258 seats and lost 88 MPs. Labour 
strengthened its position by claiming 191 constituencies and the reunification 
of the Liberal party was marked by the return of 158 MPs. With no party 
achieving an overall majority, a hung parliament resulted. To squander such a 
large Conservative majority within a year of taking power raised concerns 
about Baldwin’s leadership skills. William Bridgeman, Home Secretary, was 
amazed with Baldwin’s decision to go to the country on Tariff Reform while 
Lord Curzon called the decision ‘idiotic’ and Philip Snowden (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in Labour’s first two governments) viewed the Conservative 
election disaster as ‘suicide during a fit of temporary insanity’.5 Since then 
historians have entered into the fray including Cook, Morgan and Pugh who 
believe that Baldwin’s ill fated decision to call an early general election was 
based on a precept that Protection would restore party unity, separate Austen 
Chamberlain from Lloyd George and return coalitionist Conservatives to the 
fold.6 This is a belief reinforced by Nick Smart who asserts that in ultimately 
achieving party unity through the adoption of Tariff Reform Baldwin proved 
himself a skilled tactician. Such a notion is dismissed as ‘highly implausible’ 
and ‘without foundation in contemporary evidence’ by Robert Self.7 He further 
asserts that Baldwin’s decision to call an election was ultimately based on the 
‘spectre of a fourth winter of unemployment and its implications both 
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electorally, and in the broader context of Conservative rhetoric since 1922 
which impelled Baldwin to adopt tariff reform’.8 It is hard to disagree with 
Self’s assessment – surely if Baldwin was such a skilled politician he would 
have been aware of the ability of Tariff Reform to unite Liberals in opposition 
and that a possible outcome might have been a Labour administration, a result, 
Tory activists surely wanted to avoid at all costs. Indeed, there is evidence 
from Wrexham to suggest that Conservative unity was not uppermost in the 
party’s leaders minds. Here, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn was willing to risk 
party unity and even jettison support for Tariff Reform to join with Liberals in 
selecting a mutually acceptable candidate to prevent Labour from being re-
elected.    
Nevertheless, the election result did have long term benefits for the 
Conservative party. All thoughts of a new Conservative and Liberal coalition 
were banished when on 18 December 1923 Liberal leaders announced that 
they intended to vote against the Conservative government thus precipitating a 
Labour government.9 To this end on 17 January 1924 over 130 Liberal MPs 
voted for a Labour amendment to the Address, precipitating the first Labour 
Government.10 The Liberals’ decision to vote the government out of office and 
install Labour, however, was the flash point for facilitating a full reunion of 
the Chamberlainite faction with the Conservative party and shattering their 
dreams of a new coalition. Furthermore, while many questioned his judgement 
the Conservative Protectionists saw Baldwin as a hero who had fought their 
cause in vain while his decision to submit Tariff Reform to the people earned 
him a public reputation as a forthright and honest leader. Thus, despite the 
debacle of the election result, Stanley Baldwin survived, perhaps rather 
fortuitously, his position strengthened, as he led, for the time being, a united 
Conservative party. 
  Fortunately for the Conservative party it did not have too long to wait in 
opposition. During 1924 unemployment continued to rise undermining 
Labour’s position as the party of the working class. In August 1924 the 
government’s decision to negotiate treaties with Bolshevik Russia, including 
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the possibility of a future loan to the Communist state, was roundly 
condemned by Liberals and Conservatives, and in October 1924 their position 
worsened when the Campbell case surfaced – an accusation that the 
government had from political motives withdrawn a prosecution against the 
Communist editor of the Worker’s Weekly.11 This presented Baldwin with the 
opportunity of removing the Labour government with a motion of censure, but 
it was a Liberal amendment that forced a Commons vote and brought the 
government down. Instead of seeking a compromise solution Ramsay 
Macdonald insisted on dissolution.12 The Campbell Affair handed the 
Conservative party invaluable propaganda and fulfilled their ambition in 
tainting Labour as a party of socialist extremists while enabling them to blame 
the Liberals for removing the government it had helped install. They were 
further helped by the publication of the Zinoviev letter in the Daily Mail on 25 
October 1924 which claimed that the Comintern had instructed the British 
Communist party to infiltrate the Labour party and armed forces.13 The letter 
turned out to be a forgery, but the damage was done and Baldwin was able to 
exploit the subsequent ‘Red Scare’. Consequently, the 1924 general election 
witnessed a landslide victory for the Conservatives as they won 412 seats with 
46.8 per cent of the vote which represented an overall majority of 203. Labour 
won 151 seats recording a net loss of 40 constituencies, while the Liberals won 
a mere 40 seats on just 17.8 per cent of the vote. Victory at the 1924 general 
election finally marked the end of a difficult, at times perilous, period for the 
Conservative party - a period that saw the party rejected by the people at three 
consecutive general elections, one in 1906 and two in 1910, then submerged in 
Coalition Governments from 1915 that often witnessed more disharmony than 
unity.  
 The period 1922 –1924 demonstrated the Conservative party’s ability 
to survive coalition and emerge as the party of government, a position it hardly 
relinquished for the remainder of the century. By contrast the 1924 general 
election marked the final eclipse of the Liberal party as a major political 
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power, its paltry return from the 339 candidates it fielded final evidence that it 
was no longer a major force in British politics. Even so, the Liberal party 
remained a credible force in North-east Wales and as such attracted support 
from the Conservatives in Wrexham at the 1924 general election. Here the 
Liberal party was deemed a moderate anti-socialist group that was best 
positioned to keep out Labour and pursue the best interests of the 
Conservatives.  Elsewhere in the region a different type of anti-socialist 
strategy was deployed successfully by the Conservatives – that of tainting 
Liberals as Labour party confederates. This was especially true in Flintshire 
where at the 1924 general election they were able to discredit the Liberal party 
as an accomplice to socialism and won what was deemed a safe Liberal seat. 
Even in solidly Liberal Denbighshire in 1924 the Conservatives were able to 
tarnish the Liberals as socialist puppets, a manoeuvre helped by the anti-
Communist sentiment whipped up both by the national and local press.  
It would be wrong to assume, however, that the Conservatives in North-
east Wales spent all of their time, concentrating on an anti-socialist 
programme. While they utilised much of the anti-socialist strategy deployed 
nationally by the Conservative party, an approach that helped galvanise it in 
the days after Bonar Law’s departure when other initiatives were failing it, 
they also did much to secure the party’s future in the region.14 Between 1922 
and 1924 the party seized the opportunity to develop its organisation, 
particularly in Denbighshire where it had collapsed. The period also a saw 
major extension in political democracy, as the party opened its doors to new 
members, continued to enhance the role of women and overhauled its 
leadership. Thus, with an improvement in election results the party ended the 
period strengthened both as a political and democratic force. This final chapter 
will therefore consider the effects that the end of a Coalition Government had 
on the Conservative party in North-east Wales, and compare its fortunes to that 
of the party nationally during a turbulent period, which initially started well 
with its overwhelming victory in October 1922, deteriorated badly after the 
1923 general election and ended with glorious victory in 1924 that cemented 
its position for the future. It will explore how the party expounded its anti-
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socialist strategy, how it exploited the difficulties that were afflicting the 
Liberal party in Flintshire, how it re-established itself in Denbighshire and how 
and why it deemed it necessary to co-operate with the Liberals in Wrexham.   
 
THE 1922 GENERAL ELECTION. 
According to Michael Kinnear the election of 1922 ‘was characterised by 
a systematic effort by the leaders of all three anti-socialist parties to present as 
few policies as possible’.15 Bonar Law’s election address stressed the need for 
tranquillity and serenity at home and abroad, embodied in his pledges for a 
lasting peace in the East, the ratification of the Irish treaty, a reduction in 
unemployment, a development of trade with the Empire and a solution to the 
serious problems facing British agriculture. There was little of substance in the 
address, but Law promised ‘that every candidate, in every constituency, will, 
as I do, make retrenchment an essential part of his programme’.16 Law also 
made a pledge ‘that this parliament will not make any fundamental change in 
the fiscal system of this country’.17 As a result a year later when considering 
his political position Baldwin was virtually forced to go to the country when 
he admitted that he was considering adopting protection policies for the party. 
In North-east Wales the fall of the Coalition Government in October 1922 
and the decision to go to the country, presented the North-east Wales 
Conservatives with an opportunity to assert their political independence. 
However, the Conservative Constituency Associations were slow to assert 
their autonomy. In Denbighshire there simply was no party organisation in 
place when Coalition Government collapsed and hurried arrangements had to 
be made to organise meetings before any decision was made as to what course 
of action was best to take. The situation in Flintshire was also unclear – despite 
the tricky relations between the two parties the Coalition Government had 
been fully supported, and a good working relationship had developed with 
Thomas Parry, the Lloyd George Liberal MP, and thus when it came to 
opposing Labour the Conservatives’ were unsure what their best option was.  
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In Wrexham Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon were unwilling to 
relinquish electoral ties with the Liberals largely because of the threat Labour 
posed in a three way election contest; as Sir Watkin commented he and ‘Lord 
Kenyon were inclined to question the wisdom of bringing out a separate 
candidate in view of the Socialist menace’.18 They were not alone in their 
views, in Scotland the Eastern Division of the Scottish Unionist party decided 
not to oppose sitting Lloyd George MPs in return for an agreement by which 
Liberals promised not to oppose Conservatives. In all Scottish Unionists were 
heavily in favour of continuing the Coalition and as a result only in such 
isolated constituencies as Perth and Glasgow Cathcart did Conservatives and 
Lloyd George Liberals oppose each other.19 Less formal were arrangements in 
England and Wales where any arrangements between Coalition Liberals and 
Conservatives were agreed at constituency level.20 For example, in London 
Lloyd George Liberals at Camberwell North-west, Hackney Central and 
Southwark South-east received Conservative support when they promised to 
support Bonar Law’s new government. On the other hand Sir Hamar 
Greenwood in Sunderland faced two Conservative opponents in the double 
member constituency despite attempts to draw Conservative support.21    
Similar attempts to forge election pacts were made in North-east Wales 
and given the comments of the party leadership in the constituency it was no 
real surprise in Wrexham, that Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon 
attempted to persuade its Association’s members to strike an election deal with 
the Liberal Association. Yet at a meeting on 30 October 1922 of the 
Conservative Association an amendment was carried against support for the 
candidature of Evan Davies, the Liberal candidate, by 52 votes to 2. The 
delegates’ speeches to the meeting and the overwhelming weight of opinion 
returned from the polling districts swayed the vote resoundingly in favour of 
choosing a candidate of their own, despite the views of their Association’s 
leaders.  As a result, Major R.C. Roberts, a town councillor and former agent 
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to Ormsby-Gore, was chosen as Conservative candidate for the division.22 The 
decision had less to do with any animosity towards local Liberals here but 
more to do with the fact that many Conservatives in the division had by 
October 1922 finally become disillusioned with Coalition Government. To 
R.W. Egerton, a member of the Constitutional Association, ‘a Conservative 
government was the only one they could trust, and because they wanted a 
revival of trade and industry and the relief and ultimate end of 
unemployment’.23  To R.C. Roberts, if future conflict was to be avoided, as 
had nearly happened at Chanak, then a Conservative administration was 
needed, and not another coalition to ensure peace and prosperity.24 
Consequently, a letter setting out the Conservative position and the fact they 
no longer wished to cooperate in the division with the Liberal party was sent to 
the Liberal candidate Evan Davies ‘as a matter of courtesy’.25 From the 
outcome of the selection meeting and the subsequent comments made about 
the Coalition Government it was clear that the bulk of the Conservative party 
in Wrexham believed that the time had come to split with the Coalition 
Liberals, assert their independence and attempt to prove that Conservative 
policies were the best way of combating Labour in the division. 
By contrast in Flintshire relations between the Liberal and Conservative 
Associations had been poor throughout the period of Coalition. The 
Constitutional Association, however, had supported Lloyd George’s 
government and taken solace from the fact that Thomas Parry, the Coalition 
Liberal MP, had pledged himself to support the coalition and had subsequently 
visited the Constitutional Association to make such declarations, despite the 
antipathy shown towards the Conservatives by the Liberal Association. 
Furthermore, with Labour bringing forward the Reverend Gwynfryn Jones, a 
popular and well-respected member of the county council, as candidate fear of 
splitting the anti-socialist vote made the party hesitant in ending its electoral 
alliance with the Liberals. Therefore, it made a great deal of sense to check on 
                                                 
22 National Library of Wales, (NLW) Wrexham Conservative Party Records: Minute Book of the 
Wrexham and East Denbighshire Unionist Association. Special meeting of Association held 30 
Oct. 1922. 
23 Ibid. 
24 North Wales Guardian, 10 November, 1922. 
25 North Wales Guardian, 3 November 1922. 
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the position of Parry before deciding to select a Conservative candidate. As a 
result an attempt was made to contact him and see if he was willing to support 
Bonar Law’s government.26  Parry was thus duly sent a telegram on 24 
October 1922 and it was only when he failed to reply by 28 October that the 
Conservatives decided to take action of their own. As Lord Mostyn explained: 
 
Colonel Parry had had every opportunity of making his intentions known with 
regards to whether he was prepared to support Mr. Bonar Law and his 
government or not. Lord Mostyn now felt that Colonel Parry’s attitude of silence 
left no alternative but to contest the seat in Flintshire. 27 
 
As a result on 31 October 1922 Austin Jones, a barrister, who previously 
contested the Caernarfon Boroughs constituency in December 1910, was adopted 
as Conservative candidate for Flintshire.28 
In Denbighshire the Conservative party encountered a different set of 
problems. When the Coalition Government fell in October 1922 there was still 
no Conservative organisation in place to support a parliamentary candidate. The 
Conservatives moved quickly to address this situation, and when Independent 
Liberals in the division brought forward their own nominee they spotted the 
opportunity that a split Liberal vote could give them.29 At a meeting held at 
Ruthin on 30 October 1922 Gwendolyn Brodrick, of the Coed Coch estate, one 
of three female Conservative candidates chosen to contest seats in Wales for the 
first time, was selected for the division.30  Brodrick was a well-connected 
Conservative. She was the daughter of Colonel H.R Hughes of the Kinmel estate 
near Abergele who owned over 8,000 acres of land and was a member of the 
West Denbighshire Constitutional Association. In 1896 after the death of her first 
husband, William Edward Lloyd Wynne of the Coed Coch estate near Abergele 
she married Laurence A. Brodrick. Brodrick was the second son of the Eighth 
Viscount Midleton whose first son inherited the title and went on to become 
Secretary of State for War between 1900 and 1903.  Laurence Brodrick had been 
                                                 
26 Flintshire Observer, 19 October 1922.  
27 FRO, Flintshire Constitutional Association Minute Book 2, 12 February 1921-31 May 1930, 
D/DM/307/2. Special Meeting of the Flintshire Unionist Association, 28 October 1922.   
28. Ibid 
29 Denbighshire Free Press, 11 November 1922. 
30 North Wales Times, 2 November 1922. 
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an MP and later became a Vice-President of the West Denbighshire Association. 
Even so the choice of a woman to contest the division appeared a bold move – 
one perhaps that could connect the Conservatives to the large number of female 
voters while maintaining their hard-core vote in the constituency. At the same 
time Conservatives rallied quickly around her selection and as a fluent public 
speaker and widow of Laurence Brodrick’s her stock was high amongst the party 
faithful. The North Wales Times commented that the ‘split in the Liberal ranks 
and her personal popularity will be… of some advantage to her in her 
candidature’.31 Her selection was perhaps rushed and had more to do with the 
problem of finding someone to contest a constituency that was still seen as 
unwinnable by many Tories, but it remained an enlightened choice.32 Indeed, the 
selection of female candidates remained something of an anathema to the 
Conservative party. This was despite the fact that the 1921 National Union 
conference passed a resolution saying that Conservative Associations should not 
lag behind those of the Liberal and Labour party associations and should put 
forward women candidates. Yet, Conservative constituency associations were 
slow to appoint women. For example in 1922 only five were selected nationally 
and this had hardly improved by 1931 when only 13 female candidates were 
selected. Certainly, there was prejudice against women candidates amongst male 
dominated Conservative constituency associations at the time, and while the 
Conservatives were not alone - in 1922 only ten female Labour candidates were 
selected and a mere 16 from the Liberal party - over the years the Conservatives 
have lagged behind other political parties.33 In 1992 only 63 female Conservative 
candidates were selected - at the same time the Liberal and Labour parties 
appointed more than twice this number. 34 
The selection of Brodrick in Denbighshire in 1922 thus appeared to put 
the constituency’s Constitutional Association at the forefront of those 
enlightened associations who were willing to further the cause of women in 
politics. Moreover, for the first time since War broke out the Conservative party 
appeared ready to fight parliamentary elections again in North-east Wales. The 
                                                 
31 North Wales Times, 2 November 1922. 
32 Denbighshire Free Press, 18 November 1922.  
33 Lovenduski, Norris and Burness, ‘The Party and Women’, p627, See also Ball, ‘Local 
Conservatism and Party Organisation’, p 270.    
34 Ibid, p626. 
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political landscape had changed much since 1910 when last they had fought 
parliamentary elections in the region and it was clear that the party was sailing in 
to unchartered waters as they prepared to contest elections under the extended 
franchise, with both the Liberal and Labour parties as opposition in two 
constituencies and with a woman representing the Conservative cause in the 
third. Even so the First World War had seen the end of the Liberal and Labour 
electoral alliance which had done so much damage to the Conservative party and 
the Nonconformist issues of Disestablishment and education, which had brought 
a radicalised Liberal party so much success, especially in its rural Welsh 
speaking heartlands, were now things of the past.  
 
THE 1922 GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
During the 1922 general election campaign the Conservative candidates 
in North-east Wales faced a number of difficulties, not least of which was the 
reluctance by some Tories to condemn their previous Coalition partners, and 
Lloyd George in particular. In Wrexham, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn could only 
offer lukewarm support for the Conservative candidate R. C. Roberts, as he 
feared that a three-cornered contest would split the anti-Labour vote.35 It was 
here, perhaps, that the first evidence could be seen that Sir Watkin Williams-
Wynn – who had maintained tight control of the party machine since 1886 - 
views were at odds with party members. Defeated over the choice of candidates 
in the division he still remained convinced that support for Evan Davies, the 
Liberal candidate, was ‘the best course to adopt for the country and for 
themselves’.36 This could not have endeared himself to party workers and those 
campaigning for R.C. Roberts or those who had overwhelmingly voted against 
Davies’ candidature. As the campaign progressed he tempered his comments in 
order to show support for Roberts, but his speeches were still laced with a 
reverence for Lloyd George: 
 
The country was tired of the late administration and it wanted change. He was 
not going to turn his back on the man who helped the country in time of trouble 
but let them give Mr. Lloyd George a little breathing time, a little rest. What he 
                                                 
35 Denbighshire Free Press, 11 November 1922.  
36 Wrexham Leader, 10 November 1922. 
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would say to Lloyd George was: all honour to you. You have brought us to a 
certain pitch. Do not take it amiss if we ask you to stand aside a bit and let 
another – your own trusted lieutenant at one time – take your place and see if he 
cannot put some of the finishing touches to the foundation you have laid so 
well.37 
 
While such comments were possibly designed to keep the door open for a 
future election agreement with the Lloyd George Liberals they could hardly 
have gone unnoticed by the electorate or particularly helped Roberts’ cause. 
Furthermore, here as in Wrexham the decision to field Labour candidates 
introduced a new dimension to the campaign for the Conservatives that of 
three way contests and how to attack both the Liberal and Labour programmes 
while promoting Conservatives policies as broad based and populist.  
 Roberts attempted to address this problem by attacking the record of 
Coalition Government and by pledging to improve working class conditions by 
reducing taxation. He adhered to Bonar Law’s manifesto pledges by promising 
that a Tory government would reduce expenditure unlike the previous 
government, which he asserted had spent tax payers money in ‘wicked and 
wilful extravagance  – ministry after ministry had been created and kept in 
existence long after their period of usefulness was gone’.38 A Conservative 
government pledged to stabilise industry and increase prosperity would, he 
said, address such extravagance: 
 
The main necessity now was to reduce taxation and give industry a chance so 
that steady employment could follow. It was no use giving a man a high wage if 
he could not purchase things with it: what he needed was a steady wage and the 
cost of living reduced. They would then have a contented race and Britain would 
return to its old position and they would have prosperity and peace within its 
walls. 39   
 
Such speeches were clearly designed to maintain support from traditional Tory 
voters, the highly taxed middle classes, but were also intended to placate 
                                                 
37 Denbighshire Free Press, 11 November 1922. 
38 Ibid.   
39 North Wales Guardian, 10 November 1922.  
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working class voters. Nevertheless, the early attempts by Sir Watkin Williams-
Wynn to forge an electoral alliance with the Liberals left the party vulnerable 
to attacks from their political opponents. The Wrexham Leader claimed that 
the Conservative party’s ‘political strategic aims were impossible to 
decipher’.40 Furthermore, his decision to attack Labour’s capital levy proposals 
(a graduated levy on fortunes earned during the War exceeding £5,000) in 
exactly the same manner as Evan Davies, the Liberal candidate, only appeared 
to confirm the assertion of the Labour candidate, Robert Richards, that ‘little 
divided the Conservatives and Liberals’.41  
Austin Jones, the Conservative candidate, also faced an uphill task in 
Flintshire where Labour was contesting the division for the first time. 
According to the County Herald the Labour party was of ‘considerable 
strength in Flintshire’ and thus posed a formidable challenge to both the 
Liberal and Conservative parties.42 The campaign, however, centred on the 
long standing antipathy that existed between the local Liberal and 
Conservative Associations which had been festering since the Liberal party’s 
decision to support an electoral alliance with Labour at the 1919 and 1922 
county council elections. Local Liberals considered themselves to be 
progressives who had more in common with Labour than local 
Conservatives.Many were also supporters of Asquith and were unhappy with 
Thomas Parry, who as their MP was a staunch supporter of Lloyd George and 
the Coalition Government. Even so, Liberals united behind the candidate most 
likely to win the constituency and Parry was selected to fight the division.43 By 
uniting behind Parry the Flintshire Liberals avoided a similar fate to candidates 
in 23 other constituencies, ten in Scotland and thirteen in England and Wales, 
including Denbighshire, where Lloyd George and Independent/Asquith 
Liberals stood against each other.44 Nevertheless, such ill will amongst 
Liberals in the division allowed Conservatives to make charges that the Liberal 
party was divided and that many of their supporters in the constituency were 
actively supporting Labour. Colonel Mainwaring of the Flintshire 
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Constitutional Association believed Parry had sold himself to socialism by 
representing the Liberal party in the constituency: ‘in choosing between the 
allegiance of the Conservatives and loyalists of Flintshire he madly cast his 
vote with the rag–tag and bobtail of the Liberal party many of who were 
canvassing actively and doing their utmost for the Labour challenge’.45 Austin 
Jones pursued this line, but also attempted to exploit the apparent divisions 
between their MP and the Liberal Association as well as attack Parry for being 
part of a Coalition Government that the Conservatives had turned out of 
office.46 Despite the fact that the Conservative Association had pledged 
support for Parry during the period of coalition he was now portrayed as the 
representative of an ineffective government that had been responsible for the 
‘mismanagement of home and foreign affairs’ for the previous four years.47 At 
a meeting held in Rhyl on 4 November 1922 Jones declared: 
 
The Coalition was a very bad thing and would prove a still greater mistake if it 
was allowed to continue. The electors of Flintshire had no opportunity of voting 
for a Liberal because there was no real Liberal candidate before the 
constituency. Colonel Parry was repudiated by many of the Liberal party and 
votes cast for him would simply amount to assisting in the return of another 
coalition government.48  
 
In Denbighshire Gwendolyn Brodrick faced a different type of 
campaign to those in Flintshire and Wrexham as she faced no Labour 
opposition. Therefore, her task was to discredit the Liberal party, and in 
particular the late Coalition Government while promoting Conservative 
policies. As a result she claimed that during the Coalition Government’s time 
in power the country had ‘been rushed from one crisis to another…. what 
everyone asked was to be given a sense of security and then be allowed to 
settle down to their own individual work and interests with a sympathetic 
government at their head to lend them a helping hand where most needed’.49 
Help for poor farmers and the unemployed in an agricultural constituency like 
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Denbighshire, Brodrick asserted, would come from a Conservative 
government pledged to give relief on agricultural rating and arrange favourable 
credit schemes for farmers.50 Her comments were in accordance with Sir 
Robert Sanders, the Minister of Agriculture, who promised an inquiry into 
agricultural rating and the expansion of credit facilities to farmers in an 
attempt to address the deepening depression that had hit agriculture during the 
inter-war years.51 Brodrick’s message was not without appeal to the 
landowners and farmers of Denbighshire. According to the Denbighshire Free 
Press many tenanted farmers were now themselves landowners in the county 
and were apparently more likely to vote Tory.52 The newspaper also claimed 
that Brodrick was campaigning well in the constituency, and receiving rousing 
receptions in many towns and villages.53  Conservative leaders were also 
confident that Brodrick would poll well and remained hopeful that Llew 
Williams, the Independent Liberal, who had pledged to ‘recapture the seat for 
free Liberalism’, would win enough votes to weaken the position of J.C. 
Davies, the Lloyd George Liberal.54 However, there was some dissent amongst 
Conservatives about the choice of a female candidate which threatened to 
derail their campaign. An anonymous letter published in the Denbighshire 
Free Press emphasised the disquiet some were apparently feeling about her 
candidature:  
 
Mrs Brodrick - against whom I have nothing to say  -  is an entire stranger to the 
vast majority of the electorate, some of whom object to a Tory lady candidate. 
As things are the chances of the constituency returning a Tory, which were 
never brighter have been thrown away.55   
   
The author of the letter, merely called ‘A Voter’, did not just criticise 
Brodrick’s candidature but also drew attention to other factors that would, the 
writer believed, win the election for J.C. Davies. These included the Liberal 
party’s better state of organisation and Denbighshire’s attachment to Lloyd 
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George, which apparently showed no sign of diminishing. The letter finished 
by warning Conservative friends to ditch female candidates and spend time 
educating voters in Conservative policies, prophetically saying ‘the coming 
parliament will last but a short time. Let my Conservative friends take this 
lesson to heart and commence in earnest and at once to mend their ways’.56  
Even so the Denbighshire election result demonstrated how much more 
receptive the voters were to the Conservative message since the last time the 
party had fought the constituency in January 1910. The fact that the 
Conservatives had fielded a woman did not appear to diminish their poll, as 
Brodrick’s share of the vote nearly matched that achieved by Austin Jones in 
Flintshire and was well ahead of what Major R. C Roberts polled in Wrexham. 
J.C. Davies, the Lloyd George Liberal, topped the poll with a majority of 
nearly 4,000, Brodrick finished second with just over 9,000 votes, the party’s 
highest poll since 1895, with thirty eight per cent of the vote.  It was true that 
there were two Liberal party factions contesting the constituency and that the 
potential existed for a substantial split in the Liberal vote, but Llew Williams’ 
impact on the constituency was minimal. Taking a position of ‘hostility to the 
coalition government, its policy and administration and its betrayal of Liberal 
principles’ Williams failed to muster two thousand votes and gained just eight 
per cent of the poll.57 What the poll indicated was how the radical issues that 
were so important to Welsh Liberalism before the War were now less relevant 
- the battle for Disestablishment had been won, the sell off of land now made 
landlordism less powerful and the Coalition Government led by Lloyd George 
had spilt Liberalism in Wales and thus the potency of radicalism.58 The failure 
of Llew Williams, the Independent Liberal, epitomised this decline. For the 
Conservatives the result marked a step forward for the party which had failed 
to contest West Denbighshire in December 1910, and had polled less than 33 
per cent of the vote in the same constituency at the January 1910 general 
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election.59 The Liberals still had a healthy majority, but the Conservatives now 
posed a serious and substantial threat in the division. 
The result in Flintshire also demonstrated the advances the 
Conservative party were making in the region. Attempts to expose splits in the 
local Liberal party while condemning their association with Labour met with 
some success as the Conservative party gained over 15,000 votes, which 
represented nearly 40 per cent of the poll. Given that the Conservatives were 
less than 1800 votes behind the Liberals in a large electorate with a high 
turnout of 80 per cent, and that Labour finished bottom of the poll with just 
over 6,000 votes, the Conservatives felt vindicated by the manner of the 
campaign they fought. The Flintshire Observer commented that ‘Austin Jones 
provided a staunch and eloquent champion of Conservatism, and the fact that 
he polled 15,080 votes is significant of the strength of the party in the 
constituency’.60      
The only Conservative disappointment came in Wrexham where Major 
R.C. Roberts, candidate, finished bottom of the poll in a tight three-cornered 
contest, obtaining just over 10,500 votes, as Labour’s Robert Richards won the 
seat, with nearly 12,000 votes and Evan Davies the Lloyd George Liberal 
came second with nearly 11, 000 votes. With Davies campaigning on the same 
issues as Roberts, and over 21,000 people voting against Labour, Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn’s fears were borne out - the anti Labour vote was split. Even 
so, by attaining 31.6 per cent of the vote in an election which saw the winner 
only achieve 35.8 per cent, was in some ways a satisfactory performance for 
the Conservatives and yet again proved that that the Conservatives were 
gaining substantial support in North-east Wales.   
 
                                                 
59 The last time the Conservatives had fought the constituency was in 1910 when it was the old 
West Denbighshire division. In essence it was still the same constituency but since the changes of 
1918 the boroughs of Ruthin and Denbigh had been added.  
60 Flintshire Observer, 23 November 1922. 
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 Table 6.1. 
General Election United Kingdom 1922 
 
 Total Votes % Share Candidates MPs Returned 
Conservative  5, 502,298  38.5  482   344 
Liberal (Ind)  2, 668,143  18.9  333     62 
Lloyd G. Lib  1, 412,772    9.4  144     52 
Labour  4, 237,349  29.7  414   142 
Others      571,480    3.5    68     14 
                           14,392,330        100.0            1441                   615           
Taken from: C. Cook, The Age of Alignment. 
 
Table 6.2 
General Election, Wales 1922. 
 
Party Seats Won Votes       % Vote 
Labour 18 363877        40.7 
Nat Lib (Coalition)  9 239035        26.7 
Conservative  6 190919        21.4 
Liberal  2   67870        17.6 
Independent Labour  1   11929          1.3 
Others  0   20327          2.2 
 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997. 
 
 
Table 6.3 
General Election 1922, North-east Wales. 
 
Constituency Candidate Party Votes %  
Denbighshire J.C. Davies Lib 12,972 53.9  
 A.G. Brodrick Con  9, 138 37.9  
 Ll. Williams Ind Lib   1,974  8.2 +3834 
Flintshire T.H. Parry  Lib            16, 854 44.2  
 A. Jones Con 15, 080 39.6  
 D.G. Jones Lab   6, 163 16.2 +1774 
Wrexham R. Richards Lab 11, 940 35.8  
 E.R. Davies Lib 10, 842 32.6  
 R. Roberts Con 10, 508 31.6 +1098 
     
  
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
 Even though the Conservative party failed to capture a single seat in 
North-east Wales, there was a belief among Conservative party leaders that by 
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asserting their independence they had preformed well.61 While comparisons 
are difficult as the last time the Conservatives had fought a seat in the region 
was at the Flint Boroughs by election in 1913, where they obtained over 47 per 
cent of the poll, the Conservative vote appeared to be holding up well. At the 
January 1910 general election, where they fought all five seats under the old 
franchise in the region they achieved an average of 38.2 per cent of the vote. 
This might have dropped slightly to 36.7 per cent in the three seats they fought 
in the region under the extended franchise in 1922, but this was actually a very 
good result. If one excludes the 1918 general election where Coalition Liberals 
fought seats with Conservative support, and in extraordinary circumstances, 
the average Liberal vote in the region in 1922 dropped by 18 per cent 
compared to January 1910. At the same time Labour’s incursion into North-
east Wales in 1922, where they were victorious in Wrexham, saw them 
average over 19 per cent of the vote in the two constituencies they contested 
and thus their vote damaged the Liberal party a lot more than the 
Conservatives (see table 6.3). It can, therefore be seen that the Conservative 
party was maintaining its core vote in North-east Wales and despite their 
failure, yet again, to have a single candidate elected, there was still substantial 
support to build on, which must have allayed any fears that local 
Conservatives had about how they would fare in the new era of the extended 
franchise. Furthermore, although the Conservatives finished bottom of the poll 
in a tight three-cornered contest in Wrexham it still outperformed, in 
percentage terms, their counterparts in Wales as a whole. Out of 95,744 people 
who voted in all three constituencies, 35,060 voted Conservative, just 5,277 
votes or five per cent less than the Lloyd George Liberals, and their 36.7 
percentage vote was over fifteen per cent more than the party achieved in 
Wales as a whole (see table 6.2 and 6.3).  
 Even so, with just 21.4 per cent of the vote in Wales, the Conservative 
party won six seats, all of them in South-east Wales including three in Cardiff, 
thus highlighting the anomalies of the ‘first past the post’ electoral system. Just 
as in North-east Wales, the election in Wales was marked by a set back in 
Liberal fortunes. Across, the Principality the decline was more extensive and 
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permanent as the advance of Labour and its influence over the working 
classes, formed during the Great War, propelled it towards political 
domination in Wales.62 It won 41 per cent of the vote, compared to 31 per cent 
in 1918, and took every mining seat in South Wales. In all Labour won 18 
seats, with two in North Wales. Apart from the success in Wrexham Labour 
also gained Anglesey.  As elsewhere the election was a disaster for the two 
Liberal party factions in Wales. Nine Lloyd George Liberals were returned, 
three of them in North Wales, but only two Asquithian Liberals were 
successful. The collapse of the once great Liberal party was emphasised by the 
fact that they could only muster thirty-four percent of the vote. This would 
have been unthinkable in the heady days of radical Liberalism, which 
dominated Welsh politics between 1885 and 1918.          
In a final analysis of why the Conservative vote held up so well in North-
east Wales in the twelve years since the party had last fought a general election 
in the region there are perhaps a number of factors to consider. Given the fact 
that Labour was progressing quickly in the region and that the Liberal party 
were still maintaining a strong showing, despite its divisions and poor 
performances elsewhere, it perhaps could have been expected that the 
Conservatives would be reduced to marginal third force. Yet the Conservatives 
were and had always been well entrenched in the region – even in the days of 
Coalition Government when apathy appeared to afflict their party machine, 
party workers and local organisations continued to spread the Conservative 
word in the region. Furthermore, Labour had yet to penetrate with any degree 
of success the more agricultural and diverse counties of Denbighshire and 
Flintshire. In Denbighshire a poor performance in 1918 resulted in Labour not 
fielding a candidate in 1922 while their candidate Gwynfryn Jones, admittedly 
fighting the seat for the first time, won just 16 per cent of the vote in Flintshire. 
Thus any disillusionment with the Coalition Government in these two 
constituencies would favour the Conservatives. Furthermore, by 1922 many 
tenant farmers who had voted Liberal prior to the Great War were now 
landowners and were perhaps more inclined to vote Tory – Gwendolyn 
Brodrick in particular in Denbighshire spent much of her time emphasising 
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that the Conservatives were pledged to help agriculture. At the same time R.C 
Roberts’ promise that a Conservative government would cut taxation probably 
went down well with working class voters in Wrexham as the Conservatives 
came very close to superseding the Liberals as the second party in the 
constituency. Thus a combination of a strong message allied to the 
disillusionment many felt with Coalition Government seemed to have swelled 
the Conservative party’s vote even though it failed to take a seat.  Whatever 
the reasons were the general election results in 1922 demonstrated, once more, 
the Conservative party’s continued ability to survive and attract support in 
North-east Wales.        
 
THE THREAT OF LABOUR AND THE BUILD UP TO THE 1923 
GENERAL ELECTION. 
It was clear from the 1922 general election results that the country was 
tired of Coalition Government and that the Conservatives had benefited most 
by adopting an anti-Coalition strategy. Nationally, the Conservative party’s 
parliamentary success, however, masked undercurrents that perhaps tarnished 
their performance. It had, if one includes the Independent Conservatives 
elected at the 1918 general election, fewer MPs returned to Westminster. 
Furthermore, with just 38.5 per cent of the vote and 344 MPs returned the 
party appeared to have won more seats than it deserved. In 1923 and 1929 on 
approximately the same percentage the party won 80 fewer seats. The 
Conservatives also won 95 seats on minority votes and in a further nineteen 
straight contests their majority was less than a thousand.63 At the same time the 
election marked something of a triumph for the Labour party as it achieved 
nearly thirty per cent of the vote and gained 86 seats. Most of these gains came 
in industrial and underprivileged urban areas as Labour won seats in English 
and Scottish mining districts, previously Independent Liberal strongholds, and 
defeated Coalition Liberals in South Wales. 64 As Cook notes ‘the net outcome 
of 1922 for the Labour party was its growth from a relatively ineffective and 
insecurely based force to the position of a vigorously and determined 
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opposition, securely based in several major industrial regions’.65 Indeed, 
despite victory a sense of uncertainty pervaded the government during 1923. 
This became even more prominent after Bonar Law stepped down as Prime 
Minister due to ill health.  
The threat that the Labour party posed to the Conservative Government 
intensified in the period immediately after the general election. By October 
1922, 1.4 million people were out of work and during 1923 the rate of 
unemployment did not drop.66 The Government’s failure to address the 
problem only helped to reinforce Labour’s claim that only they could reduce 
the high unemployment figures. According to Robert Self: 
 
What alarmed high politicians after 1921 was not the possibility that Labour 
really could solve unemployment but rather the fear that if it said it could often 
enough the newly extended electorate might come to believe it. Labour’s 
exploitation of the issue and its persistent denigration of Baldwin’s failure on 
employment thus represented a major threat to Conservative credibility.67 
 
 
Labour’s increasing influence in British politics also affected 
Conservative thinking in North-east Wales. Even though it had not fielded a 
candidate in Denbighshire in 1922 and its candidate Gwynfryn Jones finished 
bottom of the poll in Flintshire, virtually 9, 000 votes behind Austen Jones, 
who finished second, its victory in Wrexham demonstrated its potential and 
how far it had progressed in the region since 1918. Consequently, 
Conservative leaders in the constituency sought a pragmatic solution to 
prevent Labour from winning again. Despite their strong showing at the 1922 
general election they still saw the Liberal party, which had dominated pre-war 
elections in East Denbighshire as the main hope to prevent Labour from 
winning again and subsequently attempted to cement an electoral pact with the 
Liberals in the division.  Little of this was made public, indeed there appeared 
to be a distinct lack of activity by the Conservative party after 1922, and in 
early November 1923 the North Wales Guardian’s ‘Looker On’ column 
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complained that with a general election imminent ‘the Denbigh parties are 
beginning to put their house in order, but I do not hear of any activity in the 
Wrexham division’.68 Yet, eager to prevent a repetition of a split in the anti- 
Labour vote at the 1922 general election behind the scenes Edward Hughes, 
Chairman of the Wrexham Liberal Association, and Sir Watkin Williams–
Wynn were negotiating an agreement by which an anti–socialist candidate 
could represent the division. After an initial approach made by Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon, Edward Hughes decided to consult Evan 
Davies the defeated Liberal in 1922, to see ‘if he thought an election alliance 
with the Conservatives was a viable proposition’.69 Davies had decided to 
stand down as his party’s candidate, but had recent experience of campaigning 
in the division and thus could gauge public opinion and the mood of the party 
workers:  
 
I quite realise the importance of avoiding a three-cornered fight, but fail to see 
how Liberals and Conservatives can work together or support the same 
candidate seeing that issue has been joined on a fundamental question of policy. 
I should be greatly surprised if the Tory headquarters would agree to allow 
Liberals and Labour to have a straight fight in the Wrexham district. If, 
however, Lord Kenyon and Sir Watkin hold that view and can carry their 
supporters I do not think there will be much difficulty in wresting the seat from 
Labour.70    
 
The issue that Davies was, of course, referring to was Tariff Reform, the 
policy initiative upon which most Liberals and Conservatives were 
fundamentally divided.  The Prime Minister, Baldwin, believed that Tariff 
Reform offered the Conservative government many opportunities, not least of 
which was a policy that would reduce unemployment and undermine Labour 
by proposing a constructive alternative to its nationalisation and taxation 
policies. 
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Yet, to most Liberals Free Trade remained a vital component of any 
government’s fiscal policy, and such a move by the Conservative party only 
threatened to disrupt any anti-socialist pacts, similar to that proposed in 
Wrexham, while providing the disparate factions of the Liberal party with a 
cause to unite on. At the same time most Conservative party activists still 
favoured, in spite of the long, divisive and bitter arguments over the policy, the 
implementation of Tariff Reform.71 Tariff Reform had always drawn strong 
support amongst Conservatives in North-east Wales. However, in Wrexham 
Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn was still willing to sacrifice the candidature of a 
Conservative, accepting that as the ‘division had always been Liberal up to the 
1922 election and that the Liberal candidate had a majority over the 
Conservative candidate, it was for the Conservative party to stand down’.72 As 
a result Edward Hughes proceeded to make enquiries about the selection of a 
candidate who could possibly unite both parties. In a letter to Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn he suggested C.P Williams, a local businessman, who had 
several industrial interests and whom he believed was ‘sane and moderate in 
his views’.73 The problem for the local Conservative leaders was that they 
were unlikely to carry their own party with them having been almost 
unanimously defeated on the issue of joint candidates at the 1922 general 
election selection meeting. Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn reply to Hughes 
indicated his problems, but highlighted his desire to overcome the differences 
between the two parties:  
 
 
Dear Mr Hughes, 
I am most obliged for your letter. I quite agree with your views, they 
coincide exactly with mine. I am of the opinion that unless some definite 
proposition was made by Conservative or Liberal candidate as to future policy 
the majority of [the] party would vote for contesting the seat come what may 
while the result I feel sure would be as per as late – giving the seat to the 
socialists… Something must be done; matters cannot be left to drift indefinitely. 
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I hardly know what to suggest. The whole matter is fraught with such 
consequences for better or worse, but the socialist menace in my view is the 
most serious of all. I wish in constituencies like ours both parties could be 
induced to take a broader course of play for safety.74     
 
The correspondence with Hughes betrayed an air of desperation. Sir 
Watkin Williams-Wynn obviously felt that he saw the wider picture and was 
thus willing to consider an electoral alliance with the Liberals even if it meant 
compromising the Conservative party position on Tariff Reform. Such a 
sacrifice was justified if it led to defeating Labour in the constituency, even if 
it meant alienating the rank and file and splitting the local party, and the 
concerns he expressed were borne out by the results of selection meetings held 
by both parties. C.P Williams was beaten narrowly by H. A. Morgan, a lecturer 
in economics and staunch supporter of Free Trade, at the Liberal party’s 
selection meeting, and on 20 November the Conservative Association selected, 
by an overwhelming majority, Edmund Bushby, a Liverpool cotton merchant 
and advocate of Protection policies who lived in the Wrexham constituency.75 
With both candidates ardent supporters of their party’s fiscal policy a return to 
the ballot box over such a divisive issue as Tariff Reform made it impossible 
for a local electoral alliance to be negotiated.  
The situation in Wrexham mirrored what was happening in other parts 
of the country. Local anti-socialist pacts planned during 1923 were abandoned 
in many areas as the Liberal party edged towards re-unification - opposition to 
Tariff Reform and support for Free Trade an issue that virtually all Liberals 
agreed on. Sir George Younger, Conservative party chairman, concluded that 
plans he had made for anti–socialist pacts to avoid three-cornered contests in 
Scotland were in tatters as his party’s fiscal policy militated against inter-party 
electoral agreements with the Liberals. However, electoral pacts were still 
arranged in some areas, despite Liberal opposition to Tariff Reform. In 
Scotland electoral agreements were reached with the Liberals in Dunfermline, 
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Stirling, Kirkcaldy and in the Glasgow divisions of Tradeston and Govan.76 In 
England anti-socialist alliances were agreed in the industrial areas of Bristol, 
Newcastle, and Wolverhampton and in parts of the Potteries. In many mining 
regions pacts were also arranged – in Durham only one three-cornered contest 
took place in eleven county constituencies at the 1923 general election and in 
Mansfield where the Liberals enjoyed Conservative support in 1922 the 
arrangement was continued in 1923. In South Wales the Liberal candidate in 
Aberavon, Ramsay Macdonald’s seat, withdrew in favour of a Conservative 
and in Rhondda East a Conservative candidate enjoyed Liberal support while 
in Rhondda West both parties endorsed the Liberal candidate.77  
 Although an attempt was made to negotiate an electoral pact in Wrexham 
in the other two constituencies in North-east Wales an accommodation with 
the Liberals was not considered. Denbighshire was amongst many 
constituencies where Liberals and Labour collaborated as local agreements 
were reached which ensured that either a Liberal or Labour candidate was 
given a free run at the general election. Denbighshire was similar to 
Huntingdonshire, Finchley and Hemel Hemstead where lack of funding 
prevented Labour from contesting the constituency.78 Here the Labour party 
chairman urged voters to support Ellis Davies a replacement for J.C Davies, 
who wanted to return to his career as Director of Education, as Liberal 
candidate. Davies was a radical Liberal and was thus able to attract Labour 
support, and was an experienced campaigner having represented Caernarfon 
Eifion between 1906 and 1918.  
As the campaign began the Conservative Association also decided to 
change their parliamentary candidate. Initially, Gwendolyn Brodrick’s gained 
the full support of the Association’s leadership. At an Association’s Executive 
Committee meeting held on 14 November 1923 a resolution was supported by 
the leadership and subsequently carried proposing Brodrick as Conservative 
candidate for the division of Denbighshire. Brodrick duly accepted the 
candidature. However, at a full Constitutional Association meeting held in 
Denbigh on 21 November 1923 Gwendolyn Brodrick announced she was 
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standing aside in favour of male candidate to defuse any animosity, which she 
felt had surfaced at the previous election, by Conservatives opposed to a 
female candidate.79 What prompted such a change of heart in such a short 
space of time is unclear – not a single member of the Executive Committee 
had expressed any reservations or displayed any prejudice about Brodrick’s 
candidature and had given her their full backing. It appears that the decision 
was Brodrick’s alone. It is more than possible that prior to the meeting party 
members had got drift of the fact that Brodrick was about to stand again, and 
agreeing with such reservations about female Tory candidates as expressed in 
the Denbighshire Free Press by ‘A Voter’ at the previous election were about 
to vote against her candidature. This may have persuaded Brodrick and leading 
local Conservatives that a split was likely if she stood, that votes could be lost 
and thus a male candidate was required. In the end David Rhys, Conservative 
candidate for East Denbighshire in January 1910, was nominated and 
subsequently unanimously elected to fight the constituency. As if to ensure 
harmony Brodrick offered David Rhys her full support and said ‘there may be 
no shadow of doubt as to her whole-hearted support and no excuse for any 
remarks that there was any feeling or division on the subject’.80    
Only in Flintshire was the candidate selection process straightforward for 
the Conservatives. Here in May 1923 Austin Jones resigned as candidate citing 
the pressure of work as his reason for wishing to stand down. On his 
recommendation Goodman Roberts a young barrister from Mold, who had not 
stood for parliament before, was, at a meeting of the Constitutional 
Association held on 19 May 1923, unanimously selected as candidate for the 
division. As in Denbighshire Labour decided not to contest the election, its 
failure to obtain a large share of the vote in 1922 acting as a deterrent, but 
despite the local election pacts between the Liberals and the Labour party in 
1919 and 1922 there were no pledges of support for Thomas Parry, the Lloyd 
George Liberal MP from Labour. This probably reflected the fact that during 
the 1922 county council elections the local Liberal and Labour parties were 
able to find common ground over their opposition to Coalition Government, 
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but Parry, who was now endorsed by the local Liberal party, had been a 
coalition MP and was therefore unlikely to attract support from Labour.  
Thus, as the election approached the Conservative party in North-east 
Wales had three candidates in the field. However, Conservative prospects did 
not appear good   – in Wrexham the party leadership was fearful that the anti-
socialist vote would be spilt again, in Denbighshire the threat came from a 
Liberal pledged Labour support, and in Flintshire the Conservatives were 
fielding an inexperienced candidate to face a Liberal who had been in 
parliament for ten years. However, the political situation remained volatile in 
North-east Wales. Despite their stunning victory in Wrexham in 1922 
Labour’s position was still far from clear in the region. They remained 
vulnerable to a combined anti- socialist candidate in Wrexham and they had 
failed to gain significant ground in Denbighshire and Flintshire where the 
Conservative party remained a substantial second force.  At the same time 
while the Liberal Party was now nationally united there were still deep-rooted 
feelings of discontent in the Liberal party in Flintshire about the continued 
selection of Thomas Parry, a candidate many felt was foisted on them in 1913 
and who as a coalitionist had annoyed more progressive members in the 
Liberal Association. In Denbighshire the Liberal candidate Ellis Davies came 
from the old radical wing of the party. In particular he took an anti-landlord 
stance, accusing landowners of profiteering from high rentals.81 In a county 
that now had many more landowners it was uncertain how this would affect 
his campaign, given that the electorate had overwhelmingly rejected an 
independent radical Liberal at the previous election. Furthermore his pledged 
support from the Labour party was a possible handicap to him - the 
constituency had overwhelmingly rejected Labour at the 1918 general election 
(so much so that they failed to field a candidate in 1922), and their appeared 
little to be gained by supporting Labour in rural divisions, such as 
Denbighshire, where as yet they had made little impact.   
Only in Wrexham did the Liberals appear to have made a suitable 
selection. H.A Morgan was an ardent free trader – apparently a good selection 
for an election fought on fiscal policy. But the Liberals had ‘parachuted him 
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in’. He hailed from Brighton, his lecturing work was undertaken in the south 
and he had little in common with Wrexham. There were therefore encouraging 
signs for the Conservatives in North-east Wales. The party in terms of votes 
had performed well at the 1922 general election and was hoping to build on 
this strong showing. The problem remained, however, was how to sell 
Baldwin’s decision to go to the country and how to promote a fiscal policy in a 
region which had constantly rejected it at elections prior to the Great War. 
 
THE 1923 GENERAL ELECTION.      
The Conservative party’s 1923 election manifesto centred on its advocacy 
of Tariff Reform. The imposition of duties on imports, it argued would raise 
money to relieve unemployment, give special assistance to industries suffering 
under unfair competition and help negotiate a reduction in foreign tariffs, thus 
helping stimulate Britain’s export trade.82 The manifesto also promised to give 
‘a substantial preference to the Empire’, to help expand trade and increase the 
co-operation with the Colonies.83 It further pledged to assist agriculture by 
paying a bounty of £1 an acre on all holdings of arable land exceeding one 
acre and promised to restructure old age and ill-health insurance schemes as 
well as unemployment benefit. Finally, it stated ‘it is not our intention, in any 
circumstances to impose any duties on wheat, flour, oats, meat, (including 
bacon and ham), cheese, butter or eggs’.84 This was expected to negate any 
dear food cries that the Liberals would employ.  
Baldwin’s decision to go to the country on Tariff Reform caused many 
Conservative candidates severe embarrassment. At the general election just a 
year earlier thirteen Unionist Free Traders had been returned in Lancashire and 
Cheshire while a further nine were elected, including Lords Hugh and Robert 
Cecil, in other parts of the country. In Lancashire Lord Derby, Secretary of 
State for War and President of the county’s Conservatives used his influence to 
limit the opposition to Baldwin’s Tariff Reform programme by urging 
candidates to regard the ‘government’s proposals as an emergency measure to 
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meet an abnormal situation’.85  However, Lancashire was the home of cotton 
manufacturing and many Unionists here believed that protective tariffs would 
only increase the price of cotton coming into the country for manufacturing. 
As a result, and despite Lord Derby’s comments, a mini-rebellion of six 
Conservative candidates, who were adopted by their Associations as Unionist 
Free Traders, took place.86 They were also joined by a small number of 
Conservative candidates in different parts of the country as over twenty Free 
Trade Conservative candidates appeared. 87  
A lack of direction from Baldwin on Tariff Reform also placed 
Conservative candidates everywhere in a difficult situation. On 9 November  
1923 The Times commented ‘almost the last advice given to the Prime 
Minister by Mr. Bonar Law was to expand a general policy without going into 
more detail than could possibly be avoided and present indications are that Mr. 
Baldwin intends to follow the advice given by the former chief’.88 
Accordingly, Baldwin failed to give any detail on how tariffs were to be 
applied. As a result the Conservative campaign ‘degenerated into a series of 
local promises’.89 For example, in Hull North- west the Conservative candidate 
advocated a tax on fish caught by foreign ships, despite Conservative denials 
that there would be food taxes. At the same time in Luton, home to hat 
making, the Conservatives advocated Protection to combat the influx of cheap 
imports.90  
A similar situation arose in North-east Wales where in Flintshire Tariff 
Reform was promoted as a policy that would protect the Shotton Steelworks 
from cheap imports of steel and unemployment. Similarly in Wrexham 
Edmund Bushby advocated Tariff Reform policies to help boost production in 
local industries including the Wrexham Leatherworks and the Brymbo 
Steelworks while in Denbighshire the policy was promoted as an ameliorative 
to local agricultural unemployment. Nonetheless, in North-east Wales all three 
Conservative candidates enthusiastically embraced the Tariff Reform 
programme and Baldwin’s decision to call an election.  
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Such an endorsement appeared to handicap Goodman Roberts’ campaign 
in Flintshire. Here the expansion of the steel and textile industries between 
1911 and 1931 helped offset the decline that was taking place in agriculture, 
which made Tariff Reform difficult to sell.91  Even so, Roberts’ campaign was 
given a boost when a letter from Henry Summers, Chairman of Shotton 
steelworks, appeared in the Flintshire Observer, arguing the case for 
protection for the steel industry: 
 
I am of the opinion that a protective duty on imported steel would be beneficial 
to the steel industry…Our trade is almost wholly an export one. If we have a 
measure of security we will keep our works up to date and endeavour to reduce 
our costs to the minimum, so that whatever comes along we shall be able to deal 
with it.92 
 
The newspaper called the letter a ‘bombshell for Flintshire Liberals’, 
pointing out that the founder of the works had been John Summers, a former 
Liberal MP, and an advocate of Free Trade. It concluded that the ‘association 
of the Summers family with Liberalism and Free Trade is only too well known 
and the announcement has been received with great interest on the part of their 
employees’.93  Roberts made as much as he could of the propaganda coup 
handed him. At a meeting in Rhyl he commented on Summers’ letter by 
pointing out ‘the ruin to a great Flintshire industry, which must result from 
Free Trade’, and asserted that with Tariff Reform ‘the Conservative party…  
had a policy which meant a better chance for British industry, greater 
production, more employment and lower cost of living’. 94   
Nevertheless, by advocating Tariff Reform policies Roberts ran the risk 
of Liberals resurrecting the dear food cries that underpinned their pre-war 
elections campaigns. This is exactly the line Thomas Parry, his opponent, took 
when he claimed that ‘they had been thrown into another election because Mr. 
Baldwin had failed to find any solution to the unemployment problem. This 
was a very grave issue. Divested of all its wrappings it simply came to this: 
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your food will cost more’.95 Such was the confidence generated in the local 
Liberal party by Baldwin’s decision to fight the election on Tariff Reform that 
the County Herald commented ‘Flintshire is noted for its steadfast and 
unwavering adherence to Liberal and Free Trade principles… in a straight 
fight it appears to us that Colonel Parry’s return is fairly certain’.96   
  In Wrexham Edmund Bushby also had problems selling Tariff Reform to 
the voters. In this constituency the largest employer was still coal mining, but 
unlike South Wales which was adversely affected by the collapse of coal 
export markets between 1923 and 1924 Wrexham was cushioned from the 
worst excesses of depression, as nearly all the area’s coal serviced local 
industry. As Frank Holloway points out ‘until 1931 output and employment in 
the Wrexham coal industry remained at a high level, largely unaffected by the 
factors which had caused the collapse of the industry in the South.’ 97 
Undaunted by this Bushby advocated Protection for other industries in the 
constituency, receiving the backing of directors of the Wrexham Leatherworks 
and Brymbo Steelworks who sent letters of support for his candidature 
claiming that protection policies would increase employment and output in 
these trades.98 In spite of these claims industry remained buoyant in the area 
and during the campaign Bushby was forced to admit that unemployment had 
not seriously affected the area and had not undermined output in local 
industry. This allowed H.A Morgan to dismiss Tariff Reform policies as 
unnecessary, claiming that ‘there was nothing that needed remedying so 
urgently at the present time’.99 Moreover, with Liberals and Conservatives 
squabbling over Free Trade and Tariff Reform, Robert Richards, the Labour 
MP, exploited their differences by dismissing the argument as one of over 60 
or 70 years old, adding that this was not what Labour wanted to debate:  
 
The Labour party were up against the present industrial system as a whole. That 
system stood condemned on every ground – even on the economic ground, and 
particularly on the moral ground, while Protection stood condemned by the 
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history of  the early part of the last century. Free Trade stood condemned until 
they had a better social order. The Labour party were out to cope with the 
present degrading poverty above everything. It wanted to put men at the top and 
things at the bottom. They wanted to get hold of the mines and railways and the 
ships, not to make the fortune of the few, but for the service of the community 
as a whole’. 100 
 
This must have caused trepidation amongst Conservative leaders in the 
division, in particular Sir Watkin Williams–Wynn, who had advocated the 
adoption of a joint Liberal/Conservative candidate to help combat the very 
things the Labour candidate in the constituency was pledging to support. 
   In Denbighshire, the main industry remained agriculture and here Tariff 
Reform had met with stubborn resistance at every election the Conservatives 
contested prior to the Great War.101 In a straight fight with the Liberals, David 
Rhys, the Conservative candidate faced the challenge that others before him 
had failed on - how to promote Tariff Reform as a beneficial agricultural 
policy.  At campaign meetings Rhys attempted to explain the benefits of the 
Conservative manifesto pledge which promised that taxes on imported goods 
would provide a subsidy for arable land providing that certain criteria were 
met.102 Yet his assurances that this would reduce unemployment in farming 
and stimulate the cultivation of more land drew an angry response from local 
farmers who heckled his meetings.103 At a meeting at Denbigh on 28 
November, local farmers claimed that the subsidy was not sufficient, and that 
not enough revenue would be collected from tariffs to supply farming. As a 
result, they postulated, Tariff Reform policies could never work in 
agriculture.104 Such opposition also drew a response from Ellis Davies who 
claimed that the Conservatives could not be trusted as the party of agriculture 
as their policy was unworkable. ‘Farming was depressed because in 100 years 
rents were doubled and because ever since the war rents had been increased in 
some cases by 40 per cent’, he added.105   
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 Such sentiments were still popular with many voters in Denbighshire. 
Indeed as the campaign progressed it was becomingly increasingly clear that 
their opponents were derailing the Conservatives as they trotted out old 
arguments successfully deployed before to defeat the Tariff Reform argument. 
In Wrexham Bushby was unable to make any headway as he was virtually 
forced to admit that under Free Trade Wrexham was hardly suffering while 
Labour was able to discredit both sides of the Tariff debate as irrelevant. In 
Flintshire Thomas Parry united the Liberal party behind him by claiming that 
Tariffs would increase basic foodstuffs and in Denbighshire David Rhys 
managed to alienate the very people who might be persuaded to switch 
political sides by advocating Protectionist policies – those landowners and 
farmers whom Gwendolyn Brodrick had tried to connect with in 1922. As a 
result the elections went emphatically the Liberals’ way in Denbighshire and 
Flintshire -  the Conservatives losing any impetus the 1922 election had given 
them, as they were comfortably defeated - while Labour won Wrexham with 
an increased majority,  
In Denbighshire Ellis Davies’ majority reached nearly 4,000, the 
Liberal share of the vote increasing by six per cent compared to 1922. 
Worryingly for the Conservative party Rhys polled a thousand fewer votes 
than Brodrick in 1922. From the Liberal perspective the election was also a 
huge success in Flintshire as voters ignored the revelations in the Summers 
letter and rejected the Conservative arguments over Tariff Reform. United 
once more in the constituency the Liberal party’s candidate, Thomas Parry, 
won the seat with a comfortable majority of 4,673, polling nearly 20,000 votes. 
The Conservative share of the vote went up to 43.2 per cent, but in a straight 
battle with the Liberals Roberts failed to win as many votes as Austin Jones 
had in 1922. (see table 6.6). The swing to the Liberals was exactly nine per 
cent. The County Herald noted that ‘from a Liberal point of view the question 
of Protection being brought before the electors has been an undoubted 
blessing. Not very long ago the Liberals were divided into two camps with 
deplorable results at the last election...the attack on Free Trade has drawn the 
party together perhaps more closely than ever’.106  
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 In Wrexham industry appeared to be surviving well in the area without 
the need for Tariff Reform. This only further helped to undermine Bushby’s 
position who finished bottom of the poll as the share of the Conservative vote 
dropped by four per cent compared to 1922. He obtained 1,400 votes fewer 
than Major R.C Roberts at the previous election, but the poll was again headed 
by Robert Richards, who increased the Labour majority by nearly 800 votes on 
a swing to him from the other parties of over three per cent. The Liberal party 
also increased their share of the vote as their number of votes increased by 
nearly 200.  
Table 6.4 
General Election 1923. 
Party Votes % 
share 
Candidates MPs 
returned 
Conservative   5, 514, 541   38.0    536 258 
Liberal   4, 301, 481   29.7    457 158 
Labour   4, 439, 780   30.7    427 191 
Others       291, 893     1.6      26     8 
Totals 14, 547, 695 100.0 1, 446 615 
Taken from: C. Cook, The Age of Alignment.   
 
Table 6.5  
General Election, Wales, 1923.     
 
Party Seats Won Votes % Vote 
Labour 19 355172 41.9 
Liberal 11 299875 35.4 
Conservative  4 178113 21.0 
Independent Liberal  1   12936   1.5 
Others  1       570  
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997. 
Table 6.6 
General Election 1923, North-east Wales 
 
Constituency Candidate Party Votes % 
Denbighshire Ellis Davies Lib 12, 164 59.8 
 David Rhys Con   8, 186 40.2 
     +3978  
 
Flintshire 
 
Thomas Parry 
 
Lib 
 
19, 609 
 
56.8 
 G. Roberts Con 14, 926 43.2 
     +4683  
 
Wrexham 
 
R. Richards 
 
Lab 
 
12, 918 
 
39.0 
 H.A. Morgan Lib 11, 037 33.4 
 E. Bushby Con   9, 131 27.6 
     +1881  
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
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For the Conservative party in North-east Wales the election was a 
disappointment given their strong showing in 1922 and represented a setback. 
In Denbighshire and Flintshire their share of the vote went up slightly as the 
constituencies returned to two-cornered contests, but the Liberal vote increased 
significantly while the actual number of people who voted Conservative 
dropped. In Wrexham where there was a three-way contest the Conservative 
party’s share of the vote and the numbers who voted for it ebbed away to the 
other two parties (see Table 6.6). Again what the results indicated was that in 
percentage terms the Conservative party in the region outperformed their 
counterparts in Wales as a whole by gaining 36.6 percent of the votes cast in 
the three constituencies compared to the meagre 21 per cent the party claimed 
across all constituencies in the Principality.  
Indeed, in Wales as a whole the results were also disappointing.   The 
Conservative party lost Cardiff South to Labour and Cardiff East to the 
Liberals, a mercantile shipping seat believed to have been lost because of the 
party’s advocacy of Tariff Reform. 107 However, Central Cardiff was retained, 
as were the seats of Monmouth, Llandaff, and Barry and by the narrow margin 
of 324 votes Newport. The domination of Labour was confirmed when it won 
19 seats, but Liberal reunification in the Principality only resulted in the same 
number of seats as in 1922 (see Table 6.5). 
What the elections in North-east Wales also reflected accurately was 
the national situation - the Conservative party was incapable of winning a 
general election on Tariff Reform in any type of constituency. Rural 
Denbighshire rejected Tariff Reform as a palliative to agricultural depression, 
in the industrial constituency of Wrexham Protection was seen as an 
irrelevance and in the more demographically diverse Flintshire not even letters 
of support for protective tariffs from the largest employer in the constituency 
had been enough to persuade people to vote Conservative. This situation was 
repeated nationally as the Conservative party lost 108 seats and gained a mere 
20, sixteen of them from the Liberals. Labour gained 41 seats from the 
Conservatives, only two were rural all the rest being industrial or semi- 
industrial constituencies. The Liberal party’s revival was marked by the gain 
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of 80 and the loss of 38 seats, 67 gains being made at the expense of the 
Conservatives, of which 44 were in county divisions, confirming the rejection 
of Tariff Reform as an agricultural policy. Liberal victories also occurred in 23 
boroughs, most of them middle class seats where the business vote was 
important, appearing to confirm the rejection of Tariff Reform by some of the 
Conservative party’s most committed supporters.108 Although the country 
decisively rejected Tariff Reform it was less clear what they had endorsed, as 
the Conservatives’ received a setback, and not a collapse as they had in 1906, 
and still remained the largest group in the new parliament, but with no overall 
majority. The problem that now faced the party was whether they could form a 
government given their antipathy to Labour and their animosity towards a 
reunited Liberal party which had amongst its leaders the most hated politician 
of them all for most Conservatives - Lloyd George.  
 
TAKING THE ATTACK TO LABOUR, 1924 
On 17 January 1924 the Liberal party decided to support a Labour 
amendment to the Address thus defeating the Conservative government and 
precipitating the first Labour government under Ramsay Macdonald.109 The 
election had reunited the Liberal party, which had used the dear food cry to its 
best advantage; many Conservatives citing this issue as having influenced 
women to vote Liberal.110 Yet the Conservative party had cause to remain 
optimistic. It was still by far the largest party in parliament as over 60 seats 
and one million votes separated it from its nearest rival. Furthermore, with just 
191 MPs the Labour government’s position remained weak dependent as it 
was on Liberal support to keep it in power. As Ramsden points out ‘the new 
government’s weak position made it likely that the next election would not be 
long delayed’.111  If this was the case then the day of the Conservative party 
returning to power was possibly not far off; especially if Tariff Reform was 
dropped.  Many of the 108 seats the Conservatives lost at the 1923 general 
election had been lost on small majorities, and if those who abstained or voted 
Liberal because of the party’s Protectionist Policies could be tempted back 
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then much lost ground would be regained.112 Thus, the long-term prospects 
were not as grim as the election results initially indicated.     
With a minority Labour government in power there were also 
opportunities for the Conservative party in North-east Wales. This was 
especially true if it could show that an extreme socialist government had been 
foisted on the country and that their policies would harmful for local people. 
As a result Conservative Constituency Associations intensified their anti-
Labour rhetoric. The position they took on Labour was in accordance with the 
wider Conservative plan to position the party as the patriotic defender of the 
British constitution and the only practicable anti-socialist force.113 It also 
involved characterising the Liberal party as mere socialist puppets having 
voted Baldwin’s government out of office and helping replace it with a Labour 
administration. This it was hoped would win the party votes from all sections 
of society.114 In Flintshire, Goodman Roberts, re-elected as Conservative 
candidate in February 1924, acknowledged whom he thought was to blame for 
installing a Labour administration:  
 
The first collective vote of the Liberals was to turn out of office the biggest 
party in the House of Commons and to put into power a party representing only 
192 members out of 615. This was called by the Liberals democracy. He did not 
think he was using too strong a term by calling it jiggery pokery. 115 
 
 This was a theme pursued by the Denbighshire Conservative Association, 
but given the demographic nature of the constituency it was important to 
equate any attacks on the Liberals and Labour with rural concerns. At a 
meeting at Ruthin in May 1924, J. Farnsworth, the newly appointed 
Conservative agent for Denbighshire argued: 
 
It was the Liberal party who had placed the Labour Party in power and the chief 
aim of the Labour party was the nationalisation of everything including the 
farmer’s land. The latter would affect the Welshman more than anything else. If 
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nationalisation came about he would not have a say in the planting of crops. He 
would have to apply to an army of state officials. 116 
 
His comments were made in response to Labour’s 1923 manifesto which 
promised to promote co-operative methods in farming production and 
distribution, and were aimed at galvanising support for the Conservatives from 
the large farming community in the constituency, which now, it was assumed, 
with more landowners in it was likely to lean towards the Tories.117 As a result 
the choice of parliamentary candidate for the division was an important one. 
At an Executive Committee meeting held in Denbigh on 30 July 1924 
Gwendolyn Brodrick was unanimously elected to fight the constituency once 
more. Her selection came less than twelve months after the Conservative 
Association had chosen a male candidate as it was believed, primarily it 
appears by Brodrick herself, that a female candidate would adversely affect the 
Conservative poll. This time, however, unlike the delegates meeting in 
October 1923 Brodrick’s candidature was rubber stamped by those who 
attended a general meeting of the Conservative Association held the same day 
as the Executive Committee meeting. Her selection was based on her strong 
performance at the 1922 general election, it being accepted that she had 
performed better than David Rhys in 1923.  She was also selected despite the 
availability of several other male candidates including Central Office 
nominees, and despite demurring comments again from Brodrick who again 
offered to stand aside. According to R.Williams-Wynn, Chairman of the 
Association: 
 
They had heard a good deal during the last election of the disability of sex. At 
the last election the Conservative party had a good fight with a male candidate 
in the field, and after the result of the election he believed that the opinion of a 
good many people had changed a good deal. After the election it had veered 
around again to the female sex. 118     
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It was unlikely that all in the local party truly believed that attitudes had 
changed in such a short space of time, but they were clearly aware that the 
party had faired well with Brodrick as candidate in 1922. The Association was 
now convinced that Brodrick remained a better choice – Rhys who hailed from 
Cardiganshire and was a barrister was ultimately seen as less suitable for the 
division.  Brodrick’s candidature gave the Conservative Association an 
opportunity to select a local candidate who as a landowner and farmer had 
strong claims to represent the agricultural community.119  
In December 1923, the Wrexham Conservative Association re-selected 
Edmund Bushby as their parliamentary candidate.120 Consequently Bushby 
spent much of the next nine months campaigning in the constituency, but when 
Ramsey MacDonald announced the dissolution of parliament on 9 October 
1924 the situation changed rapidly. At a Conservative Association meeting 
held in Wrexham on 13 October 1924 Bushby was initially adopted to contest 
the constituency, but unbeknown to him an attempt was already underway 
again to secure an anti-socialist candidate for the division.121 On the weekend 
of 11-12 October 1924, Mr. Arthur Evans of Vrondeg Hall Bronwylfa, a 
member of the Wrexham Liberal Association, fearing that the anti-Labour vote 
would again be split, approached the chairmen of both the local Liberal and 
Conservative parties in a bid to instigate a round table conference that would 
‘avoid a three-cornered fight’.122 As a result on 14 October 1924 a conference 
was held at a hotel in Wrexham between delegates from both parties. The 
proceedings were held in private with no statement given to the press, but both 
sides agreed that Bushby should stand down to allow the Liberal candidate, 
C.P. Williams, a ‘free run’ in the constituency.123  
Nevertheless, the decision to withdraw Bushby in Wrexham caused 
consternation in Conservative ranks. Many local Conservatives were of the 
opinion that the decision was made too late as the election campaign had 
already started. The North Wales Guardian thought the decision was a strange 
one given that the Conservatives had made such strides in improving their 
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organisation, and that Bushby had spent the previous nine months working in 
the constituency.124 Letters appeared in the press questioning why it was the 
Conservative candidate who had stood down when Williams, the Liberal 
candidate, was a late selection. For example, on 17 October 1924 The 
Wrexham Leader published a letter from ‘Conservative Rhos’:  
 
If any one had to stand down should it not be the party who have brought a man 
it at the last minute? Mr Bushby has worked the district and carried the respect 
of all parties and would have been returned at the top of the poll…Now our 
party leaders drop this bomb amongst us. We never had a better chance and 
voicing the feeling of Rhos and district I want to know why Mr. Bushby did not 
call a meeting of the various secretaries and get the feeling of the voters 
themselves. 125       
 
The official reason given by Lord Kenyon was that ‘pressure from 
Central Office had been strongly exerted in the direction of avoiding three-
cornered contests’, and that with the Liberals having better claims on the 
constituency as a result of their election victories in the East Denbighshire 
constituency prior to the Great War it was up to Bushby to stand down.126 
However, the Conservative rank and file in Wrexham were not easily placated 
by his assurances and several women’s branches withdrew from the party as a 
protest against the decision, not reforming until Bushby was reinstated as 
candidate in July 1925.127 Lord Kenyon’s assertions also appeared at odds with 
the facts. The NWDNU allowed individual Conservative Associations to make 
their own decisions on electoral pacts with the Liberals - the NWDNU meeting 
that made this decision was chaired by Lord Kenyon and took place the day 
before the Wrexham conference at which Edmund Bushby was asked to stand 
down. 128  Lord Kenyon would have known about any central office pressure 
to avoid three-cornered contests and surely would have informed all 
Associations in North Wales if this had been the case.  
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In fact it appears that if there was any pressure to avoid three-cornered 
contests it came from the Liberal party. Ramsden has commented that ‘in the 
1924 general election, Unionist candidates…were already in the field in most 
places and this gave them a useful advantage over Liberals [and] it was 
important to have got in first for this would place the onus on the Liberals for 
causing three-cornered contests.’129 Consequently, it was generally the Liberal 
party that asked for anti- socialist pacts to be made. This was borne out in 
Wrexham where Bushby was campaigning for some time before the Liberal 
party appointed a candidate and where the first move to form an electoral pact 
was made by a Liberal – even though their election performances in the 
division were stronger than the Conservative party’s.  
 The decision to field a joint anti-socialist candidate in Wrexham 
reflected hurried agreements reached by Liberal and Conservative 
Associations across the country as those pacts that were arranged were made 
on an ad-hoc basis.130 Many of the pacts were forced onto the Liberal party 
because of lack of funds as they abandoned 136 seats, 96 of them in 
constituencies which had previously seen three-cornered contests. The only 
pacts that covered large areas and constituencies were those made in Glasgow, 
Paisley, the West of Scotland and one that covered many parts of South 
Wales.131  Here the ‘local arrangement was that if one of the anti-socialist 
parties was already in the field, the other party failed to produce a rival 
challenge’.132 As a result there were no three-cornered contests in 
Monmouthshire, only one in Glamorgan and outside of Cardiff just one at 
Swansea West. In North Wales with the NWDNU allowing individual 
associations to make their own decisions on electoral pacts there were only 
two three-cornered contests in the region - the one at Flintshire and the other in 
Merionethshire. In both constituencies radical Liberals had influence or held 
the sway and were unlikely to do any deals with the Conservatives; the 
antipathy in Flintshire between the Conservatives and factions within the 
Liberal Association party was by now well documented. Thus, with Labour 
entering the fray again in Flintshire a three way party battle commenced. This 
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was something the Conservative and Liberal leaders in Wrexham were 
desperate to avoid. Here, Conservative leaders were willing to sacrifice the 
candidature of Edmund Bushby and even their rank and file members in a 
determined bid to oust Labour in the constituency. Without Tariff Reform to 
hamstring their bargaining position, Liberals and Conservatives were thus able 
to come together to defeat the common foe. It was only in Denbighshire where 
a straight Liberal and Conservative contest took place as campaigning returned 
to familiar ground – the battle for the agricultural vote.      
 
THE 1924 GENERAL ELECTION. 
Having jettisoned general tariffs the Conservative 1924 general 
election manifesto attacked the government for forcing an election on the 
country by seeking dissolution over the Campbell Affair - an issue, it asserted, 
that hardly amounted to a matter of principle.133 The Labour Government’s 
treaties with Russia were condemned, the Conservative party arguing that the 
Communists would not repay any of the debt handed them, and the 
government was attacked for failing to reduce unemployment. The manifesto 
also promised to use the Safeguarding of Industries Act to protect certain 
industries from foreign competition and pledged support for Britain’s ailing 
agriculture sector including relief on agricultural rates, and the extension of 
credit for efficient farming co-operatives. Finally, the manifesto promised a 
programme of social amelioration including a major extension of National 
Insurance provision.134  
With C.P Williams, the Liberal/ Anti-socialist candidate contesting 
Wrexham the Conservative party only fought the two county divisions of 
Denbighshire and Flintshire. In Flintshire Goodman Roberts persisted with 
advocating protection for certain types of industry. This was prompted by the 
continued support he received from the Summers’ family, owners of the 
Shotton steelworks, for his candidature. During the campaign Geoffrey 
Summers, a Steelworks director, appeared at meetings with Roberts in order 
‘to try to convince the electors that the Conservative party was the best for the 
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district’.135 According to Summers 1,000 men were now unemployed at 
Shotton. This he asserted had been caused by foreign dumping that undercut 
the price of British steel, the only solution to which was the application of a 
small Tariff. 136 What Summers was campaigning for was special recognition 
for the steel industry, and not the application of extensive general tariffs. In 
1921 the Coalition Government had protected vulnerable British industries 
under the Safeguarding of Industries Act but the Labour government had 
repealed part of the Act in 1924. However, as their manifesto promised, the 
Conservative party was pledged to reapply the Act for certain industries in 
order to ‘safeguard the employment and standard of living of our people’.137 
Summers was thus pleading the case for steel in any plans a future 
Conservative government had for the protection of British industry. 
Consequently Roberts’ support for him was in accord with Conservative party 
policy and in a bid to gain votes he attacked the Labour Government for 
increasing unemployment while accusing the Liberal party of helping 
exacerbate the problem as it had supported the Labour government’s decision 
to repeal the Safeguarding of Industries Act: 
 
His Liberal opponent was pledged up to the hilt to resist the safeguarding of any 
industry at all. His party was directly concerned with the removal of the 
restrictions against foreign competition. There was in Liberalism today no 
further hope for the steel trade beyond the cheerful assurance that matters must 
be allowed to right themselves on their own accord.138  
 
Roberts’ words contained a powerful message, as the Steelworks was the 
largest employer in the county. The intention was to discredit Thomas Parry, 
Flintshire’s Liberal MP, as someone who had helped increase unemployment 
while neglecting the constituency’s workforce by supporting the Labour 
government’s policies. Then by advocating protection for the steel industry he 
hoped to gain vital working class support. He also attacked Parry by 
suggesting that in voting against duty reductions on Empire grown sugar and 
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cocoa in the House of Commons, and by doing so with 34 other Liberals he 
had not only helped keep Labour in power, but had caused the price of basic 
foodstuffs to go up.  Roberts, thus astutely positioned Parry as one who had 
helped keep an inept government in power, whose policies would have a 
disastrous effect on the constituency’s workers while tainting him as a Labour 
party adjutant.  
In Denbighshire the Conservatives made similar accusations against the 
constituency’s Liberal MP, Ellis Davies. At a meeting held in Denbigh on 14 
October 1924 to support Gwendolyn Brodrick’s candidature, G.F. Harper, 
Vice Chairman of the Denbighshire Conservative Association, accused Davies 
of helping keep Labour in power by supporting most of their policies.139 Such 
accusations received support from an unexpected quarter when Pryce Williams 
of the Colwyn Bay Liberal Association said ‘he was not satisfied as to what 
were Mr. Davies’ political views… [he] leans too much towards the Socialist 
party’.140 Ellis Davies angrily refuted the charges claiming that at the Liberal 
selection meeting ‘all present were satisfied with his views and his services’.141 
Pryce Williams’ claims were given credence when it was later revealed that 
Ellis Davies had an arrangement with the Reverend J. Howard, leader of the 
Denbighshire Labour party, ‘whereby it was agreed on the ground that he and 
the socialists held similar views on nine tenths of the existing political issues 
that no socialist candidate should be brought against him’.142 Such revelations 
were pounced upon by local Conservative newspapers which ran articles about 
the arguments and divisions in the local Liberal party, while pointing out Ellis 
Davies’ apparent link to socialism.143  
Boosted by the divisions in the Liberal party Gwendolyn Brodrick 
attacked the Labour governemnt’s plan for agriculture. To a meeting of 
farmers at Conwy she re-asserted the Conservative belief that Labour was 
about to nationalise farming: 
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Do you farmers realise what the nationalisation of the land would mean to you. 
It would mean that not only the large estates but your smaller holdings would be 
under the direct supervision of committee appointed, not locally, but from a 
central office. Farmers will be turned into servants, and a son cannot succeed his 
father without permission.144 
 
Conservative landowners, of whom Brodrick was one, were keen to promote 
themselves as protectors of the status quo on the land, and of a mutually 
beneficial relationship between landlord and tenant.145 Before the Great War 
this notion was discredited by radical Liberals who portrayed Conservative 
landowners as tyrants who impoverished their tenants by instituting high rents.  
Yet such attempts to portray the Labour party as a destructive force that would 
end a farmers right of passing his family’s farm on to the next generation now 
had a special resonance in constituencies like Denbighshire. Many tenant 
farmers owned their own land and Brodrick was keen to perpetuate a mutual 
link of support between the Conservative party and farmers in opposition to 
any proposals Labour had to nationalise agriculture. Speaking at Denbigh 
during the last week of campaigning she said: 
 
Mr Baldwin has put another plank in his programme to the effect that he wishes 
to call a conference of people representing agricultural interests from all the 
different districts in the country. All knew what the agricultural community had 
suffered through past legislation… It seems to me a most level headed and 
sensible proposal, because at this conference men from the various districts can 
explain what their difficulties are and what means would be the best to help 
them carry on the arduous task of procuring food for the country. 146 
 
Brodrick thus presented Baldwin’s pledges as all-embracing constructive 
alternatives to Labour’s seemingly divisive socialistic agricultural policies.  At 
the same time by suggesting that Labour would seize land from all local 
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landowners it was anticipated that the party would gain the trust of farmers and 
subsequently their votes.147    
An entirely different situation to that in Denbighshire and Flintshire 
greeted the Wrexham electors. With the decision taken by Edmund Bushby to 
stand down C. P. Williams represented the anti-Labour cause in the division. 
As such he fought an election campaign designed to appeal to both the parties 
he was representing - he concentrated his attacks on the Russian Treaty, the 
Campbell case and Labour’s nationalisation plans, but avoided discussion on 
the more contentious issues such as Conservative support for the Safeguarding 
of Industries Act.148 With little reason to campaign so intensively the 
Conservative Association decided to help other party Associations in North 
Wales as well as supporting C.P. Williams locally. This gave Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn cause for concern, which, as President, he expressed in a letter 
to the Constitutional Association’s Executive Committee:  
 
The chairman read a letter from Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn dated 25 October in 
which it was stated that there was danger that Unionists may not poll seeing that 
Mr. Bushby had withdrawn in favour of the Liberal candidate and special efforts 
should be made to induce Unionists to record their vote. Reference was also 
made to the absence of the secretary who had been sent by the central office to 
Merioneth with the sanction of the chairman.149 
 
In response the Executive expressed their disappointment in Sir Watkin’s 
comments and denied that members had not worked hard to support C.P. 
Williams, claiming that the secretary’s services were better utilised elsewhere 
supporting Conservative candidates.150 A.D McAlpine, the Chairman, also 
informed the meeting that he had sent a letter to Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn 
saying his comments were unwarranted. A vote of confidence was 
unanimously passed approving of the Executive Committee’s actions, and a 
deputation was appointed to meet Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn to voice the 
Association’s disappointment should he not respond favourably to McAlpine’s 
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letter. However, confrontation was avoided when Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn 
privately responded in such a manner that persuaded the Chairman not to take 
any further action.151 It is unclear as to what Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn said 
that placated McAlpine as it was not reported, but the inference is clear 
conflict within the party was to be avoided at all costs. Perhaps this was 
because the party had already appeared divided over C.P Williams’ selection 
and because Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn wanted to avoid internal acrimony 
during an election campaign, the sole purpose of which was to see an anti-
socialist candidate elected. The disagreement, however, perhaps indicated that 
all was not well within the Conservative party organisation. 
The result, however, vindicated the decision to withdraw Bushby’s 
candidature. C.P Williams gained the seat with a comfortable majority of 
nearly 4,000, achieving 56 per cent of the vote, as more than 19,000 people 
voted for him. Despite defeat Robert Richards increased the number of Labour 
votes by over 2,000 compared to 1923 demonstrating that in a three-cornered 
contest Richards would have undoubtedly won the seat, thus further 
vindicating the decision to run an anti-socialist candidate. Even though no 
comments from the Conservatives were reported in the local press, Lord 
Kenyon and Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn must have been delighted with the 
result and during his acceptance speech C.P Williams commented that ‘he had 
to thank the Conservative party in Wrexham which had worked as hard as the 
Liberals’.152 This laid to rest any accusations Sir Watkin Williams–Wynn’s 
had that his own party had failed to support Williams properly. In a final 
demonstration of unity the North Wales Guardian, reporting on the election 
night revelries in the Liberal club, said ‘in the course of several enthusiastic 
speeches ...high compliments were paid to Mr. Bushby and the Conservative 
Association for the patriotism and national sacrifice made by the withdrawal of 
Mr. Bushby’.153         
In Denbighshire it was no surprise when the Liberals retained the seat as 
the county had been a Liberal stronghold since 1892, but the Conservatives 
came within 1,400 votes of taking the constituency, slashing the Liberal 
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majority by 2,500 votes. The swing to the Conservative party was nearly seven 
per cent, as it gained 47 per cent of the poll with Brodrick gaining over 11,000 
votes, more than 3,000 up on the 1923 election. Ellis Davies claimed that the 
large majority obtained in 1923 had ‘lulled many Liberals into a false sense of 
security and had bred apathy amongst the Liberal party Association, which had 
failed to campaign or canvass in the constituency until ten days before the 
election’. 154 Nonetheless, Conservatives also claimed that ‘the increase in the 
Unionist vote [was] due to the heavy transference of Liberal votes in 
consequence of the action of Mr. Ellis Davies coquetting with the 
Socialists’.155 Given the prevailing condition of an election conducted in the 
shadow of a Soviet scare, expertly exploited by the Conservative party this 
was probably true, but there were other reasons for the strong Conservative 
performance. The Denbighshire Free Press attributed Brodrick’s increased 
vote to her ‘powerful advocacy of the claims of her party’ and commented that 
at the same time the ‘splendid organisation work put in before the election’ 
had transformed the Conservative prospects in the division.156 This was 
certainly true as between March 1923 and the election of 1924 the 
Conservative party in the division went from having no organisation at all to 
having one that covered the whole constituency, and reaped the benefits 
accordingly. The result reflected this improvement, one party worker 
commenting that ‘we have kept the flag of Conservatism flying in West 
Denbigh and if we only continue to work hard, I am sure that in the near future 
we shall carry it to victory’.157 The improved result also demonstrated the 
wisdom of fighting an election on a policy that promised something positive 
for all farmers in the division – an all-embracing agricultural programme as 
compared to a divisive policy in Tariff Reform that had alienated so many 
voters at the previous election. Although they were ultimately defeated the 
Denbighshire Free Press reported that ‘the leaders of the Conservative party 
were jubilant with regard to the result despite the fact that their candidate was 
not returned.’158         
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If the Conservatives were delighted with Gwendolyn Brodrick’s result 
in Denbighshire then it was nowhere near the euphoria exhibited by them in 
Flintshire as they gained a notable and surprising victory.159 When the result 
was announced it exceeded Conservative expectations. Goodman Roberts won 
the constituency gaining more than 19,000 votes, and a majority of nearly 
5,000 over Thomas Parry whose share of the vote fell by over 20 per cent 
when compared to the 1923 election. Gwynfryn Jones’ Labour vote was nearly 
2,000 more than it was in 1922, and represented 19 per cent of those who 
voted.  
The Liberal party claimed that they had lost the seat because Roberts 
had influenced the result by making false claims about Parry’s voting record in 
the House of Commons. More likely was the fact that Parry was unable to 
campaign properly because of ill health and was represented by his sister at 
most campaign meetings. Liberals were initially keen to stress that this did not 
hamper their campaign but later admitted that without his presence the Liberal 
party was unable to defend his voting record in the House of Commons.160 It 
was also claimed that many Liberals had taken it for granted that they would 
retain the seat and therefore had not campaigned properly.161  
What Roberts’ campaign did was successfully challenge Thomas 
Parry’s candidature, by arguing that he was an accomplice to a discredited 
Labour party. 162 The Conservatives were also able, with Parry unfit to 
campaign properly, to dominate the campaign with their political agenda. By 
having Geoffrey Summers campaigning with him Roberts was also able to add 
substance to his claim that Protection policies were needed for the steel trade 
in order to prevent unemployment levels rising at the Shotton steelworks. 
Finally, the election result revealed the relative states of the Liberal and 
Conservative party organisations in the constituency. Since 1913 the local 
Liberal Association had suffered from divisions within its ranks. These had 
started when many Liberals refused to endorse Thomas Parry as a candidate at 
the 1913 Flint Boroughs by-election and were further exacerbated when 
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divisions occurred between Asquith and Lloyd George supporters after 1918. 
As a result there was no unity of purpose in campaigning at general elections 
and even during the 1923 general election when the two factions were united 
there were still some who were unsure about Parry’s candidacy.163 This 
fostered an atmosphere of apathy resulting in a number of Liberals failing to 
poll for Parry in 1924.164  
By contrast during the same period the Conservative party rebuilt its 
organisation so that it now covered the whole constituency, with particular 
attention being paid to developing fund raising and increasing membership. 
Most importantly, the Conservative Women’s Association played a vital role 
in canvassing and fundraising. When commenting on the remarkable result the 
Flintshire Observer said: ‘local branches of women workers were formed with 
considerable success and the activity and enthusiasm they displayed long 
before the election loomed on the horizon were true portents of an approaching 
political landslide’.165 Indeed, one of the strongest elements in the Flintshire 
Constitutional Association’s organisation was its women’s membership. 
Initially formed as a Tariff Reform organisation in the period leading up to the 
Great War by December 1923 the Flintshire Women’s Unionist and 
Conservative Association had over twenty branches with in excess of 1, 600 
members. One of its functions during 1924 was to distribute the anti-socialist 
newspapers ‘Danger Ahead’ and ‘The Patriot ‘. So successful was the 
distribution, which targeted rural as well as more populated areas that the 
Women’s Association asked for more propaganda literature to distribute. 
When this was allied to the fundraising and canvassing the Association 
undertook which included organising social events to raise money as well as 
arranging meetings with speakers, the Women’s movement demonstrated how 
important a cog they were in the local Conservative machine.               
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Table 6.7. General Election 1924. 
Party Total Votes % share MPs returned 
Conservative   7, 854, 523   46.8 412 
Liberal   2, 931, 380   17.8   40 
Labour   5, 489, 087   33.3 151 
Communist         55, 346     0.3     1 
Constitutionalist       185, 075     1.2     7* 
Others       124, 868     0.6     4 
 16, 640, 279  100.0  615 
* This figure includes 3 Conservatives (including Winston Churchill) and 4 Liberals. 
Taken from: C. Cook, The Age of Alignment.  
 
 
 
Table 6.8.  
General Election Wales 1924.    
 
Party Seats won Votes % Vote 
Labour 16 321118 40.6 
Liberal 11 245805 31.1 
Conservative  9 224014 28.3 
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
 
Table 6.9 
General Election 1924, North-east Wales 
 
Constituency Candidate Party Votes % 
Denbighshire Ellis Davies Lib 12, 671 53.0 
 A.G. Brodrick Con 11, 250 47.0 
     +1421  
 
Flintshire 
 
E.G. Roberts 
 
Con 
 
19, 054 
 
46.4 
 T.H. Parry Lib 14, 169 34.5 
 D.G. Jones Lab    7, 821 19.1 
      +4885  
 
Wrexham 
 
C.P. Williams 
 
Lib/Anti 
Socialist 
  
 19, 154 
 
55.6 
 R. Richards Lab  15, 291 44.4 
      +3863  
Taken from: B. Jones, Welsh Elections, 1885-1997.  
 
The 1924 election marked a significant change for Conservative 
electoral fortunes in North-east Wales. The success in Flintshire was the first 
for the party in the county in over 80 years and demonstrated that it could win 
a socially diverse constituency.  Its performance in Denbighshire proved that it 
could attract a large number of votes in agricultural communities where Welsh 
was still the first language, and in a constituency which was still regarded as a 
Liberal stronghold. Even in Wrexham Conservative leaders achieved their goal 
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of keeping Labour out (see Table 6.9). What the Conservative success in the 
region also reflected was the improved party performance in the Principality as 
a whole where its share of the vote went up by over seven per cent compared 
to the 1923 general election (see Table 6.8). As well as gaining Flintshire in 
the North it won four other county divisions: Brecon and Radnor, 
Pembrokeshire, Monmouthshire and Llandaff and Barry. It also won three 
Cardiff seats and held Newport. What the results also proved was how 
successfully the Conservatives deployed the anti-socialist message and 
discredited the Liberal party in the Principality - Labour lost three seats in 
Wales and while it remained the largest party its progress had been checked. 
The Liberals retained the same number of seats as in 1923, there was one 
Independent Liberal who lost his seat, but over 50, 000 fewer people voted for 
them and their percentage share of the vote dropped by over four per cent. 
Although the Conservative party remained in third place in Wales its victory in 
nine seats and an increase of nearly 46,000 votes compared to 1923, as it 
picked up many disaffected Liberal votes, was a triumph for the party.       
Nationally, the election was also a huge success for the Conservative 
party, vindicating its decision to fight the election largely on an indictment of 
Labour’s performance in power and the ineptitude of the Liberal party in 
supporting it. Its 412 victories included 162 gains, 105 of them from the 
Liberals, as it once more became the major party of rural Britain sweeping 
aside the Liberal party in county divisions while gaining 55 seats from Labour. 
Overall, Labour lost 64 seats, although the result confirmed its status as the 
party of Opposition and its share of the vote went up by nearly three percent as 
over one million more people voted Labour than in 1923.166 (see Table 6.7). 
Indeed, the overall Labour losses masked a number of gains, all in industrial 
areas, including Edinburgh East which Labour had not contested before and 
Paisley where Asquith was defeated in a straight fight by over 2, 000 votes. 
Ironically, it was in the West of Scotland that an election pact had been made, 
chiefly to safeguard Asquith’s position. Elsewhere election pacts appeared to 
have been successful. Of the 55 Conservative gains from Labour 40 occurred 
in straight fights, and only 15 in three-cornered contests. Of the 40 seats the 
                                                 
166Cook, The Age of Alignment, p 311  
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Liberals won, including nine gains from Labour, eight were as the result of 
electoral pacts, and only 15 were won without help from the Conservatives or 
the Labour party thus emphasising the perilous position of the Liberal party 
after the election.          
Indeed, what the results confirmed, given the numbers that had voted for 
the other two main parties, was the total eclipse of the Liberal party. It polled 
less than three million votes and its share of the vote was virtually halved 
compared to 1923 as it took a mere 17.8 per cent of all those who voted.  It lost 
123 seats and only 35 of the 158 seats it was defending survived the election, 
eighteen of these outside England. It failed to take a single seat from the 
Conservatives and even though it gained nine from Labour, these were mostly 
the result of electoral pacts. In the new parliament the Conservatives had a 
large majority of 209 over all other parties, and the election marked the end for 
the Liberal party as serious contender for political power.  Cook comments: 
 
The dimensions of the Liberal disaster have a twofold significance. They 
marked the effective end of the Liberal party as an alternative government to the 
Conservatives. More subtly they marked a vital stage in the alignment of British 
politics and the evolution of a national Labour party.167   
 
PARTY ORGANISATION 1922-1924. 
A large part of the Conservative party’s success in North-east Wales in 
1924 could be attributed to the reorganisation plans instituted by each 
Conservative Association between 1922 and 1924. In particular, the 
Denbighshire Conservative Association, which had been virtually inoperative 
since the outbreak of the First World War, was revived as a working 
organisation. During the early months of 1923 a group of leading 
Conservatives in Denbighshire, including local landowners Colonel 
R.Williams – Wynn, Colonel Wynne-Edwards and Colonel John Mellor as 
well as William Horton and Gwendolyn Brodrick met privately to discuss the 
future of the Conservative party in the county division of Denbigh.168 Notices 
were sent out to known Conservative party subscribers in the constituency and 
                                                 
167 Cook, The Age of Alignment, p 317.  
168 Denbighshire Free Press, 24 February 1923.  
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65 men and women responded signifying their intention to support a new 
Conservative organisation if started.169 Subsequently, in March 1923 
Conservative party supporters met at Rhyl and formed the Denbigh 
Parliamentary Division Conservative Association.170   
Draft rules were drawn up by Colonel Wynne-Edwards and read to those 
assembled. An election of officers saw a number of people appointed who had 
held office in the West Denbighshire Constitutional Association. Colonel R. 
Williams–Wynn, former chairman of the Management Committee, was elected 
President, and William Horton chairman of the Colwyn Bay Conservative 
Club was elected Vice-Chairman while ten new district chairmen were 
appointed, six of whom had held office previously.171  Thus all the major 
towns and districts in the constituency were covered and the new district 
chairmen were charged with advancing organisation in their districts by 
forming committees, raising funds and attracting new members. Once the new 
chairmen had been appointed representatives were then chosen from each 
district in the constituency, in relation to their size, to form an Executive 
Committee. For example six were chosen from Colwyn Bay and four from 
Denbigh, the two largest towns in the division, but only one from the villages 
of Cerrigydrudion, Llandegla, Llangernyw, and Llansilin. These were joined 
on the Committee by Colonel R.Williams Wynn and Colonel Wynne-
Edwdards.  On 26 April 1923 the Executive passed the new rules and a 
Finance Committee consisting of the ten district chairmen as well as Colonel 
R.Williams-Wynn, Colonel Wynne-Edwards and Gwendolyn Brodrick was 
formed. Of those who held the most senior positions in the new Association, 
over half came from the ranks of local landowners and thus as it had been with 
the West Denbighshire Association power remained with the landed 
establishment.172      
In October 1923 the Executive Committee decided that the women’s 
organisation be kept separate for financial purposes and should collect their 
own money, and at a meeting in November of the same year it was also agreed 
                                                 
169 DRO, Denbigh Conservative Association Papers, Minute Book 1, DD/DM/80/1, Annual 
General Meeting of Association, held 1 March 1923.  
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., Meeting of the Executive Committee 26 April1923. 
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that the Women’s Association should subscribe to the central Association.173  
A year later the Women’s Association made its first payment of £25.  Finally, 
in March 1924 an agent was appointed to further election prospects and 
registration work. At the same time a Welsh speaking Sub-agent was 
appointed to assist the agent and to help address one of the Conservative 
party’s biggest failings in Wales – the inability to address Welsh speaking 
communities in their native tongue.174   
One of the Association’s first duties was to make itself financially viable. 
After the Finance Committee was formed in April 1923 it immediately 
launched an appeal for funds. Such was the success of the appeal that by 
March 1924 the Association had been promised over £396, of which £281 had 
been paid, leaving a credit at the bank after expenses of £359- 12s- 11d.175 
This enabled the Association to offer the princely sum of £350 per annum to 
the newly appointed Agent as well as offering him the facility of a new 
motorbike to visit the districts. Yet, the lack of an Agent between March 1923 
and March 1924 meant that some of the districts remained poorly organised. 
As a result at a rules meeting held in December 1924 it was decided to further 
re-organise the constituency Association. The constituency was now split into 
two divisions - the Northern and Southern Areas. A new central Executive 
Committee was formed, comprising of twelve members, which would 
maintain control over both areas. However, both areas were to form its own 
committee and appoint its own Chairman and Treasurer. Each committee was 
responsible for the organisation and finance of its own area and were to 
appoint a part-time secretary who would ensure that the district committees 
remained in direct contact with their relevant area committee.176       
Consequently, by the end of 1924, Denbighshire Conservatives had 
successfully reformed their constituency Association and put it on a sound 
financial footing. In under two years Conservative party organisation had been 
totally transformed and now a robust de-centralised, more democratic system, 
although essentially still in the hands of the landed elite, existed in the 
                                                 
173 DRO, Denbigh Conservative Association Papers, Minute Book 1, DD/DM/80/1, Executive 
Committee Meetings, 13 October and 14 November 1923. 
174 Ibid., Annual General Meeting of Association, held 9 April1924. 
175 Ibid., Executive Committee Meeting held 12 March 1924. 
176 DRO, Denbigh Conservative Association Papers, Minute Book 2, D/DM/80/2, Meeting of the 
Rules Committee, 15 December 1924.   
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division. This would have seemed almost impossible in the period between 
1918 and 1922 when organisation fell into decay and ruin, and attempts to 
revitalise Conservative Association failed. That the party succeeded in re-
establishing a flourishing organisation which covered the whole division was 
due to the persistent hard work of party loyalists, who embraced change and 
were determined to see the Conservatives survive in the constituency.  
The Denbighshire Association’s organisation was based on the successful 
model developed by the Flintshire Conservatives. After the election loss in 
1922 the Flintshire Constitutional Association met to discuss the party’s 
position and future in the constituency.177 The Executive then discussed a new 
scheme, introduced by Mr. Ashfield Chairman of the Western Division 
Committee, which it was hoped would maximise Conservative support in the 
constituency. At a subsequent meeting on 3 March 1923 the plans were 
finalised. It was decided to split the existing Eastern and Western divisions 
into three new divisions, each with a part time Agent: the Central Division 
whose headquarters would be at Mold, the Eastern Division with headquarters 
at Shotton and the Western Division with headquarters at Rhyl. This now 
meant that the Eastern Area Committee controlled 15 parliamentary polling 
districts and 17 county council divisions with an electorate of 20,796 and the 
Western Area Committee was now responsible for 16 parliamentary polling 
districts, 17 county council divisions and an electorate of 16,198. The new 
Central Area Committee only looked after six parliamentary polling divisions 
and nine county council divisions, with an electorate of 8, 658, but it included 
the industrial working class towns of Flint and Mold.178  At the same time 
Flintshire Maelor was now formally included in the new structure, with an area 
committee that controlled three parliamentary polling districts, three county 
council divisions and an electorate of 2, 254.179 A Unionist Association had 
existed in the detached part of Flintshire since 1907, but the organisation had 
been left to its own devices with little contact between itself and the central 
Constitutional Association. Now under Hugh Peel’s leadership, the 
                                                 
177 FRO, Flintshire Constitutional Association Minute Book 2, D/DM/307/2, Annual Meeting of 
the Flintshire Constitutional Association, 10 February 1923 
178 FRO, Flintshire Constitutional Association Minute Book 2, D/DM/307/2, Meeting of Eastern 
and Western Areas Committees, 3 March 1923.   
179 FRO, Flintshire Constitutional Association, Minute Book 5, D/DM/307/5, Western Area 
District Committee Minutes, Agent’s Report March 1923.  
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Conservative organisation in Flintshire Maelor enjoyed a close relationship 
with the central body and was expected to contribute and participate in the 
Constitutional Association’s fundraising and other activities.180 With all four 
divisional committees reporting to the Association’s Executive Committee the 
organisation now fully covered the constituency and had an army of party 
workers regularly organising fundraising activities and collecting and 
canvassing for party subscriptions. This exceptional organisation provided 
excellent support for Goodman Roberts’ success in 1924 at a time when 
Liberal party organisation was in disarray and lacking leadership. 
Between 1922 and 1924 the Wrexham Constitutional Association 
underwent a number of changes that finally saw the end of the Williams-Wynn 
family’s control over Conservative politics in the area. Since the East 
Denbighshire Unionist Association was founded in 1886 the seventh Baronet 
Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, had been President and Treasurer, a position he 
continued to hold when the Wrexham Association was formed in 1918. 
Nevertheless, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn’s omnipotent control started to slip 
after the War when the franchise was extended and women and workingmen 
were incorporated on to the Executive Committee. At the same time a new 
divisional structure was formed and regular balance sheets, previously not a 
constant feature of Sir Watkins tenure as Treasurer, were now presented.  
The first indication that the Williams-Wynn family’s control was 
diminishing came at the end of 1922, when a motion, not proposed, but 
supported by Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, to adopt a joint Liberal/Conservative 
candidate at the general election was overwhelmingly lost. Nonetheless, in 
November 1923 he was re-elected President and Treasurer at the Association’s 
Annual General Meeting. It was only when Edmund Bushby finished bottom 
of the poll at the 1923 general election – falling nearly 2,000 votes short of the 
second place candidate and nearly 4,000 below the Labour winner – that 
criticisms of party organisation surfaced. In accepting Sir Watkin Williams 
Wynn’s thanks for standing, Bushby, who was re-elected as candidate, moved 
that to improve the party’s electoral chances ‘a special Executive Committee 
                                                 
180 See for example, FRO, Bryn y Pys MSS, D/BP/1018, Flintshire (Maelor) Constitutional  
Association Meeting, Overton, 7 November 1922.  
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be called together at once to overhaul the organisation’.181  By calling for such 
a measure it is more than possible that Bushby felt that he lacked the leaders 
support, having heard about the attempts to force a Coalition candidate on 
Conservatives in 1923, and that the party needed to campaign more 
aggressively while rallying around its candidate. Certainly there was very little 
Conservative activity in the constituency between October 1922 and the 1923 
general election, despite the restructuring of the organisation that had taken 
place between 1918 and 1922.  Whatever the reason, Bushby’s motion was 
carried and a special meeting of the Executive was called for 7 January 1924 – 
the very fact that this motion was even carried suggests that Sir Watkin 
Williams Wynn’s almost omnipotent power was being eroded. 
At the meeting it was decided that Mr Newman, a committee member, be 
appointed to assist Mr Leah, Secretary, in drawing up new draft rules and a 
review of organisation.182  The results were submitted to another Executive 
meeting held, on 30 January 1924 which subsequently passed the new rules.183 
This in itself was not unusual the passing of new Conservative Association 
rules occurred many times in North-east Wales and were often initiated and 
presided over by the incumbent local aristocratic President or Chairman. 
However, at the Annual General Meeting on 13 March 1924 a vote amongst 
party members resulted in a big shake-up of organisation. Sir Watkin Williams 
Wynn retained his position as President, as did Lord Kenyon as a Vice-
President, but a new Chairman, Mr A.D. McAlpine was elected, who also now 
became Chairman of the Executive Committee. Two new Vice-Chairmen were 
elected, one of whom was a woman, Mrs Fenwick, and a new Treasurer was 
appointed, G.A Mowat, who replaced Sir Watkin Williams Wynn. Only three 
members of the old Executive were retained as 12 new members were elected, 
and Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and Lord Kenyon lost their places on the 
Committee. Lord Kenyon was retained as the Association’s representative on 
the Central Council of the National Union but otherwise it was clear that 
power was being eased away from these two politically influential 
Conservative landowners. As a result of these changes Sir Watkin no longer 
                                                 
181 NLW, Wrexham Conservative Party Records, Minute Book  of the East Denbighshire 
Unionist Association, Association Meeting 19 December 1924. 
182 Ibid., Special Meeting of the Executive, 7 January 1924. 
183 Ibid., Meeting of the Executive 30 January 1924. 
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attended Executive Committee meetings and was no longer involved with the 
day-to-day running of the Association, and only appeared as President at the 
Annual General Meetings – thus fulfilling the limited role that many 
Presidents of local Conservative party Associations now played. According to 
Ball, the position of President in a local Conservative Association was:  
 
Normally an honorary position, held by a sympathetic local 
aristocrat…Presidents lent their prestige to fundraising appeals and often hosted 
fetes in the grounds of their estates, but otherwise had only ceremonial 
functions, the most important of which was to take the chair at the Annual 
General Meeting.184  
 
It is difficult to assess whether power was wrested from Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn, as there is no clear evidence amongst the available sources of 
any major schism between party leader and the rank and file at this time – 
although the disagreement over campaigning later in 1924 suggests some sort of 
split had manifested itself in the party. Furthermore, it is quite likely that Sir 
Watkin’s failure to fully endorse Major R. C. Roberts in 1922 and Edmund 
Bushby in 1923 rankled with many who had so overwhelmingly supported their 
selection while his retention of the offices of President, Chairman and Treasurer 
after the First World War may well have seemed intolerable during the new 
democratic age.  
Whatever the situation was between Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and the 
party, after the 1924 annual general meeting the Association moved quickly to 
address inadequacies within the organisation. The new structure that was adopted 
in April 1921 consisting of four sub-divisions, each containing several polling 
district associations, was retained. Now, however, regular monthly Executive 
meetings were held at which the sub-division Chairmen reported on the activity 
held in their areas. The duty of raising new and collecting existing subscriptions 
was placed on the chairmen of the various districts within each sub-division. At 
the first monthly Executive meeting held in May 1924, the subscriptions paid in 
from each district were read out. However, fourteen districts failed to report and 
J. Leah was instructed to write to each of the Chairmen and Secretaries 
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reminding them to furnish the Association with a report at the next meeting.185 
Only seven districts failed to subsequently report at the next meeting and after 
this it was a rarity for any district not to report.186   
The July Executive meeting saw the Association intensify plans to extend 
the Conservative party appeal – meetings were arranged for Wrexham on 6 
October and Rhos on 7 October 1924, where the principle speaker was to be Sir 
Joynson Hicks, Unionist MP and former editor of the Spectator. Plans for open-
air meetings to be held at Broughton, Cefn, Cross St, Ponkey and Johnstown 
were also finalised. Furthermore, at the September meeting it was announced that 
L.S. Amery MP, who wrote the 1922, 1923, and 1924 Conservative party 
manifestos and was a leading party ideologist would address a meeting at 
Wrexham Town Hall on 20 October 1924. In comparison to the previous six 
years when few political rallies or events occurred, 1924 witnessed regular 
Conservative Association meetings, an Autumn campaign at which leading 
Conservatives spoke and the distribution of propaganda material. As a result the 
Association successfully transformed itself into a highly organised body with an 
elected Executive that reported monthly and held regular campaign meetings.   
By the end of 1924 all three constituency Associations had well organised 
party machines in operation. Although the structure varied slightly from 
constituency to constituency, the basic Conservative organisation in all three 
North-east Wales divisions now centred on devolving power to local branches 
and sub-committees. The branches and sub committees were responsible for 
local party activities including canvassing and fundraising and reported back to 
an Executive Committee on the state of affairs in each district they controlled. 
This allowed the Conservative party to understand properly for the first time 
where its strengths and weaknesses lay. It also enabled the party to target 
resources and advance the Conservative cause in areas where it had not been 
fully represented before.  
One of the effects of the new divisional structure employed by the 
Conservative Associations in North-east Wales was that organisation became 
more democratic. Nowhere was this witnessed more strikingly than in Wrexham 
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where the erosion of autocratic landlord power was epitomised by Sir Watkin 
Williams-Wynn’s decline as political leader of the Constitutional Association. 
Furthermore, in Denbighshire the creation of a new Association in 1923 
witnessed the introduction of new rules and regulations that included the annual 
election of officers, and not merely the traditional rubber-stamping of the largest 
landowner’s privilege to lead the local party. Even though Lord Mostyn retained 
his place as President and member of the Executive Committee, and thus overall 
control of the Flintshire Constitutional Association until his death in July 1929, 
thereafter a new scheme was introduced which saw the rotation of the Presidency 
on an annual basis. 
It did not mean that landowners completely lost their influence in North-
east Wales, but their control either declined or became dependent on the 
Associations re-selection process. This democratisation process was similar to 
that taking place across the country as local Conservative party Associations 
restructured and improved their organisations. Constituency Associations and 
Executive Committees, as in North-east Wales, opened their doors to women and 
working class members, rotation of officers became commonplace and in some 
cases Executive Committee meetings took place on Saturdays and evenings so 
that wage earners could attend. According to Ramsden: 
 
Increased membership... necessitated changes to make the local parties more 
democratic; subscribers expected representation in return for their money. 
Abingdon’s association became ‘more democratic and representative in 1919’ 
and Waterloo adopted ‘a better system of representation in 1928… In 1923 the 
Kincardine and west Aberdeenshire Association adopted a minimum 
subscription of a shilling and a new set of rules…The rotation of officers was 
particularly important in the advent of democracy... From 1923 members at 
Banbury could serve on the Executive for only three years... from 1920 the 
chairman at Epsom was to hold office for only two years.187  
 
This all meant that Conservative Associations became less exclusive and that 
landowning domination was finally broken.188  In North-east Wales it also 
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meant that Conservative party Associations became more professional 
organisations where canvassing and fundraising became routine events and not 
the haphazard arrangements that afflicted the pre-war Associations. In addition 
it meant that the party obtained many more willing and trusted workers, who 
joined the swelling ranks of Conservative supporters in the region.    
 
CONCLUSION.  
 The 1924 general election marked an important stepping-stone for the 
Conservative party’s long-term future in the region. The Liberal party’s grip 
was finally broken in Flintshire and although the Conservatives lost the 
constituency again in 1929 they emerged as victors again in 1935 and held it 
until after the Second World War. While it would take a lot longer for success 
in Denbighshire – until 1959 – the Conservatives had come very close to 
toppling the Liberals in 1924 proving that after many years of futile 
campaigning it was now a potent force in the division. In Wrexham even 
though the Conservative party had merely acted in a supporting role at the 
1924 general election its help in assuring that an anti- socialist candidate was 
elected was duly acknowledged by the Liberals. While the Conservatives 
would never come close to taking the constituency, it remains to this day a 
Labour party bastion, the Conservative party have survived and still campaign 
vigorously on policies and issues exhibiting the same sort of survival 
techniques so adroitly employed by activists in Wrexham between 1922 and 
1924. Furthermore, what the Conservative party did effectively between 1922 
and 1924 in North-east Wales was restructure their organisation to enhance 
efficiency, maximise fund raising, and increase membership to provide the 
party with a mass of party volunteers at election time. So much was the 
advance made by the party that it terms of membership, structure and 
management it became the most successful party in North-east Wales.189 At the 
very least, by winning Flintshire, reducing the Liberal strength in Denbighshire 
and influencing the result in Wrexham the Conservatives had successfully re-
established their political authority in the region. This would not have seemed 
possible when the party was both demoralised and driven to the edge of 
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extinction by the overwhelming success of the Liberals at the 1906 general 
election.      
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CONCLUSION. 
Writing in Tories and the People Martin Pugh comments ‘like the poor, 
the Conservatives are always with us. While their opponents divide and 
coalesce, expand and contract in provoking and exciting ways they appear to 
remain the constant element in the British political system’.1 This constant 
element has also been the most successful force in British politics, claiming 
power on its own or with a Coalition partner for 85 of the last 120 years. It has 
also remained a constant element in Welsh politics, but here the history of the 
party has been one of abject failure. The same 120 years which witnessed so 
much success for the Conservative party nationally, has been marked by 
disappointment in Wales as it has failed even once to win the majority of votes 
or seats in the Principality. For example, in 1900, when a Conservative 
landslide victory marked a return of 402 MPs to Westminster only six Tories 
won seats in Wales.2 In 1924 when Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative party won 
415 seats only nine Tories were returned and when in 1957 Harold Macmillan 
formed a new Conservative Government only six Tory MPs were elected in 
Wales while 365 were retuned in Britain as a whole. Indeed, the party has only 
once come close to threatening the domination of its political opponents when 
in 1983 it won 14 seats from just 31 per cent of the vote. This result occurred 
in 1983 when Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative Government was at the 
height of its popularity. Yet subsequent elections witnessed a decline in it 
popularity as it failed to win a seat in 1997, a situation repeated in 2001. Even 
in 2005, as the Conservative party reclaimed much ground nationally, it still 
only won three seats in the Principality.  
The reasons for this marginalisation has its antecedents in the mid-
nineteenth century, where an anglicised landed gentry led the party, which 
‘alienated itself from the overwhelming majority of the people by its ‘blind’ 
adherence to the minority Established Church, its general disregard for the 
native language and its determination to maintain its privileges as a landed 
elite’.3 This image of Englishness obviously did little to enhance Conservative 
prospects and while the power of the landed elite in Wales has diminished, its 
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political influence declining as a result of franchise reform in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century and the sell off of the great estates during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century, its image as English party has remained. 
Internal Conservative party research in the 1960s suggested that a negative 
image of the party still existed in Wales – the party was still seen by many as 
only representing English interests.4 However, little was done to correct this 
perception over the next four decades and in 2005 there were only six Welsh 
speaking Conservative candidates selected to contest seats for Westminster 
elections.5 In a speech at University of Wales, Cardiff just two months before 
the 2005 general election Nicholas Bourne, Welsh Assembly Member for Mid 
and West Wales, said: 
 
Despite our pride in Welsh culture and heritage, and our Unionist credentials, 
Welsh Conservatives have been hindered by the notion that we are in some ways 
an ‘English party’. The idea that Conservatism is something imposed on Wales, 
not truly Welsh, has lingered for sometime.6        
  
 In addition to its image as an English party the political issues that 
have influenced Welsh voters have all been driven by the Conservative party’s 
opponents. Prior to the Great War the issues that dominated the political 
landscape in Wales were all ones that were espoused by a radical Liberal 
party: Church Disestablishment, Disendowment, land reform, education and 
temperance reforms were all extremely popular with Welsh voters.7  As a 
result the Conservative party was relegated to a minor cause in Wales by the 
Liberal party whose grip on Welsh politics started at the 1868 general election, 
as a consequence of the 1867 Reform Act, and continued until the outbreak of 
war in 1914. Then with the passing of Church Disestablishment Bill and the 
advent of Coalition Government, especially that led by Lloyd George, radical 
Nonconformist Liberalism lost its impetus to the Welsh voter. Even as the 
Liberal party went into terminal decline during the 1920s, the void it left in 
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Welsh politics was quickly filled by the Labour party, which found its 
influence increasing as industrial disputes and trade unionism spread through 
the South Wales coalfields during the First World War.8 At the 1918 general 
election Labour had ten MPs elected - by 1929 it dominated Welsh politics 
when 25 Labour candidates were elected to parliament. The Conservative 
party’s opposition to organised trade unionism, in particular the union levy, 
brought it into conflict with Labour whose domination of Welsh mining seats 
ensured the continued marginalisation of the party.9 At its lowest point, the 
general election of 1983, the Labour party still won 20 seats, and such was the 
eclipse of the Conservative party in 1997 that ‘Labour took great pleasure in 
announcing that Conservatism was dead in Wales’.10  
Yet throughout the last 120 years the Conservative party has remained 
resilient in Wales This resilience, however, has not always been rewarded – 
the party’s electoral failure not commensurate with its substantial share of the 
vote. For example in 1906, the first time the Conservative party failed to win a 
single seat in Wales, it still gained nearly 30 per cent of the vote. When this 
absolute failure was repeated in 1997 its share of the vote at 19.6 per cent was 
still nearly ten per cent more than Plaid Cymru’s which won four seats. 
Moreover, since 1885 the Conservative party has averaged over 28 per cent of 
the vote in the Principality, but has only been rewarded with 170 victories 
from the 938 candidates it has fielded at the 32 general elections between 1885 
and 2005. 
It is the party’s resilience and not insubstantial vote that prompted the 
only in-depth study of the Conservative party in Wales to date: Felix Aubel’s 
‘Welsh Conservatism 1885-1935, Five Studies in Adaptation’. Aubel 
acknowledges that his thesis is ultimately one of failure and that during the 
period under study the party was ‘relegated to the status of a minority political 
cause’.11 But his work is also one of a dynamic vibrant party, which averaged 
virtually 30 per cent of the vote in the 50 years under review – nearly three 
times higher than the best results ever achieved by Plaid Cymru. Aubel’s study 
examines five constituencies in Wales – Cardiganshire, Rhondda, Monmouth, 
                                                 
8 Morgan, Wales In British Politics, pp.283-285. 
9 Evans, A History of Wales, p.102. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Aubel, ‘Welsh Conservatism, 1885-1935’,p.445.  
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Llandaff, Barry and Cardiff South and concludes that with the evidence 
available it is ‘obvious that Welsh Toryism was a permanent force in the 
politics of the Principality’.12 It was the party’s resilience and the gap still left 
after Aubel’s study of the party in Mid and South Wales that prompted this 
investigation of Conservatism in North-east Wales between 1906 and 1924; 
the aim of the thesis was to see if the adaptability that Aubel accords to the 
Conservative party in the five constituencies he analysed was repeated in 
North-east Wales. 
As such this study concurs with Aubel’s findings and suggests that 
Conservatism was as resilient in North-east Wales as it was in the rest of the 
Principality. Nonetheless, where this work differs to Aubel’s is in the 
interpretation of the role played by the landed elite. Aubel asserts that: 
 
The social exclusiveness of the leadership of Welsh Conservatism, its 
association with English interests and the generally poor organisation of the 
party throughout most of the Principality were responsible for the Tory failure to 
capitalise on the dramatic upheaval within Liberalism which occurred during the 
inter-war years.13      
  
In this study there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the local landed elite in 
North-east Wales were aware of their shortcomings as English speaking, 
Anglican Church communicants and despite their sectional interests were at 
the forefront of attempts to address their negative image amongst the Welsh 
speaking Nonconformist population. This was especially the case in employing 
Welsh speaking parliamentary candidates, some of whom were even 
Nonconformists, and local Agents. At the same time, some landed leaders 
were also determined to introduce organisational change to improve 
Conservative prospects, despite the inhibiting and almost omnipotent control 
of such people as Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn. Thus, the landed elite in North-
east Wales were not typical of all Conservative party leaders in Wales. This 
thesis does not seek to exonerate landowners who evicted Welsh speaking 
Nonconformist tenants for not voting for their political choice, but what it does 
                                                 
12 Aubel, ‘Welsh Conservatism, 1885-1935’, p.442. 
13 Ibid.,pp 440-441.  
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stress is that by the 1920’s this elite had learnt their harshly inflicted lessons 
well and were in most cases leading their reorganised Conservative 
Associations effectively, either as figureheads or democratically elected 
officers.          
Furthermore, while a similar pattern of failure as that described by Aubel 
was experienced in North-east Wales, with only three Conservative election 
victories recorded between 1906 and 1924, two in Denbigh Boroughs in 1910 
and the surprise victory in Flintshire in 1924, the results do exhibit a larger 
core Conservative vote here than elsewhere in the Principality. An analysis of 
election results between 1906 and 1924 bears this out. The average share of the 
vote, excluding 1918 when no Conservatives stood for election, was nearly 40 
per cent in North-east Wales, but the average for the same period for Wales as 
a whole was 27.9 per cent. In addition the party performed well in county 
council elections, tying the number of seats with the Liberals in Flintshire in 
1907 and winning the council in 1910 and 1913. The results were not as good 
in the more rural Denbighshire but were still creditable and needed explaining. 
After an analysis of the evidence this thesis has concluded that there was no 
single overriding reason, but a number of factors that contributed to the party’s 
survival, resilience and even relatively strong election performances.  
Firstly a number of demographic factors helped the party’s cause in 
North-east Wales. By the turn of the twentieth century, largely caused by the 
influx of migrant industrial workers, less than 50 per cent of the population 
spoke Welsh in Flintshire.14 In Denbighshire Welsh was still dominant, but by 
1921 less than half the population spoke the language, and in Flintshire only 
just over 30 per cent spoke Welsh.15 In theory this Anglicisation process 
helped the Conservative party, which was further aided by the fact that the 
region contained a large number of English-speaking Anglican Church 
communicants – in 1905 nearly 17,000 people attended church regularly in 
Denbighshire and nearly 12,000 in Flintshire, but here the percentage of 
churchgoers was the highest in Wales.16 Consequently, Nonconformist Liberal 
demands for Welsh Church Disestablishment were strongly resisted and 
                                                 
14 Williams, Digest of Welsh Studies, p.86. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.315. 
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helped to galvanise a Conservative party led by Anglican Church-going 
landowners.  
Other radical Nonconformist issues, such as temperance reform and 
land reform also had less impact in the region. The drinks and associated 
trades in 1911 employed over 3,000 people in Denbighshire and the centre of 
the North Wales brewing trade was in Wrexham, home to several small and 
large brewers at the end of the nineteenth century.17 It was unlikely that too 
many people would vote for temperance measures that were likely to increase 
unemployment.18 The Conservative party’s association with the ‘trade’ was 
therefore less damaging to its position in North-east Wales than elsewhere in 
the Principality.19  
The demands for land reform were also less strident in a region where 
many Tory landowners were sympathetic to the plight of their tenants. Indeed, 
despite Liberal claims to the contrary, landlord-tenant relations were usually 
cordial in North-east Wales, and many tenants were unwilling to be associated 
with any agitation that took place against landlords.20 The evidence 
demonstrates that there was strong support for many landowners in North-east 
Wales, perhaps suggesting that there was sympathy for their political aims. 
Furthermore, Tory landlords who led the Conservative party in North-east 
Wales were more in-tune with the changing and expanding electorate than at 
first appears evident. After the debacle of the 1906 general election 
Conservative leaders were only too aware that the party’s survival depended 
upon their success in widening the party’s appeal. Such local leaders as Lord 
Kenyon, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn and Colonel Mesham played a pivotal 
role in formulating plans to make the party more popular. As early as 1871 the 
party had forged links with the working-class when a Conservative 
Workingmen’s Association was formed at Ruabon and by 1908 the Wrexham, 
Conservative Workingmen’s Association had over 800 members.21 During the 
                                                 
17 Williams, Digest of Welsh Studies, p.111.  
18 North Wales Times, 22 January 1922.  
19 Ibid. The Conservative party’s victory in Denbigh Boroughs in January 1910 in part was 
blamed on its association with the liquor trade.  
20 DRO, Wynnstay MSS, DD/WY/9060, Letter from William Owen to Sir Watkin Williams-
Wynn, 18 February 1886.  
21 DRO, Wynnstay MSS, Ruabon, Rhos, Penycae and Cefn, Workingmen’s Association, 
DD/WY/5801, Rules of the Association, 24 August 1871. 
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same year, acting on a recommendation from Lord Kenyon, the West 
Denbighshire Constitutional Association selected, Sam Thompson, a working 
class parliamentary candidate.  Thompson was one of only eight working class 
candidates, and the only miner to be selected by the party to contest the 
January 1910 general election. His candidature in West Denbighshire ended in 
failure, but the move signalled the intentions of the party to widen its appeal to 
the electorate. After 1911 an initiative to open workingmen’s clubs saw many 
new clubs open across the region, especially in East Denbighshire where six 
new clubs opened between 1911 and 1913.22 By the start of the First World 
War most major towns and villages in North-east Wales had a Conservative 
workingmen’s club. After the War a number of initiatives were also 
undertaken to increase working class support, most notably the Conservatives 
attempted to establish an alternative movement to the Trades Unions as labour 
committees were set up in many towns and parishes. This movement was part 
of a wider Conservative programme to combat trade unionism, but as 
happened elsewhere they petered out, often through lack of support but also 
because the workingmen’s club offered a more convivial environment. It did 
not necessarily mean that the party lacked support amongst the working 
classes.       
These moves belie the accusation Caradoc Rees levelled at William 
Ormsby-Gore during the December 1910 Denbigh Boroughs general election 
campaign that he represented a party, which stood for ‘the privileged classes 
against the masses’.23 Even though the vast majority of Conservative 
candidates 1906 and 1924 came from the landed and professional classes (see 
table 7.1) their representation was very similar to that of the Liberal party’s in 
the region. Yet only one Conservative candidate came from the aristocracy, 
Ormsby-Gore, who curiously was the only Conservative victor between 1906 
and 1924, and only four were major landowners, the rest came from the 
professional and business classes. On the other hand from the 27 Liberal 
candidates who fought at the six general elections, three were industrialists, 
one of whom was a steelworks owner, one was a manufacturer, one a timber 
merchant, and the rest came from the legal profession or were high-ranking 
                                                 
22 North Wales Guardian, 10 December 1913.  
23 North Wales Times, 26 November 1910.  
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civil servants. In fact it could argued be argued that by fielding one working 
class candidate the Conservative party was more representative of the masses.  
 
 
Table 7.1: Professions of Conservative Party Candidates, 1906-1924.  
 
General 
Election 
Constituency Candidate Profession 
1906 Denbigh Boroughs G.T. Kenyon Landowner 
 Flint Boroughs J. Eldon-Bankes Judge/Landowner 
 Flint County H. Edwards Barrister 
    
1910 (J) Denbigh boroughs W. Ormsby-Gore Aristocrat/Landowner 
 East Denbighshire D. Rhys Lawyer 
 West Denbighshire S. Thompson Miner 
 Flint Boroughs H. Tilby Businessman 
 Flint County Col. H.R.L. Howard Professional 
Soldier/Landowner 
    
1910 (D) Denbigh Boroughs W. Ormsby-Gore Aristocrat/Landowner 
 East Denbighshire Alfred Hood Businessman 
 Flint Boroughs Col. H.R.L. Howard Professional 
Soldier/Landowner 
    
1922 Denbighshire G. Brodrick Farmer/Landowner 
 Flintshire A. Jones Judge 
 Wrexham Major R.C. Roberts Barrister 
    
1923 Denbighshire D. Rhys Barrister 
 Flintshire E.H. Goodman Roberts Barrister 
 Wrexham E. Bushby Businessman/Landowner 
    
1924 Denbighshire G. Brodrick Farmer/Landowner 
 Flintshire E.H.Goodman Roberts Barrister 
    
By Elections    
1906 East Denbighshire A. Griffith-Boscawen Politician/Landowner 
1909 East Denbighshire  Sir F. Cunliffe Landowner 
1913 Flintshire Hamlet Roberts Professional soldier 
 
 
 The Conservative party also made strides to incorporate women into the 
party after 1906. This was initially accomplished through the activities of the 
Primrose League, which embraced members from all walks of life regardless 
of sex. Many women joined, some rising to the highest ranks in the League in 
North-east Wales.24  During its heyday prior to the First World War the 
League was an overwhelming success in the region. Attendances of over 1,000 
                                                 
24 BLO, Primrose League MSS, Roll of Habitations for 1186, 1904 and 1912. 
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people at its fetes were not uncommon, and membership in many parts 
remained buoyant.  In 1914 there were over 400 members at the Henllan and 
Ruthin Habitations, nearly 600 members at the Colwyn Bay and Hundred of 
Maelor Habitations and over 800 at Denbigh. At its peak there were over 4,200 
League members in North-east Wales.25 In the Primrose League Roll of 
Habitations held at the Bodleian Library Oxford, a handwritten entry against 
the Denbigh Habitation, which still had over 800 members in 1914, reads ‘the 
best in North Wales’.26 Women were also successful fundraisers and 
canvassers for the party and thus remained an important cog in the party 
machine. By 1911 there were 27 branches of the Flintshire Women’s Unionist 
Association with a membership in excess of 2,500. In Wrexham no such 
membership figures were recorded but the Women’s Association held regular 
outings, fetes and bazaars which proved to be some of most successful 
Conservative party functions in the region. This involvement continued after 
the Great War. In Denbighshire as organisation fell into decay the Ruthin 
Women’s Association helped keep the flame of Conservatism alight with 
meetings and social functions. By 1923 in Wrexham there were 17 local 
branches of the Women’s Unionist Associations and in Flintshire, by the end 
of the same year, over 1,300 members represented 16 branches in the county.  
What the evidence demonstrates is that by developing flourishing 
women’s, and working class movement’s as well as a large Primrose League 
membership the Conservative party had an army of party workers that it could 
call on during election campaigns. Working class members were praised by 
Ormsby-Gore for the assistance they gave during his victorious 1910 election 
campaigns in the Denbigh Boroughs. Even so it was women who proved the 
most enthusiastic of workers, repeatedly earning praise for their tireless work 
on behalf of the party – taking much of the credit for the successful campaign 
Goodman Roberts waged in Flintshire in 1924.  
Finally, the Conservative party’s survival and resilience also owed 
much to the transformation of its organisation in North-east Wales. Poor 
organisation in 1906 was one of the major factors in Conservative election 
defeats in the region. The party slowly started to address its shortcomings after 
                                                 
25 BLO, Primrose League MSS, Roll of Habitations for 1886, 1904 and 1912. 
26 Primrose League MSS, Bodleian Library, Roll of the Habitations, 1912.  
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this, as the improvements made to the women’s and working class 
organisations testify, but it was after the First World War that reorganisation 
gathered pace as the party sought to consolidate its position during the period 
of Coalition Government. In essence this meant devolving power from a 
central Executive Committee to large number of smaller parish branches. By 
1924 the three constituency associations had a network of local branches that 
undertook the bulk of canvassing, registration, propaganda and fundraising 
work – all of which reported back to the constituency Association Executive 
Committee on the state of Conservative affairs in each town and village in the 
region. This gave the Conservatives a significant advantage over the Liberal 
party in the region, which was suffering from the effects of inner party conflict 
caused by splits between Independent and Coalition Liberals. This bred apathy 
as canvassing and campaigning was often ignored.  
There is however, no way of disguising the fact that the party was 
unsuccessful in achieving a major breakthrough at parliamentary elections 
between 1906 and 1924 and ultimately it has to be concluded that while the 
Conservatives did have a considerable amount of support in North-east Wales, 
they were unable to turn it into an appreciable Westminster presence. This 
does not mean that the party was not worth researching, it merely made it a 
more complex study - one that involved trawling through the myriad of 
documents and papers that related the Liberal success story to uncover the 
evidence that chronicled Conservative party survival during the period. In 
conclusion, what this thesis has hopefully demonstrated is that in spite of its 
poor performance at general elections, and the hostile environment, the party 
remained a significant force in North-east Wales politics between 1906 and 
1924. Indeed, in spite of this environment the party successfully established 
Primrose League Habitations with a considerable membership, and was able to 
assess and adapt its appeal to the working class and women under a shrewd 
leadership that was acutely sensitive to local needs over national concerns. 
Furthermore, under a carefully planned re-organisation programme after the 
First World War, it put in place structures that would be the launching pad for 
success. The party was finally rewarded for its survival strategies and its 
persistence with a parliamentary victory in Flintshire in 1924 – its first in a 
mixed county constituency of working class and middle/upper class elements. 
 317
A strong Conservative tradition has remained in North-east Wales ever since. 
The party lost Flintshire in 1929 but regained it in 1935, thereafter maintaining 
a parliamentary presence in the county until after 1983. The Conservatives had 
to wait longer in Denbighshire but finally won the constituency in 1959, 
holding it until 1983. After this date boundary changes totally transformed the 
North-east Wales constituencies, but the Conservatives held three seats in the 
region until 1997, after this the party again went un-represented in the region, 
but in 2005 it won the Clwyd West seat. Thus the Conservative party remains 
to this day a potent force in the region.  That it has is in part due to the way the 
party adapted during the period 1906 to 1924, one of the most difficult periods 
in its history, and emerged a modern dynamic political organisation.  
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Religious Communicants North-East Wales, 1905. 
 
Denbighshire                                  Communicants 
 Church of England Nonconformists 
Urban Districts   
Abergele                                            458           1, 005 
Colwyn Bay and Colwyn           1, 823           2, 701 
Denbigh                                     924           1, 658 
Llangollen                                 820           1, 890 
Llanrwst                                    251           1, 103 
Ruthin                                       470               765 
Rural Districts  
Chirk                                        446           1, 134 
Llangollen                                 130               394 
Llanrwst                                    382           2, 138 
Llansilin                                     446           1, 104 
Ruthin                                           985           3, 169 
St Asaph              726           2, 144 
Uwchaled              177           1, 134 
Wrexham Urban/ Rural          8, 429         14, 428 
Llanelian/ Llansantffraid              222               572 
Grand Total        16, 689         35, 339 
 
 
Flintshire                                   Communicants 
 Church of England Nonconformists 
Urban Districts  
Buckley            788              811 
Connah’s Quay            170              584 
Flint/Colehills Fawr            918              655 
Holywell            496              670 
Mold            525              992 
Prestatyn            326              460 
Rhyl        1, 538          1, 613 
Rural Districts  
Harwarden        1, 191          1, 747 
Holywell        2, 346          5, 046 
Overton            954              245 
St. Asaph        1, 461           1, 163 
Grand Total        5, 952          8, 201 
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Primrose League Habitations and Membership in North-east Wales. 
 
 
Habitations with known members: 
 
Year Founded Habitation Members 
1886 Wrexham 246 
1886 Ruthin 1 586 
1886 Denbigh 1 816 
1886 Llangollen 2  76 
1886 Vale of Clwyd, Henllan 2 553 
1886 Vale of Clwyd, Llanwrst 2 119 
1886 Elwy 2 113 (1886); 196 (1891). 
1886 Llandrynog 2  70 
1892 Llangedwyn 2 300 
1886 Ruabon 3 571 
1886 Brynhinalt, Chirk 3  43 
1886 Rossett 3 208 
1886 Gresford 3 150 
1886  Hundred of Maelor 4 336 
1886 Chwilir, Bodfari and Caerwys 4 167 
1886 The Mostyn, Mold 5 525 
1886 The Mostyn, Holywell 5  50 
1891 The Pellyn (Bala – Merioneth) 438 
 
 
 
Habitations – unknown membership 
 
Habitation 
 
Holt and Marchwiel 1 
Abergele 2 
The Yale, Llandegla 2 
The Eyarth, Llanfair 2 
The Plas Power, Bersham 3 
Cefyn and Rhosymedre 3 
Sir Watkin, Brymbo 3 
Rhyl 4 
The Mostyn, Whitford 4 
Llewelyn, Ysceifog 4 
Llwynegrin 4 
Connahs Quay (founded 1896) 4 
St Asaph 5 
The Mostyn, Flint 5 
The Mostyn, Greenfield 5 
Bagillt 5 
Caerwys (founded 1894) 5 
 
All information taken from M. Pugh, The Tories and The People (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). 
Constituencies: 1: Denbigh Boroughs; 2: West Denbighshire; 3: East Denbighshire; 4: Flint 
County;5: Flint Boroughs.   
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Structure of Wales /North-east Wales Conservatives, 1885-1918. 
 
1885-1906. 
2 PROVINCIAL DIVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL UNION: 
 
SOUTH WALES DIVISION   -     Consisting of 17 County and Borough 
                                                         Parliamentary constituencies of Brecon,   
                                                         Carmarthenshire, Glamorgan, Pembrokeshire, 
                                                         Radnorshire. 
NORTH WALES DIVISION   -    Consisting of 4 Borough and 8 County 
Constituencies of Caernarfonshire,     
Denbighshire, Flintshire, Merionethshire, 
Montgomeryshire, Anglesey. 
 
NORTH WALES DIVISION LEADERSHIP, 1893.  
President:           Lord Penrhyn, Penrhyn Castle, Llandegai, Bangor. 
Chairman:          P.P. Pennant, Nantlys estate, Flintshire. 
Vice Chairmen:  G.T. Kenyon, MP Denbigh Boroughs. 
                           Earl of Powys, Powys Castle, Welshpool.  
                           Colonel W.E. West, Ruthin Castle, Ruthin, Denbighshire.         
 
NORTH WALES DIVISION LEADERSHIP, 1906.   
President:            Lord Penrhyn.  
Vice Presidents:  Earl of Powys.,  
                            Lord Kenyon, Gredington Hall, Hanmer, Flintshire. 
Treasurer:            Hon L.A. Brodrick, Coed Coch estate nr Abergele, Denbighshire. 
Hon. Secretary:   Mr. R.A. Mainwaring, Galltfaenan estate, Denbighshire.  
 
WEST DENBIGHSHIRE CONSTIUTIONAL ASSOCIATION, 1908. 
President:           Colonel Mesham, Pontrufydd, Bodfari,nr. Denbigh. 
Vice Presidents: Col.R.W.Wynn, Dolben estate, Abergele. 
                           Col. Mellor, Abergele. 
                           Mr. Joseph Nanson, Llangollen. 
                           Col. Sandbach, Hafodunos hall, Abergele.  
Treasurer:           Mr. G. H. Denton, Trefnant, Denbigh.  
Secreatary:         Mr. C.C. Mott, Ruthin. 
 
1913. Same officers as above, except 20 Vice Presidents, including: 
Lord Bagot, Ruthin. 
L.A. Brodrick, Coed Coch. 
Countess Dundonald, Gwrych Castle, Abergele. 
Col. W. Cornwallis West, Ruthin Castle. 
Seventh Baronet Sir Watkin Williams- Wynn, Wynnstay, Ruabon. 
Duke of Westminster. 
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Structure of Wales/North-east Wales Conservatives, 1885-1918,Continued.  
 
 
EAST DENBIGHSHIRE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATION. 
1908. Chairman and Treasurer:- Seventh Baronet Sir Watkin Williams- Wynn. 
          President:                           Lord Kenyon. 
          Agent and Secretary:         Mr.J.Leah, Wrexham. 
 
1918. Same officers as above, but Sir Watkin Williams- Wynn listed as President, 
Chairman and Treasurer, Lord Kenyon as Vice- President.  
 
DENBIGH BOROUGHS UNIONIST ASSOCIATION, 1917. 
Chairman:         Lord Kenyon. 
Treasurer.         Hugh Peel, Bryn-y-Pys estate, Overton. 
Executive Committee of the 4 Contributory Boroughs: 
Wrexham.         J.A. Chadwick, J. Buchanan Taylor, Charles Murless, Edwin  
Hughes, Harry Armstrong, S.Edward Jones. 
Holt.                 T.H. Lester. 
Denbigh.          R,H, Bowdage, Charles Cottom, W.H.Williams, Edgar J. Swayne. 
Ruthin.             S. Gregson Ellis, H.H. Springman. 
 
FLINTSHIRE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATION. 
1910. President:          Lord Mostyn, Mostyn Hall, Mostyn, Flintshire.  
Vice President:  W.J.P Storey. 
Treasurer:            P.T. Davies- Cooke, Gwysaney Hall, Mold. 
1915. Same officers as above, except W.J.Owen, Shotton as Vice President.           
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From an original election handbill held at the Denbighshire Record Office,DD/GL/188.   
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From an original election handbill held at the Denbighshire Record Office, DD/GL/189  
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Taken from: D. Canadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. 
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Untitled Poem 
 
 
I stood on the bridge at midnight 
I admit it was rather late 
I wondered if again the Tories 
Would win this fight be eight 
 
To tell you the truth I’d been boozing 
With some Tory pals at a pub 
And we finished up the night 
Down at the dive – that’s their club 
 
So you can really understand 
That my head was not very clear 
As to how the Tories won before 
Unless they were helped by beer 
 
Or did the ‘Lords’ ordain it 
That Gore should go to town 
And with the ancestral sword 
Should there with great renown…. 
 
I could not quite believe it 
That the Lords would serve him so 
His sire fared rather badly 
In the days of long ago…. 
 
Taken from Denbighshire Record Office, Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/1697. 
Notes on the family of Orsmby Gore. 
Untitled poem on December 1910 general election. 
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Once More! As Before. 
 
 
Once more! As before 
In with a roar! – Ormsby Gore! 
 
So were in for a general election 
And everyone asks – What for? 
And they say ‘That the Lords may 
Be done with 
That Lloyd George may then have some  
Fun with 
What is left – is – our pockets! Oh lor’ 
Once more! As before 
In with a roar! – Ormsby Gore! 
 
He cares not a bit for his country 
He praised up Redmonds Home Rule 
He stays with a Duke in his palace 
And then calls that Duke a big fool 
Once more! As before 
In with a roar! – Ormsby Gore! 
 
His speeches at Limehouse or Mile End 
Have captured the Yankee, I hear; 
For a thousand a week they now offer 
If he’ll go and Limehousey them there 
Once more! As before 
In with a roar! – Ormsby Gore! 
 
A fine old Welsh name in Caradoc 
It employs a short surname like Rees 
But he ‘Goes the whole hog for destruction, 
So send him away if you pleas, 
Like a candle he’ll flicker, or perhaps 
Even Quicker 
Be blown out like No. 8 grease 
Once more! As before 
In with a roar! – Orsmby Gore! 
 
Taken from Denbighshire Free Press Saturday 10 December 1910. 
For the December 1910 general election. 
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Ormsby-Gore Again. 
 
 
Why are all enlightened workmen 
Turning Tories now in Wales 
‘Tis because our able member 
In his wisdom never fails 
Pleading at the legislature 
That their wrong he may restore 
That is why the Denbigh workmen 
Mean to vote for Ormsby-Gore 
 
Note his courage in the Commons 
And his weighty speeches scan 
Men of different views proclaim him 
As the future leading man 
With his aid and skilful worker 
Soon shall lock the foreign door 
That is why the Denbigh workmen 
Mean to vote for Ormsby-Gore 
 
Mark the way in which he labours 
Read his writings in the press 
See how other nations prosper 
With no signs of deep distress 
Now we understand the reason 
And our hearts begin to glow 
That is why the Denbigh workmen 
Mean to vote for Ormsby-Gore 
 
Bring your best you will not beat him 
Fight the fight and take defeat 
Glowing tributes from our statesman 
Show reverses you will meet 
You will wonder at the verdict 
And your torch lamps as of yore 
Will remain for ever darkened 
Enter William Ormsby-Gore.  
 
Denbighshire Free Press, 26 November 1910. 
For the December 1910 general election. 
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Victorious 
 
 
 
Rest awhile triumphant warrior 
Duty called you and you obeyed 
Though opposed by fierce destroyers 
Denbigh Boroughs is still saved 
We were bound to win the battle 
Trusting as we did before 
To our gallant young commander 
William Arthur Ormsby-Gore. 
 
Mighty shells around us burst 
But they failed to mow us down 
Every scheme was wrought to rout us 
But he held the princes crown 
Let the fearful cannons thunder 
And the lions let them roar 
Who shall tame those wild offenders  
William Arthur Ormsby-Gore. 
 
Hate was strong, but we are victors 
No surrender in the right 
We retained the true position 
And have put the foe to flight 
Look ahead the clouds are breaking 
There are brighter days in store 
Honour then your brave commander 
William Arthur Ormsby-Gore. 
 
Do not cast away your weapons 
Righteous arms you may preserve 
First the welfare of the nation 
Must not be allowed to swerve 
Fight for freedom truth and justice 
Hold the good for evermore 
You have now a good defender 
William Arthur Ormsby-Gore.   
 
Denbighshire Free Press 17 December 1910. 
For the December 1910 general election. 
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